The Mind-Body Problem

Transcription

1 The Mind-Body Problem

2 Group Theories 1. Using your notes, identify at least three and no more than five people whose theories are similar to/compatible with your own. 2.Discuss and agree to precise answers to the following questions: What are the body, mind, brain and soul? Your answers must include precise definitions that describe the nature and composition of each item (what, if anything, it is made of). How (if at all) each item interacts with the others. How this interaction takes place (be specific) Your answers to the questions must clearly indicate when, if ever, your explanation is is describing actual existence and relationships and when, if ever, your explanation is describing metaphoric (non-actual) existence and relationships. 3.Your group should discuss and agree to one major problem your theory faces - in other words - which aspects of the above were hard to explain and why. 4.Finally, your group should prepare a poster which diagrams the relationships between the items and includes brief definitions for each item. the poster should be technical and not artistic. Please be prepared to present your theory tomorrow.

3 What is it for something to be real? Ontology Monism Idealism What is the nature of existence? What is the difference between appearance and reality? What exists in the universe?

4 What is it for something to be real? Ontology Monism Idealism What is the nature of existence? What is the difference between appearance and reality? Physicalism/materialism Dualism Pluralism What exists in the universe?

5 Rene Descartes and substance dualism Biography Systematic doubt/ rationalist epistemology

6 Systematic doubt The world known to the senses - including the body Illusions Dreams

7 The world known to the senses, including the body Illusions Dreams

8 Next! Mathematics The Evil Genius

9 Mathematics The Evil Genius

10 ...Is everything in doubt?! I think it might be

11 But wait, that s it! Just for a moment, try to doubt that you are thinking.

12 I can t, therefore, I am!

13 The Cogito - I think, therefore I am Unshakeable, even by evil demons!

14 From this basis, Descartes reasons existence of God Material things The mathematical basis of the universe

15 The world known to the senses - Illusions The world known by mathematics The physical world Dreams God Mathematics Innate ideas The evil genius The Cogito - I think, therefore I am

16 Substance dualism Minds and bodies are fundamentally different things, but each is real

17 Arguments for substance dualism Conceivability 1.I cannot doubt my mind exists (Systematic doubt) 2.I can doubt my body exists 3.If two things are identical, everything true of one is true of the other (Leibniz law) 4.There is something that is true of my mind that is not true of my body Therefore: My mind and my body are not the same thing

18 Arguments for substance dualism Intentionality 1.Some mental states are intentional 2.No physical states (bodies) are intentional 3.If two things are identical, everything true of one is true of the other (Leibniz law) 4.There is something that is true of my mind that is not true of my body Therefore: My mind and my body are not the same thing

19 Arguments for substance dualism Disembodied Pain (Gertler) 1. I can conceive of experiencing this very pain without its physical features 2.If I can conceive of a scenario then it is possible 3.It is possible that this very pain occurs in a disembodied being 4.If this very pain was identical to a physical state, it could not occur in a disembodied being 5.This very pain is not identical to a physical state (b/c it occurs w/o physical stimulation) Conclusion: The argument that every mental state is identical to some physical state is false and dualism must be true

20 Implications Humans are composed of both a body and a mind Bodies exist in space and are subject to physical laws Bodies are public Minds do not exist in space and are not subject to physical laws Minds are private Minds and bodies exert causal influence over one another

21 The appeal of dualism Problems with Descartes Model The problem of interaction

22 Law of Conservation of Energy Energy can be converted from one form to another (potential energy can be converted to kinetic energy) but the total energy within the domain remains fixed. Accessed on at

23 The appeal of dualism Problems with Descartes Model The problem of interaction Occam s Razor

24 William of Occam ( )

25 The appeal of dualism Problems with Descartes Model The problem of interaction Occam s Razor Solipsism/the problem of other minds

26 The problem of other minds is the problem of how to justify the almost universal belief that others have minds very like our own. (Accessed on at

27 The appeal of dualism Problems with Descartes Model The problem of interaction Occam s Razor Solipsism/the problem of other minds Category errors

