CHAPTER- II JAINA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Transcription

1 CHAPTER- II JAINA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE Every system of Indian philosophy is based on epistemology or the theory of knowledge. The Jainas also accept the theory of knowledge. According to the Jainas, knowledge can be attained in two ways, viz., pramāṇa and naya. 1 The Jainas define pramāṇa as the knowledge which is svaparābhāsi, i.e., it is selfrevealing and object-revealing. It is also free from all kinds of obstacles. 2 In other words, knowledge reveals both itself and the object. If knowledge is not known by itself, then it cannot also reveal its object. The Jainas also hold that knowledge is both the essence and quality of the self. The relation between the self and its knowledge is one of bhedābheda. That means, in one aspect, knowledge is nondifferent from the self and in another aspect it is different from the self. Knowledge is classified in two different ways, viz., (i) āgamic classification and (ii) logical classification. According to the āgamic classification, knowledge is divided into five categories, viz., (i) mati (ii) śruta, (iii) avadhi, (iv) manaḥparyāya and (v) kevala. From the logical point of view, knowledge is divided into two categories, viz., (i) pratyakṣa and (ii) parokṣa. 3 1.PRABHĀCANDRA S REFUTATION OF DIFFERENT VIEWS ABOUT KNOWLEDGE: Prabhācandra, the great Jaina philosopher has critically discussed the 1. pramāṇanayairadhigamaḥ // TAS, Cf. pramāṇaṁ svaparāvabhāsi jñānaṁ bādhavivarjitam. JDS, p Cf. Tatiya, N.M., Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p

2 nature of knowledge by refuting other philosophical points of view in his book Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa. (i) First of all he has refuted the Buddhists view about knowledge. The Buddhists hold that knowledge possesses the form of an object, because it arises from the object. For example, the knowledge which arises from blue substance takes the form of blue. 4 The Buddhists also say that if knowledge does not take the form of the object then the object would not be known. In that case, it will not be possible to differentiate between the knowledge of a ghaṭa and that of a paṭa. Hence, the form of the object gives rise to the knowledge of the object. 5 So, knowledge possesses the form of object. This Buddhist theory about the nature of knowledge is known as sākārajñānavāda. But the Jainas reject this view point. They point out that knowledge cannot be of the form of an object. In Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, Prabhācandra argues that knowledge cannot possess the form of an object, because it is not proved by perception. Everybody perceives the object cognized by his own knowledge which is without the form of that object. Nobody experiences knowledge as containing reflection of the object as in a mirror. 6 If it would be accepted that knowledge has the form of an object, then there would be no difference of time and space of the 4. arthasārūpyamasya pramāṇam. NB, 1.20, p arthena ghaṭayatyenāṁ na hi muktvārtha rūpatām / tasmātprameyādhigateḥ pramāṇaṁ meyarūpatā // SDS, p pratyakṣeṇa viṣayākārarahitameva jñānaṁ pratipurūṣamahamikayā ghaṭādigrāhakamanubhūyate na punardarpaṇādivatpratibimbākrāntam. PKM, p

3 objects. The objects will not be experienced as being far and near; past or present; because knowledge itself possesses that form. 7 So, knowledge cannot possess the form of an object. Prabhacāndra also argues that if knowledge being produced from object takes the form of that object like blueness etc., then it should also take the materiality (jaḍatā) of the object. In that case, knowledge will be material. Just as a material object produces other material objects, similarly knowledge being produced by material object will be material. If it is said that knowledge does not take the form of materiality, then the question will naturally arise how materiality is apprehended? Because it is upheld by the Buddhists that for knowing an object, it is necessary for knowledge to take the form of that object. If materiality is not apprehended by knowledge, then the blueness also would not be apprehended by knowledge. If knowledge does not apprehend materiality, but it apprehends blueness, then either the two would be different or many-sided (anekānta). It cannot be said that knowledge apprehends blueness only and not the materiality. For in that case nobody can say this is a blue object which possesses materiality. If the blueness and the materiality are the same or identical, then the apprehension of the one may mean the apprehension of the other. In that case the apprehension of one pillar will include the whole universe though not apprehended. Thus, there will be no knowledge which will give rise to oneness; on the contrary there will be manyness. 8 The Buddhists may here argue that just as knowledge apprehends blueness, similarly 7. jñānasyārthe dūranikaṭādivyavahārābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ. Ibid. 8. kiñca arthādupajāyamānaṁ jñānaṁ yathā tasya tathā caikopalambho naikatvasādhanam. Ibid., p

4 it apprehends its materiality. But while apprehending materiality, knowledge does not take its form. Prabhācandra refutes this argument on the basis that in that case knowledge can also apprehend blueness without taking its form. 9 Hence, there is no necessity to hold that knowledge takes the form of an object. The Buddhists, however, argue that if all knowledge were formless, then every knowledge would apprehend all objects at the same time and then there would be no difference between knowledge of different objects. 10 Prabhācandra here replies that this is not true. Because, every knowledge has some limitations and powers due to which it apprehends only one particular object; it does not apprehend other objects. So, knowledge only apprehends an object, but it does not take the form of that object. 11 Moreover, knowledge is the pramāṇa, and as such it cannot possess the form of the object. If knowledge possesses the form of the object, then it will become a prameya because object is prameya. Knowledge cannot be both pramāṇa and prameya which are two different things. Pramāṇa is internal, while prameya is external; so they are apprehended in two different ways. 12 Prabhācandra also points out that knowledge is apprehended as knowledge and not in the form of the object. Knowledge is always of the form of I know ; while the object is 9. atha nīlākāravajjaḍatāpi pratīyate kintvatadākāreṇa jñānena na tarhi nīlatāpyatadākāreṇaivānena pratīyatām. Ibid. 10. nanu nirākāratve jñānasyākhilaṁ nikhilārthavedakaṁ. Ibid., p pratiniyatasāmarthyena tattathābhūtamapi pratiniyatārthavyavasthāpakam. Ibid. 12. pramāṇatvāccāsya tadbhāvaḥ. arthākārānukāritve hi tasya prameyarūpatāpatteḥ bhedena pratibhāsanāt. Ibid., p

