# Fundamentals of Metaphysics

Size: px
Start display at page:

Transcription

1 Fundamentals of Metaphysics

2 Objective and Subjective One important component of the Common Western Metaphysic is the thesis that there is such a thing as objective truth. each of our beliefs and assertions represents the World as being a certain way, and the belief or assertion is true if the World is that way, and false if the World is not that way. Our beliefs and assertions are thus related to the World as a map is related to the territory: it is up to the map to get the territory right, and if the map doesn t get the territory right, that s the fault of the map and no fault of the territory. Van Inwagen, Objectivity, p. 1

3 The basic components of the World? Propositions States of affairs Truth Particulars Properties and relations Cause and effect

4 E.g. Wittgenstein s Tractatus 1 The world is everything that is the case. 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case The facts in logical space are the world. So says Wittgenstein in Most people probably think instead that the world is the totality of things, or particulars.

5 Propositions vs. properties Propositions and properties are both conceptual, or intelligible, components of reality. It seems that they re not independent of one another, but that one should be considered derived from the other. Which one is more basic?

6 Particulars and properties are more basic? Consider the proposition: Cristiano Ronaldo was born in Portugal Isn t it a composite of two things? There is the particular, Ronaldo, together with the property: x was born in Portugal. So it looks as if particulars and properties are more basic.

7 Objection 1 To make a proposition (or state of affairs) you need more than just a property and a particular. There is also the fact that the particular in question has the property. (This is called the instantiation or exemplification relation.) (E.g. the David Lewis has a beard example in Loux.)

8 David Lewis ( )

9 Objection 2 A single proposition can be decomposed in a variety of ways. E.g. Cristiano Ronaldo was born in Portugal Cristiano Ronaldo was born in Portugal Cristiano Ronaldo was born in Portugal

10 Objection 3 Some propositions don t have particulars in them. E.g. Every person has a beard. How do you create such a proposition out of properties and particulars?

11 Objection 4: Particulars are arbitrary Consider van Inwagen s example: Mount Everest is 8,847.7 meters high The point was raised there that the division of the earth s crust into mountains (and continents, etc.) is rather arbitrary. Such divisions are human constructs, not part of reality.

12 In a similar way, perhaps the division of the actual world into separate states of affairs is rather arbitrary as well? Perhaps these divisions are also human constructs, due to the fact that our minds have to break reality into pieces that are small enough to fit into our heads? (The particular properties we define, such as height, are perhaps somewhat arbitrary as well.)

13 Arguments for anti-realism 1. It is a human fiction, one that has gained currency because it serves certain social needs, that a certain portion of the earth s topography can be marked off and called a mountain. 2. Mount Everest to the ground and then measure the rope with a meter stick and call the result the height of Mount Everest. We therefore have to use a special instrument called a theodolite to measure the height of Mount Everest.

14 Response: These points are correct, but so what? Suppose (just for convenience) that God exists, so that the actual world is God s (perfect and complete) understanding of the world the God s eye view. Does God have the concept of Mount Everest? Or of height? Maybe not.

15 E.g. Is Pluto a planet? Humans: God: We re trying to figure out whether or not Pluto is a planet. Can t you tell us? I m afraid that planet is your concept, not mine. You ll just have to decide what planet will mean. However, God surely approved of the changes that have occurred to the meaning of planet. E.g. when the earth became a planet, and the sun and moon ceased to be planets, this was a step towards reality.

16 Natural kinds Some human concepts are more real than others, in the sense of better capturing the real divisions in nature. These natural kinds are said to carve nature at the joints. The old concept of a planet, as a heavenly body that moves through fixed stars, isn t a natural kind.

17 Classification changes Celestial bodies for Ptolemy

18 Copernican taxonomy

19 What is truly objective? Arguably, then, the only truly objective reality is the actual world, the totality of facts. The division of the actual world into bite size facts may be a human construct? The division of a fact into particulars and properties may be a further human construct? Nevertheless, given our language and the categories it creates, the World then determines whether or not a given proposition is true or false.

20 Are propositions objective? Frege says that propositions are objective and mindindependent, in order to avoid psychologism. But what of the cases where two different beliefs represent the same possible state of affairs? Or no possible state of affairs? (Frege didn t have much to say about states of affairs. For him, the Bedeutung of a sentence was its truth value, since only the truth value of a sentence is invariant under substitutions of co-referring names.)

21 Are propositions objective? As I mentioned in the second reading, propositions don t need to be objective, in order for logic to be objective. Basically, the Ps and Qs of logical laws can be understood as states of affairs rather than propositions, as exactly the same rules apply. E.g. (P Q) ( P Q) Then the rules concerning states of affairs will be normative for human thought, just as truth is normative for belief.

