ARTHAPATTI (POSTULATION)

Transcription

1 CHAPTER VII ARTHAPATTI (POSTULATION) The term 'Arthapatti' means supposition or presumption.of fact. It is considered as an independent source of valid knowledge by the schools of Purva-Mimarp.sa and Advaita Vedantins. Postulation is generally employed in order to account for an observed fact which cannot otherwise be explained. The procedure involved in Postulation can be illustrated as follows: When we see that a man is fat and yet does not eat in day time, our knowledge ofhis fatness conflicts with our knowledge of his not eating in day time. And this conflict is removed by postulating his eating at night. Hence, Postulation gives us a knowledge of facts which cannot be explained by other means of knowledge such as perception, inference etc. So Postulation is a distinct source of valid knowledge. Vedantaparibha~a defines Postulation as the assumption ofan explanatory fact (upapadaka) from the knowledge ofthe fact to be explained (upapadya).l Here the knowledge ofthe thing to be explained is the instrument, and the knowledge of 216

2 the explanatory fact is the result. In other words, it is the assumption (apatti) of a fact (artha) to explain another inexplicable fact or the supposition of a cause. The effect is given and the cause is assumed. According to Dharrnaraja Postulation is of two kinds (1) Postulation from the perecived (dr~tarthapatti) and (2) postulation from verbally cognized (srutarthapatti').2 The first, postulation from the perceived, means the assumption of a third fact. to explain two apparently incongruous facts. It can be illustrated from the instance of the illusory silver. One sees the shell as silver. The cognition. now is "This is silver". The sublation is of the form "This is not Silver", contradicting the earlier cognition "This is Silver". Now, the sublating cognition "This is not silver will be quite unintelligible, if the silver in "This is silver" were real. So one has to presume that the silver is not real but illusory. The second, postulation from verbally cognized, means the assumption ofan implied meaning ofa sentence due to the inadequacy or incongruity ofits direct meaning. In the case of a sentence that is heard, the unintelligibility of its own sense may lead to the postulation of another sense 3, e.g. The Chand5gya Upani~ad says: 'He who knows the self crosses sorrow'. 4 This declaration is ambiguious in that the worldly 217

3 bondages represented by the term sorrow are surmountable only by self-knowledge. Since it is impossible in any other way worldly bondages or sorrow must be illusory. But we know that sorrow is real and it cannot be removed by knowledge. In the Upani~adic dictum 'sorrow' means the bondage of transmigration, and hence it is an illusion. Thus, the postulation here is based on illussoriness. Even in empirical statements like "Devadatta who will Jive to be a hundred is not at home", his existence somewhere outside his home is postulated. 5 Two different types of postulations can be recognized from the verbally' cognized. (l) the non-intelligibility of expression-(abhidhananupapatti) (2) the non-intelligibility of the expressed (abhihitanupapatti). 6 Abhidhananupapatti can be illustrated as follows: On hearing a part of a sentence one cen presume additional word or words in accordance with its intention. Forinstance, to utterance ofthe word 'close' or 'open' one can suppliment the term "the door" in agreement with th context. 7 Similarly, on reading the sign 'slow' on a driveway a person can know that it means 'drive slowly'. Abhihitanupapatti or the non-intelligibility of the expressed, is to be understood where a sense cognized from an unintelligible sentence postulates another sense 8, e.g., 'He 218 >

4 who desires heaven is to sacrifice with the Jyoti~t6ma, since instrumentality to heaven, which is cognized as present in the momentary Jy6ti~t6ma sacrifice, is unintelligible. The question is how a sacrificial rite that comes to an' end in the temporal bring about a result in the transeendental; the attainment of heaven? This invariably presupproses some intervening means between the present act and the ultimate result. It is, therefore, assumed by the Mlmarpsakas that the performance of the sacrificer that is enduring and it leads him to heaven. 9 Another example of postulation can explain the incongruity of meaning in a sentence more lucidly. The sentence. "The camel is the ship of the desert" is meaningless if the word" 'ship' is taken in its primary literal sense, It is by the assumption ofits secondary or figurative meaning, such as 'a means of transportation' that we find the significance of the statement. Postulation is not a case of inference According to the Advaita Vedanta and the BhaHa Mlmarpsa, Postulation is a separate source of knowledge, because it renders a knowledge of facts which cannot be otherwise obtained. It cannot be explained by perception, since the fact known through Postulation is not perceived but postulated. 'A fat man eats at night' is not a matter ofperception. 219

5 Nor a knowledge obtained by inference. Presumption reveals an object which is assumed. But the difference between. Presumption and inference is merely verbal, not actual. According to the Advaitins, postulation is not an inference. Since it cannot be reduced to anvayi inference. In the above example, there is no anvaya or agreement in presence between fatness and eating at night as between smoke and fire. We cannot say 'wherever there is fatness there is eating at night' as we say 'where ever there is smoke there is fire'. Postulation cannot be reduced to vyatireki inference for the Advaita Vedantins. According to them "the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance is not a cause of inferential knowledge lo only affermative invariable concomitance (anvaya-vyapti) can lead to inference. So it accepts only one kind of inference, affirmative (anvayi), but, concedes that negative invariable concomitance can lead to inference in a round-about way, that is, through affirmative invariable concomitance. For, from the knowledge ofnegative invariable concomitance one can have the knowledged of affirmative invariable concomitance. For, from the knowledge ofnegative invariable concomitance one can have the knowledged of affirmative invariable concomitance by means ofpostulation. 11 Further, the direct notion of our consciousness is against the 220