5 manifested without reference to the I. If the object is a form of knowledge, then one should feel I am the jar, but this is not possible. 13 Therefore, knowledge does not possess the form of an object. (ii) According to Yogācāra Buddhists, there are no objects apart from cognition or knowledge. That means, if object exist, then it is as the object of knowledge through which it takes the form of object. Therefore, there is no difference between object and its knowledge, i.e., there is no difference between blue and the knowledge of blue. External objects are non-existent, they are fictitious. As due to some defect in eyes, one sees double moon in the sky, in the same way, the external objects seem to be real because of avidyā, but there is no existence of external objects apart from knowledge. So, the object and its knowledge are identical. 14 This theory of the Yogācāra Buddhists about the nature of knowledge is known as vijñānavāda. The Jainas reject this view point. They hold that the objects exist apart from their knowledge. The object and its knowledge are not one. They believe that knowledge is self-revealing as well as object-revealing. Prabhācandra rejects the view point of the Yogācāra Buddhists in his Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa. He asks the Yogācāras how is it known that there exists only knowledge and not objects? Is it known by perception or by inference? It is not possible to apprehend knowledge only which is not related in any way to the external objects. Without first establishing the non-existence of external objects it is not possible to determinate the 13. jñānarūpatayā bodhasyaivādhyakṣe pratibhāsanānnārthasya. na hyanahaṅkārāspadatvenārthasya ahaṁ ghaṭaḥ iti pratītiprasaṅgaḥ. Ibid. 14. Cf. PKM, vol. 1, ed. by Āryikā Jinamatī, p

6 existence of knowledge only. Non-existence of objects also cannot be known by perception, because without an existent of external object perception is not possible. Moreover, if the existence of the object which is manifested by perception is denied, then non-existence of knowledge only (vijñaptimātra) will also have to be accepted. 15 Like perception, inference also cannot prove the non-existence of objects. Inference is not applicable to such cases which are opposed to perception. 16 The Yogācāra Buddhists, however, argue that the law of sahopalambha proves that the object and its knowledge are non- different. 17 It is always seen that the objects are invariably perceived together with their knowledge. Hence, the blue and the knowledge of blue must be identical. The Buddhists also maintain that of these two, the objects are non-existent, only knowledge exists. But Prabhācandra refutes the view that knowledge and its object are non-different. He argues that sahopalambhaniyama is not established. Even without the perception of nīla etc. and even when the activities of the sense-organs are stopped, it is possible to perceive the knowledge of happiness etc. 18 Moreover, in the day time, the colour of an object and the light of the sun are apprehended together, but they are different from each other. In the same way, though knowledge and its object are always 15.tatra na tāvatpratyakṣaṁ bahirarthasaṁsparśarahitaṁ. PKM, p nāpyanumānena adhyakṣavirodhe numānasyāprāmāṇyāt. Ibid., p sahopalambhaniyamādbhedo. Ibid., p sahopalambhaniyamaścāsiddhaḥ nīlādyarthopalambhamantareṇāpyuparatendṛiyavyāpāreṇa sukhādisaṁvedanopalambhāt. Ibid., pp

7 apprehended together, they are different from each other. 19 So, knowledge and its object are not one. Prabhācandra again asks the Yogācāra Buddhists: what is meant by the word sahopalambha. Does it mean yogapadupalambha or krameṇopalambhābhāva or ekopalambha? In the first case, if sahopalambha is accepted as yugapadupalambha, i.e., the simultaneous apprehension of knowledge and its object, then the hetu would be viruddha. Because in the sentences like the teacher comes with (saha) the disciple, the word saha denotes yugapat, i.e., together but refers to two different entities and not one. So, sahopalambha does not mean yugapadupalambha. In the second case, if sahopalambha means krameṇopalambhābhāva, i.e., the mere absence of apprehending knowledge and its object one after another, then the hetu would be asiddha. Because both the Yogācāra Buddhists and the Jainas reject such non-existence. So, sahopalambha does not mean krameṇopalambhābhāva. In the third case, if sahopalambha means ekopalambha, then what is meant by ekopalambha? Does it mean the perception of only one? In that case, does it mean perception of knowledge or that of object? If ekopalambha means the perception of knowledge only, then the hetu would be asiddha, because there is no difference between knowledge and its object according to the Yogācāra Buddhists. If ekopalambha means the perception of object only, then how the objects would be apprehended without the existence of knowledge? So, sahopalambha does not mean ekopalambha. Hence, the meaning of sahopalambha 19. rūpālokayorbhinnayorapi sahopalambhaniyamasambhavāt. Ibid., p

8 also cannot be ascertained. 20 In this way, Prabhācandra rejects the Buddhists view of sahopalambhaniyama. He says that knowledge and its object are not one. An object can exist apart from knowledge. There is a difference between knowledge and its object in their nature. Knowledge is of the nature of grāhaka (apprehender) and the object is of the nature of grāhya (apprehended). If there be no difference between them, then both can be the apprehender and apprehended without any difference. Again, there is a difference between them in their cause. Knowledge arises from the causes like indṛiya etc., while the object arises from other causes. So, knowledge and its objects are different from each other. 21 (iii) Prabhācandra also refutes the view of the Sāṁkhyas. He presents the Sāṁkhya view about knowledge as follows: knowledge or jñāna or buddhi is not svaparavyavasāyātmaka, i.e., it is not self revealing and object- revealing, because knowledge is acetana. Just as, ghaṭa, paṭa, etc. being acetana, cannot know itself, so 20. kiñca sahopalambhaḥ kiṁ yugapadupalambhaḥ krameṇopalambhābhāvo vādiprativādinorasiddhatvāt. Ibid. ; arthaikasyaivopalambhaḥ kiṁ jñānasya arthasya vā asiddho hetuḥ. Ibid., p. 82; athārthasyaivaikasyopalambhaḥ nanvevaṁ jñānasyaivābhāvasiddhiprasaṅgāt. Ibid. 21. svarūpakāraṇabhedāccānayorbhedaḥ grāhakasvarūpaṁ hi vijñānaṁ cakṣurādikāraṇaprabhavatvāttadviparītatvācca pp nīlādyarthasyeti. Ibid., 37

