Oeneral situation in Europe with partioular reference to Romany. Former Chanoellor Brunlng and Mr. Measersralth.

Transcription

1 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation DATE: January 31 % SUBJECT: Oeneral situation in Europe with partioular reference to Romany. PARTICIPANTS.- Former Chanoellor Brunlng and Mr. Measersralth. COPIES TO: The Secretary The Under Secretary Mr. Dunn _ P/(/ Mr. Moffat JZL*> rrlfc &* F*> u ^^t^~ ^ BPO The former Chancellor of Qermnny, Dr. Brunlng, who is an ol^ friend,»pent last evening with me at ray home prior to scaling fo# England whex* he will spend the next three or four months at oxford. He has been spending four or five months quietly at Lowell House at Cambridge. Although Br. Brunlng refrains alraost entirely from commenting oa the general situation, the following may be of interest. He said that he felt that the approach which our Government was ranking to * Battlement of the general problem was the correct one. We were arming to be prepared for defens* at a time when thlss was the only prudent and was the essential thing to do. At the same time we were approaching the problem through our trade agreements program i» a constructive

2 -3- oonstruotive manner. The political approach h*a been tried for years and was definitely unsuccessful. "The post war 11 had grown out of economic condition* and.the healing approachraustbe through economic appeasement. He hoped that we would continue on our program for, while the effects would be slow, they were being steady nn& inre. Italy and, Germany could not in the end stand up against this pressure. It might be one more year and 1% might be three years but they could not in the end resist and would be obliged to adapt their * onorai* system to the general one we were trying t bring about. These oonoaic change* in Germany would be accompanied by the necessary political one* there and give ft reasonable hope for peace. He u?as much concerned about conditions in Germany. Thing* were getting worse in every way rather than better to the country. There were likely to be some change* but he did not think them of much significance except as indicating a *trengthening of the radicalftleiaante.blomberg was really nut ft!! man and he felt sure that his.marriage would be seized as the opportunity for retiring him. He had not been well since 1931 or 1932 when he had hi* accident. Since then he had been suffering from occasional mental disturbances nnd was at times really out of his hesd. It did not mnten so much difference for the present who replaced him

3 tjmm hla as long as Fritoh and Beck remained. Goering was trying to get the Army under hie oontrol but under present wfinditlona fcven if he were made Minister of $ar it would not mean hie controlling the Army with Fritoh and Beck remaining. It would, however, be a.step in the direction of getting the Army, police and 3.3. under one head. There was no doubt that Hlmral * mn& his group were definitely opposed to Goering and that Himmler eventually hoped to be the head of all the armed forces. If that came about no one oould make any prognopt lections about what would happen in Germany and in Europe. He kmtw that Hlramle* was openly saying in Berlin that some of the Array Generals (meaning Bedfc and Fritoh) should get the same treatment as certain Generals had reoeived in Russia. It was a question as to how long Fritoh and Beck could stay. They had steadfastly refused to send troops to Spain toward th* end of 1936 at Hitler's demand. They would have been replaced then but Hitler had not found a single high ranking general whp would wwplaoe them. It wnt a sort of strike of the Army. Even General Reiohenau had refused to replaow Fritoh or Beok. The position of Fritoh and Beck had, howeve# f recently ween weakened on ncoouwt of various Englishmen going to Berlin and telling Hitler that no matter what Gerraafljf ** * England would not move. This disturbed even

4 even some of the other general liondonderry had tola Hitler he ooulet movs Into the Rhlneland and England would not move. He knew that Flandin haft reoently been in Berlin and told Hitler that fvanca would not move even in oai?e of German encroachment n Czechoslovakia* It was the same old story of 1914 Simon then had told the German Ambassador in London what the situation in the British, cabinet wan and that If It oats to a vote there would be a balance of two against nglan<ft Joining In a war. and this is what influenced the Germans then to go ahead. Dr. Pruning emphasised the important part which the Amy was playing tit Germany but that.it was a question as to how long It could hold this position, once it no longer had this control over foreign policy, particularly external adventures, war was almost a certainty. He was a good deal concerned about the English position for they Aid not cent to be able t sake up their mind. Chamberlain was a good Chancellor of the &xohe<num» but he was not a statesman and could not get away from his City ideas and Influences, fher were too many still in the Oity whose principal Interest was in immediate profits,. Chamberlain wag too old and too Inflexible to ohange hia ideas. If England woult establish a definite policy in the right direction of standing up to Germany and Italy, Chamberlain would have to

