Session 03: The Argument from Morality

Transcription

1 Subjective: a matter of personal opinion or, : abortion, hot or cold Absolute: regardless of the circumstances or, : rape, child abuse Relative: varying with the circumstances. : murder, lying The argument from morality is an argument for the existence of God. Based on the asserted need for moral order to exist in the universe and for this moral order to exist, God must exist to support it. What makes morality objective? Session 03: The Argument from Morality What is morality? Morality is a set of principles used to distinguish between what is right or wrong and what is good or bad. What are the types of morality? Objective: independent of personal (including one s own) opinion or, values which are good or evil, right or wrong no matter who or how many agree or disagree. Even if no one on earth agrees that something is moral or immoral, that fact has no bearing on whether that something IS moral or immoral. 1. First, moral values or obligations must either be true or false. 2. Second, moral duties and values must be universal: If something is good, it is good everywhere and always. 3. Third, moral facts cannot be the product of our desires. 4. Fourth, morality must be part of the furniture of the universe. They must be as real as say, gravity. Argument from Morality: If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist. Objective moral values and duties do exist. Therefore, God exists. Let s look at some definitions: 1. Values have to do with whether a person, place, thing, or idea is good or bad. Values have to do with moral worth. It would be good to become a doctor but you aren t obligated to become a doctor. It would also be good to be an architect, a pastor and a doctor but you can t do them all. 2. Duties have to do with whether an action is right or wrong. This is moral obligation; what you ought to do or ought not do. 1 2

2 Where do others say we get our morality? Can science determine human values and morality? New atheists like: Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens seem to think so. What is a new atheist? Same old-school atheist views but held to very dogmatically. New atheist also feature an unusually high sense of moral concern and outrage directed at the harm religions have done in the name of their gods. The framework for new atheism has a metaphysical component, an epistemological component, and an ethical component. Metaphysical Component: they believe that there is no supernatural or divine reality of any kind. Epistemological Component: they claim that religious belief is irrational. Moral Component: The moral component is new to atheism and sets them apart from other prominent historical atheists such as Nietzsche and Sartre. The assumption here is that there is a universal and objective but secular moral standard. It seems the new atheists include the moral component only because they must if they wish to attack objective morality. Specifically, the morality of a God that can command genocide while allowing people to suffer sickness or disease. Evolutionary Naturalism as a Foundation for Morality Another view from Biologist E. O. Wilson and philosopher Michael Ruse, is Evolutionary Naturalism which argues the human experience of moral obligations was the result of evolutionary pressures, which attached a sense of morality to human psychology because it was useful for moral development; Evolutionary Naturalism hopes to shows that moral values do not exist independently of the human mind. Further, Evolutionary Naturalism hopes to show that morality might be better understood as an evolutionary imperative in order to propagate genes and ultimately reproduce. No human society today advocates immorality, such as theft or murder, because it would undoubtedly lead to the end of that particular society and any chance for future survival of offspring. This is an example of the is-ought fallacy, the assumption that because things are a certain way, they should be that way. Simply because moral predilections exist doesn t mean that they ought to exist. Similar to this is a statement, because something is natural doesn t mean it is good, i.e. disease or tornados. While not the same as is and ought they are similar and important to the discussion. There is a mistake we often make when discussing whether or not something is good. We assign it an equivalency to a human concept such as happiness. You can say happiness is good but you cannot say that happiness equals good. Why not? Because happiness may be derived from an evil act by a sadistic person. Can that be called good? How does this relate to the topic at hand, the Moral Argument? It is important because Objective Morality is not something that ought to be if we are simply here through the process of evolution. Objective Morality is too high a standard to be an evolved sense of morality. Because Objective Morality calls us to do things which aren t necessarily natural or comfortable or even to our own advantage; it remains a constant reminder of our responsibility regardless of our desire. This is quite different from Evolutionary Naturalism which doesn t require us to make any of the unnatural or uncomfortable selfless act which Objective Morality would. If our morality was something attached to us as a result of evolution, then what has to be proven is that this morality ought to have been. Why should it be here? 3 4

