APA PANEL TALK ON ORGANISMS, PERSONS AND BIOETHICS

Transcription

1 APA PANEL TALK ON ORGANISMS, PERSONS AND BIOETHICS David B. Hershenov

2 My contention is that considering a person to be co-located with an organism, or one of its spatial or temporal parts, gives rise to a host of problems as a result of there then being too many thinkers. These problems, which Olson has emphasized, can be mitigated (somewhat) by a Noonan-style pronoun revisionism. But doing so will have very unwelcome consequences for bioethics as autonomy, informed consent, advance directives and substituted judgment will be impossible for the human animal. I count it as a point in favor of Olson s answer to the metaphysical question What are we? that it avoids such ethical quandaries. But his animalism - with its Parfit-inspired claim that it is not identity that matters in survival but the continuation of our psychology even if someone else is its subject - appears to be at odds with our self-conception and practical concerns. And if the only argument for this thesis is the fission scenario, then the thesis is further undermined as Parfit s account of fission runs afoul of Wiggins s Only a and b rule. What I will very tentatively suggest is that we explore two (incompatible) accounts of animalism which deny that being identical to a future being is only of derivative importance to us. Assume that we are essentially thinking beings that are related to but distinct from organisms. The problem which arises is that if the person can think, why can t the organism think since it shares the same brain? I doubt there is a convincing account of why the overlapping beings don t all have similar mental lives. Olson draws our attention to four specific problems. There is first the duplication problem that the thinking organism would seem to meet the same cognitive criterion for being a person it too is selfconscious, rational, free and responsible etc. Secondly, there is the trivialization problem if the organism is denied personhood because it has the wrong persistence conditions. Personhood then becomes insignificant for there would be non-persons that were also selfconscious and moral etc. Third, there would also be an epistemic problem for an individual wouldn t have any reason to believe that he was the person rather than the organism. Any reason the person had to think he was the person, so would the overlapping thinking organism sharing his thoughts. Finally, there would be the related false self-ascription problem. A truth expressed by one about its essential nature would be a falsehood simultaneously espoused by the other. To mitigate the problems of too many thinkers, some sort of Noonan-style pronoun revisionism is required. Noonan suggests that to have thoughts about thoughts is 2

3 not enough to make an entity a person, rather an individual must have the appropriate psychological persistence conditions. So the referent of the personal pronoun I is not the thinking organism, thinking brain, thinking stage or a less than maximal psychologically related sum of stages. As a result, while there might be many entities thinking one s thoughts, they all refer to the same person. This avoids the duplication problem of two persons, one essentially a person and the other contingently, because the non-persons are only conscious of the thoughts belonging to the person, not of their own thoughts qua organism, qua brain or qua stage. Unable to use the first-person pronoun to think about themselves as themselves, they don t meet Locke s criterion for personhood. And since the non-persons can t self-consciously refer to themselves by the first-person pronoun, the trivialization problem doesn t arise. There also isn t an epistemic problem of a thinking organism, brain or stage wondering whether or not it is the person since they all recognize that the referent of the first person pronoun is the person. For the same reason they avoid the false self-ascription problem when they claim I am essentially a person. While I am unconvinced that overlapping thinkers would have the limitations Noonan puts on them, I ll table my doubts and turn to the bioethical dilemmas that arise from a metaphysics adopting pronoun revisionism. (Incidentally, some of the same problems will arise in the absence of pronoun revisionism due to the epistemic problem.) If organisms can t refer to themselves with the first-person pronoun, then how can they be said to autonomously agree to any treatment or make provisions for their future in say an advance directive? While I don t have a favored theory of autonomy to expound, it would seem safe to say that one couldn t be autonomous if one could not reflect upon one s interests, desires and reasons as one s own. And if there isn t autonomy, there won t be informed consent which is so important to the doctor/patient relationship. The person could agree to a treatment but the organism qua organism wouldn t be agreeing to it. So, pace DeGrazia, there is a someone else problem even if organisms are spatially coincident with persons. And the problem is not just with advance directives but everyday care. It would also seem that substituted judgment would be impossible. Substituted judgment involves deciding for the patient as he would have when competent and autonomous. But if the organism could never be autonomous, the only way to decide for his care would be to rely upon the best interests doctrine, generally considered a less attractive option. 3

