CHAPTER - IV BATTLE OF KOLACHAL AND CAPTAIN DE-LANNOY

Transcription

1 CHAPTER - IV BATTLE OF KOLACHAL AND CAPTAIN DE-LANNOY Travancore and Battle of Kolachal The battle of Kolachal represented the culmination of the struggle between the Dutch and Marthanda Varma over the ascendancy on the Malabar Coast. The Dutch mission under Van Imhoff failed to conclude a new contract with Travancore. The Madurai army marched on the Suchindram temple near Kottar with an attractive target to plunder its treasures. 1 The Travancore army could not stop the invaders and therefore the Potimar decided to arm all their tenants to prevent an attack on the temple. Travancore, in short, was urgently in need of money not only to pay off the Nawab, but also to buy arms to withstand the attacks of both the Dutch and their allies. 2 The Dutch at Tuticorin even reported a conspiracy of the Pillamar against Marthanda Varma with the help of Madurai Troops. Marthanda Varma, anxious to prevent a restoration of the exiled nobility, turned for help to the French, at the same time putting more pressure on the English to increase the military support he already received 1 Stapel F.W., Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlamdo-Indicum, AD, Gravenhage, 1938, p Velu Pillai T.K., The Travancore State Manuel, Vol.II, Trivandrum, 1996, p

2 form them. 3 The latter had told him that further contacts with the French would damage Travancore - English relations. Nevertheless, Marthanda Varma invited the French to his kingdom. Soon, three French ships arrived on the roadstead of Kolachal. They opened a correspondence with Pedro Correa, a Jesuit father living in Kolachal. He informed them of the situation in Travancore which was threatened from the sea by the Dutch fleet and from the south by Chanda Sahib of Madurai. 4 In spite of this, on March 13, 1740 A.D., a number of French soldiers disembarked and were received with joy by the people of Kolachal, who probably hoped that they would assist them against the Dutch. But the French did not stay long at Kolachal. It was not desirable to become involved in the Travancore - Dutch war and ordered the French to return to Mahe. On the northern front in the meantime, the Dutch at their fortress Hollandia in Ayrur decided to fortify Paravur. On April 10, 1740 A.D. they sent for this purpose Captain Engineer Leslorant to that place. 5 Moreover, the Dutch main force marched from Ayrur via Quilon to Nedumangadu in order to protect the princess Regent of that principality on the throne. She was the only member of her family who escaped from Travancore imprisonment. She lived in exile in Tekkumkur. 3 Adriaan Moens, Memior written in the year 1781 AD, Madras, 1908, p Suranad Kunjan Pillai P.V., The Defeat of the Dutch in Travancore, Proceedings of Indian Historical Records Commission, Vol.XXX, 1944, p Diary of Hacker, I.H., on April 10, 1740, p

3 On April 19, 1740 A.D. there were about 4,000 soldiers of Desinganadu together with 150 Dutch men. Under the command of Captain Berger, they marched from Quilon to Kottarakara. 6 In May 1740 A.D. the Madampimar gathered at Kallada, the residence of the Rani of Desinganadu near Quilon, where they subjected themselves for the second time to the Princess-Regent who had also come to that place. They also promised to supply the Dutch with pepper that came from Nedumangadu. 7 At Kallada, the Princess-Regent was recognized for her nobility as the legitimate ruler over Nedumangadu but she did not receive the title of Rani, because her mother was alive, as was, for that matter, her elder brother, the former first Prince of Nedumangadu. Shortly after the second Restoration of the Princess-Regent to the throne her elder brother, the first prince of Nedumangadu died at Kalkulam in Travancore custody. 8 It was generally believed that the sudden death of this unhappy prince was due to malicious intention of Travancore that Marthanda Varma wanted to place the Rani of Attingal on the throne. That way Marthanda Varma would then restore the control of his Swarupam he once had over 6 Ibid., April 19, 1740, p Panicker K.M., Malabar and the Dutch, Annamalai Nager, 1959, p.80. Shortly after the Second Restoration of the Princess Regent to the throne her elder brother, the first prince of Nedumangadu, 8 Robert Bristow, Cochin Saga, Ernakulum, 1967, p

4 Nedumangadu and which was lost with the death of Prince Chittrall. 9 He also tried to raise political support from the ever shifting Madampimar. He hastened to Kottarakara to attend the cremation services, as his presence there, according to Malabar customs, would give him a special preference over his main rival Desinganadu who also claimed the throne of Nedumangadu. The death of Nedumangadu Prince in fact removed the final obstacle for the Cheravai Swarupam and Tirupapur Swarupam to put forward own candidates for adoption in that principality. The Princess- Regent of Nedumangadu was reduced to a puppet-queen. The Cheravai- Swarupam, however, was supported by the Dutch, which made her more powerful than Marthanda Varma. The dilemma was solved by the Dutch in close consultation with the Cochin King. 10 The latter had reluctantly seen that Desinganadu had increased influence in Nedumangadu, for the Karappuram princes who descended from the Elayadathu Swarupam were related to Cochin royal family. The Dutch on the Southern Coast So it seems natural that the Cochin King desired compensation for his loss of influences, and strove a further growth of Cheravi influence at 9 Edwin P. G., Marthandavarma s relations with the French, Journal of Indian History, L, Part III, Calicut,1972, p Ibrahim Kunju A.P., Rise of Travancore, Trivandrum, 1976, p