22 Is realism excessive? How could there be truths totally independent of minds or persons? Truths are the sort of things persons know; and the idea that there are or could be truths quite beyond the best methods of apprehension seems peculiar and outre and somehow outrageous. What would account for such truths? How would they get there? Where would they come from? How could the things that are in fact true or false propositions, let s say exist in serene and majestic independence of persons and their means of apprehension? How could there be propositions no one has ever so much as grasped or thought of? Alvin Plantinga, How to be an anti-realist, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 56, No. 1. (Sep., 1982), pp

23 Correcting the terminology How could there be states of affairs totally independent of minds or persons? States of affairs are the sort of things that thoughts represent; and the idea that there are or could be states of affairs quite beyond the best methods of apprehension seems peculiar and outre and somehow outrageous. What would account for such states of affairs? How would they get there? Where would they come from? How could states of affairs exist in serene and majestic independence of persons and their means of apprehension? How could there be states of affairs no one has ever so much as grasped or thought of?

24 It is true, there could be a metaphysical world; the absolute possibility of it is hardly to be disputed. We behold all things through the human head and cannot cut off this head; while the question nonetheless remains what of the world would still be there if one had cut it off. from Nietzsche s Human, All Too Human, s.9, R.J. Hollingdale translation. 24

25 States of affairs are beliefs in the sky? An easy objection to this realist view is that possible states of affairs look very much like beliefs, and actual states of affairs, or facts, look very much like true beliefs. Surely all we re doing here is (as Kant said) projecting the structure of our minds onto the world. States of affairs are beliefs in the sky. (Rather like the way that God, according to some, is just an imaginary Daddy in the sky.) 25

26 Nominalism about states of affairs Loux: the general tenor of nominalist criticisms of propositions will not surprise us. We find the familiar charges of bloated ontologies, baroque metaphysical theories, and bizarre and mysterious abstract entities. We meet as well complaints about two-world ontologies and the epistemological problems they generate. How could concrete beings like us have epistemic access to abstract things like states of affairs?

27 Can we do without states of affairs? Wouldn t Frege s fears of psychologism then be fully realised? But this conception pushes everything into the subjective, and if pursued to the end, annihilates truth.

28 Are states of affairs causal? Shouldn t we say that facts at least can be causes and effects? For example, the spherical shape of the earth is an actual state of affairs (a fact). And this fact has effects that we can observe, such as Polaris having a lower elevation as one travels south. (Non-actual states of affairs don t seem to be causes and effects though. What caused Harper to win yet another general election in 2015?)

29 So our knowledge of non-actual states of affairs seems more problematic than knowledge of facts. What do we even know about non-actual states of affairs? E.g. There being life on Venus is a possible, nonactual state of affairs? Venus not being identical to Venus is not even a possible state of affairs? (says Kripke)

30 Necessity and Possibility Philosophers today love to talk about modality. Usually in terms of possible worlds. A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs. A necessary state of affairs is one that is included in (entailed by) every possible world. A possible state of affairs is one that is included in at least one possible world.

31 Knowledge of counterfactuals Non-actual states of affairs are needed for counterfactuals, it seems. E.g. Had Trudeau supported Bill C-51, Harper would have won the election. For some philosophers (e.g. David Lewis), causation is very close to counterfactual dependence: If C hadn t occurred, then E wouldn t have occurred either.

32 What turns a state of affairs into a fact? Facts seem to have an extra ingredient of concreteness, when compared to non-actual states of affairs. What is this? Is it a property?

33 Descartes idea of substance But as I speak these words I hold the wax near to the fire, and look! The taste and smell vanish, the colour changes, the shape is lost, the size increases... But is it still the same wax? Of course it is; no-one denies this. So what was it about the wax that I understood so clearly? Evidently it was not any of the features that the senses told me of; for all of them brought to me through taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing have now altered, yet it is still the same wax. I am forced to conclude that the nature of this piece of wax isn t revealed by my imagination, but is perceived by the mind alone.

34 The idea of a substance, or object, as a thing that continues to exist even while its properties change, is considered an innate idea by rationalists. After all, we have sensory ideas of the properties of the wax, but do not perceive the substance itself.

35 (The house is a property of the bricks, not a substance.)

36 Locke on substance The idea then we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing, but the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities, we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, sine re substante, without something to support them, we call that support substantia, which, according to the true import of the word, is in plain English, standing under or upholding. (II xxiii 2) On this view, existence or substance isn t just another property, but something rather different. Something we have no clear conception of.