4 One might respond that the person and the overlapping organism s interests are the same, so the organism s inability to construe itself as the subject of thought is not a bioethical problem. I think it is more likely that human organisms (and the other thinking non-persons) don t realize they have distinct interests because of pronoun revisionism or the epistemic problem. Just because they don t protest that their interests are being neglected provides us with no more reason to deny their interests are being ignored here than it would in cases of the brainwashed or constitutionally unreflective. For instance, I don t see why it is not true that embedded perduring objects are having their immediate gratification sacrificed for that of the 4D worm composed of them. Nor do I see why it would be in the 3D or 4D organism s interest to acquire a new body to avoid a non-fatal but physically incapacitating disease. While the person might embrace the opportunity to survive with a new body, the organism seconding that treatment will be endorsing the end of its mental life in the transplant scenario or the end of its actual biological life in the (the slightly more medically realistic) case of too many prosthetics replacing its organic body. Moreover, if the person and the organism both support donating organs at their deaths, the possibility of the organism and person s deaths occurring at different times prevent the shared values from both being realized. Similar problems will arise if their religious beliefs or conception of dignity demand some immediate posthumous treatment such as next day burial. There is no recourse here to a conscience clause that some states have implemented to handle different conceptions of death amongst their citizenry. If advocates of 3D or 4D try to avoid dilemmas like these by arguing that the organism is just concerned with the welfare of the person, then they will be positing an organism in transplant and prosthetic replacement cases that doesn t care about itself since it appears to be nonplussed about the prospects of being either left behind in a mindless state or destroyed. I find it very hard to believe that with creatures so much alike as the human person and the human organism, it is in the interest of one to be identical to a future being but it is not in the interest of the other. It seems that they should either both care about themselves or identity should matter to neither of them. If the former is chosen, there are the just mentioned moral dilemmas. But if the latter is chosen, I don t see why audience members would then resist the claim there is only one entity where we are, and it is essentially a living being rather than essentially a thinking entity. Doing so would mean 4

5 that one doesn t have to countenance spatially coincident or embedded thinkers. Moreover, if identity doesn t matter, then the transplant and inorganic body thought experiments will fail to provide such compelling support for psychological approaches to identity. Leaving aside issues of patient autonomy, interests and prudential concern, consider the havoc that too many thinkers provides for families and friends. Do they start to grieve when the person dies (at the onset of PVS) or not until the organism does or do they grieve for both but to different extents? The latter would be quite different from the two stages of grieving for a single individual whose mental life might be extinguished before his biological life. Even with pronoun revisionism, family members and dear friends conversed with and were loved by both the non-identical organism and the person. It thus seems a good number of metaphysical and bioethical problems can be avoided if there aren t any thinkers overlapping organisms. So the animalist can argue that the advocates of psychological accounts of identity don t do as well by our practical concerns as they claim because, in all likelihood, they have to accept that other creatures share our thoughts and intend our actions. As a result, they must either tolerate identity not mattering to organisms and other person-like non-persons or suffer the ethical problems if such creatures do have interests of their own. A metaphysical theory is more attractive the better it coheres with the rest of our beliefs. Unfortunately for the Olson-style animalist, the thought experiments seem to elicit beliefs that we are essentially thinkers. To offset these intuitions, Olson must claim we are misled in the hypothetical cases by the existence of psychological continuity. Our error is due to thinking that such responses are tracking identity. Fission cases, Olson alleges, teach us that identity does not matter and so our concern is not metaphysically informative even in the case of the transplant of an undivided brain. However, I, like many others, fail to share Olson s intuitions about identity not mattering. I want to survive into the future and find little comfort in a merely qualitatively identical replacement. Identity seems a precondition for much of what we value, it is not something only of derivative value. Moreover, I suspect if the argument about identity not mattering is based on fission, then it is flawed for the reason Hawley gives: it leaves unexplained correlations between distinct existences. Each of the branching-produced individuals exists only because of the other but they are without causal connections. Hence the appeal of Wiggins s Only a and b rule. 5