5 the southern border. 11 The Dutch, who always relied on the Cochin King in political matters, decided that the latter would designate two princes for adoption into Karunagappalli. The Cochin King complied with his request and two princes arrived in Karunagappalli. So both Desinganadu and the Cochin King had taken advantage of the Dutch involvement in Malabar politics. The Raja of Cochin received Karunagappalli, Desinganadu and Nedumangadu where as the Dutch themselves thought that these princes formed not only the best guarantee for continuous supply of pepper, but also checked and even decreased the power of the Travancore King. 12 In September 1740 A.D. the Princess-Regent of Nedumangadu pressed the Dutch to support her immediately because she could not hold out an hour against the King of Travancore. She asked the Dutch to help her brother still imprisoned by Travancore who was since her restoration forbidden to correspond with her and received hardly any food. But the Dutch refused to help her and had other plans. 13 The Dutch Governor Van Imhoff s plans they withdrew, at the end of September, on the coast when the rains of the north-eastern monsoon started and fighting in the interior was hardly possible. In addition to their northern forts, Paravur and Hollandia, the Dutch wanted to increase the control of the Southern Coast 11 Shungunny Menon A., A History of Travancore, Madras, 1878, p Velu Pillai T.K., op. cit., p Krishna Ayyar, K.V., The Zamorin of Calicut, Calicut, 1938, p

6 down to Kanyakumari. South Travancore was important for the cloth industry which the Dutch hoped to ruin by an occupation of the coastal area between Kolachal and Kanyakumari. It was the intention of the Dutch to blockade all Travancore ports on the sea side. In this way it would be impossible for Travancore to export pepper and other commodities. This would deprive Marthanda Varma from his main source of income called chunkam. Without this source of income, the King of Travancore could not finance his war against the Dutch and other allies. 14 After the north-east monsoon was over, the Dutch could commence the coastal area raid and destroy the pepper gardens and cloth industry, a plan that was already developed by Van Imhoff. 15 These plans were meant to drive the King of Travancore from income with which he could buy western arms from the English. The Dutch Governor Van Imhoff therefore expected that the Travancore treasure would soon be empty, that English help would come to an end, and that, in this way, the war would soon end itself. The ideas of the Dutch Governor Van Imhoff were perhaps characteristic of the limited views of a man whose career in the service of the sea-borne empire had taught him little about the possibilities of inland in a region like south India. The centers of pepper and cloth industry in the south were in the interior at 14 Mark D' Lannoy, The Kulasekhara of Travancore, Netherlands, 1897, p Ray, Dutch Asiatic Relations, , New Delhi, 1969, p

7 Kottar, between Kolachal and Kalkulam, and from there transportation to Madurai in Coromandal Coast was easy. 16 So, although the blockades of the harbours would certainly damage the king s income, pepper and piece goods could be brought over land to the Coromandal Coast. Nevertheless, this Dutch strategy had several advantages. They could not only stop the export of goods from Travancore but also the import of arms. 17 The Great Attack The forts on the Coast could easily receive provisions from the ships anchored on their roadsteads, and they no longer had to fight an enemy in a country that was unknown to them and perfectly suited for a guerilla war. Apart from this, there was another advantage. The Dutch received neither reinforcements from Ceylon nor arms, so that they could not carry out further military campaigns against Travancore. The weather also quickly deteriorated so that it was hardly possible to carry the heavy Dutch artillery in the impassable hinterland. On November 26, 1740 A.D. Dutch ships started a heavy bombardment of the town of Kolachal, which lasted for two or three days. 18 The inhabitants fled, after which the harbor was blocked by Dutch ships. 16 Willson M.M., History of Indian Trade, Bombay, 1938, p Achutha Menon C., Cochin State Manual, Ernakulum, 1911, p Anjengo to Tellicherry, November 26, 1740 AD, Records of Fort St. George, Letters to Tellicherry, Vol.V. p

8 The king of Travancore swiftly sent 2000 men to Kolachal to prevent further destruction of the cloth industry. But the Dutch did not capture this place because of the heavy north-east monsoon winds. Instead, Dutch ships blocked the whole coastal area between Quilon and Kanyakumari. This strongly affected the English trade. On January 13, 1741 A.D. the Dutch ship Maarseven steered towards the south. 19 The Dutch found it strategic to occupy Kolachal with a view to attacking Travancore. The English factors at Tellicherry received intelligence of the impending invasion of Travancore by the Dutch. On February 4, 1741 A.D. a Dutch expedition consisting of seven large ships and a number of small vessels with their land forces on board under the command of the commander of Cochin sailed southward of Anjengo. 20 On February 10, 1741 A.D. the Dutch had landed just to the Northward of Kolachal and hoisted their flag. opposition made to hinder their landing. There was little or no The Dutch forces setup entrenchments and organized the defence of the place they occupied near the Kolachal port. 21 They built stockades and stationed their troops there. The Dutch forces seized the outlying villages and marched against Eraniel. They overran the region between Kolachal and Kottar looting and divesting. 19 Boxer C.R., Dutch Sea Borne Empire, , London, 1965, p Pachu Muthathu, Hisotry of Travancore, Earnakulam, 1924,p Mahadeva Aiyer, The Travancore Land Revenue Manuel, Vol. V, 1983, p

9 Stein Van Gollenesse the Dutch Commander of Cochin favoured the occupation of the entire region from Kolachal to Cape Comerin. He recommended strongly for action because it contained all the important places for linen. 22 More over it is the most beautiful district in the whole of Malabar. At this stage the Dutch made the fatal error in making the availability of a powerful force. They were waiting for reinforcements from Ceylon and Batavia after spreading their troops in their enemy s land. 23 They evolved and implemented a military strategy without taking into account the possibility of a failure in the supply of reinforcements. They were not aware of the fact that the Supreme Government at Batavia was helpless at this critical stage of war, as the continuance of the war in Java to establish a Dutch Empire in the rich island would not permit them to send troops to Travancore. 24 The shortage of men became acute. The Dutch commander got the news of the march of the king of Travancore south wards with all his forces to take Kolachal. 25 He transmitted the information to the Governor of Ceylon narrating the difficulties of defending Kolachal at the time of the year. 26 As the Dutch forces had been cut down so much, the Commander requested the Governor to dispatch at least 300 or 400 men. 22 Raveen Hart R., Dutch Wars with Kandy, , 23 Krishna Menon T.K., The Progress of Cochin, New Delhi, 1980, p Ashin Das Gupta, Malabar in Asian Trade, , Cambridge, 1967, p Vadam, Dutch History of India, Bombay,1930, p Codihas W., Dutch Migration and Colonization, Calicut, 1963, p

