The Cultural Tension within Jerusalem s Jewish Population

Transcription

1 The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies The Cultural Tension within Jerusalem s Jewish Population Shlomo Hasson and Amiram Gonen Jerusalem, December 1997 Translator: Lisa Perlman Principal Editor: Shunamith Carin Preparation for Print: Silvina Freund Printed by: Ahva Press Ltd.

2 The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors 1997, The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies Ltd. 9a Diskin St., Jerusalem. Tel Fax: floerins@actcom.co.il ISSN About the Authors Shlomo Hasson - Professor of Geography at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and director of a research program on issues of Religion, Society and State at The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies. Amiram Gonen - Professor of Geography at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and director of The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies

3 The authors wish to thank Dr. Aharon Fein director of Tazpit Survey Institute, for his collaboration in preparing the survey questionnaire which served as a basis for this research. About the Research One of the research programs on the Floersheimer Institute s agenda centers on issues of Religion, Society and State in Israel. Among others, it focuses on relations among Jewish cultural groups, and in particular relations between Haredi and Secular Jews in the public urban domain. This research examines the attitudes of Jewish cultural groups to various aspects of public life in the city of Jerusalem. The research analyzes the disposition of various groups to coexist in one neighborhood and in one city, and their forecasts concerning Haredi-Secular relations in years to come. Particular attention is paid to attitudes toward traveling on the Sabbath and operating restaurants and places of entertainment on the Sabbath and Holidays in several locations in the city. The research reveals grave concern among the Secular population regarding its future in the city, which is manifested in considerations for leaving the city should the proportion and power position of the Haredi population grow further. This mood, which is also shared by the Traditional group, may well affect the distribution of the Jewish population in Jerusalem, the character and quality of its political and cultural life and its social makeup. It is pertinent for policy-makers to devote some thought to the matter. About the Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies In recent years the importance of policy-oriented research has been increasingly acknowledged. Dr. Stephen H. Floersheimer initiated the establishment of a research institute that would concentrate on studies of long-range policy issues. The purpose of the Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies is to research fundamental processes likely to be major issues for policymakers in years to come, analyze the long-range trends and implications of such problems, and propose to the policymakers alternative options and strategies. The members of the Board of Directors are Dr. Stephen H. Floersheimer (chairman); Y. Amihud Ben-Porath, advocate (vice-chairman); David Brodet, chairman of the Board of Directors of the Mizrahi Bank; and Hirsh Goodman, editor-in-chief of the Jerusalem Report. The director of the Floersheimer Institute is Prof. Amiram Gonen of the Department of Geography of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

4 The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies Publications on Religion, Society, and State in Israel 1. The Cultural Struggle over Jerusalem: Accommodations, Scenarios and Lessons Shlomo Hasson, 1996 (Hebrew and English). 2. The Politics of Accommodation: Settling Conflicts of State and Religion in Israel Eliezer Don-Yehia, 1997 (Hebrew). 3. The Cultural Tension Within Jerusalem's Jewish Population Shlomo Hasson and Amiram Gonen, 1997 (Hebrew and English). 4. Religion and Democracy in Israel Benyamin Neuberger, 1997 (Hebrew and English). 5. Governing and Managing a Haredi (Ultra-Orthodox) City Yosseph Shilhav, 1997 (Hebrew).

5 Table of Contents Introduction 7 1 The Four Cultural Groups 11 Cultural, Social and Economic Characteristics 11 Geographic Patterns 13 2 Perception of Relations Between the Secular and Haredi Groups 17 Nature of Haredi-Secular Relations Today 17 Changes in Haredi-Secular Relations in the Last Five Years 18 3 Residents Perception of Their Own Neighborhood 20 Perception of the Neighborhood Today 20 Perception of the Neighborhood in the Future 22 4 Living in the Same Neighborhood 25 Living Together 25 Facing a Growing Haredi Population in the Neighborhood 26 Designating a Building in the Neighborhood for Haredi or Secular Pupils 27 5 Living in the Same City 29 Preference for Living in a Haredi or Non-Haredi Municipality 29 Readiness to Live in a Municipality that Does Not Match One s Lifestyle 30 6 Leaving the City 33 The Short Term: Measures Taken to Leave the City 33 The Long Term: Positions Regarding Leaving the City 34 Preferred Destinations for Leaving the City 38 7 Transport and Entertainment on the Sabbath and Holidays 41 Closure of Bar-Ilan Street on the Sabbath and Jewish Holidays 41 Views on the Operating of Public Transport, Restaurants and Places of Entertainment on the Sabbath 45 8 Views on Municipal Issues 47 Changes in City Hall s Treatment of Haredi and Secular Residents 47 Views on the Eventuality of a Haredi Mayor in A Joint Left-Right Non-Haredi Electoral List 50 Views on an Alternative Municipal Settlement in Jerusalem 51 Conclusion 54 References 57 The Survey Questionnaire 58

