Emotions and Epistemic Value: How Our Hearts Tell Us What Our Minds Cannot Jason Sangiamo Spring Introduction

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1 Emotions and Epistemic Value: How Our Hearts Tell Us What Our Minds Cannot Jason Sangiamo Spring Introduction Philosopher Adam Pesler has recently argued that emotions can be a source of epistemic justification. Epistemic justification is a measure of how likely a belief is to be true. His theory, coined the Justificatory Thesis, contends that beliefs can be non-inferentially justified by emotions themselves. This is to say that it is the very presence of the emotion itself rather than a corresponding inference that serves as an epistemic justifier. In his paper titled Emotion, Evaluative Perception, and Epistemic Justification, Pesler presents a number of arguments in favor of the Justificatory Thesis, the strongest of which is that some beliefs seem impossible to justify without emotions (Pesler, p. 11). One objection that philosopher Michael Brady has raised in response to Pesler s argument is that emotions themselves must be justified by other sources of epistemic justification, such as perceptual experience, and therefore should not count as a form of justification themselves. I believe that Pesler s argument withstands this criticism because there do exist beliefs for which an emotion is the only epistemic justifier and because even in instances of emotions being dependent on other epistemic justifiers, they may still be epistemic justifiers themselves. 2.0 The Justificatory Thesis: Introduction to Thick Evaluative Beliefs Pesler s theory effectively explains our proclivity to trust emotions as justifying evidence for beliefs (Pesler, p. 3). However, he believes that emotions most likely only serve as independent sources of epistemic justification for what he calls thick evaluative beliefs 1

2 (Pesler, p. 1). A thick evaluative belief is one that carries deep and rich content rather than a simple evaluation of something as good or bad. For example, the belief that a painting is good would be a thin evaluative belief whereas the belief that a painting is innovative would be a thick evaluative belief. One question upon which Pesler s argument hinges is whether there are some thick evaluative beliefs that require an emotion. If this is the case, this would be strong evidence in support of his thesis that emotions are an independent source of epistemic justification because it would mean that the emotion itself is doing the epistemic work for the belief. 2.1 The Justificatory Thesis: Emotion and Thick Evaluative Beliefs Pesler contends that some beliefs are justified by one s direct experience of the value properties instantiated in the state of affairs the belief is about (Pesler, 8). This is to say that a belief about a certain event might be formed by one relating to it emotionally. For example, I believe that torture is abhorrent, despite my never having experienced it. I hold this belief because I have experienced some of the properties implicit in torture such as intense pain and being stripped of my autonomy, and the emotions associated with these experiences allow me to, in a way, experience torture emotionally. My belief that torture is abhorrent is dependent upon me being able to relate to it emotionally in this way. Pesler takes this argument one step further and goes on to say not only are there beliefs that we may form on the basis of emotion, but in addition, there are beliefs that we must form on the basis of emotion (Pesler p. 10). The example he puts forth is of an autistic scientist overlooking a beautiful mountain range (Pesler, p. 11). As she does so, she is asked if she thinks the mountain range is sublime. When asked this 2

3 question, she simply does not know how to respond because, as Pesler argues, she is unable to form the belief that something is sublime because she is without that belief s associated emotion: awe (Pesler, p. 11). She could however, establish the belief that the mountain range was pretty. What distinguishes an evaluation of something being sublime versus an evaluation of something being pretty such that she can form the latter but not the former? Pesler argues that to believe something is sublime is an inherently emotional belief (Pesler, p. 9). Where the judgement that something is sublime requires one to be able to feel the emotion awe, judgement that something is pretty requires no such emotion; it is simply an evaluation of aesthetic value and therefore the woman can form the belief that the mountain range is pretty. Herein lies one major point in Pesler s favor: the scientist s lack of emotional response to the mountain range preempted her from being able to evaluate it as sublime (Pesler, p. 9). If it is the case that there are beliefs such as these that require emotion to be formed, this would be strong evidence in favor of the Justificatory Thesis. 3.0: The Common Source Objection: Overview The strongest objection put forth against Pesler s Justificatory Thesis is articulated by philosopher Michael Brady who argues that emotions themselves are not capable of doing epistemic work, and instead they merely track certain non-evaluative epistemic justifiers (Brady, p ). If it is the case for all emotion-based beliefs that the emotion is merely serving as a proxy for non-evaluative reasons to hold that belief, this would be strong evidence against the core of Pesler s argument. Referring back to Pesler s core example, if the autistic woman could learn to identify things as sublime or not sublime based solely off of their non- 3

4 evaluative properties, Brady would argue that one s feeling of awe is merely a proxy for whatever these properties are (Brady, ). 3.1 The Common Source Objection: Relevant Features of Emotional Justification An integral component of Brady s argument is that unlike perceptual experiences, which are direct justifiers, meaning they do not need to be justified themselves, emotional experiences are indirect justifiers, meaning they themselves need to be justified (Pesler, p. 16). Borrowing an example from Pesler, consider a man who, based on little evidence, believes that his wife is cheating on him and feels jealous because of it (Pesler, p. 16). Clearly, this emotion is in some way unjustified because the man is without good reason to believe that his wife is cheating. As Pesler observes, in order for an emotion to be justified, the beliefs about the object of that emotion must be justified (Pesler, p. 16). In the case of the man who believes his wife to be cheating based off of insufficient evidence, clearly the beliefs foundational to his belief are unjustified and this is why the emotion is unjustified. If it is the case that all emotions are indirect justifiers, then Brady can go on to make the case that this disqualifies them from doing real epistemic work. 3.2 The Common Source Objection: Emotions as Proxys The core of Brady s argument is that as indirect justifiers, emotions are reliant upon certain non-evaluative properties in their formation and we should therefore attribute the epistemic work being done in the creation of these supposedly emotion-based beliefs to the non-evaluative properties rather than the emotion itself (Brady, p ). His most cogent example of an emotion not doing epistemic work involves a dog that has sharp teeth, a rapid 4