10 The critical situation forced him to send some of the Company s people to Cape Comerin to attack Travancore forces from there. 27 The King of Travancore saw that the leading princes of Malabar were in league with the Dutch and the Elayadathu forces. 28 The King therefore collected his forces and attacked the Dutch and Elayadathu forces. Not one solider of the Dutch regiment lived to tell the dismal tale. Elayadathu Swarupam was taken over to Travancore. 29 The ignominy of defeat coupled with disappointment of hopes combined to irritate the Dutch who desired to teach Marthanda Varma a severe lesson. 30 They resolved to seize the country from Kolachal to Cape Comerin where they had a factory and a fort. The Maharaja determined to make a final effort to crush the power of Kayamkulam. 31 The Dutch assumed the offensive when fresh reinforcements arrived from Ceylon. They secured a place near the port of Kolachal, fortified it with stakes and garrisoned it with the detachment of soldiers. The outlying villages of Thengapattanam, Midalam and Kadiyapattanam were captured. The Dutch advanced to Eraniel, harassing 27 Mateer Samuel Rev, Native Life in Travancore, London, 1883,p Boxer C.R., Op. cit., p Edwin P.G., op. cit., p Kareem C.K., Kerala under Haider Ali and Tippusultan, Cochin, 1973, p Padmanabha Menon K.P., History of Kerala, Vol. I, Ernakulum, 1924, p

11 the inhabitants and plundering their property. 32 The country between Kolachal and Kottar surrendered and the Dutch made preparations to take Kalkulam. The idea was to make the whole country a Dutch province as it is the most beautiful district in Malabar. It was hoped that in spite of the war in Java the Company might be able to send troops from Batavia for the reduction of Travancore. Other European nations had begun to compete with them and not without success. 33 A squadron of boats watched the movements of the Dutch ships which brought re-inforcements from Ceylon. 34 The army was drawn up in favourable strategic positions under the command of the best officers. King Marthanda Varma and the Kolachal War The Maharaja proceeded to Thiruvattar, offered his worship at the famous shrine, and invoked the blessings of the deity. He placed his sword at the altar and received it back from the officiating priest after due consecration. The Maharaja conducted the war with courage and determination, directing the movements of his forces in person. 35 Marthanda Varma watched the developments with great caution. He took advantage of 32 Elamkulam Kunjan Pillai, P.N., Studies in Kerala History, Kottayam, 1970, p Willson M. M., op. cit, p Glamann, Dutch Asiatic Trade, , London, 1959,p Goonewardena K.W., The Foundation of the Dutch Power in Ceylon, , Amsterdam, 1957, p

12 the Dutch predicament and mustered a large force in order to attack their forces. On February 9, 1741 A.D., a large number of ships left Cochin for Quilon under the command of Stein Van Gollenesse and sailed for Kolachal. 36 The Dutch fleet anchored but due to the strong wind it was impossible to land at Kolachal and Stein Van Gollenesse was obliged to postpone the occupation of the port. Spies had stated that the Travancoreans had entrenched themselves in strong positions on the beach. The Cochin commander had great plans for Kolachal because with artillery on its walls it was easy to control the road on the land side to Kottar, one of the arteries of Travancore trade serving as the principal road to the transport of piece-goods. The fortress had to be built in the European manner, that is to say with parapets and the like and had to be manned with a garrison of nearly 300 men. 37 The Travancore trade in piece-goods could then effectively be controlled which would entail a permanent and considerable loss for the king of Travancore. On February 19, 1741 A.D. at five O clock in the morning, the landing took place. The Dutch troops were covered ships sailing as closely 36 Letter form Cochin to Batavia, February 9, 1740 AD, ARA. VOC.2542 fol.2, Diary Stein Van Gollenesse, entry of February 19, 1741 AD: ARA. VOC fol , Press Lists of Ancient Dutch Records from 1657 to 1825, Madras, p Menon, V.K.K., Cochin, Ernakulum, 1943, p

13 as possible to the see shore to fire at the Travancore positions. They had provisions only for three days. Three companies of grenadiers and two companies of Indian soldiers, in total more than 400 men, landed on the seashore. The operation took more than two hours and cost the lives of 22 soldiers on the Dutch side, where as 17 were injured. The Travancoreans fled in great confusion into the dunes and hid in a palm forest and amongst the barren cliffs. 38 After the Dutch had captured a piece of artillery the road to Kolachal lay open to them. The Travancoreans withdrew behind the Catholic Church where they entrenched themselves. The Dutch set several houses on fire where as the Church was attacked by the Dutch sailors. They shot bullets through the doors and windows of the church and one Jesuit was seriously wounded in his head. Both the French and the Portuguese would complain about the Dutch, and demanded war damages and the withdrawal of their troops. 39 The French protested because Marthanda Varma had ceded Kolachal to them. Unfortunately, they lacked the power to defend to defend their new factory for they were engaged in a war against the Valunnavar of Vadakara, a powerful nobleman of Kolathiri and suzerain Lord of Mahe. 40 Therefore, Dirois had ordered all ships to return to Mahe. 38 Robin Jeffrey, The Decline of Nair Dominance, New Delhi, 1976, p Sreedhara Menon A., Cultural Heritage of Kerala, Trivandrum, 1979, p John Bruce, op. cit., p