28 Gilbert Ryle ( ) There is a doctrine about the nature and place of the mind which is prevalent among theorists, to which most philosophers, psychologists and religious teachers subscribe with minor reservations. Although they admit certain theoretical difficulties in it, they tend to assume that these can be overcome without serious modifications being made to the architecture of the theory... [the doctrine states that] with the doubtful exceptions of the mentally-incompetent and infants-in-arms, every human being has both a body and a mind.... The body and the mind are ordinarily harnessed together, but after the death of the body the mind may continue to exist and function. Such in outline is the official theory. I shall often speak of it, with deliberate abusiveness, as "the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine." I hope to prove that it is entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle. It is not merely an assemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is, namely, a category mistake. (Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 1949)

29 A category Mistake from Alice in Wonderland "Four thousand two hundred and seven, that's the exact number," the King said, referring to his book. "I couldn't sent all the horses... And I haven't sent the two Messengers, either. They're both gone to the town. Just look along the road, and tell me if you can see either of them." "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. "I only wish I had such eyes," the king remarked in a fretful tone. "To be able to see Nobody! And at that distance too! Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people, by this light!"

30 Materialist theories of mind Life is but a motion of the limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principle part within; why, may we not say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings, and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer. (Thomas Hobbes - Leviathan 1649)

31 The Basis for Logical Behaviorism Ludwig Wittgenstein Private language Beetles and Boxes

32 Logical Behaviorism Only the observable can be studied Minds = linguistic fiction The concept of mind is eliminated Mental language = shorthand for behavior

33 The Theory Minds and mental language are convenient linguistic fictions - they describe nothing real (there is no ghost in the machine). The statement, Ms. Hurst believes a tiger has escaped from the zoo is just shorthand for her behavior or her propensity to behave in certain circumstances - the statement describes no real internal processes. The real meaning of the statement would be expressed as follows: If she has a phone, Ms. Hurst will call the neighbors and the police. If the tiger is outside, Ms. Hurst will lock and barricade the doors If the windows are open, ms. Hurst will draw the curtains (etc. etc.)

34 Strengths of Behaviorism No problem of interaction! The theory is based entirely upon evidence (behaviors) that is observable and measurable and thus subject to scientific inquiry

35 Problems of Behaviorism Endless qualifications What about mental language that doesn t refer to observable behavior? What about deceptive behavior? Consciousness?

36 Mind-Brain Identity JC Smart

37 Mind-Brain Identity Phineas Gage

38 Reduction not elimination Mind - Brain Water - H2O Lightning - Electrical discharge between clouds Chemistry - physics

39 Strengths of identity theory No problem of interaction. It solves the problem of interaction without the problems associated with behaviorism Identity theory fits neatly into the scientific model of investigating the mind empirically.

40 Criticisms of Identity Theory Correlation is not identity No brain, no mind Consciousness The eliminative objection Chauvinism/moral hazard objection

41 Mental language = Folk psychology (Paul and Patricia Churchland) This theory is not reductionist but eliminative Demonic possession = Hallucinatory Psychosis Mind = Brain Likewise, what we now call consciousness will someday be explained by clearer, more precise, and less mysterious language

42 Problems with eliminative materialism The theory offers no explanation for why we have experience (the problem of consciousness). If consciousness is merely a folk psychology words describing a neurological event, this suggests that our experience of consciousness is an illusion. How can this be so (think of the cogito) If so, why do we have experience?

43 Frank C. Jackson and the Qualia Argument Jackson s thought experiments related to qualia: Fred Mary Accessed on at

44 VI.Materialist theories of mind (continued) A.Behaviorism B.Mind Body Identity C.Eliminative Materialism D. Functionalism

45 Functionalism What makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Any physical system that is complex enough to recreate the functional interactions between the neurons in our brain can have a mind (Rauhut 233).

46 A functionalist theory might characterize pain as a state that tends to be caused by bodily injury, to produce the belief that something is wrong with the body and the desire to be out of that state, to produce anxiety, and, in the absence of any stronger, conflicting desires, to cause wincing or moaning. According to this theory, all and only creatures with internal states that meet these conditions, or play these roles, are capable of being in pain. Suppose that, in humans, there is some distinctive kind of neural activity (Cfiber stimulation, for example) that meets these conditions. If so, then according to this functionalist theory, humans can be in pain simply by undergoing C-fiber stimulation. But the theory permits creatures with very different physical constitutions to have mental states as well: if there are silicon-based states of hypothetical Martians or inorganic states of hypothetical androids that also meet these conditions, then these creatures, too, can be in pain. As functionalists often put it, pain can be realized by different types of physical states in different kinds of creatures, or multiply realized. (accessed on at

47 Strengths of functionalism Functionalism eliminates the problem of interaction The problem of chauvinism/moral hazard is eliminated It acknowledges the potential for AI All minds do not have to function identically (this is reflective of modern neuro science)

48 Problems of functionalism John Searle s Chinese room (syntax in the absence of semantics) Rules v. procedures How does consciousness arise from the functions of a mind?