37 Substance as obscure Our obscure idea of substance in general. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; he would not be in a much better case than the Indian before mentioned who, saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on; to which his answer was- a great tortoise: but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied- something, he knew not what. (Locke)

38

39 Bundle theories of objects A thing (individual, concrete particular) is nothing but a bundle of properties. See e.g. James van Cleve, Three versions of the bundle theory, Philosophical Studies 47 (1985)

40 Objections 1. If a thing were nothing more than a set of properties, any set of properties would fulfill the conditions of thinghood, and there would be a thing for every set. But in fact there are many sets without corresponding things - e.g., the set {being an alligator, being purple}. 2. If a thing were a set of properties, it would be an eternal, indeed a necessary, being. For properties exist necessarily, and a set exists necessarily if all its members do.

41 Sophisticated defenders of the bundle theory do not say that a thing is nothing but a bundle of properties; they say that it is a bundle whose elements all stand to one another in a certain very important relation. Let us call the relation co-instantiation. The informal explanation of co-instantiation is generally this: it is the relation that relates a number of properties just in case they are all properties of one and the same individual.

42 This makes it sound very much as though coinstantiation either is or is derivative from a relation that properties bear to an entity in some other ontological category, namely, the category of individuals or things, in which case the bundle theorist s analysis would be circular. He must therefore insist that the informal explanation is merely a ladder to be kicked away, and that co-instantiation is really a relation among properties and nothing else.

43 The puzzle of real existence Consider a physical system whose behaviour must satisfy some equation of motion. In that case, each solution to the equation represents a possible history of the system, but only one of these is actual. Now, what quality of this actual history distinguishes it from the myriad of possible histories? Two things are obvious here: 1. This quality of concreteness or real existence is not something that can be expressed mathematically. 2. Physics as a subject has nothing to say about real existence, in the sense that physicists don t write papers about it, or construct theories of it.

44 Probability: subjective and objective

### Cartesian Rationalism

Cartesian Rationalism René Descartes 1596-1650 Reason tells me to trust my senses Descartes had the disturbing experience of finding out that everything he learned at school was wrong! From 1604-1612 he

### Cartesian Rationalism

Cartesian Rationalism René Descartes 1596-1650 Reason tells me to trust my senses Descartes had the disturbing experience of finding out that everything he learned at school was wrong! From 1604-1612 he

### Lecture 3: Properties II Nominalism & Reductive Realism. Lecture 3: Properties II Nominalism & Reductive Realism

1. Recap of previous lecture 2. Anti-Realism 2.1. Motivations 2.2. Austere Nominalism: Overview, Pros and Cons 3. Reductive Realisms: the Appeal to Sets 3.1. Sets of Objects 3.2. Sets of Tropes 4. Overview

### does. All reality is mental, consisting only of minds and their ideas. Ideas are passive, whereas minds are active. Every idea needs a mind to be in.

Berkeley s Idealism Idealism Matter doesn t exist, but the external world still does. All reality is mental, consisting only of minds and their ideas. Ideas are passive, whereas minds are active. Every

### PHIL 399: Metaphysics (independent study) Fall 2015, Coastal Carolina University Meeting times TBA

PHIL 399: Metaphysics (independent study) Fall 2015, Coastal Carolina University Meeting times TBA Professor Dennis Earl Email, phone dearl@coastal.edu, (843-349-4094) Office hours Edwards 278: MWF 11

### Objectivity. and falsity are conferred on those beliefs and assertions by their objects, by the things they are about.

Objectivity From Peter Van Inwagen, Metaphysics, Chapter 5, Westview Press, 2015. One important component of the Common Western Metaphysic is the thesis that there is such a thing as objective truth. This

### Philosophy 125 Day 13: Overview

Branden Fitelson Philosophy 125 Lecture 1 Philosophy 125 Day 13: Overview Reminder: Due Date for 1st Papers and SQ s, October 16 (next Th!) Zimmerman & Hacking papers on Identity of Indiscernibles online

### The knowledge argument

Michael Lacewing The knowledge argument PROPERTY DUALISM Property dualism is the view that, although there is just one kind of substance, physical substance, there are two fundamentally different kinds

### Putnam: Meaning and Reference

Putnam: Meaning and Reference The Traditional Conception of Meaning combines two assumptions: Meaning and psychology Knowing the meaning (of a word, sentence) is being in a psychological state. Even Frege,