6 List of Tables Table 1: Interviewees, individuals in interviewed households and average number of persons per household, by cultural group (in percentages) 12 Table 2: Socioeconomic characteristics, by cultural group (percentages) 13 Table 3: Interviewees in zones by cultural group (percentages) 14 Table 4: Interviewees in cultural groups by zone (in percentages) 15 Table 5: Relative geographical representation index by zone 15 Table 6: Perception of Haredi-Secular relations, by cultural group (percentages) 18 Table 7: Perception of changes in the Haredi-Secular relationship, by cultural group (percentage) 19 Table 8: Perception of the majority in one's own neighborhood, by cultural group (percentages) 21 Table 9: Perception of the majority in one's own neighborhood, today and in 10 years (percentages) 22 Table 10: Perception of the majority group in one's own neighborhood, today and in 10 years among Secular and Haredi interviewees (percentages) 23 Table 11: Views on joint residential areas for both Haredi and non-haredi residents, by cultural group (percentages) 25 Table 12: Views on a possible 10 percent growth of the Haredi population in the neighborhoods, by cultural groups (percentages) 26 Table 13: Interviewees who stated that designating a Haredi or Secular school in their neighborhood was not desirable, by cultural group (percentages) 28 Table 14: Preferred municipality, by cultural group (percentages) 30 Table 15: Views on a municipality that does not match lifestyle, by cultural group (percentages) 31 Table 16: Measures taken to leave the city, by cultural group (percentages) 34 Table 17: Intentions for leaving the city, by cultural group (percentages) 35 Table 18: Reasons for leaving the city and cultural group (percentages) 35 Table 19: Intentions for leaving the city, based on lenght of residence in the city (percentages) 37 Table 20: Mean reasons for leaving the city, by main reason and lenght of residence in the city (percentages) 37 Table 21: Intentions for leaving the city, by age group (percentages) 38 Table 22: Intentions for leaving the city by number of years of study (percentages) 38 Table 23: Preferred destinations outside Jerusalem, by cultural groups (percentages) 39 Table 24: Views on the closure of Bar-Ilan street on the Sabbath and Holidays, by cultural group (percentages) 42 Table 25: Accounts of driving through Bar-Ilan street on the Sabbath and Holidays, in the last six months (percentages) 43 Table 26: Activity patterns of Secular and Traditional residents with regards to driving through Bar-Ilan street on the Sabbath and Holidays, in the last six months (percentages) 44 Table 27: Views on operating public transport, restaurants and places of entertainment on the Sabbath and Holidays, by cultural group (percentages) 45 Table 28: Views of Secular and Traditional interviewees, in the north and south of the city on operating 46 transportation and entertainment on the Sabbath and Holidays (percentages) 46 Table 29: Views on municipal actions today as compared to the previous administration, by cultural group (percentages) 48 Table 30: Views with regards to the eventual election of a Haredi mayor in the 1998 municipal elections, by cultural group (percentages) 49 Table 31: Views on a joint non-haredi list of Left and Right for City elections, by cultural group (percentages) 50 Table 32: Views on proposals for a municipal settlement, by cultural group (percentages) 52 Table 33: Preferred municipal settlement, by cultural group (percentages) 53

7 Introduction The conflicts between Haredi (ultra-orthodox) and Secular Jews in Jerusalem are the source of intensive public debate. Violent demonstrations over the opening - or closing - of Bar-Ilan street, one of the city s main thoroughfares, on the Sabbath and religious holidays, and disputes over residences and public institutions in the suburb of Ramot have spurred substantial media attention and public discussion. However, until now, it has not been clear what Jerusalem s residents themselves think and feel, especially the silent majority who do not attend demonstrations or take an active role in the disputes; nor is it clear how residents perceive the relationship between the Haredi and the other Jewish cultural groups in the city. There is no substantiated information on residents reactions to the operating of public transport and places of entertainment on the Sabbath; nor is it known what they think about the Bar- Ilan street issue and the efforts to solve the problem. It was not previously known if the disputes between the Haredi and non-haredi Jews have any influence on the quality of life of Jerusalem s residents. Indeed, these and many other questions were unanswered until now: Do non-haredi residents tend to leave the city at a higher rate than their Haredi counterparts? What does the public think of City Hall and the various plans to change the city s municipal structure? We posed these questions at the center of this research. We believed the basic requirement was a comprehensive clarification of the views of the different Jewish cultural groups that live in the city and are influenced by local demographic and cultural developments. Such a clarification can expose the range of opinions regarding relations between Haredi and non-haredi Jews in Jerusalem, identify points of agreement and disagreement between the various groups and assist in the policy-making based on the needs, interests and views of all sectors of the society. The current research aims to present this range of opinions and clarify any underlying significance therein for the future relations between the different Jewish cultural groups in the city. The main source of the data for this study is a questionnaire survey, administered by telephone. The survey was carried out among the Jewish population of Jerusalem during the month of October The Floersheimer Institute commissioned Tazpit, a private survey firm, to perform the tele-survey and to tabulate the data. The survey included a sample of 702 Jewish households. In each household one adult, aged 18 years or more, was interviewed. Each interviewee was asked to answer a series of questions regarding the 7