3 You can claim it ought to be because it helps with the survival of the species but can it be proven that without this morality the species would die out or be harmed beyond repair. Plenty of animals survive and flourish without any kind of observable morality. Sometimes lions and monkeys eat their young yet they flourish and survive. No evidence of remorse or pity. No evidence would suggest that this action was wrong or evil or even that the other animals object to these acts. No morality is needed to propagate the species. How are these evolutionary morals then something that ought to be if we continue to flourish and survive? The concept of evolution is summed up in Darwin s misquoted phrase, survival of the fittest, what he actually wrote was survival of the fit. The idea is that one merely needed to be fit enough to reproduce to pass on its genetics in the form of a new generation. This idea says nothing about any kind of morality being needed in order to reproduce and survive. As such, Evolutionary Naturalism has then failed to show why morality ought to be. Naturalism then provides us no reason to believe morality is objectively true, so if Objective Morality is something that should not exist because it couldn t be attached to us through evolutionary naturalism, then a reasonable explanation for why people hold to objective moral values and duties would be it must be something they are given and if it is given then it is given by someone. A creator. Logic as the Foundation of Morality: Which brings us to Logical Morality. Dr. Shelly Kagan, professor of Moral Philosophy at Yale University has proposed that logic itself, rather than God, is the true objective standard for morality. Kagan s argument goes like this: Social creatures who are perfectly logical, and who reason with an ignorance of ego, will naturally and inevitably form a social contract of perfect moral structure. What does this mean? Simply put, if free and perfectly rational agents were able to build a moral system for society without knowing what his or her position or role in society would be, these perfectly logical agents would create a perfectly moral society. This social contract, Kagan argues, would consist of basically two rules which sound a lot like the Golden Rule: Do help others that you know are in need. Do not hurt others purposefully. Kagan claims that both of these rules are perfectly logical extensions of the human experience of an understanding of need, pain, death, and joy. In other words, humans understand that they want help when they are in trouble and also wish to avoid hurt, pain, and death. No God is necessary for this understanding. Logic, therefore, serves as the basis of morality, and God is not required. One weakness of this argument is his use of the word purposefully, which requires there to be moral compass which would define what purposefully means. Is our moral obligation then cast aside because we did harm but not purposefully or intentionally? Or is it absolved if we did something purposefully or intentionally we thought as good yet it harmed in an unforeseen way? Another problem might be related to the question, can the logically moral thing to do still be a morally wrong thing to do? The problem, or one of the problems, with the logical morality argument is that we can never as a society reach a logical moral code which Kagan hopes everyone can agree on, so the conversation becomes meaningless and an ever shifting morality based on intent and whatever concepts like do good or words like help or need are defined as. Do good? In whose opinion is this good being done? And help? Do you define what help is and if I need it or do I? Objective Morality makes no claim that morality is about helping or not harming, intentionality or purposefulness, but is rather an un- 5 6

4 changeable and consistent moral set which we obey or don t, agree with or don t, cling to or don t. But a set we cannot escape from or talk our way out of. A Rebuttal of Logical Morality: Let s sum up a rebuttal to Logical Morality: the idea that we can obtain morality if we (1) know the set of data points and (2) we can then, therefore, reach a moral agreement as a society by simply doing good, helping others, and doing no harm intentionally from this data set using logic: The real weakness in Kagan s argument is this idea about purposefulness or intentionality. Intentionality is separate from morality. Intentions can be morally depraved and result in good. Intentions can be morally correct yet result in harm. Only a being who is all-knowing can know all the results from an action. The outcome of intention is unpredictable to everyone who lacks omniscience or maximal knowledge. The formal argument would be: Reasoning is a function of consciousness. Logic is the science of sound reasoning. Sound reasoning is merely self-consistency among known data points. Therefore, the ontology or existence of logic emerges from knowledge, which is a function of consciousness. Maximal logic can only emerge from maximal knowledge or omniscience. Therefore, perfect morality is dependent upon perfect logic which is dependent on perfect knowledge which is a function of a maximally great mind, otherwise known as God. - Chris Waner How would you simplify this? What is required to logically analyze a situation? 1. We need a consciousness before we can gain knowledge or data. 2. We then need to gain or learn the knowledge or data set. 3. Only then can we use logic. Logic must follow data or knowledge. To gather the data, we need a consciousness. Logic cannot exist before this consciousness, only the data would exist. To fully and completely assess the perfect morality of a purposeful action then would require all of the data points possible. Kagan, in his social contract, wants to ascribe to this society all of the characteristics of God for this logical morality to be established and then he seeks to remove God, the only being who has all the necessary attributes. Additional Thoughts: Let s look at this from a couple of hot button issues in America, abortion or euthanasia. Does Logical Morality hold up? *Below is a series of texts between Chris and I on abortion and how Logical Morality would answer the question of do help and do good but do no harm purposefully. B=Brandon C=Chris, as devil s advocate B: Simply, if the whole argument is do good, do no harm, and society is setting the acceptable morality as Kagan says, are those who perform abortions or euthanasia moral? The intentionality or purpose is good but there is a perceived harm by many. This morality then boils down to a popularity contest. C: That s an interesting point, but I think that a significant case exists not only among Christians and believers in other religions but also among atheists that abortion does harm, 7 8

