1 PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE & REALITY W E E K 4 : I M M A T E R I A L I S M, D U A L I S M, & T H E M I N D - B O D Y P R O B L E M
2 AGENDA 1. Quick Review 2. Arguments Against Materialism/Physicalism (continued) 3. The Mind-Body Problem 4. The Thirteenth Floor film 5. Quiz # 2
3 REVIEW Our main question from two weeks ago: What makes me me over time? Answers: Body Theory, Memory Theory, Psychological Continuity Theory, Ego Theory, Bundle/Illusion Theory, Soul Theory Our main question from last week: But, when you think about this issue, what is doing the thinking? Is your brain doing the thinking, or are you using your brain to think?
4 INTUITIONS ABOUT THE SELF There s a sense that there is a me beyond my brain. Then the universe is comprised of material substance and mental substance (immaterial substance). Is this true?
5 SO WHAT S REAL? Materialists/Physicalists: Those who believe the only material substance exists. Ionian Naturalists, Atomists, Assumption of Science Objections to Materialists: Plato, the spirituality inclined, or those who believe in life after death. Berkeley s Idealism
6 GEORGE BERKELEY: IDEALISM How would you summarize the argument?
7 GEORGE BERKELEY: IDEALISM esse est percipi To be is to be perceived
8 GEORGE BERKELEY: IDEALISM Overheard in 18th century England: Did you hear that George Berkeley died? His girlfriend stopped seeing him.
9 OBJECTIONS TO MATERIALISM Berkeley's Idealism The Problem of Consciousness/Mind The Knowledge Arguments Mary s House Argument What is matter? Non-material
10 THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS Made out of Meat What s the story about? It s about how/why does dirt (meat) have a mind?
11 THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS What is a mind?
12 MENTAL PROPERTIES OR STATES (PG 127) Thought experiment: Imagine a universe that consists only of physical objects and physical properties but which lacks minds and mental properties. Make a list of those features of the world that would vanish if all minds were suddenly wiped out.
13 MENTAL PROPERTIES AND STATES (PG 127) Minds allow us to: Perceive, smell, and feel the world Feel emotions Have self-awareness Have dreams, hopes, and fantasies Store and retrieve memories Reason about the world Communicate with others
15 EASY AND HARD PROBLEMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS Distinction proposed by David Chalmers The easy problems: How does consciousness work? How do different brain states correlate to different mental states. How does sensory input get turned into actions/reactions. The hard problem: Why is our material processing accompanied by internal, felt sensations? If we are made from inanimate material, why does this mound of inanimate material have conscious awareness? Why does it feel, desire, and have an internal subjective experience? Couldn t it just have behaviors?
16 WHAT MAKES THE HARD PROBLEM HARD? QUALIA!
17 QUALIA Definition: Qualia are the subjective or qualitative properties of experiences. What it feels like from the inside to experience the world. The Problem: There seems to be more than just physical material. There is an internal, subjective experience: an awareness that may be influenced by the material world, but is itself non-physical by definition.
18 THE HEART OF THE MYSTERY: QUALIA Leibniz ( ) No essential difference between a windmill and a brain: Seeing all its inner mechanisms says nothing about the associated subjective experience! The subjective experience (qualia) IS non-physical.
19 THE QUALIA QUESTION
20 QUALIA: LOCK S INVERTED SPECTRUM ARGUMENT Is it possible your qualia is different than someone elses? Is it possible then, that you could conceivably wake up one day, the universe & you be physically the same, but your qualia be different?
21 QUALIA: LOCK S INVERTED SPECTRUM ARGUMENT Premises: (P1) If something is possibly false, then it is not necessarily true. (P2) It s conceivable that qualia can be different even with identical brain states. (P3) What s conceivable is possible. necessarily (C1)Therefore, qualia is not identical with brain states. (C2) Therefore, qualia is not physical. What do you think of the argument?
22 HOW TO RESPOND TO PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS Be sure to answer the question directly. Be sure to always have justifications all your claims. Avoid all statements of beliefs or opinion without justification. Use examples to illustrate your point or to demonstrate your understanding of the material. Be sure to demonstrate how well you understand the material!!!
23 OBJECTIONS TO MATERIALISM Do you think a materialistic view of the world can ever be used to explain consciousness and qualia? According to philosopher Thomas Nagel, no.
24 WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A BAT? Thomas Nagel (1937- ) American Philosopher In 1974, published one of the most famous papers in all of philosophy. Summary: We can never know what it feels like to be a bat.