8 cultural tension among the Jewish residents of Jerusalem (see the survey questionnaire at the end of this publication). The overwhelming majority of households in the sample agreed to answer the questions and no severe problem emerged among all the Jewish cultural groups included in the survey, not even among those who define themselves as Haredi Jews, known to be reluctant to participate in such surveys. It seems that the timing of the survey, October 1996, when recurring demonstrations and confrontations took place on Saturdays on the issue of vehicle traffic on the Sabbath in Bar-Ilan street, where a large Haredi population resides, was instrumental in its readiness to take part in the survey. This was also the time when a special committee known by the name of its chairman as the Zameret Committee, appointed by the Minister of Transportation, was debating the issue of regulating vehicle traffic on the Sabbath in the Bar-Ilan street. Members of all groups, including Haredi members, were probably anxious to have a say in the decisions to be taken by the committee. The first chapter presents the main characteristics of each of the four Jewish populations in Jerusalem: Secular, Traditional, Orthodox and Haredi. It is crucial to recognize these groups to be able to understand the various positions of Jerusalem s Jewish population; yet for some reason it is common to present the cultural dynamics in the city as a conflict between Secular and Haredi Jews only. The division into four groups, which appeared in the research-survey undertaken by the Gutman Institute on Beliefs, Religious Observance and Social Relations among Israeli Jews (Levy, Levinson and Katz, 1993), serves as the basis of analysis in this research. The first chapter thus outlines the cultural, social and economic characteristics of the four groups and the main geographical patterns. The second chapter examines the relations between the two most prominent groups - Haredi and Secular - as they are perceived by interviewees from the four groups. The interviewees responses were analyzed according to their perception of the quality of Haredi-Secular relations today and differences in these relations in the last five years. An interesting finding on this subject is the huge difference between the two groups: the vast majority of Secular Jewish residents define relations with Haredi residents as not good, whereas less than half the Haredi ones agree with this definition. Furthermore, it is apparent that neither side is aware of how the other group perceives their relationship. Chapter 3 deals with how interviewees perceive the cultural composition of their residential neighborhoods. First, their current perception of the neighborhood is presented and, later, their perception of the same neighborhood in the future. The general anticipation for the future is a reduction in the number of predominantly-secular neighborhoods, and a concomitant rise in the number of neighborhoods where Haredi residents form the majority. Chapter 4 deals with interviewees views on the possibility of living in mixed Haredi/non-Haredi neighborhoods. Within the same issue, we also examined how interviewees view the possibility of a 8

9 future increase in the Haredi population in their neighborhoods. As could be expected, their views on the subject of living in the same quarter reflect their different opinions on religious principles in the city s public life and, particularly, in their own neighborhoods. Chapter 5 examines interviewees views on the possibility of living in a city in which the way the municipality is managed influences its lifestyle. The interviewees were asked to note in which municipality they would prefer to live if Jerusalem were hypothetically split in two: Haredi and non-haredi municipalities. On this hypothetical issue, too, interviewees opinions reflect the groups to which they belong. Most interviewees - except the Haredi ones - would prefer to live in a non-haredi municipality. Chapter 6 discusses tendencies to leave the city among the cultural groups. The survey pointed to a growing trend among the Secular residents to consider leaving Jerusalem because of Secular-Haredi tensions, although the facts show that this trend has not been realized on a significant scale. Chapter 7 examines the views of Jerusalem residents in matters related to the closing of streets, the operation of public transport and the opening of places of entertainment on the Sabbath. Certain questions in the survey were specifically aimed at clarifying how interviewees feel about the closing of the thoroughfare Bar-Ilan street on Saturdays. Chapter 8 deals with municipal matters and clarifies residents stands regarding changes that have taken place since the current municipal coalition came to power. Their responses to the possibility of a Haredi mayor being elected in 1998 were also examined: Secular and Traditional interviewees expressed grave reservations about this possibility. This chapter also deals with respondents reactions to the possibility of different municipal arrangements of Haredi/non-Haredi relations, whether by dividing the city in two, by separating City departments, or by creating separate self administered neighborhood councils for each of the two groups. The idea of splitting the city into two municipalities was rejected by the vast majority of interviewees. The idea of delineating distinct neighborhood councils won some credence. One of the main conclusions of the study is that Jerusalem s Jewish population cannot be split simply into Haredi and Secular, as is often the case in the public debate on the cultural tension in the city. The Jewish population is split into four main groups which differ from each other in their characteristics and in their ways of dealing with life in the public space of the city and its neighborhoods. These groups are: Secular, Traditional, Orthodox and Haredi, with the Traditional and Orthodox groups falling between the more polarized Secular and Haredi groups. The Traditional group has a significant degree of identification with the Secular one, although they also show great understanding for Haredi motives on religious matters. The Orthodox, while agreeing with the halachic (religious law) framework that drives the 9