5 and therefore, would be immoral on those grounds alone. The facts then would remain exactly as they are. Where something is objectively doing harm, it is also objectively immoral, but not socially adopted. In other words, it stops being a moral question and starts being a policy or political problem. B: But wouldn t logical morality then be a popularity contest with no clear morality? C: No, abortion either does harm or it does not. You cannot have it both ways. The best argument that you could make is that there is a weighing of harm which must take place in order to determine whether the death of the baby is more harmful than the harm done to the mother by bringing the baby to term. B: I m quite sure here in America it is both ways. When a person wants the baby we have baby showers and if an expectant mother is killed the accused is charged with two murders. But if it is unwanted then the baby is referred to as a fetus or as a mass of tissue. Where does Logical morality fit it to that scenario? C: Kagan, I believe, would say that it doesn t. I m quite confident he would argue that the current state of abortion policy and cultural trends demonstrate selfish ego, which he would reject on those grounds alone. I have no doubt that he would return to the idea that the morals of abortion, like the morals of all topics, must be decided in an ego-free logical environment. B: Couldn t you respond by saying it may be his view that is the selfish view and reliant on his ego. I still contend the problem is who decides who is selfish, who is moral and who isn t. There is not center to logical morality. C: Yes, but I think given his general agnosticism, he would likely appeal to pragmatism at that point. In other words, he would admit that we can never know everything but through the use of sound logic with the existing set of data points we could come to reasonable conclusions. All of this brings up an interesting question, however, how much of our argument is predicated upon our world view. In other words, he might be suggesting that we should base morality on logic, not that we can find absolute morality through logic. B: Ok, but where does abortion land with our existing set of data points? Seems as a culture we are somewhere in the middle. So which one is the logically moral, pro-choice or prolife?... But if we base morality on logic as you think Kagan might be saying, it might be logically to kill off every child because we can t feed them. This type of thing leads to values clarification. Logic can then be abused to provide any morality we choose. Even if you took the side that starving therefore wouldn t intentionally hurt anyone, Kagan earlier makes the argument that Craig is wrong, when Craig says that killing people wouldn t really matter if we are just animals, Kagan says it matters to the person being killed, as he would have to admit to here, that the starving people would believe that they are being harmed so it would matter to them. C: Which is to say, that our assessment of the argument from last night is absolutely correct. You would have to have all knowledge, you would have to have omniscience, in order to find self-consistency among all data points. It s simply not actionable for temporal and limited beings. But since his definition requires perfect logic, it seems as though he is forced into admitting that logic is dependent upon consciousness. And that admission leads necessarily to the view that perfect logic is dependent upon a perfect and all-knowing mind, which we call God. 9 10

