Cut and paste. Niko Strobach. What use Boethius makes of Scipio's dream in the consolatio philosophiae 1

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1 Niko Strobach 1 Cut and paste What use Boethius makes of Scipio's dream in the consolatio philosophiae 1...faccio stelle di cartone pensando a Gloria. Umberto Tozzi 1. Introduction The aim of this article is to investigate how Boethius (ca ) makes use of Scipio's dream in his consolatio philosophiae. The starting point is the observation that Boethius uses a kind of cut and paste technique. So naturally, it will be interesting to see where he took what from, where he put it, what happened to it in the course of this action, especially at the beginning and the end (where it had to fit in with other text), and why he did it, i.e. what function the passages modelled on Cicero s somnium serve in Boethius text. Cut and paste is what you do when pressing ctrl-c first, moving the cursor to the place where you want to insert some previously selected text and then inserting it by pressing ctrl-v. In prehistoric times hardly remembered now, this used to be done with scissors and glue. In a way, this is what Boethius does. There is a clearly defined passage in Cicero s somnium, i.e. sections 20 to 25 (with bits of section 29). And there is one definite place in the consolatio where this passage is somehow inserted. Insofar, there is cutting and pasting going on. The text undergoes transformation, though. In detail, it shows some influence of Macrobius and many other sources. 2 The metaphor of cutting and pasting should therefore not be taken too literally: no text is copied verbatim. The structure of the Ciceronian passage, though, is nearly perfectly preserved, and it appears right here in the consolatio and nowhere else. Another metaphor one could use for what Boethius does is sampling. DJs today know a lot about the history of pop music, especially their own genre just as Boethius knew about the history of philosophy. Now a sample, e.g. a sampled riddim in Jamaican popular music, need not be immediately recognizable. It will be recognized by an expert, though, e.g. by another DJ. Certainly the sampled item will have undergone creative transformation and will now fulfil some musical function in a context different from the original one. Before comparing the texts directly, it is important to realize the overall structure of the consolatio. Boethius decontextualizes, and he recontexutalizes. Therefore, some idea of the general layout of the consolatio is needed in order to be able to see where the Ciceronian passage is relocated. My main claim is that the message of the passage is no less than reversed by its relocation. 1 Special thanks in connection with this article go to Steffen Kammler, Christiane Reitz, Wolfgang Bernard, Ludger Jansen, Malcolm Schofield, Christoph Rapp, Jean-Louis Labarrière and Berndt Strobach. 2 Joachim Gruber s line-to-line commentary (Gruber (1978)) is impressive and very useful for details.

2 2 2. Changes of perspective and Platonic psycho-therapy in the consolatio To recall the story of the consolatio philosophiae: 3 Boethius wrote the book in prison in Pavia under some time pressure shortly before his execution in 525 AD. It is a first-person report of a long dialogue between Boethius and Lady Philosophy who appears in prison in order to comfort him. It was not one of Theoderic s best ideas to have the most important scholar of his age executed, but so it happened. The story is plausible because of some well-researched loose ends in the text 4 and because there are places where Lady Philosophy is worried about running out of time. 5 If this is fiction, it is brilliant fiction. If not, it is no wonder that text is rather not reproduced verbatim, but as memorized information (perhaps memorized by the method of topoi ). 6 There was no prison library. The consolatio is a book that achieves one great perspective change by performing many small ones. Perspective changes have been very important devices of philosophizing throughout the history of philosophy. Both Scipio s dream and Boethius consolatio provide marvellous examples of one kind of them: the great zoom (readily at hand through Google Earth today). There are various ways of using imaginary changes of perspective as exercises in philosophical psycho-therapy. This is very clear in late Stoicism, e.g. in Epictetus. 7 Boethius provides a very different example of the same technique, although this seems to be rarely noticed. 8 When Hellenistic philosophy was, sensibly, interpreted as psycho-therapy, 9 Boethius received no attention, probably because he was not considered to be sufficiently Hellenistic. The consolatio is a large-scale Platonic psycho-therapy. The meditative poems 10 are part of this: learning is more than getting some conclusions right. Other than Stoic psycho-therapy, this therapy follows a clear theoretical layout: the layout of a periagogê tês psychês, well-known from Plato s similé of the cave. 11 Philosophy can only assist a process of self-healing. The five books of the consolatio mark stages in this process. In book I the central metaphor is caligo, fog, bad sight; one is still deep down in the cave. 12 In book III, Boethius, all of a sudden, starts talking himself. 13 Book III ends with a long poem on Orpheus. 14 The explanation is clear: Boethius himself is advised not to turn his eyes back towards the cave again while the periagogê 3 For a survey of life and works cf., e.g. Walsh (1999), xi-xxx. 4 Details in Tränkle (1977). 5 Cf. book V, 1 st prose, and especially book IV, 6 th prose angusto limite temporis. 6 Cf. Cicero, De oratore II Cf. e.g. Epictetus, Encheiridion 3, 1, 12, 15, 16, 26, Duclow (1979) notices the role of perspective, providing rather a sketch of the idea than elaborating it, though. The fact that the consolatio is a psychotherapy has, of course, been widely noticed Curley (1986) is right to state: The Consolation of Philosophy is essentially a dramatized therapy (214). Cf. also 219f. Cf. also Belsey (1991), p.7: Philosophy appears to Boethius as physician, nurse, therapist, counsellor, bringing the medicine of consolation. Cf. also Gruber (1978), 34f. 9 Cf. e.g. Nussbaum (1996), Sorabji (1997), Williams (1997). 10 For detailed interpretations cf. Scheible (1972), a little less detailed: O Daly (1991). 11 Plato, Pol. VII 514a-519b. periagogê : 518d. 12 Cf. e.g. book I, 7 th poem and its introduction at the end of the 6 th prose. 13 Book III, 12 th prose. 14 Book III, 12 th poem. Rand (1904), 263: a somewhat perverted application of the story of Orpheus and Eurydice. Detailed interpretation with respect to the similé of the cave: Scheible (1972), I don t agree with her, though, that the motive of perspectival direction ( Motiv der Blickrichtung ) is not taken from the similé of the cave. It is (cf. 518c-d). Cf. O Daly,