10 Haredi group in their battles for a certain lifestyle, are not at all eager to leave the management of the city s public and municipal life in the hands of the Haredi political establishment. It seems that despite the distinct differences between the groups, within each one there are further differences regarding the issue of religion and society as they pertain to public life. Thus, for example, it was found that not every member of the Haredi community goes with the mainstream on social matters, and quite a number of them suggest a modus vivendi be sought with the other cultural groups. Another important conclusion of this research is that Secular Jews feel threatened by the growing Haredi presence and political power in the city. They are concerned about changes that may take place in the city and in their neighborhoods in the future. Many are taking a wait and see approach for now, but would consider moving out of the city limits to the surrounding suburbs if the Haredi population continues to gain political and geographic power. The political upheaval that took place in the 1993 municipal elections when Laborbased Teddy Kollek, the long-time major of the city was replaced by Haredi-supported Likud-based Ehud Olmert has contributed to the unclear picture for the Secular population regarding its continued presence in Jerusalem. A certain anxiety can be detected as the Secular population waits to see what happens in the 1998 elections. An increase in Haredi power in City Hall is likely to push a significant part of the Secular population to decide in favor of leaving Jerusalem. Similar concerns are found among the Traditional group. 10

11 1 The Four Cultural Groups The Jewish population of Israel has four cultural groups which can be differentiated in their approach to religion. They have been defined as Secular, Traditional, Orthodox and Haredi (ultra-orthodox) (Gutmann, 1996; Neuberger, 1994). Other researchers make further differentiations within each group. Liebman, for example, distinguishes between Universal- Secular, who want to apply universalistic liberal-democratic principles in the State of Israel, and Particularistic-Secular, who are willing to compromise with the existing situation (Liebman, forthcoming). The main four-group division can also be found in a national survey of the country s Jewish population which examined identities, views and cultural and religious customs (Levy, Levinson and Katz, 1993); the survey divided the groups according to degrees of religious observance. For the purposes of our research on Jerusalem s Jewish population, we relied on this division into four cultural groups and this is how we presented it to those surveyed: Secular, Traditional, Orthodox and Haredi. Cultural, Social and Economic Characteristics In the questionnaire survey, we left the definition of cultural identity in the area of religion to the interviewees themselves. The division of the interviewees according to their selfdeclared cultural identity was as follows: Secular percent; Traditional percent; Orthodox percent and Haredi percent. In order to use the sample to estimate the divisions into cultural groups within the total population, including adults and children, each interviewee was asked to note the number of individuals living in his/her household. This made it possible to calculate the number of individuals in each group, their relative part of the total Jewish population, and the average number of persons per household in each group (Table 1). The average number of persons per household was highest among the Haredi group, with 6.1, compared to 3.5 for the Secular group. Thus, the relative Haredi share in the total population is higher than their share in the sample, at 25.9 percent. By contrast, the share of the Secular group in the total population is lower than that in the sample, which reaches 29.5 percent. The relative share of both the Traditional and the Orthodox groups in the total population reflects their share in the sample. 11

12 Table 1: Interviewees, individuals in interviewed households and average number of persons per household, by cultural group (in percentages) Cultural Group All Groups Secular Traditional Orthodox Haredi Percentages Interviewees Individuals in households Averages Persons per household No difference was found among the four groups concerning the length of time they have been living in Jerusalem. In each group, about three-quarters of those interviewed have been living in the city for at least 10 years (Table 2). Hence, length of time cannot explain differences in the groups positions regarding general city-related questions, including how they view continued residence in Jerusalem, based on the assumption that those who have been living there longer have stronger roots there than others. Nor is there a difference between the four groups regarding whether they own or rent their residence: more than three-quarters live in apartments owned by themselves or their immediate family (Table 2). There is little difference in the educational level of the groups: percent of the Haredi, Orthodox and Secular groups have at least 13 years of schooling behind them (Table 2). Only the Traditional group has a significantly lower rate of higher education, which reaches just 43 percent. Large differences can be found among the groups concerning car ownership: 85.1 percent of the Secular residents own a car; 74.5 percent of Traditional; 65.4 percent of Orthodox; and just 29.9 percent of Haredi (Table 2). In research projects undertaken in past years in Israel it was common to use the rate of car ownership as an alternative index to income, figures for which are difficult to gather. This would indicate that members of the Secular group have the highest income, and the Haredi ones the lowest. However, another cultural factor should be taken into account for the Haredi group and that is the impact of religious sanction on the rate of car ownership. They have no use for a car on the Sabbath and would therefore have a lower propensity to own one. 12