9 also knowledge is not self-revealing. Knowledge is inert, because it is the evolute of Pradhāna or Prakṛti. 22 Pradhāna itself is inert, so its evolutes are also inert. 23 Prabhācandra rejects this view. He argues that jñāna is the vivarta (evolutes) of ātman and not of Pradhāna. In the Sāṁkhya philosophy, Puruṣa or ātman is draṣṭā (cognizer). It can be inferred that knowledge is the vivarta of the self because it is draṣṭā. That which does not possess knowledge cannot be a cognizer (draṣṭā) like ghaṭa, paṭa etc. But ātman is the cognizer; hence, it must possess knowledge. If Pradhāna is admitted to possess knowledge, then it should be recognized as the cognizer, in which case there is no need to accept a ātman other than Pradhāna. 24 Moreover, as it is inferred that the self is of the nature of consciousness because it feels that I am conscious, similarly it can be presumed that knowledge is the nature of the self, because it feels as I am the knower. 25 The Sāṁkhyas may here argue that the self becomes the cognizer due to its relation (saṁsarga) with knowledge, and not because it is of the nature of knowledge. This is also not tenable, says Prabhācandra, because in that case, the self s nature of 22. na jñānaṁ svavyavasāyātmakamacetanatvād ghaṭādivat. tadacetanaṁ pradhānavivarttatvāttadvat. Ibid., p Cf. SK, jñānavivarttavānātmā draṣṭṛtvāt. yastu na tathā sa na draṣṭā yathā ghaṭādiḥ draṣṭā cātmā draṣṭṛtvānuṣaṅgādātmakalpanānarthakyam. PKM, pp cetano ham ityanubhavaccaitanyasvabhāvatāvaccātmano jñātā ham ityanubhavād jñānasvabhāvatāpyastu viśeṣābhāvāt. Ibid., p. 99 ; STK on SK, p

10 consciousness will also be incompatible. This is not possible, for everybody directly perceives oneself as conscious. 26 Prabhācandra also argues that knowledge is self revealing because it reveals objects without depending on any other cause. If knowledge is not self revealing, then it would not also be object revealing. So, it is both svaparavyavasāyātmaka. 27 Hence, jñāna or buddhi or knowledge is not acetana. It is cetana. It is the paryāya of ātman or Puruṣa not Pradhāna or Prakṛti. (iv) According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas, knowledge is not self-revealing. It is always parokṣa. They argue that if knowledge is perceived, then it would be the object of knowledge (karma). In that case another knowledge would be required as the instrument for this perception. Again, for the perception of this second knowledge a third knowledge should be required as the instrument. This will lead to infinite regress. 28 If the second knowledge can be an instrument without itself being perceived, then the first knowledge also should be an instrument without itself being perceived like the second knowledge. Moreover, the same knowledge cannot be 26. jñānasaṁsargāt jñātā ham ityātmani pratibhāso na śuddhisaṁsargācchuddho na tu svabhāvataḥ. PKM, p tato buddhiḥ svavyavasāyātmikā kāraṇāntaranirapekṣatayā rthavyavasthāpakatvāt yatpunaḥ svavyavasāyātmakaṁ na bhavati na tattathā rthavyavasthāpakaṁ. Ibid., p nanu vijñānasya pratyakṣatve rthavatkarmatāpatteḥ karaṇātmano parikalpanīyamityanavasthā syāt. Ibid., p

11 regarded both as the object an instrument of perception. Hence, Kumārila Bhāṭṭa holds that knowledge is neither self-revealing nor directly perceived. 29 Prabhācandra rejects this view on the ground that the reason advanced by Kumārila Bhāṭṭa is not satisfactory. He argues that just as the prameya, i.e., the object is perceived, likewise pramātā, pramāṇa, and pramiti are also perceived. Here the self is the pramātā or agent, pramāṇa is the instrument and pramiti or knowledge is the action. Māṇikyanandi has shown the perceptibility of all these in his sūtra. Thus, in the proposition I know the jar by myself, the kartā or agent, the karaṇa or instrument and kṛiyā or actions are all cognized just like the object. 30 Prabhācandra points out that there is no rule that for being directly perceivable a thing must be a karma. For in that case the self will not be perceived, since it can never be the karma of knowledge. The Mīmāṁsakas do not accept the karmatva (objectivity) of the self, but accept it as a kartā (agent). They also accept the perceptibility of the self. But then, says Prabhācandra, if the self can be directly perceived without being recognized as a karma, knowledge can also be directly perceived being an instrument (karaṇa). 31 He also argues that if knowledge cannot manifest itself, then it would not be able to manifest object also. The light of a lamp 29. tasyāpratyakṣatvepi karaṇatve prathame ko paritoṣo jñānasya parasparaviruddhakarmakaraṇākārābhyupagamo. Ibid. 30. ghaṭamahamātmanā vedmīti // karmavatkartṛkaraṇakṛiyāpratīteḥ // PS, 1.8-9; prameyavatpramātṛpramāṇapramitīnāṁ pratītisiddhaṁ pratyakṣatvaṁ. PKM, p na hi karmatvaṁ pratyakṣatāṁ pratyaṅgamātmano pratyakṣatvaprasaṅgāt pratyakṣatāstu viśeṣābhāvāt. PKM, p

12 manifest its object only when it is itself manifested. If knowledge cannot be directly perceived, then its object also cannot be perceived. That means, whatever manifests an object, must be itself manifested first. So knowledge manifests an object only when it itself is manifested or perceived. 32 Hence, knowledge is self-revealing and directly perceived. (v) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system believes in the theory of parataḥprakāśa. They hold that knowledge is not self-revealing. Knowledge is known by another knowledge, because it is prameya, just as ghaṭa, paṭa etc. are known by another knowledge, because these are prameyas. They also argue that knowledge cannot be known by itself, just as a sword cannot cut itself. If knowledge knows itself, then there arises the difficulty that it would be the object of its own activity which is not valid. So, knowledge is known by another knowledge. 33 Prabhācandra rejects this view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. He argues that an object is manifested by knowledge, because the manifestation of the object proves the manifestation of knowledge. The nature of knowledge is compared to a lamp. Just as a lamp manifests the object and itself, and does not need another light to manifest it, in the same way, knowledge also does not need another knowledge to manifest itself. If knowledge is known by another knowledge, then that another 32. arthaprakāśakavijñānasya prākaṭyābhāve tenārthaprakaṭīkaraṇāsambhavātpradīpavat anyathā santānāntaravartinopi jñānādarthaprākaṭyaprasaṅgaḥ. Ibid., p jñānaṁ jñānāntaravedyaṁ prameyatvātpaṭādivat. Ibid., p. 132 ; svātmani kṛiyāvirodhānmithyeyaṁ pratītiḥ na hi sutīkṣnopi khaṅga ātmānaṁ chinatti. Ibid., p