14 The Portuguese accused the Dutch of having committed several horrible cruelties against the Jesuits. It was certainly true that five Jesuits were made prisoners by the Dutch and were kept in the cabin of the ship. The Dutch had two reasons for these measures. The Jesuits were suspected of having contacts with the King of Travancore, and they had to be protected against the plundering Dutch soldiers, Stein Van Gollenesse hoped to be able to induce the Christian fisherman who had fled from Kolachal, to return to their homes. 41 The Christian fisherman could serve as coolies and were essential for the building of a fortress. The Jesuits told Stein Van Gollenesse that the inhabitants of Kolachal who had fled would certainly not dare to return and help the Dutch, afraid as they were of the wrath of the King of Travancore. The Jesuits offered the Dutch their mediation to solve their conflict with Travancore, but refused to convey Dutch treats to that King. On March 3, 1741 A.D. the council of war at Kolachal resolved to construct fortress with a bastion made of bricks on the west-side according to the building plan of Captain Engineer Andries Leslorant. 42 The Dutch attacked fortress of Eraniel. But the King of Travancore had evacuated Eraniel and had withdrawn his troops into the hills. 41 Clive Day, The Dutch in Java, Newyork,1904, p Boxer C.R., op. cit., p

15 The Kolachal War The Dutch also attacked the important sea-harbor and centre of the cloth industry at Thengapattanam, north of Kolachal. They had two reasons to do so. In the first place of Thengapattanam was only second to Kottar as a centre for the cloth-industry which they wanted to destroy. 43 They sent spies to the town in order to get an idea of the situation there. On their return they reported that Thengapattanam was adorned with the French Flag and defended by a large force. They had seen five ships presumably French presence at Thengapattanam where alarmed the Dutch. They sent their ships there to attack. When the inhabitants of Thengapattanam saw the Dutch ships on their road stead they panicked and fled. The fortress at Thengapattanam was not as well defended as the Dutch presumed. The king of Travancore had thought of a trick. 44 On March 26, 1741 A.D. the Dutch attacked Thengapattanam. After a heavy bombardment, they landed on the beach and burnt down houses as well as temples. They made many prisoners amongst whom were women and children. The Dutch had taken prisoners of 14 and more years of age and had to sell them as slaves. The Dutch campaign in the South proved to be effective. Desinganadu felt threatened by the coming of Travancore troops and asked the Dutch to attack both Kalkulam and 43 Shunguny Menon., op. cit., p Velu Pillai T.K., op. cit., p

16 Trivandrum from Kolachal. The Travancore military pressure on his troops at Kilimanur was lifted. 45 The Dutch attack on Thengapattanam helped Desinganadu who was then nearly cut off from Nedumangadu by Travancore offensive. He swiftly abandoned Kilimanur which was there upon taken by Travancore. But Marthanda Varma could not hold into this fortress for long. On March 27, 1741 A.D. after a battle which lasted for three hours, the allies reconquered the fortress and secured an entrance to Nedumangadu. 46 More than 400 houses were burnt down. Instead of continuing the campaign, Desinganadu stopped at Kilimanur. At Kolachal the Dutch developed plans to strengthen this place. Leslorant planned to build three mud bastions and one bastion of bricks which would be suited for planting thirty pieces of artillery on them. The Church would serve as a warehouse for grain and other provisions, while for the soldiers a wooden shed had to be constructed near the Church. Meanwhile a counter attack seemed imminent. On April 1, 1741 A.D three hundred Travancore soldiers dressed like Europeans and armed with flint locks appeared in front of 45 Nagam Aiya V., Travancore State Manual, Vol. II, Trivandrum, 1906, p Diary of Stein Van Gollenesse, entry on March 27, 1741 AD: ARA, VOC. 2543, fol and entry of March 31, 1741 AD; fol.3183, Press List of Ancient Dutch Records from 1657 to 1825, Madras, p

17 Kolachal and they were accompanied by three hundred Maravar cavalry. 47 Besides these another thousand soldiers arrived. In the subsequent days more reinforcements marched from Kalkulam to Eraniel. The number of troops grew daily. There was a rumor; however, that disagreement between Nair and Maravar had prevented the Travancoreans so far to attack Kolachal. The Dutch became more and more alarmed and redoubled their efforts to complete Kolachal fortifications, as soon as possible. On April 5, 1741 A.D. they withdrew their field artillery which they had so far left in position outside the fort. 48 There was no water in Kolachal and it became too dangerous to leave the encampment to obtain it. Therefore it was decided to make a water tank within the fort. On April 6, 1741 A.D. much further north the army of Desinganadu and Princess-Regent was defeated at Ayrur. This made Stein Van Gollenesse more optimistic about the course of the war and therefore decided to leave Kolachal and called his allies to a meeting to fix their common strategy. Captain Hackert became the Commander-in-Chief. Andries Leslorant became Superintendent of the fortifications and Johan Christian Rijtel was made commander of two hundred and fifty European soldiers. Stein Van Gollenesse advised his successors to complete the building of the fortress as 47 Diary of Stein Van Gollenesse, entry of April 1, 1741 AD ARA VOC 2543, fol , Press Lists of Ancient Dutch Records from 1657 to 1825, Madras, p Diary of Stein Van Gollenesse, entry of April 5, 1741 AD ARA, VOC 2543, fol.3215, Press Lists of Ancient Dutch Records from 1657 to 1825, Madras, p

