The Stoics. The Stoics
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1 The Stoics Overview The Stoic system of philosophy: Physics (including Ontology) Logic (including Epistemology) Ethics The Stoics Ontology
2 Stoic Ontology Epicharmus Growing Argument P1: The personal identity of each individual is a strict function of its material composition. P2: Since all matter is in constant flux, the material composition of each individual is in constant flux. C1a: Therefore, personal identity of each individual is in constant flux. C1b: But common sense tells us that personal identity is continuous over time. Stoic Ontology Chrysippus Response to the Growing Argument (14C) (1) Chrysippus, the most distinguished member of their school, in his work On the Growing [Argument], creates a freak of the following kind. (2) Having first established that it is impossible for two peculiarly qualified individuals to occupy the same substance jointly, (3) he says: For the sake of argument, let one individual be thought of as whole-limbed, the other as minus one foot. Let the wholelimbed one be called Dion, the defective one Theon. Dion Theon (Pre-amputation, tentative)
3 Stoic Ontology Chrysippus Response to the Growing Argument (14C) Then let one of Dion s feet be amputated. (4) The question arises which one of them has perished, and his claim is that Theon is the stronger candidate. (5) These are the words of a paradox-monger rather than of a speaker of truth. For how can it be that Theon, who has had no part chopped off, has been snatched away, while Dion, whose foot has been amputated, has not perished? But it isn t clear why either Dion or Theon should perish. Dion Theon (Post-amputation, tentative) Stoic Ontology Chrysippus Response to the Growing Argument (14C) Theon (6) Necessarily, says Chrysippus. For Dion, the one whose foot has been cut off, has collapsed into the defective substance of Theon. And two peculiarly qualified individuals cannot occupy the same substrate. Therefore it is necessary that Dion remains while Theon has perished. Dion (Pre-amputation) Theon or Dion? (Post-amputation) But it still isn t clear why one should perish rather than the other. And why accept the premise that Theon is a part of Dion?
4 Stoic Ontology Chrysippus Response to the Growing Argument (14C) P3: Suppose that Theon initially lacks a foot, Theon Stoic Ontology Chrysippus Response to the Growing Argument (14C) Theon P3: Suppose that Theon initially lacks a foot, and suppose that for Theon, material flux takes the form of growing a foot. C2: Since the material composition of Theon has changed, we now have a new individual who we will call Dion. C3: But since the personal identity of each individual is a strict function of its material composition (P1), and since all of the matter that constituted Theon is still present in a particular region of the individual that we now call Dion, we must still view this region of Dion as a numerically distinct individual that is related to Dion as part to whole. Therefore, C4: Theon is related to Dion as part to whole. Dion
5 Stoic Ontology Chrysippus Response to the Growing Argument (14C) P4: Suppose that Dion s new foot is chopped off again. C5a: Since personal identity of each individual is a strict function of its material composition (P1), we must conclude that Theon survives and Dion dies. C5b: The surviving person is obviously the one who lost the foot. But this must be Dion, because Theon never had a left foot. So we must conclude that Dion survives and Theon dies. Theon or Dion? Stoic Physics The Principles of Bodies To exist = to be a body. The 2 most fundamental types of body = principles : 1) Active/Rational Principle. 2) Passive Principle. These principles: are inseparable from each other. are eternal, ungenerated, and indestructible. combine to form the world as a whole, and every object in it.
6 Stoic Epistemology Presentations Presentation (phantasia) = self-revealing impression Different sorts of presentations (21D & 23A): Sensible/Simple. Intellectual/Complex. Basic grasps Stoic Epistemology Criterion of truth The graspable presentation : makes infallible knowledge possible is worthy of assent (24B) Assent = a faculty in humans but not in animals that goes along with or refuses to go along with the truth or desirability of the content of a presentation.
7 Stoic Epistemology Criterion of truth A graspable impression satisfies two conditions, viz., 1) it has a real object as its cause (24D), and 2) it illuminates that object in a clear and accurate way. (24C) Objection from the Academic Sceptic Arcesilaus: Couldn t a phantasm be qualitatively identical to a graspable presentation? Zeno: A graspable presentation must satisfy a third condition: 3) it is of such a kind as could not arise from what is not. Arcesilaus: No presentation exists that can t in principle be counterfeited. (24D) Counterexamples: wax pomegranates, identical twins, eggs, etc. Stoic Epistemology Criterion of truth Stoic Reply: Assert the identity of indiscernibles: x y( F(Fx Fy) x = y) Claim that a peculiar qualification marks off every object as a unique individual.
8 Presentation true false graspable Stoic Epistemology Grasping, knowledge & opinion (25B) merely true Assent strong knowledge (grasping) opinion opinion weak opinion (grasping) opinion opinion Stoic Epistemology Character, knowledge & opinion The marks of a virtuous man: Doesn t assent to non-graspable presentations Can t be talked out of assent to graspable presentations. The marks of a base man: Assents to non-graspable presentations Can be talked out of assent to graspable presentations.
9 Principal Claims: The Goal of Life = to live according to virtue = to live according to reason = to live according to human nature (12A 87) Living according to virtue is necessary and sufficient for living well. (It is only a reasonable/virtuous use of the other supposedly good things that makes one live well.) (12A 103-4). Idealized Developmental Argument: Proceeds from "common conceptions" about the way most people are, to an idealized conception of the way everyone should be; a normative conception involving: 1. Practical reason 2. Sociability 3. A desire for one s own well-being. Argument takes the form of an account of the idealized process of natural development of a human being's concept of their final good toward the Stoic notion of eudaimonia.