13 knowledge must be known by some another knowledge. In this way, there will be infinite regress. So, knowledge is self-revealing. 34 Prabhācandra also argues that by inference it is proved that knowledge is to be self revealing as well as object revealing, because it is jñāna, or because it reveals objects without any distance or because it has the nature of knowing objects, like the knowledge of God. The knowledge of God reveals His self as well as other things, it reveals objects without any distance and it has the nature of knowing its object. 35 So, knowledge is self revealing as well as object-revealing. It is not known by another knowledge. From all these points of discussion it is clear that according to the Jainas, knowledge does not possess the form of an object. It is different from its object. It is cetana. It is self-revealing as well as object revealing. It is not known by another knowledge. 2. PRAMĀṆAS: Generally in Indian philosophical thought, two words are used for knowledge, viz., jñāna and pramā. The word jñāna stands for all kinds of cognition true and false. But the word pramā is used only in the sense of true knowledge or yathārtha-jñāna. True knowledge is distinct from false knowledge or ayathārthajñāna which is known as apramā, such as knowledge of rope in the snake. Pramā means right knowledge of an object. It means valid experience. It is free from all 34. Ibid., p tato jñānaṁ svaparaprakāśātmakaṁ jñānatvānmaheśvarajñānavat avyavadhānenārthaprakāśakatvādvā arthagrahaṇātmakatvādvā tadvadeva. Ibid., p

14 kinds of doubts, errors etc. 36 Right judgment about an object is pramā. In knowledge, knower is known as pramātā, the knowing object is known as prameya and the means of knowledge is known as pramāṇa. Without pramāṇa, prameya is not known, because pramāṇa is the karaṇa (instrument) of pramā. That means the instrument of pramā or valid knowledge is called pramāṇa. 37 A karaṇa is conceived as the unique cause through which the action of a particular effect is produced. 38 So, pramāṇa is the means of right knowledge. Though all accept pramāṇa as the karaṇa of pramā, yet there are differences of opinion regarding the nature of pramāṇa. The Jainas generally define pramāṇa as knowledge which is self-revealing as well as object-revealing. It is clear from all kinds of obstacle. 39 This is the general definition given by the Jaina logicians. Samantabhadra defines pramāṇa as knowledge which knows its nature along with the object. Siddhasena defines pramāṇa as knowledge which reveals itself and its object and also free from all kinds of obstacle. Akalaṅka defines pramāṇa as knowledge which is un-contradicted and also which manifests unknown object. 40 Though these definitions differ in their language, yet their meanings are the same. 36. yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā. TBh, p pramākaraṇaṁ pramāṇam. Ibid., p vyāpāravadasādhāraṇaṁ kāraṇaṁ karaṇam. TS, p svaparavyavasāyi jñānaṁ pramāṇam. JTBh, p. 1; vijñānaṁ svaparābhāsi pramāṇaṁ bādhavarjitam / SDS, p Cf. JDS, p

15 Māṇikyanandi defines pramāṇa as that knowledge whose nature is the determination of itself as well as objects which are previously not known. 41 In this definition, there are five terms, viz., (i) sva (ii) apūrva, (iii) artha, (iv) vyavasāyātmaka and (v) jñāna. Here, jñāna means knowledge. Sva means itself. Apūrva means new and artha means object. So, apūrvārtha means that object, which is quite new, i.e., it is not known before. The word vyavasāyātmaka is the adjective of the word jñāna. Hence, pramāṇa means that determinate knowledge which not only reveals itself but also reveals the new object. It means that pramāṇa is knowledge which is truly of determinate nature. If it is not determinate, then it cannot contradict error, doubt etc. It is also of the form of knowledge because it knows the right things and does not accept wrong things. Thus, pramāṇa means the determinate knowledge of an object. 42 Explaining this sūtra giving the definition of pramāṇa, Prabhācandra refutes different theories of pramāṇa forwarded by different philosophers. First of all he refutes the kārakasākalyavāda of the old Naiyāyikas. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, one of the most famous Naiyāyikas, defines pramāṇa as the collocation (sāmagṛī) of conscious and non- conscious conditions which gives rise to the knowledge of objects that is un-contradicted and devoid of doubt. Jayanta also makes it clear that pramāṇa is the instrument (karaṇa) of cognition and that 41. svāpūrvārthavyavasāyātmakaṁ jñānaṁ pramāṇam // PS, aniścito pūrvārthaḥ // Ibid., 1.4 ; svonmukhataya pratibhāsanaṁ svasya vyavasāyaḥ // Ibid., 1.6; tanniścayātmakaṁ samāropaviruddhatvādanumānavat // Ibid., 1.3; hitā hitaprāptiparihārasamarthaṁ hi pramāṇaṁ tato jñānameva tat // Ibid.,

16 karaṇa is the collocation of different factors. Hence, in this view, pramāṇa is nothing but a collocation. This theory is referred to by Prabhācandra as kārakasākalyavāda, i.e., the theory of collocation of all conditions. 43 Prabhācandra refutes the theory of kārakasākalya. He says that the word jñāna in the definition of pramāṇa given by Māṇikyanandi serves the purpose of refuting this theory that the aggregate or collocation of all the conditions giving rise to knowledge constitutes pramāṇa. Pramāṇa means the karaṇa of cognition and karaṇa is defined as sādhakatamam (i.e., the most efficacious condition). Prabhācandra argues that collocation of conscious and non-conscious conditions cannot be the most efficacious condition for giving rise to knowledge of the self as well as of others, because collocation is of the nature of ajñāna (ignorance), just like an object of cognition (prameya). Knowledge which is contradictory to ignorance can only reveal itself and others and as such it should be accepted as the karaṇa of right cognition, i.e., pramāṇa. The object is manifested by knowledge; without knowledge an object cannot be manifested, just as, without lamp a room is not manifested. So, knowledge is the cause. Prabhācandra argues that pramāṇa is knowledge which reveals both itself and its object. But kārakasākalya is not of that nature. Because, it is both conscious and non-conscious. The things which are nonconscious cannot produce knowledge. Although conscious and non conscious conditions are the secondary causes for producing knowledge, none of these is the extra ordinary cause. For both natures, i.e., conscious and non conscious, 43.avyabhicāriṇīmasaṁdigdhāmarthopalabdhiṁ vidadhatī bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagṛī pramāṇam. NM, p