### WHAT DOES KRIPKE MEAN BY A PRIORI?

Diametros nr 28 (czerwiec 2011): 1-7 WHAT DOES KRIPKE MEAN BY A PRIORI? Pierre Baumann In Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke stressed the importance of distinguishing three different pairs of notions:

### Under contract with Oxford University Press Karen Bennett Cornell University

1. INTRODUCTION MAKING THINGS UP Under contract with Oxford University Press Karen Bennett Cornell University The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible

### From Transcendental Logic to Transcendental Deduction

From Transcendental Logic to Transcendental Deduction Let me see if I can say a few things to re-cap our first discussion of the Transcendental Logic, and help you get a foothold for what follows. Kant

### Truth At a World for Modal Propositions

Truth At a World for Modal Propositions 1 Introduction Existentialism is a thesis that concerns the ontological status of individual essences and singular propositions. Let us define an individual essence

### Class #3 - Meinong and Mill

Philosophy 308: The Language Revolution Fall 2014 Hamilton College Russell Marcus Class #3 - Meinong and Mill 1. Meinongian Subsistence The work of the Moderns on language shows us a problem arising in

### Realism and its competitors. Scepticism, idealism, phenomenalism

Realism and its competitors Scepticism, idealism, phenomenalism Perceptual Subjectivism Bonjour gives the term perceptual subjectivism to the conclusion of the argument from illusion. Perceptual subjectivism

### Subjective Logic: Logic as Rational Belief Dynamics. Richard Johns Department of Philosophy, UBC

Subjective Logic: Logic as Rational Belief Dynamics Richard Johns Department of Philosophy, UBC johns@interchange.ubc.ca May 8, 2004 What I m calling Subjective Logic is a new approach to logic. Fundamentally

### Possibility and Necessity

Possibility and Necessity 1. Modality: Modality is the study of possibility and necessity. These concepts are intuitive enough. Possibility: Some things could have been different. For instance, I could

### Kant s Transcendental Idealism

Kant s Transcendental Idealism Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant Copernicus Kant s Copernican Revolution Rationalists: universality and necessity require synthetic a priori knowledge knowledge of the

### What is consciousness? Although it is possible to offer

Aporia vol. 26 no. 2 2016 Objects of Perception and Dependence Introduction What is consciousness? Although it is possible to offer explanations of consciousness in terms of the physical, some of the important

### Armstrongian Particulars with Necessary Properties

Armstrongian Particulars with Necessary Properties Daniel von Wachter [This is a preprint version, available at http://sammelpunkt.philo.at, of: Wachter, Daniel von, 2013, Amstrongian Particulars with

### PHIL 399: Metaphysics (independent study) Fall 2015, Coastal Carolina University Meeting times TBA

PHIL 399: Metaphysics (independent study) Fall 2015, Coastal Carolina University Meeting times TBA Professor Dennis Earl Email, phone dearl@coastal.edu, (843-349-4094) Office hours Edwards 278: MWF 11

### 17. Tying it up: thoughts and intentionality

17. Tying it up: thoughts and intentionality Martín Abreu Zavaleta June 23, 2014 1 Frege on thoughts Frege is concerned with separating logic from psychology. In addressing such separations, he coins a

### Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts

ANAL63-3 4/15/2003 2:40 PM Page 221 Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts Alexander Bird 1. Introduction In his (2002) Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra provides a powerful articulation of the claim that Resemblance

### Aspects of Western Philosophy Dr. Sreekumar Nellickappilly Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Madras

Aspects of Western Philosophy Dr. Sreekumar Nellickappilly Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Madras Module - 21 Lecture - 21 Kant Forms of sensibility Categories

### This handout follows the handout on The nature of the sceptic s challenge. You should read that handout first.

Michael Lacewing Three responses to scepticism This handout follows the handout on The nature of the sceptic s challenge. You should read that handout first. MITIGATED SCEPTICISM The term mitigated scepticism

### Que sera sera. Robert Stone

Que sera sera Robert Stone Before I get down to the main course of this talk, I ll serve up a little hors-d oeuvre, getting a long-held grievance off my chest. It is a given of human experience that things

### A New Argument Against Compatibilism

Norwegian University of Life Sciences School of Economics and Business A New Argument Against Compatibilism Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum Working Papers No. 2/ 2014 ISSN: 2464-1561 A New Argument

### The British Empiricism

The British Empiricism Locke, Berkeley and Hume copyleft: nicolazuin.2018 nowxhere.wordpress.com The terrible heritage of Descartes: Skepticism, Empiricism, Rationalism The problem originates from the

### Early Russell on Philosophical Grammar

Early Russell on Philosophical Grammar G. J. Mattey Fall, 2005 / Philosophy 156 Philosophical Grammar The study of grammar, in my opinion, is capable of throwing far more light on philosophical questions

### Van Fraassen: Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism

Aaron Leung Philosophy 290-5 Week 11 Handout Van Fraassen: Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism 1. Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism What is scientific realism? According to van Fraassen,

### Philosophy 125 Day 21: Overview

Branden Fitelson Philosophy 125 Lecture 1 Philosophy 125 Day 21: Overview 1st Papers/SQ s to be returned this week (stay tuned... ) Vanessa s handout on Realism about propositions to be posted Second papers/s.q.

