Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will,

Transcription

1 Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, (or, How the existence of Truth entails that God exists) Introduction: In this chapter, Augustine and Evodius begin with three questions: (1) How is it manifest that God exists? (2) Do all things, insofar as they are good, come from God? (3) Should free will be counted as one of those good things? Most of the chapter is devoted to question (1), with many tangents along the way. Roughly, Augustine will attempt to prove that God exists by demonstrating that the nature of perception and knowledge entails that there exists something perfect and immutable. I Think, Therefore I Am: The first tangent occurs before we even get started. Augustine gives a brief proof for his starting assumption (namely, the assumption that he exists): I will first ask you whether you yourself exist. Or do you perhaps fear that you might be mistaken even about that? Yet you could certainly not be mistaken unless you existed. Well then, it is obvious that you exist (2.3, pg. 33) Basically, Augustine is saying that your own existence is absolutely, 100% certain. For, your existence is literally undoubtable. A few years later, in City of God (bk.11, ch.26), Augustine would expand on this idea (reading here): I need not quail before the Academicians when they say: What if you should be mistaken? Well, if I am mistaken, I exist. For a man who does not exist can surely not be mistaken either, and if I am mistaken, therefore I exist. So, since I exist if I am mistaken, how can I be mistaken in believing that I exist when it is certain that if I am mistaken, I exist. Therefore, from the fact that, if I were indeed mistaken, I should have to exist to be mistaken, it follows that I am undoubtedly not mistaken in knowing that I exist. Imagine that I say, I exist. Then, you (a supreme skeptic) come along and say, But, you might be mistaken. But, that s impossible. If I m mistaken about something, I would have to EXIST in order to BE mistaken. 1

2 Put it another way: When I claim that I exist, either (1) I m right, or (2) I m mistaken. If (1), then it follows that I exist. If (2), then I get a contradiction. For, in order to be mistaken about the fact that I exist, I d have to exist in order to BE mistaken. So, (2) is logically impossible. Therefore, (1) is guaranteed, and I can be absolutely certain that I exist. What s even more interesting about this is that Rene Descartes would become famous over 1,200 years later for saying almost exactly this same thing. Even today, Descartes still gets all of the credit. Everyone s heard of Descartes famous line, I think, therefore I am. But, no one s heard of Augustine s, If I am mistaken, I exist. The Hierarchy of Being: So far, we ve established that <It s obvious that I exist>. But, if that s true, then, in addition to: (i) I exist, The proposition above entails two more things: (ii) I am alive, and (iii) I have understanding. For, not only do you exist, but you are absolutely certain that you do. But, in order to be certain about anything, you must both be alive, and have understanding. Augustine orders these into a hierarchy, pointing out that everything at a higher tier possesses the attributes of all of the lower tiers, but not vice versa, like this: Understanding Life Existence (humans have understanding, life, and existence) (animals have life and existence, but not understanding) (rocks exist, but are neither alive, nor have understanding) He says that understanding is superior to life or existence BECAUSE having understanding entails having those other two things. Similarly, life is superior to existence BECAUSE having life entails having existence. He writes, 2

3 So a nature that has existence but not life or understanding, like an inanimate body, is inferior to a nature that has both existence and life but not understanding, like the souls of animals; and such a thing is in turn inferior to something that has all three, like the rational mind of a human being. (2.6, pg. 40) In short, Augustine orders the things that exist into a hierarchy or a Great Chain of Being an idea borrowed from the Ancient philosophers of Athens. Now, sentient beings have not only sensations (e.g., sight, smell, touch, etc.) but an inner sense which presides over them, and can move the creature to action. For instance, animals are moved to pursue certain (pleasurable) sensations and avoid other (painful) sensations. This motivation is not itself one of the five senses but nor is it reason, since animals have it. (Only humans have reason; i.e., the ability to think rationally, define terms, acquire knowledge, etc.) In short, among sentient creatures, there is a hierarchy of mental processes: Reason The Inner Sense Sensation (the ability to understand, know, etc.) (presides over sensations and moves a creature to action) (e.g., sight, smell, touch, taste, sound) Summary So Far: Augustine began by pointing out that you know at least one thing with certainty: (i) You exist. But, your certainty of this entails that you know two at least more things: (ii) You are alive, and (iii) You understand. In turn, further contemplation of these three attributes led to the conclusion that there is a hierarchy of superiority between them, with mere existence at the bottom, and reason or understanding at the top. The next question is, might there be something even more superior still? Something superior to reason? Proof of God s Existence: Keep in mind that, ultimately, we re asking whether there is any evidence that God exists. Augustine asks the following question: What if we could find something that you were certain not only exists, but is more excellent than our reason? Would you hesitate to say that this thing, whatever it is, is God? (2.6, pg. 40) Evodius replies that MERELY being superior to reason would not be enough, but being superior to ALL things would be. If we could find THAT sort of thing, we would have found God. What follows is Augustine s argument for the existence of this sort of thing. 3