13 Socioeconomic Table 2: Socioeconomic characteristics, by cultural group (percentages) Cultural Group Characteristics All Groups Secular Traditional Orthodox Haredi At least 11 years in the city Home owners At least 13 years of schooling Car owners Geographic Patterns The four Jewish cultural groups are not evenly distributed around Jerusalem. To examine their distribution, the city was divided into four zones: Far north: including the neighborhoods Shmuel Hanavi, Ramat Eshkol, French Hill, Pisgat Ze ev, Neve Ya akov, Ramot; North: Mea She arim, Beit Yisrael, Geula, Romema, Ma alot Dafna; Center: the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, Morasha, Yemin Moshe, city center, Nahlaot, Rehavia, Givat Shaul, Har Nof; South: Qiryat Moshe, Beit Hakerem, Qiryat Yovel, Qiryat Menahem, Ramat Sharett, Malha/Manhat, Qatamonim, Old Qatamon, Gonen, Greek Colony, German Colony, Giv'at Ha Oranim, Rascco, Qiryat Shemuel, Talbiye/Qomemiyut, San Simon, Baq a/geulim, Talpiot, Arnona, Abu Tor/Giv'at Hanina, East Talpiot, Gilo. The neighborhoods included in each zone were set by the local telephone exchanges, and it is possible that this does not reflect the exact geographical location of a neighborhood. As a result, there may be an error margin in the geographical analysis. Despite this limitation, we opted to use the proposed division because through it it is possible to learn distribution trends for the four Jewish cultural groups (Table 3). About half the population in the north, towards Mea She arim and west, is Haredi. In the south, about half the population is Secular and about another third Traditional. In other words, the north and south of the city are characterized by the dominance of a defined group: Haredi in the north, and Secular and Traditional in the south. On the other hand, the far north and center of the city are heterogeneous, displaying no dominance of any specific group. 13

14 Table 3: Interviewees in zones by cultural group (percentages) Zone Far North Near North Center South Cultural Group All Groups Secular Traditional Orthodox Haredi However, a relatively high presence of Traditional residents can be found in the far north while Secular and Orthodox residents can be found in relatively large numbers in the center - about one-third of the total population in these zones. The reason for this high presence of Traditional population in the in the Far North and the South apparently stems from the large number of public housing projects found in these zones. The Traditional group tends to constitute a large proportion of lower income households having their origin in North Africa and the Middle East and they form the majority of such housing areas on the periphery of the city. In order to further probe the distribution of the cultural groups in the city, we divided the interviewees according to the various zones (Table 4). A little less than half the Haredi population lives in the north and most of the other half in the far north and center. Most of the Secular population lives in the south; Secular residents also constitute a little over 10 percent of the population in the center, north and far north. It is thus very clear that the main concentrations of the Haredi and Secular populations are separated spatially from each other. Only about one-tenth of the south is Haredi, and the Secular population comprises a similar proportion in the Far North, which is dominated by the Haredi group. The geographical distribution of the Traditional population in the various zones resembles that of the Secular one, except for the Far North where it outnumbers the Secular group. The geographical distribution of the Haredi population is different from that of the other groups. Although about a tenth of this group lives in the city, the figure is low compared to the Secular and Traditional groups. In contrast to other groups, the Orthodox population tends to be much more evenly scattered in the urban space. A relatively high concentration of this group can be found in the Center and the South, but the figure is also quite high in the Haredi-dominated North. It is possible that this distribution trend reflects tolerance, which is a characteristic of the Orthodox population, and its ability to adapt to the different ways of life in the city. 14

15 Table 4: Interviewees in cultural groups by zone (in percentages) Zone Cultural Group All Groups Secular Traditional Orthodox Haredi Total Far North Near North Center South The Orthodox do, at the same time, show a significant preference for a lifestyle that is not Haredi in character, and the majority of this group can be found in zones that are not Haredi dominated. The geographical pattern of the different groups in the city space can be further examined by examining the index of relative geographical representation. This index shows the extent of concentration of the population groups in defined zones compared to the concentration of the cultural groups in those zones. Relative geographical representation is calculated in the following way: the share of the group in the zone out of the total share of that group in the city, divided by the share of the total population in the zone out of the total population in the city. Index values above 1.0 indicate over-representation and measures below 1.0 indicate under-representation. Table 5: Relative geographical representation index by zone Zone Far north Near North Center South Cultural Group Secular Traditional Orthodox Haredi Based on the relative geographical representation index it is possible to mark the preferred zone of the different groups: the Secular group in the South, the Traditional group in the Far North and to a lesser extent in the South, the Haredi population in the Near North, and the Orthodox in the Center. The Haredi population demonstrates the highest measure of segregation among all the Jewish cultural groups in Jerusalem by its

16 significant concentration in the Near North. It is in this zone where the old and the new Haredi neighborhoods cluster one near the other, all originating from the old code of the Me'a She'arim neighborhood, built in the 1860s. 16