18 soon as possible. The European soldiers had to help with the building for the usual pay where as the Mukkuvas had to be persuaded with good words at the construction. On April 14, 1741 A.D., a Karyakkar of Desinganadu deserted to Travancore with one hundred and fifty men armed with European flintlocks and five hundred soldiers armed with bows and arrows. 49 Soon more Karyakkars followed, so Desinganadu s fortune seemed on the decline where as the influence of the second prince, that had a pro-travancore attitude increased. On April A.D., Stein Van Gollenesse and Desinganadu met each other in Quilon. 50 The Cochin Commander had difficulty in motivating Desinganadu to continue the war against Travancore. That Prince even claimed that it was against local custom to invade the country of a neighbour. The Dutch not well-informed of the motives of Desinganadu thought this a rather ridiculous excuse. 51 They ascribed the unwillingness of Desinganadu to fight Travancore first of all due to financial reasons. The dynastic struggles of the various Swarupams remained incomprehensible to the Dutch. The Dutch did not realize that the 49 Fortress Sechurg (Paravur) to Captain Berger (Fortress Hollandia, Ayrur) April 14, 1741 AD: ARA VOC 2581, fol.6740, Press Lists of Ancient Dutch Records from 1657 to 1825, Madras, p Diary Stein Van Gollenesse, Entry of April 15, 1741 AD: ARA, VPC fol , Press lists of Ancient Dutch Records from 1657 to 1825, Madras, p Sreedhara Menon A., A Survey of Kerala History, Kottayam, 1967, p

19 real reason for Desinganadu s unwillingness to continue the campaign against Travancore was caused by the fact that they refused to support his claims to the Nedumangadu throne. On April A.D., Stein Van Gollenesse met the Princess-Regent of Nedumangadu who lived in exile at Mannadi on the border of Kalkulam and informed that the Dutch were willing to restore her to the throne. 52 Stein Van Gollenesse proposed to request all Madampimar to join allies, if they refused they should be considered enemies and punished. At the same time he proposed that the Princess-Regent adopted a prince from another Swarupam just as Desinganadu had advised. But her advisers were less enthusiastic about this, arguing that if the legitimate prince who was 16 or 17 years old then imprisoned by Travancore was set free many difficulties would be the result of such an adoption. On April 17, 1741 A.D. Stein Van Gollenesse left Quilon by sea for Karur near Ambalapuzha in the Palakkad principality where he had a meeting with the ruler there. 53 That prince was curious to have the latest news on the Dutch fortress of Kolachal and enquired whether it was sufficiently strong fortress. 54 Stein Van Gollenesse boasted that even 5, Diaryof Stein Van Gollenesse, entry of April 16, 1741 AD; ARD, VOC fol.3299, p Ibid., Entry of April 17, 1741 AD fol , p Geyl, P., The Dutch in India, Vol.V, New Delhi, 1968, p

20 soldiers could not conquer the fortress. He told the anecdote that some captured Travancore Chogans were shown the fortress of Kolachal. After wards they were released to inform Travancore king that he could attack the fortress within a fortnight. After this meeting, Stein Van Gollenesse returned to Cochin. But Kolachal was really so well defended as Stein Van Gollenesse. He suggested the building process was considerably delayed because neither Hackert nor Leslorant acted to Stein Van Gollenesse s orders. 55 For example Hackert decided to accept the Europeans from Indian soldiers who were dismissed. This aroused of course the discontent of Indian soldiers who were finally released from building duties because Leslorant thought them indolent and lazy. He even accused them of being the cause of the delay in the building process of Kolachal, for the Dutch had wasted much money and time employing them. There upon Hackert decided to hire 400 Mukkuvas as coolies. On April 18, 1741 A.D. the northern and southern bastions of Kolachal were so big that there was no space left for the soldiers. 56 The bastions had collapsed under the weight of the artillery. The damage was provisionally repaired by Leslorant. 55 George Edmondson, History of Holland, London, 1922, p Leslorant to Stein Van Gollenesse, April 18, 1741 AD, ARA: VOC.2542, fol , pp

21 The Difficulties of Soldiers Inside the fortress, there was no good drinking water. The newly constructed water tank was not finished because the necessary lime was lacking. 57 Another problem was that Kolachal was so crowded with soldiers that they had no good roof over their heads. They slept under a provisional one constructed near on of the defence lines of the fortress. Hackert received orders from Stein Van Gollenesse with his main force to join the troops of Desinganadu and Princess-Regent of Nedumangadu of Quilon. From there the united armies would attack the Travancoreans at Navaikulam. The strong diverse winds however prevented the Dutch to set sail to Quilon. On May 3, 1741 A.D. Hackert left Kolachal for Tuticorin with all the ships. 58 Rijtel stayed behind with 250 Europeans, 50 soldiers and two ensigns. Stein Van Gollenesse got intelligence that Travancoreans had received arms and ammunition again from the English. This must have worried him for western arms would make a siege of Kolachal. Stein Van Gollenesse was also dissatisfied with the information Rijtel sent him from Kolachal ordering the Malabar Commander to house the soldiers in the church and bring the provisions outside under a shed. 57 Deklerck E.S., History of Netherlands - East Indies, Vol. I, Rotterdam, 1938, p Mark D Lannoy, op. cit., p