### Reid Against Skepticism

Thus we see, that Descartes and Locke take the road that leads to skepticism without knowing the end of it, but they stop short for want of light to carry them farther. Berkeley, frightened at the appearance

### Universals. If no: Then it seems that they could not really be similar. If yes: Then properties like redness are THINGS.

Universals 1. Introduction: Things cannot be in two places at once. If my cat, Precious, is in my living room, she can t at exactly the same time also be in YOUR living room! But, properties aren t like

### Class 33 - November 13 Philosophy Friday #6: Quine and Ontological Commitment Fisher 59-69; Quine, On What There Is

Philosophy 240: Symbolic Logic Fall 2009 Mondays, Wednesdays, Fridays: 9am - 9:50am Hamilton College Russell Marcus rmarcus1@hamilton.edu I. The riddle of non-being Two basic philosophical questions are:

### Constructing the World

Constructing the World Lecture 1: A Scrutable World David Chalmers Plan *1. Laplace s demon 2. Primitive concepts and the Aufbau 3. Problems for the Aufbau 4. The scrutability base 5. Applications Laplace

### Berkeley, Three dialogues between Hylas and Philonous focus on p. 86 (chapter 9) to the end (p. 93).

TOPIC: Lecture 7.2 Berkeley Lecture Berkeley will discuss why we only have access to our sense-data, rather than the real world. He will then explain why we can trust our senses. He gives an argument for

### Abstract Abstraction Abundant ontology Abundant theory of universals (or properties) Actualism A-features Agent causal libertarianism

Glossary Abstract: a classification of entities, examples include properties or mathematical objects. Abstraction: 1. a psychological process of considering an object while ignoring some of its features;

### PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS & THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE

PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS & THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE Now, it is a defect of [natural] languages that expressions are possible within them, which, in their grammatical form, seemingly determined to designate

### Metaphysics. A contemporary introduction. Michael J. Loux. Third edition

Metaphysics A contemporary introduction Third edition Michael J. Loux Contents Preface Preface to second edition Preface to third edition x xii xiii Introduction 1 Overview 1 The nature of metaphysics

### 5 A Modal Version of the

5 A Modal Version of the Ontological Argument E. J. L O W E Moreland, J. P.; Sweis, Khaldoun A.; Meister, Chad V., Jul 01, 2013, Debating Christian Theism The original version of the ontological argument

### Bertrand Russell Proper Names, Adjectives and Verbs 1

Bertrand Russell Proper Names, Adjectives and Verbs 1 Analysis 46 Philosophical grammar can shed light on philosophical questions. Grammatical differences can be used as a source of discovery and a guide

### Philosophy 125 Day 4: Overview

Branden Fitelson Philosophy 125 Lecture 1 Philosophy 125 Day 4: Overview Administrative Stuff Final rosters for sections have been determined. Please check the sections page asap. Important: you must get

### Can Rationality Be Naturalistically Explained? Jeffrey Dunn. Abstract: Dan Chiappe and John Vervaeke (1997) conclude their article, Fodor,

Can Rationality Be Naturalistically Explained? Jeffrey Dunn Abstract: Dan Chiappe and John Vervaeke (1997) conclude their article, Fodor, Cherniak and the Naturalization of Rationality, with an argument

### Excerpt from J. Garvey, The Twenty Greatest Philosophy Books (Continuum, 2007): Immanuel Kant s Critique of Pure Reason

Excerpt from J. Garvey, The Twenty Greatest Philosophy Books (Continuum, 2007): Immanuel Kant s Critique of Pure Reason In a letter to Moses Mendelssohn, Kant says this about the Critique of Pure Reason:

### Truthmakers for Negative Existentials

Truthmakers for Negative Existentials 1. Introduction: We have already seen that absences and nothings cause problems for philosophers. Well, they re an especially huge problem for truthmaker theorists.