17 2 Perception of Relations between the Secular and Haredi Groups Since the end of the 1980s, the conflicts between the Secular and Haredi groups in Jerusalem have increased. The opening of places of entertainment, such as cinemas, on the Sabbath around that time were met with Haredi demonstrations. These conflicts heightened in the 1990s as Haredi demonstrators attempted to stop traffic passing through the thoroughfare Bar-Ilan street with the aim of getting the street closed on the Sabbath (Hasson, 1996). With this background it is interesting to see how local residents evaluate the relations between Secular and Haredi groups; thus, the interviewees were asked their opinion on the quality of relations between the two groups in Jerusalem today and in 10 years. Nature of Haredi-Secular Relations Today Of those surveyed, a total of 71.1 percent stated that relations between the Secular and Haredi groups today were not good ( bad and not so good ). But there was a large gap between the two groups themselves, with the vast majority of Secular interviewees (89.7 percent) believing relations were not good, compared with less than half (43.2 percent) of their Haredi counterparts. Despite the fact that both groups reside in the same city, they live in worlds which have no contact with one another. The Haredi residents of Jerusalem do not understand the distress of the Secular ones and imagine a relationship which has no basis in reality. Looking at the Secular response, it is hard to gauge how more than half the Haredi population believes that relations between the two are good. The reverse is also true: the Secular residents are not aware that the Haredi ones view their mutual relationship in a much more positive light. Most Orthodox and Traditional residents believe relations between the Secular and Haredi groups are not good, but a split can be found in these two groups as well: the Orthodox are closer to the Haredi view, with a large number (39.1 percent) believing that relations are good, while less than a third of the Traditional group believe so, following the pattern of the Secular one. Table 6: Perception of Haredi-Secular relations, 17

18 Perception by cultural group (percentages) Cultural Group All Groups Secular Traditional Orthodox Haredi Total Very good Good Not so good Bad Changes in Haredi-Secular Relations in the Last Five Years The question arises whether the pessimistic views expressed by the Secular, Traditional and Orthodox groups reflect a static situation or whether they are the result of changes that have taken place in the Secular-Haredi relationship in recent years. In other words, in the last few years have relations between the two groups stayed the same, worsened or improved? To examine this issue, the interviewees were asked, How have relations between the Haredi and Secular groups changed over the last five years? More than two-thirds (67.1 percent) responded that relations have worsened, over a quarter (27 percent) said no change has been marked and only 5.9 percent believe relations have improved (Table 7). The views of the Secular residents are gloomier than those of the other groups: 81.4 percent said relations have worsened in the last five years, compared with 49.1 percent of the Haredi residents, 60.3 percent of Orthodox residents and 64.4 percent of Traditional ones. Two conclusions can be drawn from these responses: the first is that, again, the Haredi are not aware of the reality experienced by the Secular, and second, in this area too there is a scale in which the Secular interviewees are characterized by having the gloomiest views, followed by the Traditional and Orthodox interviewees. The gloomy assessments of the nature of Haredi-Secular relations and of the way these relations are changing have far-reaching urban implications. They indicate the growing distance between the two polarized groups in Jerusalem s Jewish population, particularly by the asymmetry between them. While most Haredi residents think relations are good, and most of them do not identify a worsening of those relations, most people in the other groups believe otherwise. 18

19 Table 7: Perception of changes in the Haredi-Secular relationship, by cultural group (percentages) Perception Cultural Group All Groups Secular Traditional Orthodox Haredi Total Better Worse No change It is hard to assess how the gloomy assessments of most of the city will affect inter-group behavior in the coming years. It is possible that the growing gloominess among the Secular and Traditional residents will lead to an increase in the conflict, or cause out-migration among those publics from the city. One thing seems clear: the detachment between the groups has grown in recent years and if Haredi awareness to the harsh feelings of the Secular and Traditional groups is not increased the situation will continue to worsen for all population groups in the city. 19

20 3 Residents Perception of Their Own Neighborhood The pessimistic feelings regarding relations with the Haredi population call for examination of the cultural composition of residential areas in Jerusalem. Two main questions are raised in this study: 1. How do the interviewees perceive the cultural make-up of their own neighborhoods today? and 2. How do they view future cultural changes in their own neighborhood? Perception of the neighborhood today In order to assess residents perception of the cultural composition of their neighborhoods today, the following question was asked: Are most of the residents of your neighborhood today Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional or Secular? Some 40 percent of the sample responded that most of the neighborhood population was Secular, 25 percent said the majority were Traditional, 14.8 percent said the Orthodox hold the majority, and 17.7 percent defined the neighborhood as mostly Haredi (Table 8). These distributions of the interviewees responses indeed reflect their varying perceptions of the neighborhood, but nevertheless enable a first approximation of the cultural dominance of the various cultural groups in the different residential areas of the city. Most of the local Secular population (70.5 percent) and most of the Haredi one (66.4 percent) believe they live in an area in which their own group is dominant, in one way or another. Less than half (48.3 percent) of the Traditional residents feel they live in a mostly Traditional neighborhood, and less than one-third (30.8 percent) of the Orthodox noted that the dominant group is Orthodox (Table 8). What about when the individual lives in an area in which his or her group does not represent the majority, or a large part? In this case, it is interesting to examine, based on what the interviewees say, who holds the majority in the neighborhood. 20