26 SUMMARY OF THE PAPER Bats are mammals. Most people agree they have experiences they are conscious. But, their consciousness is alien to us: They see by sonar. They fly and hang upside-down. They lust for other bats. We might be able to imagine what it would be like for us to live and behave like a bat. But we can t imagine what it is like for a bat to be a bat.
27 SUMMARY OF THE PAPER Bat s experience is subjective. Consciousness = having a point of view (interiority) Scientific knowledge is objective. The view from nowhere (exteriority) Example: lightning Subjective: looks like a flash of light objective: electrical discharge Study of objective (material) science can never reveal the character of subjective experience.
28 OBJECTIONS TO MATERIALISM Berkeley's Idealism The Problem of Consciousness Awareness rather than non-awareness Subjective experience rather than nothing (Qualia) The Knowledge Arguments Mary s House Argument What is matter? Non-material
29 THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT What Mary Didn t Know - Frank Jackson
30 THE CASE AGAINST MATERIALISM/PHYSICALISM To make the case against physicalism we need to show that An individual that knows all the physical facts about the universe might still be lacking knowledge of some facts about the universe. This would show that the physical facts are not all the facts there are.
31 MARY IN THE BLACK AND WHITE ROOM Mary is a brilliant scientist who is forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes and use terms like red
32 WHAT MARY DOESN T KNOW Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on black and white television She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of physical which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of course functional roles. If physicalism is true, she knows all there is to know. For to suppose otherwise, that there is more to know than every physical fact, and that is just what physicalism denies.
33 MARY GETS OUT! When Mary is released from her black and white room It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then is it inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Therefore, there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false.
34 OBJECTIONS TO MATERIALISM: PHYSICS? Matter: Something that takes up space and has mass. What is matter made up of? Atoms
35 OBJECTIONS TO MATERIALISM: PHYSICS?
36 OBJECTIONS TO MATERIALISM: PHYSICS? So matter is mostly empty space, since atoms are mostly empty space. What are atoms made up of? Particles are actually particle-waves Depends on how you observe it. Waves of what?
37 OBJECTIONS TO MATERIALISM: PHYSICS? So matter is mostly empty space, since atoms are mostly empty space. And the parts that aren t empty are waves of probability.
38 OBJECTIONS TO MATERIALISM: SUMMARY Berkeley's Idealism The Problem of Consciousness/Mind Hard Problem of Consciousness Inverted Qualia Argument Subjective Experience What is it like to be a Bat. The Knowledge Arguments Mary s House Argument What is matter? Non-material We will look at materialist counter arguments next week.
39 SO WHAT S REAL? Metaphysical Views of Reality 1. Materialism: So maybe there is just material substance. 2. Idealism: So maybe there is just immaterial substance. 3. Dualism: Or maybe there is both..
40 SO WHAT ARE YOU? If you are like Descartes you Believe you have a material body. AND you believe you have an immaterial mind. So, there exists two different substances in the universe. Hence Descartes view is called substance dualism. But this leads to a pretty big problem
41 THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM What s the problem? How does something non-physical cause changes in a physical body? How are the two related?
42 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM Metaphysical views of reality Materialism: only matter exists Dualism: both mind and matter exists Idealism: only mind exists Possible Solutions: Physicalism / Materialism Substance Dualism Idealism
43 READ FOR NEXT WEEK Chapter 6 up to page 139 Read Chalmers Simulation Dualism Argument
44 PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE & REALITY W E E K 4 _ D A Y 2 : D U A L I S M, & T H E M I N D - B O D Y P R O B L E M
45 AGENDA 1. Quick Review of the Mind-Body Problem 2. Substance Dualism 3. The Thirteenth Floor film
46 OBJECTIONS TO MATERIALISM: SUMMARY Berkeley's Idealism The Problem of Consciousness/Mind Qualia (Subjective Experience) What is matter? We will look at materialist counter arguments next week.
47 SO WHAT S REAL? Metaphysical Views of Reality 1. Materialism: So maybe there is just material substance. 2. Idealism: So maybe there is just immaterial substance. 3. Dualism: Or maybe there is both..
48 SO WHAT ARE YOU? If you are like Descartes you Believe you have a material body. AND you believe you have an immaterial mind. So, there exists two different substances in the universe. Hence Descartes view is called substance dualism. But this leads to a pretty big problem
49 THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM What s the problem? How does something non-physical cause changes in a physical body? How are the two related?