### 1/7. The Postulates of Empirical Thought

1/7 The Postulates of Empirical Thought This week we are focusing on the final section of the Analytic of Principles in which Kant schematizes the last set of categories. This set of categories are what

### What does it mean if we assume the world is in principle intelligible?

REASONS AND CAUSES The issue The classic distinction, or at least the one we are familiar with from empiricism is that causes are in the world and reasons are some sort of mental or conceptual thing. I

### What is the Frege/Russell Analysis of Quantification? Scott Soames

What is the Frege/Russell Analysis of Quantification? Scott Soames The Frege-Russell analysis of quantification was a fundamental advance in semantics and philosophical logic. Abstracting away from details

### Session One: Identity Theory And Why It Won t Work Marianne Talbot University of Oxford 26/27th November 2011

A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind Session One: Identity Theory And Why It Won t Work Marianne Talbot University of Oxford 26/27th November 2011 1 Session One: Identity Theory And Why It Won t Work

### Wright on response-dependence and self-knowledge

Wright on response-dependence and self-knowledge March 23, 2004 1 Response-dependent and response-independent concepts........... 1 1.1 The intuitive distinction......................... 1 1.2 Basic equations

### Postmodal Metaphysics

Postmodal Metaphysics Ted Sider Structuralism seminar 1. Conceptual tools in metaphysics Tools of metaphysics : concepts for framing metaphysical issues. They structure metaphysical discourse. Problem

### Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

The Physical World Author(s): Barry Stroud Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 87 (1986-1987), pp. 263-277 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Aristotelian

### ARMSTRONGIAN PARTICULARS WITH NECESSARY PROPERTIES *

ARMSTRONGIAN PARTICULARS WITH NECESSARY PROPERTIES * Daniel von Wachter Internationale Akademie für Philosophie, Santiago de Chile Email: epost@abc.de (replace ABC by von-wachter ) http://von-wachter.de

### Philosophy 125 Day 1: Overview

Branden Fitelson Philosophy 125 Lecture 1 Philosophy 125 Day 1: Overview Welcome! Are you in the right place? PHIL 125 (Metaphysics) Overview of Today s Class 1. Us: Branden (Professor), Vanessa & Josh

### 5 The necessary and the possible

5 The necessary and the possible Problems about modality Possible worlds Possible worlds nominalism The metaphysics of possible worlds nominalism David Lewis Actualism and possible worlds Alvin Plantinga

### Introduction. I. Proof of the Minor Premise ( All reality is completely intelligible )

Philosophical Proof of God: Derived from Principles in Bernard Lonergan s Insight May 2014 Robert J. Spitzer, S.J., Ph.D. Magis Center of Reason and Faith Lonergan s proof may be stated as follows: Introduction

### 12. A Theistic Argument against Platonism (and in Support of Truthmakers and Divine Simplicity)

Dean W. Zimmerman / Oxford Studies in Metaphysics - Volume 2 12-Zimmerman-chap12 Page Proof page 357 19.10.2005 2:50pm 12. A Theistic Argument against Platonism (and in Support of Truthmakers and Divine

### Perception and Mind-Dependence: Lecture 2

1 Recap Perception and Mind-Dependence: Lecture 2 (Alex Moran, apm60@ cam.ac.uk) According to naïve realism: (1) the objects of perception are ordinary, mindindependent things, and (2) perceptual experience

### To appear in The Journal of Philosophy.

To appear in The Journal of Philosophy. Lucy Allais: Manifest Reality: Kant s Idealism and his Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. xi + 329. 40.00 (hb). ISBN: 9780198747130. Kant s doctrine

### Merricks on the existence of human organisms

Merricks on the existence of human organisms Cian Dorr August 24, 2002 Merricks s Overdetermination Argument against the existence of baseballs depends essentially on the following premise: BB Whenever

### Intermediate Logic Spring. Extreme Modal Realism

Intermediate Logic Spring Lecture Three Extreme Modal Realism Rob Trueman rob.trueman@york.ac.uk University of York 1 / 36 Introduction Extreme Modal Realism Introduction Extreme Modal Realism Why Believe

### Philosophy Courses-1

Philosophy Courses-1 PHL 100/Introduction to Philosophy A course that examines the fundamentals of philosophical argument, analysis and reasoning, as applied to a series of issues in logic, epistemology,

### Divisibility, Logic, Radical Empiricism, and Metaphysics

Abstract: Divisibility, Logic, Radical Empiricism, and Metaphysics We will explore the problem of the manner in which the world may be divided into parts, and how this affects the application of logic.

### PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE & REALITY W E E K 7 : E P I S T E M O L O G Y - K A N T

PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE & REALITY W E E K 7 : E P I S T E M O L O G Y - K A N T AGENDA 1. Review of Epistemology 2. Kant Kant s Compromise Kant s Copernican Revolution 3. The Nature of Truth REVIEW: THREE

### SIMON BOSTOCK Internal Properties and Property Realism

SIMON BOSTOCK Internal Properties and Property Realism R ealism about properties, standardly, is contrasted with nominalism. According to nominalism, only particulars exist. According to realism, both

### Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics 1. By Tom Cumming

Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics 1 By Tom Cumming Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics represents Martin Heidegger's first attempt at an interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781). This

### 1. Introduction. Against GMR: The Incredulous Stare (Lewis 1986: 133 5).

Lecture 3 Modal Realism II James Openshaw 1. Introduction Against GMR: The Incredulous Stare (Lewis 1986: 133 5). Whatever else is true of them, today s views aim not to provoke the incredulous stare.

### Some Good and Some Not so Good Arguments for Necessary Laws. William Russell Payne Ph.D.

Some Good and Some Not so Good Arguments for Necessary Laws William Russell Payne Ph.D. The view that properties have their causal powers essentially, which I will here call property essentialism, has

### Nature of Necessity Chapter IV

Nature of Necessity Chapter IV Robert C. Koons Department of Philosophy University of Texas at Austin koons@mail.utexas.edu February 11, 2005 1 Chapter IV. Worlds, Books and Essential Properties Worlds

### George Berkeley. The Principles of Human Knowledge. Review

George Berkeley The Principles of Human Knowledge Review To be is to be perceived Obvious to the Mind all those bodies which compose the earth have no subsistence without a mind, their being is to be perceived

### Chapter Six. Putnam's Anti-Realism

119 Chapter Six Putnam's Anti-Realism So far, our discussion has been guided by the assumption that there is a world and that sentences are true or false by virtue of the way it is. But this assumption

### PHIL 181: METAPHYSICS Fall 2006 M 5:30-8:20 MND-3009 WebCT-Assisted

PHIL 181: METAPHYSICS Fall 2006 M 5:30-8:20 MND-3009 WebCT-Assisted PROF. THOMAS PYNE MND-3032 278-7288 E-Mail pynetf@csus.edu PHILOSOPHY DEPT. MND-3032 278-6424 FAX 278-5364 OFFICE HOURS: M 4:00-5:00;

### Truth and Modality - can they be reconciled?

Truth and Modality - can they be reconciled? by Eileen Walker 1) The central question What makes modal statements statements about what might be or what might have been the case true or false? Normally

### Philosophy 203 History of Modern Western Philosophy. Russell Marcus Hamilton College Spring 2014

Philosophy 203 History of Modern Western Philosophy Russell Marcus Hamilton College Spring 2014 Class #26 Kant s Copernican Revolution The Synthetic A Priori Forms of Intuition Marcus, Modern Philosophy,

### The Cosmological Argument: A Defense

Page 1/7 RICHARD TAYLOR [1] Suppose you were strolling in the woods and, in addition to the sticks, stones, and other accustomed litter of the forest floor, you one day came upon some quite unaccustomed

### The Consequence Argument

2015.11.16 The Consequence Argument The topic What is free will? Some paradigm cases. (linked to concepts like coercion, action, and esp. praise and blame) The claim that we don t have free will.... Free

### Every simple idea has a simple impression, which resembles it; and every simple impression a correspondent idea

'Every simple idea has a simple impression, which resembles it; and every simple impression a correspondent idea' (Treatise, Book I, Part I, Section I). What defence does Hume give of this principle and

### Introduction to Philosophy PHL 221, York College Revised, Spring 2017

Introduction to Philosophy PHL 221, York College Revised, Spring 2017 Beginnings of Philosophy: Overview of Course (1) The Origins of Philosophy and Relativism Knowledge Are you a self? Ethics: What is

### KANT, MORAL DUTY AND THE DEMANDS OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON. The law is reason unaffected by desire.