17 kārakasākalya cannot reveal itself, so it cannot reveal its object. An object is manifested by knowledge. So, knowledge is the cause. Hence, kārakasākalya is not the cause of valid knowledge and it is not pramāṇa. 44 After refuting the kārakasākalyavāda of the Naiyāyikas, Prabhācandra proceeds to refute the theory of sannikarṣa forwarded by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas accept four pramāṇas, viz., pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna and śabda. Of these pratyakṣa or perception is defined as that knowledge which is generated by sense-object-contact (indṛiyārthasannikarṣajanyaṁ jñānaṁ pratyakṣam). Hence, in their view sannikarṣa or the relation between the object and sense-organs is the karaṇa, pramāṇa or perception. This sense-object-contact is of six kinds, viz., (a) saṁyoga, (b) saṁyuktasamavāya, (c) saṁyuktasamavetasamavāya, (d) samavāya, (e) samavetasamavāya and (f) viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva. In all perceptual knowledge, sense object contact is necessary. 45 Prabhācandra refutes this view. He argues that sannikarṣa cannot be the karaṇa or instrument of knowledge. Karaṇa is the most efficacious condition. That is called the most efficacious condition, the existence of which entails the production of the effect and the non-existence of which results in the non production of the effect. But in case of sannikarṣa this is not noticed. Even though there is sannikarṣa, sometimes knowledge does not arise. For an example, a jar is perceived by the eye when it has saṁyoga-sannikarṣa with the eye. But ākāśa (ether) is not perceived by 44. tasyā jñānarūpasya prameyārthavat jñānena vyāptatvāt. PKM, p indṛiyārthayostu yassannikarṣaḥ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaśceti. TBh, p

18 the eye even though there is saṁyoga sannikarṣa between the eyes and the ākāśa. Hence, even though there is the existence of sannikarṣa, resultant knowledge does not arise. Similarly there is saṁyuktasamavāyasannikarṣa between eyes and the colour of the jar, and as such the eyes apprehend the colour of the jar. But there is no perception of sound and taste by the eyes even though there is saṁyuktasamavāyasannikarṣa. By saṁyuktasamavetasamavāyasannikarṣa, the eye cannot apprehend the rasatva of the rasa belonging to a mango. By samavāyasannikarṣa, the eye cannot apprehend the śabda of ākāśa. By samavetasamavāyasannikarṣa, the eye cannot apprehend the śabdatva of the śabda of ākāśa. By viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva, the eye cannot apprehend the absence of ether. Thus, all these sannikarṣas do not produce knowledge. Hence, sannikarṣa cannot be the karaṇa of pramā. 46 The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas here try to contradict the Jaina objection by pointing out that the sense-object contact or sannikarṣa can produce knowledge only when it has the capacity to produce it. 47 But Prabhācandra counters that if it is the yogyatā which produces knowledge, and then what is the necessity to accept this sense-object-contact as the karaṇa of pramā? So, sannikarṣa is not the karaṇa of pramāṇa CLASSIFICATION OF PRAMĀṆA: Every system of Indian philosophy accepts pramāṇa as a valid knowledge. 46. na hi cakṣuṣo ghaṭavadākāśe saṁyogo viśeṣaṇajñānādviśeṣyapramiteḥ sadbhāvopagamāt. PKM, p Ibid., p yogyatābhyupagame saivāstu kimanenāntaragaḍunā. Ibid. 47

19 But there is a difference of opinion among all the system about the numbers of pramāṇa. The Cārvākas accept only perception as pramāṇa. The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas accept perception and inference as pramāṇas. The Sāṁkhyas and the Yogas recognize perception, inference and verbal testimony as pramāṇas. The Naiyāyikas recognize perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Prabhākara Mīmāṁsakas adds presumption to perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Kumārila Bhāṭṭa and the Advaita Vedāntins accept six pramāṇas, viz., perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, presumption and nonapprehension. 49 But the Jainas do not agree with the above classification. They recognize only two pramāṇas, viz., (i) pratyakṣa-pramāṇa and (ii) parokṣa-pramāṇa. 50 All other pramāṇas come under these two types of pramāṇas. Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa is of two kinds, viz., (a) sāṁvyavahārika-pratyakṣa and (b) mukhya or pāramārthikapratyakṣa. 51 Sāṁvyavahārika-pratyakṣa is of two kinds, viz., (i) sensuous and (ii) non-sensuous. It has four stages, viz., (i) avagraha, (ii) īhā, (iii) avāya and (iv) dhāraṇā which actually come under mati-jñāna. 52 Mukhya or pāramārthika- 49. pratyakṣamekaṁ cārvākāḥ kaṇādasugatau tāni paurāṇikāḥ jaguḥ. VP, Intro. p taddvedheti // PS, 2.1 ; pratyakṣaṁ ca parokṣaṁ ca dvidhā meyaviniścayāt. SDS, p pratyakṣaṁ mukhyasāṁvyavahārikapratyakṣaprakāreṇa dviprakāram. PKM, p etacca dvividhaṁ indṛiyajam anindṛiyajaṁ ca. JTBh, p. 2 ; matijñānam avagrahehāvāyadhāranābhedāccaturvidham. Ibid., p. 3 48

20 pratyakṣa is of three kinds, viz., (i) avadhi, (ii) manaḥparyāya and (iii) kevala. 53 Parokṣa- pramāṇa is divided into five categories which are caused by pratyakṣapramāṇa. Its five categories are smṛti, pratyabhijñāna, tarka, anumāna and āgama. 54 Now in the following lines, these two kinds of pramāṇas i.e. pratyakṣapramāṇa and parokṣa-pramāṇa and their divisions are discussed in details: (a)pratyakṣa-pramāṇa: The Jainas hold that the word pratyakṣa is derived from the word akṣa. Here akṣa means the self or jiva which knows all the objects in space. 55 Māṇikyanandi defines pratyakṣa or perception as clear or distinct (viśadam) knowledge. 56 Prabhācandra points out that whatever knowledge is not clear, that is not called pratyakṣa, just as, inference is not clear, so, it is not pratyakṣa. 57 So, pratyakṣa- pramāṇa means clear knowledge. But what is this clarity of knowledge. Māṇikyanandi says that clarity means the apprehension of an object without the mediation of any other cognition or the apprehension of the objects as possessed of its distinctive character. 58 Thus, 53. tat trividham avadhimanaḥparyāyakevalabhedāt. Ibid., p pratyakṣādinimittaṁ smṛtipratyabhijñānatarkānumānāgamabhedam // PS, 3.2 ; tacca smaraṇapratyabhijñānatarkānumānāgamabhedataḥ pañcaprakāram. JTBh, p Cf. akṣṇoti vyāpnoti jānāti iti akṣa ātmā. SS, p. 1.12, as quoted in Bothra, P., The Jaina Theory of Perception, p viśadaṁ pratyakṣam // PS, viśadajñānātmakaṁ pratyakṣaṁ pratyakṣatvāt yattu na viśadajñānātmakaṁ tanna pratyakṣam yathā numānādi. PKM, p pratītyantarāvyavadhānena viśeṣavattayā vā pratibhāsanaṁ vaiśadyam // PS,