4 Something Fixed and Immutable: Augustine begins by pointing out that each of us has access to our own personal sense (i.e., sensations). For instance, you might ask, Are you seeing what I m seeing? because you do not have access to my inner sensory experiences you only have access to your own. Similarly, each of us has access only to our own reason not that of others. I might understand something that you do not. And you will not know that I understand it unless I report to you that I do. However, surely the OBJECT of our sensations can be the same. Augustine writes, But surely you wouldn t say that each of us has a private sun that he alone sees, or personal moons and stars and things of that sort. Although your sense is distinct from my sense, it can happen that what you see is not distinct from what I see, but is a single thing that is present to both of us. (2.7, pg. 41) This is especially obvious with sight and sound. We can see the same Moon. We can hear the same song. With touch, we can both touch all of something, but not at the same time. With smell and taste, the object of our sensation isn t EXACTLY the same thing, since I do not inhale the same part of the air or eat the same part of the food as you. (2.7, pg. 42) We cannot perfectly share these things. For, air, food, and drink have parts that we take and transform into a part of ourselves. (2.7, pg. 43) (Though, we can still taste the same drink or the same food in some broader sense.) But, with this exception, many objects of sensation do not become our own private property, as it were. (pg. 43) Rather, they are common and public property that is, they can be perceived by everyone without any change or transformation. (2.7, pg. 44) Reason: So, are there any common objects of REASON? i.e., things that we can all perceive with reason without consuming or transforming it into private property? Evodius gives an answer: Numbers. We can ALL perceive truths about numbers with our reason, and when we do so, we do not destroy or change these truths. These truths are fixed, secure, and unchangeable (he also calls them incorruptible and immutable ). Seven plus three equals ten, not just now, but always; it has never been and never will be the case that seven plus three does not equal ten. (2.8, pg. 44) 4

5 On Numbers: Side tangent. Augustine argues that all numbers are really just different multiples of ONE. For Augustine, all of the numbers that aren t one don t seem to exist fundamentally rather, they re derivative of one. For 2 is really just one twice. 3 is one thrice. And so on. Furthermore, ONE is not just another name for a single physical object. For, any time you think you see one object, it always has a left half and a right half, a top and a bottom, etc. So, objects are always MANY, rather than one. So, one is not a material thing. Yet, we still know of it. For, you couldn t know that objects weren t ONE unless you already had a prior concept of one. And, since the bodily senses only perceive physical things, we must have come to know about one through some other sense. Namely, We see it by an inner light of which the bodily sense knows nothing. (pg. 46) Wisdom: Augustine shifts his attention. He states that wisdom is the truth by which one discerns the highest good, and how to pursue it (2.9, pg. 47). Furthermore, he thinks our highest good is happiness. We all want to be happy. Happiness might come in different forms for different people (I love the mountains; you love the beach), but this doesn t mean that happiness itself isn t a single good. (He thinks it IS a single good.) Still, even if we DID each have our own private highest good (something different for every person), this does not entail that there is more than one WISDOM by whose light we discern our private good (just as there is only one Sun, even though we all perceive different things by its light). So, here is a truth that seems obvious to ALL of us: Wisdom should be diligently sought after. (2.10, pg. 50) Furthermore, the following all seem to be fixed truths that are true for all as well: One ought to live justly. One should not love corruption, but rather incorruption. The uncorrupted is better than the corrupt. The eternal is better than the temporal. The invulnerable is better than the vulnerable. It seem that, the better you see them and live your life by these, the more wisdom you have (and vice versa). Consider, e.g., someone who lives by the second: when they choose the very thing that everyone admits they ought to choose, and turn their souls toward it, can it be denied that they choose wisely? (2.10, pg. 51) 5