KANT, MORAL DUTY AND THE DEMANDS OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON The law is reason unaffected by desire. Aristotle, Politics Book III (1287a32) THE BIG IDEAS TO MASTER Kantian formalism Kantian constructivism

### Understanding, Modality, Logical Operators. Christopher Peacocke. Columbia University

Understanding, Modality, Logical Operators Christopher Peacocke Columbia University Timothy Williamson s The Philosophy of Philosophy stimulates on every page. I would like to discuss every chapter. To

### Propositions as Cambridge properties

Propositions as Cambridge properties Jeff Speaks July 25, 2018 1 Propositions as Cambridge properties................... 1 2 How well do properties fit the theoretical role of propositions?..... 4 2.1

### Philosophy 125 Day 12: Overview

Branden Fitelson Philosophy 125 Lecture 1 Philosophy 125 Day 12: Overview Administrative Stuff Philosophy Colloquium today (4pm in Howison Library) Context Jerry Fodor, Rutgers University Clarificatory

### Retrospective Remarks on Events (Kim, Davidson, Quine) Philosophy 125 Day 20: Overview. The Possible & The Actual I: Intensionality of Modality 2

Branden Fitelson Philosophy 125 Lecture 1 Philosophy 125 Day 20: Overview 1st Papers/SQ s to be returned next week (a bit later than expected) Jim Prior Colloquium Today (4pm Howison, 3rd Floor Moses)

### Philosophy Courses-1

Philosophy Courses-1 PHL 100/Introduction to Philosophy A course that examines the fundamentals of philosophical argument, analysis and reasoning, as applied to a series of issues in logic, epistemology,

### Constructing the World

Constructing the World Lecture 5: Hard Cases: Mathematics, Normativity, Intentionality, Ontology David Chalmers Plan *1. Hard cases 2. Mathematical truths 3. Normative truths 4. Intentional truths 5. Philosophical

### PHI2391: Logical Empiricism I 8.0

1 2 3 4 5 PHI2391: Logical Empiricism I 8.0 Hume and Kant! Remember Hume s question:! Are we rationally justified in inferring causes from experimental observations?! Kant s answer: we can give a transcendental

### NATURALISED JURISPRUDENCE

NATURALISED JURISPRUDENCE NATURALISM a philosophical view according to which philosophy is not a distinct mode of inquiry with its own problems and its own special body of (possible) knowledge philosophy

### Boghossian & Harman on the analytic theory of the a priori

Boghossian & Harman on the analytic theory of the a priori PHIL 83104 November 2, 2011 Both Boghossian and Harman address themselves to the question of whether our a priori knowledge can be explained in

### Saving the Substratum: Interpreting Kant s First Analogy

Res Cogitans Volume 5 Issue 1 Article 20 6-4-2014 Saving the Substratum: Interpreting Kant s First Analogy Kevin Harriman Lewis & Clark College Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans

### A Posteriori Necessities by Saul Kripke (excerpted from Naming and Necessity, 1980)

A Posteriori Necessities by Saul Kripke (excerpted from Naming and Necessity, 1980) Let's suppose we refer to the same heavenly body twice, as 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'. We say: Hesperus is that star

### Theories of propositions

Theories of propositions phil 93515 Jeff Speaks January 16, 2007 1 Commitment to propositions.......................... 1 2 A Fregean theory of reference.......................... 2 3 Three theories of

### Faults and Mathematical Disagreement

45 Faults and Mathematical Disagreement María Ponte ILCLI. University of the Basque Country mariaponteazca@gmail.com Abstract: My aim in this paper is to analyse the notion of mathematical disagreements

### On Truth At Jeffrey C. King Rutgers University

On Truth At Jeffrey C. King Rutgers University I. Introduction A. At least some propositions exist contingently (Fine 1977, 1985) B. Given this, motivations for a notion of truth on which propositions

### Are There Reasons to Be Rational?

Are There Reasons to Be Rational? Olav Gjelsvik, University of Oslo The thesis. Among people writing about rationality, few people are more rational than Wlodek Rabinowicz. But are there reasons for being

### Against Lewisian Modal Realism From a Metaontological Point of View. Tora Koyama, Osaka University, Japan

Against Lewisian Modal Realism From a Metaontological Point of View Tora Koyama, Osaka University, Japan koyama@irl.sys.es.osaka-u.ac.jp The aim of this talk Modal realism discussed in On the Plurality

### Broad on Theological Arguments. I. The Ontological Argument

Broad on God Broad on Theological Arguments I. The Ontological Argument Sample Ontological Argument: Suppose that God is the most perfect or most excellent being. Consider two things: (1)An entity that

### 1/8. Descartes 3: Proofs of the Existence of God

1/8 Descartes 3: Proofs of the Existence of God Descartes opens the Third Meditation by reminding himself that nothing that is purely sensory is reliable. The one thing that is certain is the cogito. He

### - We might, now, wonder whether the resulting concept of justification is sufficiently strong. According to BonJour, apparent rational insight is

BonJour I PHIL410 BonJour s Moderate Rationalism - BonJour develops and defends a moderate form of Rationalism. - Rationalism, generally (as used here), is the view according to which the primary tool