21 clarity of knowledge means that knowledge which does not require any other knowledge in order to manifest its object. So, perception means clear knowledge. 59 Inference is not clear knowledge, because it is based on the other knowledge like the vyāptijñāna. But perception is clear, because it is not based on any kind of other knowledge for manifesting its object. Some arguments are also put by the opponents that the definition of clarity of knowledge is not true, because in perceptual knowledge like īhā, etc., there is found mediation of avagraha etc., and so, it cannot be called clear in the above sense. 60 Prabhācandra replies that this argument is not tenable because avagraha etc. are produced by the operation of different sense-organs and as such they are not required for īhā etc. This implies that avagraha etc. are independent knowledge and do not depend on the mediation of any other knowledge. 61 Hence, the definition of pratyakṣa as clear knowledge stands proved. Prabhācandra, however, argues that perception does not arise from the sense-object contact. If it arises from the sense object contact, then there would be no omniscience. Secondly, if perception arises from the sense object contact, then there is no contact between the sense-organ and pleasure pain etc. because, pleasure 59. viṣaye viṣayidharmasyopacārāddoṣe ta eva dharmaḥ spaṣṭatāvat. PKM, pp nanvevamīhādijñānasyāvagrahādyapekṣatvādavyavadhānena pratibhāsanalakṣaṇavaiśadyābhāvātpratyakṣatā na syāt. Ibid., p tadasāram aparāparendṛiyavyāpārādevāvagrahādīnāmutpattestatra pramāṇāntarāvyavadhānamatrāpi prasiddhameva. Ibid. 50

22 and pain etc. are known by itself. So, pratyakṣa-pramāṇa means only the clarity of knowledge. 62 By this definition of perception, Prabhācandra rejects the Buddhist point of view. The Buddhists hold that when there is cognition of fire immediately after seeing smoke, then there is the vyāptijñāna in the form of that, which has smoke, must have fire. This vyāptijñāna, though aspaṣṭa is regarded as pratyakṣa. 63 But Prabhācandra points out that these are not perceptions, because these are aspaṣṭajñānas, whereas perception means only clear knowledge. It may be asked here what is apprehended in the knowledge of fire which arises from suddenly seeing the smoke? Is it sāmānya, i.e., generality or is it viśeṣa, i.e., a particular fire? If the knowledge is sāmānya, then that cannot be pratyakṣa, because according to the Buddhists sāmānya is not an object of perception. 64 If the knowledge is viśeṣa, i.e., the knowledge of fire is not universal of fire but a particular fire, then there would not arise any doubt in the mind of the cogniser who apprehends the particular fire that whether this fire is from grass or from leaves? 65 When one perceives nearby fire then one does not have any doubt. If any kind of doubt arises in case of 62. tato nirdoṣatvādvaiśadyaṁ pratykṣalakṣaṇaṁ svagrahaṇātmakatvenodayād. Ibid., p anenā kasmāddhūmadarśanāt vahniratra iti jñānam cāspaṣṭamapi pratyakṣamācakṣāṇaḥ. Ibid., p kiñca akasmāddhūmadarśanādvahniratretyādijñāne sāmānyaṁ vā pratibhāsate viśeṣa tasya tadviṣayatvānabhyupagamāt. Ibid. 65. viśeṣaviṣayatve tataḥ pravarttamānasyātra sandeho na syāt tārṇo vātrāgniḥ pārṇo vā iti sannihitavat. Ibid., pp

23 nearby fire, then the knowledge which arises either from śabda or from a mark also will be doubtful. Then the Buddhist point of view that the knowledge of particular fire which arises from word or from a mark does not have any doubt will be fallacious. So, by seeing smoke, the knowledge of fire is not perception; it is only inferential knowledge. If one knows all smokes and all fires clearly, then nothing would be left for inference. Hence, inference will become useless. But, one cannot clearly know the knowledge of smoke and fire. So, vyāptijñāna is not perception. 66 Thus, if the knowledge is not clear, then it is not perception. The Buddhists, however, argue that if unclear knowledge is not perception, then this vagueness (aspaṣṭatā) will be the quality of either knowledge or object. If vagueness is the quality of knowledge, then how the object of knowledge is called vague? Vagueness of one thing cannot be attributed to another thing, because that will lead to over pervasion. If vagueness is the quality of the object, then how can this vagueness be found in vyāptijñāna? The same difficulty arises also in the cause of clearness (spaṣṭatā). 67 So, by vagueness and clearness of the object, one cannot know the knowledge as vague and clear. Prabhācandra replies here that clearness and vagueness are the qualities of knowledge and not of the object. Moreover, the 66. na khalu sannihitaṁ pāvakaṁ tarhi liṅgadarśanaprabhavatvādanumānam. Ibid., p. 217; na ca teṣaṁ sarve.anumānānarthakyaprasaṅgāt. Ibid. 67. nanu cāspaṣṭatvaṁ jñānadharmaḥ arthadharmo vyāptijñānasyāpratyakṣatāprasiddhiḥ. Ibid. ; spaṣṭatvepi samānatvāt. tadapi hi yadi jñānadharmastarhi kathamarthe spaṣṭatā atiprasaṅgāt. Ibid. 52

24 Jainas maintain that clearness and vagueness depend on the destruction of the āvaraṇa or the veil. The destructions of spaṣṭajñānāvaraṇakarma and aspaṣṭajñānāvaraṇakarma are the causes of clarity and unclarity of knowledge. 68 That means the knowledge which is clear is known as pratyakṣa and which is unclear is known as parokṣa. Types of Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa: Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa is divided into two categories, viz., (i) sāṁvyavahārika-pratyakṣa and (ii) mukhya-pratyakṣa. Now, the detail account of sāṁvyavahārika-pratyakṣa and mukhya-pratyakṣa are given in the following: (i) Sāṁvyavahārika-pratyakṣa: According to Māṇikyanandi, sāṁvyavahārikapratyakṣa or empirical perception means that clear knowledge which is caused by sense organs and mind and which is partial. 69 Explaining this sūtra, Prabhācandra says that the word saṁvyavahāra means right and uncontradicted action either of the nature of pravṛtti or nivṛtti. The knowledge which is the cause of such vyavahāra or action is known as saṁvyavahāra. The perception which has the necessity of this saṁvyavahāra is known as sāṁvyavahārikapratyakṣa. 70 From the definition of sāṁvyavahārika-pratyakṣa, it is clear that it is divided into two categories, viz., arising from indṛiya (sense-organ) and arising from anindṛiya (mind). Indṛiyas or sense-organs are sub-divided into two categories, viz., 68. spaṣṭajñānāvaraṇavīryāntarāyakṣayopaśamaviśeṣāddhi kvacidvijñāne spaṣṭatā prasiddhā aspaṣṭajñānāvaraṇādikṣayopaśamaviśeṣāttvaspaṣṭateti. Ibid., p indṛiyānindṛiyanimittaṁ deśataḥ sāṁvyavahārikam // PS, tatra samīcīno bādhitaḥ pravṛttinivṛttilakṣaṇo vyavahāraḥ saṁvyavahāraḥ sāṁvyavahārikaṁ pratyakṣam. PKM, p