22 On May A.D., Hackert arrived at Tuticorin and immediately lodged a complaint against Captain De Here who had disobeyed his orders to give spare anchor. 59 Hackert also informed Stein Van Gollenesse of his departure to Tuticorin that four bastions were planted with artillery, fortifications seemed in a good state of defense and the walls of the gun powder-magazine were ready, although it lacked a roof. But Hackert had received alarming message from the Governor of Ceylon called Maurits Bruininck who informed that he had received request demanding permission to withdraw his troops completely from Malabar Coast. 60 The situation in Tuticorin was not much better than at Kolachal. The troops were lodged in the church and wooden sheds. Stein Van Gollenesse was angry with Hackert as he had disobeyed his orders and gone to Tuticorin instead of Quilon. Hackert s departure encouraged Travancore to intensify the siege of Kolachal. Cochin Fort became even more alarmed when it received urgent requests from Kolachal for reinforcement. Stein Van Gollenesse immediately sent orders to Hackert to march back via Kanyakumari to Kolachal. 61 After Hackert s departure Marthanda Varma ordered two large pieces of artillery carriages and ladders to be brought from Trivandrum to 59 Ibid, p Geyl P., op. cit, p Panicker K.M., Asia and Western Dominance, Newyork, 1922, p

23 besiege Kolachal. But before the break out of the monsoon on May 27, 1741 A.D. Marthanda Varma visited the Sri Adi Kesava Perumal Swami temple at Thiruvattar prayed to Adi Kesava Swami for success on his war against the Dutch. The Siege of the Dutch The Dutch forces withdrew to the small fort and organized their defense. The king s army surrounded the Dutch entrenchments at Kolachal and encircled them from all sides. 62 His army outnumbered the Dutch forces. They continued the siege with a view to conquering the place. The English factors noted that according to the report of the local people the king of Travancore had good chances of succeeding in the attempt. 63 Though the king had set up several batteries within 40 yards of the fortification, he had not been able to force the Dutch to submission. The long delay made the English factors express their doubt on his success in the venture. 64 However the siege of Kolachal turned out to be effective. The Dutch forces were trapped in the fort. The supply line was cut off despite the desperate position, the Dutch rallied sufficiently to retrieve the situation. 62 Ibrahim Kunju A.P., op. cit., p Yule, Marcopolo, Chapter XXIV, Book. II, Vol. III, London, 1903, p Macleod, A View of the English Interests in India, Madras, 1807, p

24 On June 6, 1741 A.D., the Dutch attacked with heavy artillery served by the Dutch deserters and English soldiers. The Dutch openly accused the English of actively supporting Travancore; Anjengo claimed that the English men serving Travancore were deserters. All European mercenaries in Travancore service were commanded by a German named Carl August Duijenschot who had himself supervised the siege of Kolachal which was carried out in a European way that is with batteries, gabions, trenches and casemates. 65 The king of Travancore would, according to Stein Van Gollenesse, never have been successful in a siege like this without the help of deserters who not only commanded the Travancore troops but also had been given powers to sentence them severely when they tried to flee. 66 This explained Travancore's persistence in besieging Kolachal although thousands of soldiers were already killed. The English had supplied Travancore with gunpowder and had even lent some artillery to Marthanda Varma together with four constables who knew how to use them. The Dutch accused the English of having warmly welcomed the deserter Duijvenschot. The Dutch also complained about the English refusal to give them a free passage through Anjengo. The Dutch wanted to make Travancore a tributary kingdom and free passage for the Dutch would damage their relationship with Travancore. 65 Galletti A., The Dutch in Malabar, Madras, 1878, p Vekke H.M., Evolution of the Dutch Nation, Netherlands, 1963, p

25 The English continued their support to Travancore sending to Marthanda Varma three ships with gun powder and ammunition. 67 In exchange of their help the king promised the English that they could build two fortresses between Anjengo and Thengapattanam. The Travancore troops had advanced to Kolachal to the distance of the pistol shot. The Dutch defenders managed to inflict considerable causalities to the Travancore army. The situation of the Dutch garrison became desperate. The Travancoreans had built batteries on the sea shore so that it would become impossible to supply Kolachal with provisions and ammunition form the sea-side. The Travancore artillery was far advanced. Never before an Indian Prince had firmness to besiege a European fort. On June A.D., the Council of War at Tuticorin decided to refrain from attacking the Travancore forts of Eraniel and Kalkulam as they were requested to do by Desinganadu. 68 The Tuticorin army would advance to Kanyakumari and relieve Kolachal from there. But monsoon made it difficult to achieve this. The roads were almost impossible because of the continuous rainfall. 69 The heavy cannons had sometimes to 67 David Macperosn, The History of European Commerce with India, London 1812, p Surendra Natesen, Indian Travels of Thevnot and Coreri, New Delhi, 1949, p Rijtel (Colachel) to Cochin June 19, 1741 AD: ARA VOC fol.7721, Press List of Ancients Dutch Records from 1657 to 1825, Madras, p

26 be taken of their carriages and carried on by coolies whose number had been considerably reduced by an epidemic of small pox. Hackert arrived at Kanyakumari on July 1, 1741 A.D. Immediately the Council of War received requests from Lieutenant William Harnesz and William Lucasz Secretary to allow them to make a short visit to Colombo. Though two Dutch ships went near Kolachal, 70 they were not able to do anything because of the continuous fire of the forces of Travancore. The Dutch did not succeed in breaking through the blockade. Regarding the relative position of the two forces, the English factors at Anjengo stated that the king of Travancore had successfully carried on the siege. 71 He continued to nourish great hopes of conquering the place. After incurring heavy loss of men and money he would not withdraw. The Dutch Limitations The Dutch pitched a force at Cape Comerin ready to enter Travancore. But it was insufficient to confront Travancore forces since the king dispatched 5000 men to defend the passage and check their advance. The Dutch forces in the fort of Kolachal withstood the siege of Travancore forces with great courage, but their position was helpless without the arrival 70 Ramachandran P., The Dutch expedition against Colachel, Journal of Kerala Studies, 1978, pp Tellichery Factory Diary 13th and 15th April,