21 Table 8: Perception of the majority in one's own neighborhood, by cultural group (percentages) Perception Total Secular Majority Traditional Majority Orthodox Majority Haredi Majority Cultural Group All Groups Secular Traditional Orthodox Haredi Such an examination can reveal who the neighbors are and which groups are missing, or found in smaller numbers. Subsequently, it may be learned in which population groups the interviewees feel comfortable when they are a minority in the neighborhood. The findings of this study show that Secular residents who do not live in an area with a Secular majority tend to live in Traditional-dominated neighborhoods; they avoid living in predominantly Haredi areas. Traditional individuals who do not live in mainly Traditional neighborhoods tend to live in neighborhoods dominated by the Secular and Orthodox groups and far less in Haredi neighborhoods. Orthodox residents of non-orthodox neighborhoods will live in Traditional and Secular neighborhoods. Haredi residents who do not live in areas where that group is dominant will seek Orthodox neighborhoods. The largest spatial polarization found in the interviewees perception is between the Secular and the Haredi groups. These two groups avoid living in neighborhoods in which the other group represents the majority. This tendency is particularly strong for the Secular group: just 3.0 percent of the Secular interviewees live in predominantly Haredi areas, compared to 9 percent of the Haredi ones who live in Secular-dominant areas. Similarly, Traditional and Haredi residents will tend not to live in an area dominated by the other group, with the Traditional ones, like their Secular counterparts, demonstrating stronger views in this case: 3.4 percent of Traditional residents live in neighborhoods they define as Haredi, and 7.4 percent of Haredi residents live in what they say are Traditional-dominant zones. On the basis of interviewees reponses, it is possible to draft Jerusalem s main cultural-spatial lines: Secular residents segregate themselves from the Haredi and Orthodox ones, preferring Secular and Traditional neighbors. The Haredi residents segregate themselves from Traditional and Secular groups, opting for Haredi neighborhoods and, to a lesser extent, Orthodox ones. The Orthodox do not segregate themselves but show a preference for Secular and Traditional neighborhoods. 21

22 Perception of the neighborhood in the future The social dynamic of residential areas is the result of demographic, economic and political processes. However, it is also influenced by residents expectations of the demographic and social composition of their environment in the future. Positive expectations - primarily preserving social-cultural stability - can contribute to a neighborhood s continued stability. On the other hand, negative expectations may strengthen the trend to leave the area. In order to examine interviewees feelings regarding the future cultural make-up of their neighborhoods, they were asked: In your opinion, will most of the residents living in your neighborhood in 10 years time be Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional or Secular? About one-third responded that the majority would be Haredi, a quarter said Traditional, some 20 percent said Orthodox and a similar proportion said Secular. Comparison of the neighborhood composition today and in the future allows anticipated demographic-cultural processes in Jerusalem neighborhoods to be identified, according to the interviewees (Table 9). Table 9: Perception of the majority in one's own neighborhood, today and in 10 years (percentages) Secular majority Traditional majority Orthodox majority Haredi majority Perception Today In 10 Years The proportion of interviewees perceiving their own neighborhood as having a Secular majority falls by half when comparing their view of the present situation with that of 10 years later. The reverse is true for the perceived change in the proportion of the Haredi population. The proportion of interviewees perceiving their own neighborhood as dominated by the Haredi group rises from 17.7 percent for the present situation to 32.3 percent for 10 years later. The proportion of interviewees perceiving an Orthodox majority in their neighborhood also grows when the data for the present are compared with those for a decade later. There is no change in the proportion of interviewees perceiving their neighborhood as having a Traditional majority. It is noteworthy that more than half (54.8 percent) of all groups perceive that in 10 years they will live in neighborhoods where the majority of residents are Haredi or Orthodox, compared with one third (32.5 percent) perceiving so at the present. 22

23 The residential dynamics that is expected to prevail in the city in future is very clearly expressed by the Secular and Haredi interviewees (Table 10). The Secular interviewees forecast is gloomy. While today 70.5 percent of Secular interviewees stated that most of the residents in their neighborhoods are Secular, only a third (33.6 percent) think the situation will remain the same a decade from now. Most of the Secular residents (66.4 percent) see the Traditional, Orthodox and Haredi representing in the near future the majority in their neighborhoods. More specifically, half the Secular interviewees (49.3 percent) believe they will live in neighborhoods that are dominated by Traditional and Orthodox groups, while 17.1 percent even believe most future residents of their neighborhoods will be Haredi. The Haredi interviewees forecast supports these views: twothirds say they live today in mostly-haredi neighborhoods, but over 80 percent of them expect that in the future they will live in Haredi-dominated neighborhoods. The Orthodox and, even more so, the Traditional interviewees also anticipate the growth of the Haredi population in their neighborhoods. Of the Traditional residents, 3.4 percent say the majority in their neighborhoods today is Haredi; but this figure grows to 18.8 percent when asked to anticipate the situation in a decade. Table 10: Perception of the majority group in one's own neighborhood, today and in 10 years among Secular and Haredi interviewees (percentages) Perception Total Secular majority Traditional majority Orthodox majority Haredi majority Cultural Group Secular Haredi Today In 10 Years Today In 10 Years The change the Orthodox community expects is slighter than that of the Traditional one: 17.8 percent of interviewees claim to live in Haredi-dominated areas today, and this figure grows to 24.8 percent regarding their views of the future. It seems the Traditional prediction of an increased Haredi presence in their own neighborhoods is linked to the fact that many of them live in older quarters of Jerusalem which adjoin Haredi neighborhoods in the city center. It is in the Traditional-dominated neighborhoods in the inner-city that much of the expansion of the Haredi population has been taking place in recent decades. The gloomy expectations of the Secular residents are likely to be realized in the long term. If most of 23