6 It is also worth adding that the animalist s claim is, ironically, bad or, at least, peculiar biology. I would claim that survival is in the interest of a mindless animal just as water and sun is in the interest of a plant. But according to the Olson-style animalist, when organisms develop significant cognitive function they aren t nonderivatively concerned for themselves. What they come (or ought) to really care about is their psychology continuing, not themselves as the subject of such thought. I think this is an odd sort of disconnect that organisms at one stage in their ontogentic (and phylogenetic?) development have survival as a good (which then must obviously be nonderivative) but come later to care only derivatively about their own interests and persistence. A similar charge against Olson-style animalism can be made in terms of proper function which will reinforce the above argument or replace it if it is an error to ascribe interests to mindless animals. On Boorse s account of health, organ systems are functioning properly when they make their contribution to the organism s survival. But if we read the Parfit-Olson claim about identity not mattering in a normative fashion, then when the organism s cognitive system develops, it is functioning properly when it serves not the organism s survival but that of its psychology, whoever may be its subject. The organism would be malfunctioning if it cared about its own survival in the transplant scenario. This is thus evidence of a rather peculiar biological disconnect between the proper functioning of an organism s cognition and the rest of its organ systems. So if psychological approaches of identity give us problems stemming from too many thinkers, pronoun revisionism means a lack of organism autonomy, while Olsonstyle animalism is incompatible with our practical self-understanding, what are the alternatives? One possibility is identifying the organism and the person but claiming it has psychological persistence conditions. Such a being thus could be reduced to cerebrum-size and transplanted though it would cease to be alive during the process and hence is only contingently an animal. The claim that the person is the organism rather than spatially coincident or embedded within it avoids the extra thinkers and preserves the intuitions many have in transplant and irreversible coma cases. This view has a few modern adherents but I think that it is actually the best way to construe the Catholic hylomorphic tradition. (Perhaps here moral considerations restrain metaphysical conceptions even more than in secular theories.) Catholic claims that we are 6

7 made in God s image in virtue of our mentality rather than animality and are bodiless when morally reformed in Purgatory, suggest we are only contingently living beings. And Aquinas s own position that every deceased human being is resurrected for eternal rewards in a body akin to that of a year old which doesn t eat, drink, sleep and thus metabolize is at odds with the claim that we are essentially living organisms that persist by our parts being caught up in the same life. The substantial change that Aquinas envisions with the acquisition of rationality (delayed hominization) and then its loss (departed hominization) is akin to the substantial change that Olson has shown would occur in the transplant scenarios where animals are ascribed psychological persistence conditions. Olson suggests the idea is bad biology for it would lead to organisms popping in and out of existence - though his own alternative account has cerebrum-size persons popping in and out of existence in the transplant scenarios. The allegedly bad biology infecting hylomorphism is that when an organism X with psychological persistence conditions has its cerebrum removed, found on the table where the operation took place is not the original organism X in a mindless state but a new cerebrumless organism Y that just came into existence. And, given the assumption that there is no spatial coincidence, when X, who has become cerebrum-size, is later placed in the mindless body of a third individual Z, that organism Z, pops out of existence rather than acquires the capacity for thought. Many in the audience will agree with Olson that it is odd biology and they might not think this is offset by our distinctiveness as rational animals, nor want an account intertwined with theology and one which avoids the Only a and b rule by positing a simple soul configuring a composite animal. However, it is worth pointing out that there is a secular kind of hylomorphism that Williams calls a polite form of materialism. Anyway, I wish to tentatively propose a different version of animalism that I m afraid many will find to be bad psychology rather than bad biology. It is incompatible with a hylomorphism that suggests we are transplanted when our rational faculties are, but shares the hylomorphic belief that identity is what matters and that we human persons are organisms rather than parts or spatially coincident with them. And it avoids running afoul of the Only a and b rule as long as organism fission is modeled on cell mitosis where a life ends regardless of whether there is one or two successors. What I now want to suggest is that in a brain transplant scenario, where my cerebrum will be destroyed and that of my identical 7