49 V. The Problem of Consciousness A.What is Consciousness? B.Easy and hard problems of Consciousness C.Approaches to the hard problem of consciousness 1.Jackson 2.Nagel 3.Chalmers 4.Dennett

50 Daniel Dennett Speak, Dennett! Dennett s ideas There is no hard problem. Consciousness is the collection of solvable easy problems The myth of the hard problem arises out of a misconception of how the brain generates our sense of self

51 Dennett claims that the myth of the hard problem arises from the Cartesian theater approach to consciousness Cartesian materialism is the view that there is a crucial finish line or boundary somewhere in the brain, marking a place where the order of arrival equals the order of "presentation" in experience because what happens there is what you are conscious of.... But... the persuasive imagery of the Cartesian Theater keeps coming back to haunt us laypeople and scientists alike even after its ghostly dualism has been denounced and exorcized. Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained

52 Problems with the Cartesian theater model It requires a viewer, which requires a mind, which opens up all the problems associated with Descartes and interaction It misunderstands how the brain works

53 Serial v. Parallel Processing The Cartesian theater model sees the brain as a serial processor - processing one thing at a time in a series.

54 Serial v. Parallel Processing Dennett argues that the brain is a massively parallel processor - that it processes many things simultaneously.

55 Serial v. Parallel Processing What we believe is our unified first person experience is really an illusion that arises from the brain s effort to sew together many inputs into a coherent whole. Dennett calls this theory the multiple drafts model, and argues that it is entirely explicable by empirical (scientific) means

56 Dennett s Problem Dennett ignores the hard problem by stating it doesn t exist

57 Key parts of the Dennett Readings Daniel Dennett video transcript Our brains are cunningly evolved, cunningly designed to make life easier for us. And many ways that it makes life easier for us but one of them is that it gives us over simplified versions of what we re doing. This is a set of tricks which has been sort of reinvented by software engineers. Your desktop is a very good case of it, we have this you know, little yellow files that can be move around with click and drag and things get put here and there and this is called the user illusion and it is illusory to some degree but of course it s a very benign illusion, it s really, really it s the helpful way of organizing a lot of complexity. We don t need to know all those details. We just need to know how to achieve certain effects and basically our brain does the same thing and has been doing it for you know, millennia and it s got, it s evolve some sort of internal sign posts that are good short hand for things that we can do. Everywhere we look, there s things we can do we don t know how we do them. Where completely cut off from the process if I say you know, give me the first line of limerick make up the first line of limerick well you know, give me a few seconds you ll come up with 2 or 3. How did you do that? You don t know. The words just come sort of bubbling up and you don t have any insight into the sort of subterranean unconscious process that generates that particular thing. You may have a little insight but not much. And it s there is a very sharp limit to the depth that we as conscious agents can probe our own activities and this, this sort of superficial access that we have to what s going on, that s what consciousness is. Now, when I say who is this we whose got this access that s itself part of the illusion because there isn t a sort of boss part of the brain that s sitting there with this limited access that itself is part of the illusion what it is, there s a bunch of different subsystems which have varying access to varying things and that conspire in a sort of competitive way to execute whatever project it is that their, in their sort of mindless way executing.

58 D. Approaches to the easy problems of Consciousness Crick and Koch and the 40 htz theory Roger Penrose and the Quantum mechanics theory The HOT theory of consciousness

59 The HOT theory Consciousness is a thus a functional concept that is defined in terms of relationships between mental events. Consciousness is not a thing. Thought - Eating meat is not good for the environment, so I should skip biscuits and gravy (T2) Thought A thought alone is not conscious A thought (T1) becomes conscious only when it is the target of another higher order (T2) thought (Thought) Biscuits and gravy (T1)

60 Criticisms of Identity Theory Advances in technology may prove that mental states correlate with brain states, but not that they are brain states. Chauvinism/moral hazard objection - If only things with brains have minds, do we have less moral obligation to things without brains? If identity theory is true, machine minds are impossible. Identity theory does not offer an explanation of consciousness The eliminative objection