24 them think the nature of their neighborhoods will become dominated by non-secular groups, they may seek residence outside the city limits, in settlements with a Secular majority. This is also true for the Traditional interviewees, who also anticipate substantial growth among the Haredi community. The message to the leaders and policy-makers of the city and the state is that these pessimistic expectations of the Secular and Traditional communities should be quieted by guaranteeing Jerusalem s cultural stability. To ensure the continuation of Jerusalem as a multi-cultural city, the Secular and Traditional residents, most of whom still believe they live in like-minded neighborhoods, must be able to continue to believe this. Only in this way will it be possible to lessen their anxieties. 24

25 4 Living in the Same Neighborhood In recent years, the Haredi population has been embroiled in a number of battles with its environment - not only with the Secular population, but also over the management of life in the whole of the city s public space, especially at the neighborhood level. Non-Haredi residents find themselves in the midst of the lifestyle battle in the neighborhood in view of Haredi aspirations to deepen the characteristics of their lives. Sometimes the question arises whether the trend found in the Haredi battle to create a residential territory that is absolutely Haredi in nature is compatible with the possibility of the existence of heterogeneous Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem for Haredi and non-haredi residents alike. Living Together In order to examine interviewees positions on the possibility of living in the same neighborhood, they were asked, Are Haredi and non-haredi residents capable of living in the same neighborhood? Two-thirds (66.7 percent) responded positively (Table 11), although the rate differed between the different groups. The highest rate with a positive response was the Haredi group (81.3 percent); the lowest was found among the Secular group (48.6 percent). High rates of positive responses were also found among both the Orthodox (78.2 percent) and the Traditional residents (73.4 percent). Table 11: Views on joint residential areas for both Haredi and non-haredi residents, by cultural group (percentages) View Cultural Group All Groups Secular Traditional Orthodox Haredi Total Possible Not possible The Secular interviewees were split in their responses to this question. This split can be explained by significant differences in the positions of those living in the north of the city, close to Haredi quarters, and those who live in the Secular-dominated south. Almost three- 25

26 quarters (72.4 percent) of Secular residents in the north of the city believe Haredi and non- Haredi residents cannot live together in one neighborhood; this figure compares to less than half (44.0 percent) for their counterparts in the south who agree with them. The conclusion can be drawn that those Secular residents who live in close contact with the Haredi community have a more pessimistic view regarding the possibility of common inter-group neighborhood life. Facing a Growing Haredi Population in the Neighborhood One of the most conspicuous processes in Jerusalem s residential geography is the expansion of Haredi quarters, which is bringing about the gradual creation of a continuous bloc of Haredi neighborhoods, especially north of Jaffa Road (Shilhav and Friedman, 1985). In recent decades, this process has increased and a pattern of leapfrogging to neighborhoods in new areas of the city can be observed, such as Har Nof in western Jerusalem and Ramot- Polin in the north, in the Ramot-Elon area. Previous research by Shilhav (1991) and Hasson (1996) show that after a new Haredi concentration has been created, it then expands, penetrating buildings and whole streets that are gradually made vacant by residents who are not Haredi. The process ends by the whole area being populated by Haredi residents. This expansion has caused neighborhood disputes between Haredi residents, who are searching for housing and a residential environment in which they can live their own lifestyle, and the other groups. As a result, a certain degree of tension in Jerusalem s non-haredi neighborhoods has been created regarding the potential penetration by the Haredi population. In order to evaluate interviewees positions regarding this possible growth of the Haredi community in their neighborhoods, the following question was asked: Do you think an increase of about 10 percent of the Haredi residents in the neighborhood in which you live is desirable? About a fifth (21.3 percent) said yes; about half (47.8 percent) said it would not make a difference to them; and only about a third (30.9 percent) said this would not be desirable (Table 12). In other words, more than two-thirds of interviewees (69.2 percent) do not object to a moderate growth of Haredi numbers in their neighborhoods. As could be expected, there are differences among the four groups, with the biggest difference being between Haredi and Secular respondents. About three-quarters of Haredi residents said such a growth would be desirable to them, compared to just two percent of Secular ones who agreed with them. View Table 12: Views on a possible 10 percent growth of the Haredi population in the neighborhoods, by cultural groups (percentages) Cultural Group 26