25 dravyendṛiya and bhāvendṛiya. Dravyendṛiya are made of matter (pudgala) which possess qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch and which have been transformed into definite shapes like eye, ear etc. Bhāvendṛiya is of the nature of consciousness. It is of two kinds, viz., labdhi and upayoga. Labdhi means the power of the sense organ due to which the object is apprehended after the veils of karman is destroyed. If there is no labdhi, then the sense-organ cannot apprehend the object. Upayoga means the activity of consciousness of the self towards the object. If there is no upayaga, then the object cannot be apprehended. Thus, labdhi and upayoga are the special properties of bhāvendṛiya. 71 Anindṛiya or mind is also divided into two categories, viz., dravyamana and bhāvamana. 72 Hence, the clear knowledge which arises from indṛiya and anindṛiya is partial and it is called sāṁvyavahārikapratyakṣa. Some opponents hold that the sense-organ and mind are not only the causes of sāṁvyavahārika-pratyakṣa, but also the self, the object and light are the causes thereof. 73 Rejecting this Prabhācandra says that the self is not only the cause of sāṁvyavahārika-pratyakṣa but of parokṣa-pramāṇa also. As here the extraordinary cause of pratyakṣa is accepted, so the self is not mentioned here, self being 71. tatrendṛiya.golakādipariṇāmaviśeṣapariṇatarūparasagandhasparśavatpudgalātmakam. Ibid.; bhāvendṛiyaṁ tu labdhyupayogātmakam rūpādiviṣayagrahaṇavyāpāraḥ. Ibid., pp evaṁ manopi dvedhā draṣṭavyam. Ibid., p nanu cendṛiyānindṛiyanimittaṁ tadityasāmpratam ātmārthālokāderapi tatkāraṇatayā. Ibid., p

26 a general cause of other pramāṇas also. 74 Regarding object and light the sūtra clearly states that objects and light cannot be the cause of cognition, being objects of knowledge like darkness. 75 Darkness is the pratibandhaka or obstruction of knowledge due to which it is not the cause of knowledge, but the object of knowledge. So, the self, the object and light are not the causes of knowledge. 76 The opponents ask Prabhācandra, what is the harm if the object and light are accepted as the causes of knowledge, though they are the objects of knowledge? 77 Then Prabhācandra replies that if the object and light are accepted as the causes of knowledge, then they would not be the objects of knowledge at the same time; just as the eye, which is a cause of knowledge and not its object at the same time. 78 The opponents argue that by an inference it is proved that the object and light are the causes of knowledge, because knowledge is the effect of the object and light. Because, there is a relation of anvaya-vyatireka (concomitance) between knowledge and object or light. When there is an anvaya-vyatireka relation between the two things, then those two things are known together as cause and effect; just like fire and smoke. Fire is the cause of smoke, because smoke is related by the relation of anvaya-vyatireka with fire. In the same way, knowledge is related by the 74. tannah ātmanaḥ samanantarapratyayasya vā pratyayāntarepyaviśeṣāt. Ibid. 75. nārthā lokau kāraṇaṁ paricchedyatvāttamovat // PS, prasiddhaṁ hi tamaso vijñānapratibandhakatvenātatkāraṇasyāpi paricchedyatvam. PKM, p nanu paricchedyatvaṁ ca syāttayostatkāraṇatvaṁ ca avirodhāt. Ibid., p tatkāraṇatve tayoścakṣurādivatparicchedyatvavirodhāt. Ibid. 55

27 relation of anvaya-vyatireka with the object and light. This anvaya-vyatireka is not a fallacious hetu, because if there are object and light, then there would be knowledge; but if there is no object and light, then there would be no knowledge. 79 So, the object and light are the cause of knowledge, because knowledge is the effect of object and light. But Prabhācandra rejects this view. He says that knowledge is not the effect of object and light, because there is no relation of anvaya-vyatireka between them. 80 As for example, when there is knowledge of snake in a rope, then there is not found the object of knowledge, i.e., snake, yet there is knowledge. In this example, knowledge is not the effect of object, because the object itself is absent. 81 Again, the light is also not the effect of knowledge, because there is no relation of anvaya-vyatireka between them. As for example, nocturnal animals can see in darkness. Though there is no light, yet there is knowledge. Some kinds of perceptual knowledge are also possible in darkness, just as knowledge of taste. So, the object and light are not the causes of knowledge, because knowledge is possible in the absence of both object 79. athānumānāttatkāryatāvasāyaḥ tathāhi arthālokakārye vijñānaṁ satyevāsya bhāvādbhāve cābhāvāt. Ibid. 80. tadanvayavyatirekānuvidhānābhāvācca keśoṇḍukajñānavannaktañcarajñānavacca // PS, niyamena hi yadyasyānvayavyatirekāvanukaroti tattasya kāryam yathāgnerdhūmaḥ. na cānayoranvayavyatirekau jñānenānukṛiyete. PKM, p. 233; keśoṇḍukajñānavannaktañcarajñānavacca. Ibid. 56