10 3 Phases of Moral Development: 1. Primary Impulse (protê hormê) 2. Rational Selection (eklogê) 3. Choice (hairesis) Primary Impulse (protê hormê) & Orientation (oikeiôsis) 12A 85: 1st common conception: It is part of the normative nature of animals, including human animals to 1. be conscious of themselves and their own constitution (sustasis) and to instinctively seek their own well-being in the sense of the preservation of their own lives and constitutions.
11 Primary Impulse & Orientation Terminology: hormê: n., impulse; either a movement in the soul or a disposition of the soul to move in a certain way in response to certain stimuli (hexis hormêtikê). sustasis: n. a condition or constitution of a person or a thing. oikeioô: v., to make something have a caring orientation toward something. Related words: to oikeion: adjectival substantive; what something comes to have a caring orientation toward. oikeiôsis: either 1. the process of causing a living being to have a caring orientation towards something (to oikeion) or 2. the caring orientation resulting from this process. Primary Impulse (protê hormê) & Orientation (oikeiôsis) 12A 85: The first behavioral disposition of every animal to act in response to stimuli is a disposition to act with the aim of preserving itself. Nature 1. caused this disposition, from the very beginning, to select for stimuli and responses likely to preserve the animal's constitution, and 2. caused the animal to be aware of its constitution, presumably so it could aim at its preservation.
12 Primary Impulse (protê hormê) & Orientation (oikeiôsis) 12A 85: A teleological argument: Nature either orients animals toward themselves, or 2. alienates animals from themselves, or 3. does neither. But we can rule out 2. and 3. based on the principle that Nature does nothing in vain. So Nature orients animals toward themselves. Primary Impulse (protê hormê) & Orientation (oikeiôsis) 12A 85: Primary things in accordance with nature (12B 7a): "health, strength, soundness of one's sense organs, and things like this" Primary things in contrary to nature (12B 7a): "disease, weakness, impairment, and such things" Appropriate actions (kathêkonta 12B 8): Repelling primary things in contrary to nature and pursuing primary things in accordance with nature, i.e., "what is consistent in life, which when done admits of a reasonable defense." Being governed in accordance with impulse (12A 86): Acting without deliberation, so that the appearance of a primary thing in accordance with nature is sufficient to motivate action.
13 Rational Selection (eklogê): Rational selection (eklogê): An impulse resulting from a disposition to reflectively deliberate about setting priorities with respect to one s endeavors Enables one to give reasoned justifications for one s actions Concept of well-being: Unsystematic maximization of the things valued by one s culture. Well-being of the animal qua rational animal (12A 85): a greatly expanded, culturally influenced concept of one s own well being including e.g., wealth, reputation, honor, noble birth, etc. The emergence of responsibility: Emergence of the ability to assent or withhold assent to propositions. Appearance of a thing in accordance with nature is no longer sufficient to motivate action so that the response to stimuli is neither automatic nor necessary, and therefore, voluntary and morally assessable in a human sense. Rational Selection (eklogê): Preference: Everything natural has value. Everything unnatural has disvalue. Things with a lot of value are to be preferred. Things with little value are to be shunned. (12B 7f & 7g) Selective Value: All of the above is subject to an all things being equal proviso (12B 7f). But insofars as the future is unclear, always choose what is natural. Deliberation: Rational selection involves conscious deliberation, and as a result, activities involving this impulse can be justified discursively.
14 3 Phases of Moral Development: Type of impulse Standards of Value/Disvalue Standards for assessing actions Concept of wellbeing Phase 1 primary impulse the primary natural and unnatural Appropriate action = what conduces to self-preservation self-preservation Phase 2 rational selection The natural and unnatural as defined by culture Appropriate action (kathêkonta) = what maximizes the natural as defined by one s culture Maximization of the natural as defined by culture Phase 3 choice Good = virtue and bad = vice Perfect appropriate action (katorthômata) = what accords with a comprehensive Eudaimonia = living according to virtue Choice (hairesis): Concept of well-being (eudaimonia): "that which is perfectly in accord with nature for a rational being, qua rational." (12A 94) Living consistently and the true good: Living according to virtue = "reasonable behavior in the selection of things according to nature." (12A 88) Virtue is a "disposition in agreement" or a consistent disposition (12A 89) "Selection becomes continuous, and, finally, stable and in agreement with nature. At this point that which can truly be said to be good first appears and is recognized for what it is." (12C 20-1)
15 Moral responsibility The Stoic subscribed to a strong causal determinism: The Stoics say [fate] is a string of causes, i.e., an ordering and connection which is inescapable. (22C) Problem: The Lazy Argument Chrysippus answer: Events are co-fated. Moral responsibility Another problem: If virtue & vice = assenting to the correct beliefs, and if everything is causally determined, including our beliefs, then virtue & vice will be out of our power. Chrysippus answer: There are two types of cause at work (32B): Proximate cause: incitement to φ (e.g., opportunity to steal; like pushing a cylinder) Principal cause: disposition to φ (e.g., tendency to steal when presented with an opportunity; like the shape of a cylinder)
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