8 twin placed in the body where my cerebrum had been, I not only would survive as the organism but should now care about my future self even though my psychology will then become just like my twin s. To soften up the audience, let me remind them, or some of them, that they did or will care that their own mindless embryonic child have a certain future for its own sake. It isn t that such expectant parents only start to care later about a new being (a person) that emerges or care now for a being yet to come into existence. They want their mindless unborn child to become happy and to flourish for its own sake and believe that a brain will obviously be beneficial to the child. Their attitudes seem to be presupposing that identity is a component in what matters to the child since they care about that child for its own sake, even before it is psychologically continuous with anyone. If we can care for the mindless fetus before it has a psychology on the basis that the later psychology will be good for it, then perhaps adult human animals should have prudential concern for their own future even in the absence of psychological continuity of any sort as in the earlier thought experiment of our acquiring a new upper brain. I want to try a different strategy to strengthen this position that we should be prudentially concerned about our adult conscious organism even when it is without any psychological connection to the present or even the same brain playing a role subserving our future mental life. Consider that we care prudentially for the stroke victim that we would become even if our mental capacities are reduced to mere sentience. Many philosophers believe this shows that it is mere consciousness or sentience, not selfconsciousness that is essential to our persistence. I think instead that such thought experiments can actually be construed as showing that organism identity matters rather than is of just derivative concern. Is our concern for our post-injury self with just a rudimentary mind really due to our possessing the same organ that underlies consciousness or is it rather that it is just the same organism that is conscious? Ask yourself if your reaction to the prospect of coming out of a stroke-induced coma with pain and pleasure sectors intact but no cognitive capabilities above this will be different if such sentience is a result of different parts of your cerebrum being rewired during the coma to realize pain and pleasure when you awaken? If you would have prudential concern for the same organism 8

9 with a different physical realization for sentience, why should you react differently to your organism getting an entirely new cerebrum in the earlier thought experiment? Someone might respond that it matters that the different anatomical structures involved in the production of sentience are in the same cerebrum. If so, consider a second case where, early in someone s life, in the absence of injury and before a web of beliefs and desire arises, different parts of a developing brain give rise to the pain and pleasure sectors. Imagine one is in the brainstem as Shewmon has shown to be possible and the other is in the cerebrum. Would it be correct to say there were two thinking beings in one body? And if one is destroyed, is it correct to claim there is then only one thinking being? And would we say that we have a new thinking being produced by fusion if there is the later development of a self-conscious person who provides the respective pain or pleasure reports when either the sector in the brainstem or cerebrum is stimulated? I very much doubt it. I don t see any reason to identify ourselves with parts of the sentience-producing brain a la McMahan, nor with a larger being only if it continuously possesses the same functioning brain-like structure a la (the pre-dualist) Unger, rather than holding that these pains and pleasures would be mine because they are subserved by parts caught up in the same biological life and belong to the same organism. But if you agree with me about this then why maintain that we would have no prudential reason to care about one s organism if it received a new brain in the thought experiment? Perhaps you will argue that you would survive with any parts of your brain producing conscious states but not with a new brain. I would then ask for a compositional principle that makes the cerebrum, midbrain, cerebellum, brainstem etc. all parts of the same thing? As far as I can see, what they have in common is that they are caught up in the same biological life. But so would be the assimilated brain in the transplant thought experiment. If you lack my compositional doubts, imagine that now and after a debilitating stroke that your pain is realized by the upper spine while pleasure has a cortical basis. In conclusion, if either of these animalist approaches is plausible, then we can avoid the metaphysical and practical problems of approaches that construe psychology as essential to us without abandoning the claim that identity matters. However, I must admit that these appear to be rather thin limbs to climb out on and so expect few in the audience to follow me. But my question then is where are the sturdier branches? 9