6 supposition that postulation is an inference. In anuvyavasaya or introspection of the knowledge by postulation we do not feel to have 'inferred' anything, but simply to have supposed or presumed something inorder to explain something else. 12 Objecting the validity ofpostulation the Naiyayikas try to bring Postulation under inference. According to the Navya Nyaya School, it may be reduced to an inference based on negative concomitance. In negative invariable concomitance, the major premise express a universal relation between the absence of the major and the middle terms. Thus the above example of postulation may be reduced to the following syllogism. A man who does not eat at night while fasting by day is not fat; this man is not a man who does not eat at night, i.e., he eats at night. As arthapatti may thus be reduced to negative inference, the Navya-Nyaya School refuses to acknowledge it as a separate source,of knowledge 13 because its purpose is served. by the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance (vyatireka-vyapti). So also the Sailkhya philosophers explain arthapatti as a form of inference. Postulation resembles hypothesis in Western logic. However, hypothesis is tentative and may be rejected later on, but postulation is held to be the only possible explanation of an observed state of affairs. It 221

7 may further be noted that postulation explains unobserved facts, whereas inference draws conclusion from those observed facts. Briefly postulation is the search for grounds, and inference is the search for the consequences ofgrounds. 14 Kumarila and Prabhakara differ from each other in their views on postulation. Prabhakara maintains that the element of doubt distinguishes postulation from inference. While Kumarila denies its existence in it. There is doubt according to Prabhakara, as to the truth ofthe two perceived facts which cannot be reconciled with each other. In the oft quoted example, the doubt regarding Devadatta being alive, serves as the means and this is removed by the Postulation of'his being outside his house', while in inference there is no such doubt. Thus Postulation removes doubt, and reconciles two appearently inconsistent facts and hence it canpotbe regarded as inference. Is Prabhakara and Kumarila both agree. in holding that in Postulation there is so middle term at all which is the basis ofinference. According to Kumarila, the basis of Postulation is not doubt, but the apparent incongruity involved in two perceived facts. For example, the apparent incongruity involved in increasing fatness and fasting cannot be resolved without, presuming 'eating at night'. In inference there is no such 222

8 " incongruity. The fundamental element in the mental process involved in Postulation is through negative concomitance while in inference as Advaitins assert it is postitive concomitance. In fact, Postulation belongs more to the side of imagination than to inference. Presumptive knowledge is articulated through proposition like 'I presume' and not through Proposition like 'I infer'. Utility ofpostulation Postulation provides us with the knowledge of facts unattainable otherwise. Recognising it as a separate source of knowledge the Mlmarpsakas employ Postulation for explaining the Vedic scriptures by presuming missing words and meanings. For example on the basis ofan incomplete injuction like one should perform 'Visvajit' sacrifice we assume 'svargakama' to supplement it. Thus the complete injuction amounts to: 'one who is desirous of heaven should perform 'Visvajit' sacrifice. Their belief in the immortality of the self is also based on Postulation. The Advaitins use it for explaining the paradoxes in the Vedanta texts. For instance the Upani~ads speak ofthe world,as created by Brahman and out of Brahman. But sometimes the Upani~ads say that there is no multiplicity and Brahman o'nly is the reality. This paradox is resolved by treating creation 223

9 not as transformation (parii}.ama ofbrahman) but as an apparent change (vivarta) like a rope appearing like a snake. The supposition of maya as the power of Brahman to create an apparent world is a kind ofpostulation. The Advaitins employ Postulation in assuming some unperceived facts and principles for explaining experienced facts. For example the existence of an objectless blissful consciousness during dreamless sleep is presupposedto explain the experience of a sound sleep that we later say 'I had a confortable sleep.' Conclusion Only the schools of Purva-Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta accept arthapatti as an independentprama1).a. It serves the purpose of accounting for an observed fact which cannot be explained by other means of knowledge. ~he knowledge renderedby arthapatti cannotbe explainedbyperceptionsince the fact known through postulation is not perceived but postulated. Postulation is not an inference since it cannot be reduced to anvayi inference. Instead, the Naiyayikas include it under negative inference. Dharmaraja devides arthapatti into presumption from what is seen and presumption from what is heard. Ofthese the former is further divided into abhidhananupapatti and 224

10 abhihitanupapatti. Arthapatti is useful in everyday life and in explicating the vedic scriptures and the paradoxes thereof. Notes and references 1. Dpapadyajiianena upapadakakalpanamarthapatti, V.P.; P V.P.; P V.P.; P C.D.VII. i V. P.; P V.P. P Ibid. 8. V.P.; P Ibid. 10. V.P.; P Ibid; Ibid - P-93. V, See also Sikhamal}.i. 12. V.P.; P Yastu na ratrau bhmikte nasau divabhuiijanatve sati pinal:!, etc. T.B. P Copi, Introduction to Logic, p P.P.; PP