5 go. If he went, Dr f Brunlng felt «ure that BXman oul* not stay 1» the Cabinet. K ale* felt sure that in that ease Koare would have to go for Labor would then no longer tolerate him and he was too vulnerable on account of hie tin connections and certain soandalt which touched hi. Chamberlin, Moaro t Simon and Horaan rest *8ider the strange delusion that if they did not support in eoa#w%y this present government in Oerraany, it would be followed by oooraunlg&u fhay did not realise that there wn.already something in Oenaany far worse than oonraunlsm in Husnia and that what would oorae if they supported this present government in Germany would be even worse still and that instead of bringing appeasement the situation for England would be even worse than thajr now feared. He was vary peaslaiatio with regard to the Van Iceland report* j$ wa useless to try any approach througa a meeting of the five powers a he had suggested. Italy and Germany would never enter' auoh a conference except to sabotage it. Italy might be willing to Hake certain concessions of real value and could be brought into line but Germany would not do so. King Leopold was trying to follow out th tradition of hie father who had been a wise Kid sound man. 1?he Queen Mother was ala* advising her son to go slowly. He had talked over the Van Zealand plans with her at length. The young King was a fine man but oould not realise

6 -6- realist* the scop of the problem. He was getting too many letters froia hie sister in Italy and wa$ seeing tine whole problem froia to# narrow a point of view. Van Seeland was a good economist but not a statesman. His last talk that he had with hl«aftofp seeing the <^ueen Mother was most disillusioning.. He had the most naive viewa about Germany and the Gersaana. It was really appalling to find that a man about to make such a report had. so little understanding of the German situation and the elements and personalities Involved. It T-as useless to think of ooncesnions to Germany as helping the situation as ah was not prepared to and would not make any counter concessions that would be lived up to. T!il# was the great fallacy and whewi the thinking of so raany went wrong. Ai a Garraan he mist be presumed to kno* ecu*. thing about that. There were plenty of sound sen in Germany today and the sound ones would nevur get control of their country If the rest of the world did not make a more firm stand. He said that he thought we in thic country were,doing all that we could and that we were on the right path. He hoped that we would stand up,to England and insist on a fair constructive trade agreement. It was the beat thing we could do for the whole world. The English wara a strange people?. They understood one thing and that waa a firm steady attitude in

7 -'T IS others. If they found that we were going ta stand up firmly In thesa negotiations they would finally acme around. If tha* found our attitude such that they thought they «ouli swing us away from our main principles and objectives, the situation would only be made worse. He was confident that an American-British trade agreement was the next great constructive, step and we could d a great service to peace by not swerving. &van Chamberlain inflexlbla as he was and influenced by the City a* he was would have to give waf* It was too bad, he said, that the British were writing in. their papera the way they were about our country recently. They ^ere having a very real recension la business there today and ware trying to hlda it by talking about that in the United states* It was a very short-sighted policy, h said, but we must reraetabap what kind of men aontrol In tha City today, fhey are a wry short-sighted lot, he said* He said that he was naturally much disturbed over thla armaments program beeausa, although neoesaary reduction in armaments would have to b» slow, he kn»w aotaething about generals and admirals and their methods* Ones it had been decidad in principle in a Cabinet to give the a new kind of gun, it was useless to try to stop them until every single unit had the new gun * Under any circumstance a* since economy in so many countries was so largely based on armaments, reduction would have to be slow* It was well to remember this

8 this at it was just one of those facts that had to be faced ana. that idealists found it hart! to face the facts. As %, war, he felt that the worst p*h.ase war? past about a year ago. It Was now a question as to whether England would evolve toon enough a definite policy and keep her arraastents program going. If we west on with our trad agreements program and England joined in, slow hut steady progress would be raade toward bringing most of the world In Una and littlt by littlt those fundamental ohanget would be mad* which would eventually force Germany and Italy to bring their economic system* into line. When that point came there wars those in G-ermany who would see that the necessary political changes were sad there. 1'he important factor in the meantime was no faltering in thl* program of determined economic approach and no concessions of any kind to Germany and Italy. & 3. lie sser smith. A-M;Q3I*:VN0