5 gait, and is very large that is rapidly approaching a man (Brady, p ). As the dog approaches, the man feels fear and forms the belief that the dog is dangerous (Brady, p. 143). Brady argues that our emotional response is necessarily based off of the non-evaluative properties of the dog; the man s fear is based off of the sharpness of the dog s teeth, speed of approach, and size (Brady, p. 143). But, he argues, these non-evaluative reasons are, in and of themselves, reasons to belief that the dog is dangerous (Brady, p. 143). These emotion-relevant features of the object of the emotion are also reasons to form the same evaluative judgement that the emotion causes (Brady, 143). Since it is possible to form the same evaluative belief on the basis of non-evaluative direct epistemic justifiers, Brady argues that it isn t just the case that emotion might track these non-evaluative properties, but rather that they should, in all cases, be reducible to such properties and therefore are never really doing any epistemic work (Brady, p. 143). 4.0 Pesler s Response: Overview Pesler responds to Brady s objection that there are non-evaluative properties underlying emotions such that they should not be viewed as doing epistemic work in two ways. First, he demonstrates that there are instances in which an emotion does direct epistemic work meaning it exists independent of underlying non-evaluative properties. Second, he argues that even in the case of emotions that are justified by non-evaluative properties, we should still consider these emotions as doing epistemic work. 4.1 Pesler s Response: Emotions as Direct Epistemic Justifiers 5

6 In response to Brady s claim that emotions do not serve as direct epistemic justifiers, Pesler argues that there are instances in which beliefs are justified solely and non-inferentially on an emotion (Pesler p. 17). The example he puts forth is that of an estranged father discovering that his daughter has died. Prior to her passing, the father believed that she was of little value to him and therefore did not anticipate her passing to affect him so strongly (Pesler, p. 17). Now, after his daughter has passed, the father feels intense grief over her loss (Pesler, p. 17). However, the belief consequent to grief is that one has experienced an irrevocable loss of someone valuable. The father had no prior reason to believe that his daughter was so valuable to him but, because of his grief, he comes to realize that her passing is a great loss to him (Pesler, p. 17). In this instance, it would seem that the emotion is a direct epistemic justifier for the belief that the daughter was valuable and, in fact, it is the only epistemic justifier for that belief (Pesler, p. 17). This example demonstrates that there are instances in which an emotion is doing direct epistemic work. 4.2 Pesler s Response: The Value of Indirect Epistemic Justifiers One major question that remains is whether emotions that are indirect epistemic justifiers can be viewed as doing epistemic work. To answer this question, Pesler invokes an example of a color-blind man sorting socks (Pesler, p ). Say, for the sake of argument, that his socks are either red or green; two colors between which the man is unable to distinguish. However, all of the red socks have stripes and all of the green socks do not. On the basis of the socks being with or without stripes, the man is able to sort the socks whereas anyone who is not color blind would merely sort the socks on the basis of their color. However, we would never say that the perception-based belief of someone who is not color blind of the 6

7 socks being red or green is not an epistemic justifier just because there are other ways of justifying the belief. Analogously, there may be an emotionless way of forming certain beliefs, but this does not mean we should attribute the justification of evaluative beliefs to this emotionless evidence (Pesler, p, 19). Borrowing the example from section 2.1, perhaps the autistic woman could learn to categorize the mountains as sublime based on certain emotionless evidence, but this doesn t mean that we should say that the beliefs of everyone who thought the mountains were sublime based on emotional evidence were really justified by the non-evaluative properties of the mountain. 5.0 Conclusion I believe that Pesler s argument that emotions can be epistemic justifiers for thick evaluative beliefs withstands the forceful objection put forth by Brady. Brady s objection is entirely undone by Pesler s example of the estranged father s daughter passing and, even in cases for which the emotion is an indirect epistemic justifier, Pesler makes a convincing argument that this doesn t mean we should dismiss the emotion as having done epistemic work. As Pesler points out, just because emotions may be tracking or correlated with these nonevaluative properties, this does not entail that they do no epistemic work. Brady only provides softball examples, such as that of the dog approaching the man, when arguing that emotions track non-evaluative features to the extent that we ought to consider them as having not done epistemic work. If presented with some of Pesler s examples and arguments, Brady would likely find that his argument is indefensible. For these reasons, I believe that Pesler s Justificatory Thesis is correct and more than capable of addressing every concern brought up in Brady s objection. 7

Robert Audi, The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and. Substance of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Pp. xvi, 286.

Robert Audi, The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. xvi, 286. Reviewed by Gilbert Harman Princeton University August 19, 2002