28 and light. 82 Therefore, the object and light are not the causes of sāṁvyavahārikapratyakṣa. The sāṁvyavahārika-pratyakṣa is caused by the sense-organs and mind. The Jainas further hold that the sense-organ and mind are the instruments by which sāṁvyavahārika-pratyakṣa is known. That means, the knowledge of sāṁvyavahārika-pratyakṣa arise through the sense-organs and mind. The nature of the knowledge of sāṁvyavahārika-pratyakṣa is analyzed in term of its stages. It has four stages, viz., (i) avagraha, (ii) īhā, (iii) avāya and (iv) dhāraṇā. These four stages actually come under mati-jñāna. Among these four stages, avagraha is the first stage of knowledge through which one catches the general features of an object after the contact of the object with the sense-organ and mind. For an example, in the stage of avagraha, a man is known simply as a man. It is divided into two types, viz., (a) vyañjanāvagraha and (b) arthāvagraha. The next stage is called īhā which means one has a desire to have the definite and specific knowledge of the object known by avagraha. As for instance, in avagraha, one knows a man simply as a man, while in the stage of īhā, he wants to know what kind of man he is, i.e., to which country he belongs etc. The third stage is called avāya which means the determinate and specific knowledge about an object. For an example, in the stage of avāya, one can get a clear knowledge about a man to be belonging to a particular place by observing some nature. The last stage, i.e., dhāraṇā means the condition of memory of the object by previous knowledge. It is because of dhāraṇā that a thing which is perceived at an earlier time is remembered at a later time. Hence, these four 82. naktañcarādīnāṁ rūpe smadādīnāṁ rasādau ca tadbhāvepi tasya vaiśadyopalabdheḥ. Ibid., p

29 stages arise one after another. 83 These four stages which arise one after another are not totally different, because the succeeding stage comes after the preceding one. (ii) Mukhya-pratyakṣa: According to Prabhācandra, mukhya or pāramārthikapratyakṣa or transcendental perception means that knowledge which arises in the self directly without the help of the sense-organ and mind. It arises when the obstruction of the karmans are destroyed. In the Parīkṣāmukhasūtra it is said, mukhya-pratyakṣa is that absolutely clear, non-sensuous and infinite knowledge in which all the obstructions or veils are removed completely by some special conditions (sāmagṛīviśeṣa). 84 Explaining this sūtra, Prabhācandra says that special conditions are right faith, direct cognition, space, time etc. Among these, right faith is the internal condition, while cognition, space, time etc. are the external conditions. When all of these conditions are found as favorable, then the karmans are removed completely. After the destruction or subsidence of all the veils of karmans, there arises mukhya-pratyakṣa. Thus, after the destruction of the āvaraṇas of avadhijñāna, manaḥparyāyajñāna and kevalajñāna, the resulting avadhijñāna, manaḥparyāyajñāna and kevalajñāna arise. Hence, when all the veils are removed the knowledge of mukhya-pratyakṣa is known clearly tatra viṣayaviṣayisannipāta dhāraṇā. JDS, p. 191; ayaṁ puruṣa iti jñānamavagrahaḥ tadviṣayasmaraṇaṁ bhavati. SDS, p. 64; JTBh, pp sāmagṛīviśeṣaviśleṣitākhilāvaraṇam tīndṛiyamaśeṣato mukhyam // PS, jñānāvaraṇādipratipakṣabhūtā hīha samyagdarśanādilakṣaṇāntaraṅgā bahiraṅgānubhavādilakṣaṇā sāmagṛī gṛhyate tasyā yasyāvadhimanaḥparyayakevalajñānatrayasya tattathoktam. PKM, p

30 The proof for mukhya-pratyakṣa is forwarded by Prabhācandra in the form of an inference. Thus, wherever there is clear and true knowledge, there is the destruction of all veils, just as in the case of perception of trees, which are being enveloped by clouds of mist or dust. When all kinds of dust or mist are removed the tree can be clearly perceived. 86 So, mukhya-pratyakṣa means clear and true knowledge. Mukhya-pratyakṣa is non-sensuous because it does not depend on mind and sense-organs. As it does not depend on mind and sense-organ it is free from all impurity. Hence, it is non-sensuous (atīndṛiya), perfect and infinite. Whatever knowledge is not non-sensuous, that knowledge is not independent, because it is dependent on sense-organ and mind, just like our ordinary knowledge of perception, i.e., sāṁvyavahārika-pratyakṣa which is caused by the sense-organ and mind. So, if a knowledge is not non-sensuous then that knowledge is also not mukhya. 87 The Jainas further hold that there are three types of mukhya-pratyakṣa, viz., (i) avadhijñāna, (ii) manaḥparyāyajñāna and (iii) kevela- jñāna. Firstly, it is divided into two kinds, viz., (i) sakala- pratyakṣa and (ii) vikala-pratyakṣa. Under these two kinds of pratyakṣa, avadhi, manaḥparyāya and kevala come. Vikalapratyakṣa means partial knowledge. It is of two kinds, viz., avadhijñāna and 86. yadyatra spaṣṭatve satyavitathaṁ jñānaṁ tattatrāpagatākhilāvaraṇam yathā ca kvaciduktaprakāraṁ jñānamiti. Ibid. 87. tathā tīndṛiyaṁ tat mano kṣānapekṣatvāt. tadanapekṣaṁ tat sakalakalaṅkavikalatvāt. Ibid.; yattu nātīndṛiyādisvabhāvaṁ na tattadanapekṣatvādiviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭam yathāsmadādipratyakṣam. Ibid. 59

31 manaḥparyāyajñāna, while sakala-pratyakṣa means the complete knowledge. Kevelajñāna comes under this pratyakṣa. 88 Firstly, avadhijñāna means that kind of knowledge which arises after its own veil is destroyed or subsided. Avadhijñāna is non-sensuous. It is the knowledge of limited objects having some particular form of dravya, kṣetra, kāla and bhāva. It arises in the self without the help of the senseorgans and mind. It apprehends very fine objects, such as atoms. So, avadhi means that kind of knowledge by which one can apprehend the objects of limited form without the help of sense-organs and mind. It is of two kinds, viz., (a) bhāvapratyaya which belongs to the gods and (b) guṇa-pratyaya which belongs to man and other beings. 89 Manaḥparyāyajñāna means the clear and definite knowledge of the thoughts of past, present and future of another s mind without the help of the sense-organ and mind. It arises after the destruction or subsidence of its own āvaraṇa. It is of two kinds, viz., ṛjumati and vipulamati. 90 Kevelajñāna means pure, perfect and infinite knowledge. By this knowledge, one apprehends all the substances and all their qualities directly without the help of the sense-organs and mind. This knowledge arises by the destruction of its own veil (kevalajñānāvaraṇa). After that the self attains kevalajñāna. So, kevalajñāna is pure knowledge by which 88. Cf. JDS, p sakalarūpidravyaviṣayakajātīyam ātmamātrāpekṣaṁ jñānāmavadhijñānam. JTBh, p. 7; Cf. JDS, p Cf. JDS, p