6 Therefore, These truths are a part of wisdom. (2.10. pg. 51) Furthermore, just as we saw that numbers have a fixed and unchangeable order, there are also true and unchangeable rules of wisdom. (2.10, pg. 52) [Note all of the Platonic imagery so far: (i) We see eternal truths by the light of Wisdom just as we see material objects by the light of the Sun. (ii) Wise persons turn their souls toward the eternal, unchangeable truths of Wisdom. Sound familiar?] Next, Augustine explores whether number and wisdom are the same thing, with a beautifully poetic tribute to the wonder of numbers (on pg. 53). (iii) Similarly, in the section of the Republic just after the allegory of the cave (not assigned) Plato goes on to suggest that the two most important things that should be taught are arithmetic and geometry, since those studies are best for turning the soul around, away from becoming, and towards truth and being. ] Truth: So, just as there are some things that we can all share an experience of with sense perception, there are also some things that we can all share with reason. Namely, TRUTH (e.g., truths of number, truths of wisdom). But, Truth is either (a) inferior, (b) equal, or (c) superior to reason. Which one is it? (a) Truth is not inferior to reason. Things that are inferior to reason are things that we make judgments ABOUT (i.e., we judge that they OUGHT to be a certain way) rather than judgments IN ACCORDANCE WITH (i.e., we judge that they ARE a certain way). But, we are in no position to make judgments ABOUT Truth. No one says that 7+3 ought, or ought not, to equal 10. Rather, we just say that it DOES equal 10. [Keep in mind that Augustine is concerned with Truth with a capital T, the fixed and unchangeable truths. Perhaps truths with a lower-case t are ones that we DO make judgments about. For instance: It s true that you re sleeping in, when it ought to be the case or, it ought to be true that you re in class.] With respect to Truth (capital T ), we are like explorers who rejoice in what they have discovered, not like inspectors who have to put things right. (2.12, pg. 55) (b) Truth is not equal to reason. Reason/the mind changes. Sometimes, reason sees the truth more clearly, sometimes less so and this changes over time. But, 6

7 Truth itself does not change, or get better or worse, or clearer or dimmer, as we move toward or away from it. So, Truth cannot be equal to reason. (c) Therefore, Truth is superior to reason. If Truth is neither inferior nor equal to reason, it follows that it is superior to it. Oh! But, remember the question that was initially asked: What if we could find something that you were certain not only exists, but is more excellent than our reason? Would you hesitate to say that this thing, whatever it is, is God? (2.6, pg. 40) We ve just done so! What is more excellent than reason? Truth! Section 2.13 is basically one giant love poem to Truth, ending with, and the truth is God himself. Furthermore, Truth is not private, or consumable. ALL can simultaneously enjoy it. (2.14, pg. 57) [Notice this is just Plato, with the addition that Truth/The Good = God.] God Exists Augustine has proven that God exists, since we have shown that Truth exists, and Truth is God. He writes, Now you had conceded that if I proved the existence of something higher than our minds, you would admit that it was God, as long as there was nothing higher still. I accepted this concession, and said that it would be enough if I proved that there is something higher than our minds. For if there is something more excellent than the truth, then that is God; if not, the truth itself is God. So in either case you cannot deny that God exists. (2.15, pg. 58) So, his argument is really this: 1. Truth exists, and is superior to reason. 2. Either (a) Truth is the most excellent thing, i.e., the highest good, or (b) it is not. 3. If (a), then Truth is God. 4. But, if (b), then there is something even more excellent than Truth in which case THAT thing is God. 5. Conclusion: Either way, God exists. Evodius rejoices. We have proven the existence of God. Or, Truth, and it is the highest good, the good that makes us happy. (2.15, pg. 59) 7

8 [Objection: But, what if (a) is correct? Does this really sound like the God of Christianity? Reply: Augustine would probably reply by pointing out that, what we ve just discovered is a HIGHEST GOOD; a most excellent and perfect thing that is the source of Justice, Beauty, Goodness, Truth, and Wisdom, and which we all admit even the atheist admits that we ought to strive toward. Isn t this exactly the sort of thing the theist is referring to when they speak of the divine?] [Another worry: Evodius says that Truth makes us happy. Yet, it sure seems like truth often makes us sad. For instance, when you learn truths about failing a test, or someone lying to you, or the fact that unicorns don t exist. Reply: But, keep in mind, Augustine is talking about Truth with a capital T these are truths that could not be any other way. They are fixed and unchangeable (e.g., the rules of numbers and wisdom). On the other hand, you could have passed that test, your friend could have NOT lied to you, and God could have made unicorns. So, these (contingent, changeable) truths are just truths with a lower-case t.] 8