50 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM Metaphysical views of reality Materialism: only matter exists Dualism: both mind and matter exists Idealism: only mind exists Possible Solutions: Substance Dualism Physicalism / Materialism Idealism
51 (SUBSTANCE) DUALISM Mental states and physical states are equally real and ontologically independent. Ontologically independent: one thing doesn t depend on another other thing for it s existence. Why do people believe this? Intuitive for many. Fits with beliefs in an afterlife, or soul. Logically believable? Near death (out of body) experiences Conceivability argument Intention argument
52 ARGUMENTS FOR DUALISM: 1. NEAR DEATH EXPERIENCES (PG 132) Main Argument: P1. If substance dualism is false, then minds cannot exist independently from bodies. P2. But minds can exist independently from bodies. C1. Therefore, substance dualism is true. Support of the second premise: P1. Hundreds of people report having experiences while being outside their bodies. P2. The best explanation for these reports is that minds can exist independently from bodies. C1. Therefore, minds can exist independently from bodies. Objections?
53 ARGUMENTS FOR DUALISM: 1. NEAR DEATH EXPERIENCES (PG 132) Objections: Rational explanations for Near Death / Out of Body Experiences
54 ARGUMENTS FOR DUALISM: 2. CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENT (PG 134) We first need to understand the Leibniz s Law: A & B are identical to each other only if they have all properties in common. So, if at least ONE property is different, A & B are NOT identical.
55 ARGUMENTS FOR DUALISM: 2. CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENT (PG 134) P1. I can conceive that I exist without a body. P2. I cannot conceive that I exist without a mind. C1. My mind is more intimately connected to me than my body is. (so now the mind has one property that is different than my body being intimately connected to me ) C2. But since my mind has at least one property that is different from my body, then my mind cannot be identical to my body (Leibniz Law)
56 ARGUMENTS FOR DUALISM: 2. CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENT (PG 135) Objections: 1. Can you really conceive of existing without a body? (no senses, no experiences, no movement) 2. Just because you conceive (imagine, believe) a property that is different doesn t mean that it really exists. For example
57 ARGUMENTS FOR DUALISM: 2. CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENT (PG 135) P1. I can conceive (imagine, believe) that Clark Kent is an ordinary human being. P2. I cannot conceive that Superman is an ordinary human being. C1. So, Clark Kent has a property that Superman lacks. C2. Therefore, by Leibniz s law, Clark Kent is not the same person as Superman.
58 ARGUMENTS FOR DUALISM: 3. CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENT 2 ND TRY (PG 136) Intentionality The mind s ability to be about something. (Has nothing to do with intention. ) *Remember, looking for at least one property that is different. Bodies ARE things: brain, hands, arms, legs, etc Mental states are ABOUT things: feelings, thoughts, memories are ABOUT things.
59 ARGUMENTS AGAINST DUALISM: PROBLEM OF INTERACTIONISM How do minds and bodies interact?
60 DUALIST RESPONSES: #1 DESCARTES PINEAL GLAND Descartes: The mind affects the brain at the pineal gland in the brain.
61 DUALIST RESPONSES: #2 PARALLELISM The mind and body are two separate things and do not causally interact with each other. Mental processes and physical processes run parallel to each other. Just happen to happen at the same time: Ouch! I m hungry!
62 DUALIST RESPONSES: #3 OCCASSIONALISM But how do they both JUST happen to happen at the same time? Ouch! I m hungry! God makes it so!
63 First few minutes FILM
64 CHAMBERS SIMULATION ARGUMENT In groups: What is Chambers saying in the reading. How does Chambers argue for substance dualism?
65 HOMEWORK For full credit you needed to 1. Address each part of the question. 2. Demonstrate a full understanding of the material by providing definitions, examples, etc.. 3. Always provide reasons for a claim (through an argument, evidence, example). Never say I believe, I think, I feel without providing reasons.
66 HW #2 In the film, Thirteenth Floor, a company has created a large simulation of old Los Angeles. The simulation is so detailed and complex, that the simulated people act real and believe they are real. Question: If we did live in a simulation, how could this be used to explain the convictions of idealists, dualists, and materialists? If we lived in a simulation, how could we ever know?
PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE & REALITY W E E K 3 D A Y 2 : I M M A T E R I A L I S M, D U A L I S M, & T H E M I N D - B O D Y P R O B L E M AGENDA 1. Quick Review 2. Arguments Against Materialism/Physicalism
Lecture 8 Property Dualism Frank Jackson Epiphenomenal Qualia and What Mary Didn t Know 1 Agenda 1. Physicalism, Qualia, and Epiphenomenalism 2. Property Dualism 3. Thought Experiment 1: Fred 4. Thought
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PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE & REALITY W E E K 3 : N A T U R E O F R E A L I T Y AGENDA 1. Review of Personal Identity 2. The Stuff of Reality 3. Materialistic/Physicalism 4. Immaterial/Idealism PERSONAL IDENTITY
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