6 *The above was an extension of a conversation Chris and I had over coffee as we discussed possible counter arguments to Logical Morality. A brief conclusion to the arguments of Naturalism and Logic. Let s discuss the subjects of heroism, bravery and courage, briefly. Is it unlikely that either Evolutionary Naturalism or Logical Morality would ever require a person to be brave or heroic? Without objective morals and duties how are heroism, bravery, and courage explained? People in these cases would only be acting as evolution or logic dictates. In the reverse, the person who doesn t throw themselves in front of a bus to save the child cannot really be looked down upon or be called a coward, they too are just acting as evolution or logic dictate. We are courageous or brave or heroic not out of any logical or evolutionary morality, but from an objective morality which calls us to act unselfishly even when we don t want to. Here is what retired professor and atheist philosopher Kai Nielson said about reason or logic and morals in his book, Why Be Moral? We have not been able to show that reason requires a moral point of view, or that all really rational persons, unhoodwinked by myth or ideology, need not be individual egoists or classical amoralists. Reason doesn t decide here. The picture I have painted for you is not a pleasant one. Reflection on it depresses me. Pure practical reason, even a good knowledge of the facts, will not take you to morality. Because atheists are the ones most likely to say there is no objective morality, let s discuss them first. -Atheism and Morality: William Lane Craig vs Lewis Wolpert The question the atheist is avoiding is: where does his morality come from. The much harder questions I think the atheist must address are related to the grounds upon which he or she might criticize or judge the morals of others. Can an atheist be moral, can an atheist teach morality and can they extend that morality to others? Absolutely the atheist can be moral and there is nothing to keep an atheist from teaching morality or morals. However, this morality can only extend to his or her thoughts inwardly and his or her actions outwardly and not to others actions toward them or to the world. An atheist who teaches morality can pass along this morality, but can place no expectation for the person being taught to accept or obey it. One atheist could teach that stealing is ok, while the other teaches it is not. The question remains, that while the atheist can teach his morality, why should he or she expect anyone else to adhere to it? This isn t to say that the atheist may not have great moral standards, but in the end they are still, and can only be, his or her morality in the absence of an Objective Morality. If there is no objective morality, why don t atheists behave nihilistically? If morality is given by a creator (God), it is given to all. It is in the design. All humans know murder is wrong, stealing is wrong, abusing a child is wrong, rape is wrong. Ignoring this knowledge changes nothing and does not negate the fact that most cultures throughout the world and throughout time have adhered to this moral knowledge. We don t have discussions about the wrongness of murder, rape or abuse. What we do have are discussions about when they are permissible and under what circumstances. These are areas of personal morality which permeate the social discourse. But at the root, at our core: murder is wrong, rape is wrong and abuse is wrong; how can evolution explain this? Even if we were convinced that Naturalism provided good an

7 swers for why something might be considered moral or immoral, it doesn t explain the universal agreement about moral values and duties. We know instantly when we see something wrong or evil. So why not eat our young during a famine, kill our neighbor for better access to water or better lodging, or forcibly take what we want sexually? Even though you may not do these things out of your own sense of morality, this doesn t mean you can say that your neighbor can t. And if he does, you as an atheist, can t say your neighbor is doing anything morally wrong, unless you claim your moral compass is better than his. But then the atheist must explain why this is the case. Can atheists pass judgment against God, someone who in their mind doesn t exist? They can but only if certain obligations are met. Atheists can pass judgement on God if they hold Him only to the standard of a lesser making being, but then He is, therefore, not God but a created contingent being. And as a created being would have a lesser making being s sense of morality which they cannot question as they would like to question a greater making being s sense of morality. If an atheist truly believes there is no God, then their judgment against Him is misplaced or misguided, rather it must be directed toward the Christian who believes in God. And this I can understand. The questioning of how a person could believe and tell others they must believe in a God that instructs them to commit genocide is rather a good thing. But it turns out this also cannot be done because an atheist s morality can only extend to their own thoughts and actions and not put upon others, or in this case God. If they are truly angry with God and His action or non-action, then they aren t truly an atheist but more of an angry theist. There are two arguments that go something like this: There is no God or I can t believe in God because there is pain in the world; I can t believe in God because people go to hell; I can t believe in God because there is suffering. These lead to the next curious objection of the atheist or self-described atheist: I am angry at God because there is war and innocent people die; I am angry at God because there is starvation in the world. This person is in effect saying, The God I don t believe in wouldn t let these things happen. So is it that they don t believe God exists or are angry at God, and, therefore, don t wish to admit they believe in a God they don t understand? This is much like me saying, I don t believe in the Easter bunny and then getting mad at the Easter bunny for not giving Easter eggs to everyone in the world and not allowing everyone to go to Easter bunny heaven. How can a being I do not believe in be held responsible for all of the things which I don t consider fair? It turns out there are very few dictionary-defined atheists in the world. Most people confuse I don t believe God exists with I don t believe in God because. These are two completely different claims but a distinction of great importance. One is a belief that God or gods don t exist while the other stems from the idea that because pain and suffering are in the world, I can t or don t believe in a God who would allow this. I don t know how many of you have watched the debates on YouTube between William Lane Craig, the Christian apologist, and Sam Harris or Lawrence Krauss or Christopher Hitchens. In the end the debate usually devolves to the atheist not debating the Moral Argument but putting forth a series of questions about how if there was a God, then why is there genocide in the Bible, or if God is all knowing, all powerful and all loving, how could He allow human trafficking or children with cancer. Where is the morality of a god who is allowing this to happen? To which C.S. Lewis answers, Why do you care? You don t believe in God. Now I agree with him if the atheist doesn t believe God exists but not if he is asking how we, as Christians, can believe in a God that allows this to happen. These are questions we must have an answer to and we will discuss in depth in a few weeks