27 of reinforcements. 72 The Dutch Political Marshall Council at Cape Comerin was considerably alarmed by the deterioration of the situation at Kolachal. The council realized that it was impossible to relieve Kolachal. The adverse wind, floods and rough sea foiled their efforts to get gunpowder, war material and troops through ships from other places. 73 The Dutch were unable to send ammunitions and other provisions to Kolachal by land due to lack of coolies. The heavy rains prevented them from keeping their powder dry and use their weapons. Even if the Dutch had all what was necessary a small troop of about 400 men among whom only 150 were Europeans, would not be able to stand against 12,000 to 15,000 troops of the king of Travancore. 74 The Dutch found no hope to avert the desperate situation. The Council recorded a danger of total defeat which was unavoidable. The position of the Dutch forces trapped in the fort at Kolachal became extremely critical, it seemed that it would be surrounded, and either captured or destroyed. The Travancore forces kept their guard vigilantly over the sea. They held undisputed control over region which prevented the rescue operations of the Dutch fleets. The siege was tightened and Travancore 72 Madeod, A View of English interests in India, Madras, 1867, p Ibrahim Kunju A.P., The Battle of Colachel, 1741 AD and the Debacle of the Dutch on the Malabar Coast, Journal of Kerala Studies, Vol.II Part. III, 1975, pp Achutha Menon C., Op. cit., p

28 forces closed in from all sides. The whole attention of Travancore army was then directed against the Dutch forces. On July 15, 1741 A.D., Travancoreans blew up two mines which they had placed under Kolachal but the attack which followed the explosions was repulsed by the Dutch. For the Council of War of Kolachal this attack was critical enough to send out the interpreter Dufuijt to Kanyakumari to ask for help in person. 75 Together with a corporal and a Mukkuva boatman he embarked on a small ship used for postal services to the fortress. The ship was wrecked on the beach because of treason of the Mukkuvas and the interpreter and the corporal were taken prisoners by Travancore soldiers. The news of the imprisonment of the interpreter Dufuijt caused unrest at Kanyakumari. The Council of War concluded that Kolachal was in great need of help from Cochin. Stein Van Gollenesse wrote he could not spare provisions and ammunitions for otherwise Cochin itself would have a lack of them. 76 Hackert might have been equally well aware of the critical situation of the Kolachal garrison but he could do hardly anything because his army had only 100 soldiers and he locked both food supplies and 75 Henry Marshal, Ceylon, London, 1846, p.60, Spiritual Conquests of Ceylon, Vol.V, Colombo, 1930, p Fernao De Queyoz, The Temporal and Spiritual Conquests of Ceylon, Vol.V, Colombo, 1930, p

29 ammunition. His army would be no match for the 12,000 to 15,000 Travancore soldiers around Kolachal. On July 27, 1741 A.D., the Dutch army consisting of 420 men amongst whom were 150 Europeans marched from Kanyakumari lines to the mountains at Aramboly to the North Kanyakumari. 77 The Aramboly Lines consisted of a huge wall of thick high palisades on which several pieces of artillery were planted. As soon as the Travancoreans discovered the Dutch approaching their wall they beat the drums and sounded their horns continuously. After this alarm the Dutch gun was shot by mistake which was answered by the Travancore soldiers. In order to stop a further escalation Hackert ordered the withdrawal of his troops because an attack would cost too many lives. 78 Besides there were not enough soldiers to occupy the fort. But this decision was not supported by the other members of the Kanyakumari Council of War. Francois Haenens and Hendrick Wedelin koller had questioned a Chetti who had been in the Travancore camp and he had told them that during the siege of Kolachal the head of one of the principal Nair of the king was shot off, the second prince was wounded and illness had reduced the number of Travancore besieges. So Hendrik Wendelin Koller and Francoisd Haenens the chief of Kanyakumari refused to sign the decision of the 77 Pierh P.E., Ceylon and the Portuguese, Yalpanam, 1878, p Resolution Cochin Council on July 27, 1741 AD: ARA: VOC.2577, fol. pp

30 Council of War that further attacks on the Travancoreans were fruitless. 79 Hackert did not know what to do next. He wrote desperately to Colombo. The irresolution of Hackert was reflected on the reports Stein Van Gollenesse received from Hackert and he complained of the unclear reports which aroused his suspicion. Defeat of the Dutch At Kolachal mean while on July 28, 1741 A.D., the Travancoreans again launched heavy attack on the fortress. It was repulsed and caused the deaths of many Travancoreans. 80 Their dead bodies filled the trenches of the fortress. The Travancoreans not only used mines but also pepper rockets with burning and fuses in order to set the fortress on fire. Life of the Kolachal garrison was hardly bearable then. Rijital wrote to Hackert that if he did not receive reinforcements he could no longer hold the fortress which he intended to surrender within eight days. Rijital blamed Hackert in particular for the difficulties which had occurred since the latter had left for Tuticorin Nilakanta Sastri K.A., Some Documents on the History of Cochin, Proceedings of the Indian Historical Commission, Vol.XV, 1939, p The Batavia Dagh, Register, 1661, p Resolution Kanyakumari Council of war on July 28, 1741 AD ARA VOC.2581 fol , Press Lists of Ancient Dutch Records from 1657 to 1825, Madras, p