8 Now let s leave the atheist alone and asked a more general question. Can a non-believer (those not holding an atheist belief) or the agnostic be moral without God? Do they stand on more solid ground when directing their anger toward God? Turns out the answer is about the same as it was for the atheist, as atheist aren t the only ones to claim there is no objective morality. However non-believers or agnostics can express anger and confusion toward God without any hesitation or reservation. They aren t constrained by the belief that God or gods don t exist, but they are limited again to their morality only being their morality if, of course, they don t accept any objective morality. Simply put, non-believers, in whatever form, stand on more solid ground as far as being angry with a perceived unloving God, but they have no more footing when it comes to the matter of morality if they can t or don t explain where their morals come from. The more honest non-believer can agree there is an objective morality but simply choose not to follow the Creator of this morality because they don t like the God they see in the Bible or in the Christians who follow Him. Conclusions: Without an Objective Morality no one can make a claim with any certainty or clarity about what is moral, instead morals become a cacophony of ideas clamoring for recognition and supremacy. And that is the problem. Asides and Definitions: Kagan seems to think he has a point that Christians only obey from a fear of retribution. I m not sure why this objection is meaningful to him. Surely people would obey a logically moral contract he talks about for fear of retribution. This doesn t imply that the morals themselves are less than satisfactory or that anyone would necessarily be wrong in following them out of questionable motivations. What he doesn t account for is that many Christians choose to continue to do the morally right thing out of a sense of love, not duty (Craig missed pointing that out). Ontology and Epistemology Epistemology is the study of knowledge and what is knowable. Ontology is the study of being or existence. We should be clear that epistemology is distinct from ontology. In other words, a fact might exist (ontology) but not be known (epistemology). For example, a person in another room has written a number on a piece of paper. The fact is that the number is written and that the number is nine; ontologically these statements are existentially true. Yet, epistemically we might not know what the number is. Consequently, we find a frequent disparity between ontology and epistemology, between what is a fact and what is known to be a fact. Epistemology, unlike ontology, is a result of consciousness. In other words, knowing a fact requires a mind to know the fact. However, we might suggest that a fact could exist with no minds existing at all. If this is true, we find a further distinction between epistemology and ontology; specifically, ontology or existence is independent of mind; whereas, epistemology is dependent on mind. We must be clear, however, that in the case above ontology must precede epistemology. In other words, the existence of a fact must precede the knowledge of the fact. For this reason, it is possible that there is an ontology of an epistemology. Or put plainly, there can be an existential fact that a person s mind knows something. Consequently, we find a further characteristic of the relationship between ontology and epistemology to include that ontology or existence is the antecedent of epistemology or knowledge