31 The Commander of Cochin added that he had for God and his own conscience tried at most to prevent the surrender of Kolachal and that he therefore was not afraid to justify himself before the High Council in Batavia. The repeated repulsions of their attacks discouraged the Travancore troops. Apart from this small pox broke out. Although they were severely punished when caught by the European deserters who were in command many soldiers fled. Marthanda Varma ordered his troops to withdraw on the village of south of Kolachal leaving behind only a small body of troops. 82 When the Dutch in Cochin heard the Travancore withdrawal, they ordered the forces to be stationed in Ayrur as well as those at Kanyakumari to make a last attempt to relieve Kolachal. The commander of the fortress Hollandia in Ayrur however could impossibly come to rescue as the monsoon had caused the rivers to overflow and made the road impassable. The Kanyakumari Council of War considered an attempt to relieve Kolachal from the seaside. On August 2, 1741 A.D., the Commander Rijtel was severely wounded at his head and died afterwards. 83 On his death bed he gave the keys of the fortress to ensign Adolf Swarts and instructed him to defend the fortress as a proud and honest soldier. The Dutch soldiers were demoralized and saw that their situation was hopeless. After their commander was buried 82 John Nieuhoff, Voyages and Travels in to Brazil and East indies, Vol.II, London, 1739, p Churchill K.J., A Collection of Voyages and Travels, Vol.III, London, 1732, p

32 they received some attack. There upon they got drunk and climbed the walls of the fort where they waved their hats to draw the attention of the Travancore troops outside the fortress indicating that they wanted to surrender. The few soldiers of Marthanda Varma who were left behind saw the drunkards and misunderstood then completely. 84 They thought the Dutch were being relieved by a force from Kanyakumari and were celebrating this fact. But Marthanda Varma in person came to the fortress to inquire into the strange behavior of the Dutch men. He asked the Dutch to climb down the walls so that he could talk with them. About 31 Dutch soldiers swung themselves down the walls with ropes and went strait to the Travancore camp. 85 Marthanda Varma greatly distrusted them when they were in his tent and he asked them where their officers were. 86 The soldiers said that there were no officers at all. Consequently on August 3, 1741 A.D. an agreement was made between these soldiers and Marthanda Varma. The Dutch were granted a free passage to march with the rest of the garrison fully armed to Kanyakumari. The Dutch at Kanyakumari were not aware of the tragedy that had taken place in Kolachal. Hackert received orders from Stein Van Gollenesse to attack the Travancore lines between Kanyakumari and 84 Resolution Council on August 2, 1741 AD, ARA VOC.2577 fol.pp Poonen T.I., Keralathil Portuguesukaraude Authya Ghattam, Cheruthaurathi, 1967, p William Foster, Travels of Bartholomeo, London, 1800, p

33 Kolachal. The Travancore king despaired of ever conquering Kolachal. War fatigue prevailed in the Travancore camp. 87 unaware that such an attack had failed. But Stein Van Gollenesse was The War Council decided to consider a new attack on the Travancore lines and a spy was sent out to reconnoiter them. He reported the Dutch could easily attack Manakudy which was not well defended by Travancoreans. They could take the road in the direction where the defense line ended in the mountains. The line was made of mud and the soldiers could take shelter behind the bushes and the Dutch could attack without much risk. In this opening the spy had met 12 travelers cooking their dinner. Corporal Daniel Emmett was also consulted by the council of war before the hostilities started at Kolachal. The Dutch garrison surrendered on August 3, 1741 A.D. 88 The Travancoreans encouraged by the capture of 31 Dutch men redoubled their efforts to conquer the fortress on the Western side of Kolachal, and they filled the moat with coconut shells, guards and soil. 89 They built watch towers that were higher than the walls enabling them to shoot at anyone within the Dutch fortress. Apart form this, the watch towers 87 Alexander Hamilton, A New account of the East Indies form 1688 to 1723, Edindurg, Vol.I, 1727, p Poonen T.I., A Survey of the Rise of the Dutch Power in Mabar, Trichinopoly, 1948, p Resolution Kanyakumari Council of war on August 3, 1741 AD, ARA:VOC 2583; , Press Lists of Ancient Dutch Records from 1657 to 1825, Madras, p

34 also served to look, if the Dutch received reinforcements by land from Kanyakumari. The long stalemate at Kolachal was broken on August 5, 1741 A.D. when a burning hot bullet of the Travancore forces hit the gun powder barrel by accident and there was an explosion. The flames gutted the food provisions. The fire continued for two days. On the second day the resistance of the Dutch forces collapsed. They surrendered to the king of Travancore. The English factors at Tellicherry recorded the news that the Dutch at Kolachal surrender to the king of Travancore for want of provisions. 90 The Dutch forces did not surrender unconditionally. They laid down arms on the promise of the king that they would be permitted to go to Cape Comerin with their weapons. But the king did not honour his word. As soon as they came out from the fort, the Travancore forces surrounded them and captured them as prisoners. They were stripped off their arms and sent to Kalkulam. Later they were given weapons and were asked to join the army of the king of Travancore. Some of the Europeans accepted the offer to serve Travancore William Foster, op. cit., p Ashin Das Gupta, Malabar in Asian Trade, , London, 1967, p

35 Two Eminent Warriors In the battle of Kolachal the Dutch were completely defeated and most of them were taken as the Dutch prisoners, two men who attracted the Dalawa s notice, were taken before Marthanda Varma who pitied their condition, but was unable to communicate with them, as there was nobody present who understood their language. 92 Marthanda Varma made it a point to see them occasionally and succeeded at last in getting a man who understood their language. The two men whom Marthanda Varma took special notice were Estuations De-Lannoy and Donaldi both of Flemish origin. Of these two, the one on whom the Maharaja fixed his particular regard was M. Eustatius De-Lannoy and he was selected to discipline a few companies of the Dutch, whom Marthanda Varma looked upon as the flower of his army, for his bodyguard. 93 The Dutch prisoners were so happy with the kind treatment they received in the hands of the Maharaja that they resolved to serve him in any capacity and were enlisted in the Marthanda Varma s army. Most of them distinguished themselves in Maharaja s service as Captains 92 Koshy M.J., The Dutch in Kerala, Trivandram, 1972, p Press List of Ancient Dutch Records, 1657 to 1825, p