3 3 has been so well underway. Book IV contains some examples from astronomy, 15 which affords the broadest perspective still assisted by sense-perception this is the mathematician s stage in the similé of the line. 16 Only book V, by developing a non-temporal view of eternity and reflecting on the mind s own faculties transcends this position. If you look at him superficially, Boethius is not creative, because he makes use of traditional material throughout the consolatio. It is a veritable patchwork. Probably, he could only finish the book in time because he had plenty of material in mind. But then, he could only finish the book in time because he had a convincing blueprint in mind which determined how to arrange the material. The way in which he does so is in itself very creative. The order is all-important. One is tempted to say that the bad arguments come first and they get better book by book which would already be a remarkable trick in order to integrate heterogeneous material. But there is more to it: The patient himself changes in the course of the therapy. Lady Philosophy makes clear that first of all some tranquilizer is needed, and that afterwards mild medication must precede strong medicine. 17 So if she started with the deep thoughts on eternity that are developed in book V the therapy would be bound to fail. 18 At the beginning of book II, though, an argument like Look, other people have some bad luck, too 19 is a good argument, because that is where it is in its proper place. 3. Where does the somnium fall into place in the consolatio? So where do sections 20 to 25 of Cicero s somnium fall into place? Here is what one might expect: The somnium is the solemn ending of Cicero s Republic. It hints back at the myth of Êr at the very end of Plato s Politeia. 20 It is a great zoom to a grand vista, a pan of the whole earth, which is somewhat reminiscent of parts of the myth at the end of Plato s Phaedo. 21 So it should reappear somewhere near the very end of Boethius consolatio. Indeed there is some view of the earth as a whole in book IV 22 (this is still not abstract enough for book V). The proper place for the somnium is somewhere else, though: the 7 th prose of book II. This looks like some downgrading, and in a way it is. What does book II of the consolatio consist of? Roughly speaking, it is a long list of only apparent goods. It is part of the therapy to make Boethius grasp that all these goods are only apparent. The idea is that gloria is only an apparent good. It appears only towards the end of book II, since some kind of striving for gloria is, other than striving for money, pardonable even for a philosophical mind but only right at the beginning of a periagogê tês psychês. Along with gloria, virtus itself is affected. 15 Book IV, 5 th poem. 16 Plato, Pol. VI 509c-511e. 17 Book I, 5 th prose; book II, 5 th prose; book III, 1 st prose. Cf. also Gruber (1978), 148. According to Schmid (1956), 135, who thoroughly investigates the medical context, the idea is taken from Galen (compos. medicam 2, 590). 18 For the same view: Curley (1986), Book II, 3 rd and 4 th prose. 20 Pol. X, 613e-621b. 21 Phaedo, 108e-111c. 22 Book IV, 5 th poem.

4 4 At least, this is true for virtus in a specific sense. It will be necessary to distinguish between two senses of virtus. This reflects a development from Cicero to Boethius The structure of sections 20 to 25 of Cicero s somnium Section 20 begins with some admonition. Scipio sr. is not quite happy with what his grandson is doing. He complains that Scipio jr. is even now ( etiam nunc ) doing something he tried to dissuade him from before. This before is at the end of section 16. In that section, Scipio jr. looks back to earth and compares the size of the stars to the size of the earth. This leads, at the very end of section 16, to what Sigmund Freud taught us to call narzisstische Kränkung - narcissistic humiliation: 24 ipsa terra ita mihi parva visa est, ut me imperii nostri quo quasi punctum eius attingimus paeniteret. [I]ndeed the earth itself seemed to me so small that I was scornful of our empire, which covers only a single point, as it were, upon its surface. Scipio sr. directs his view towards the celestial mechanism. But at the beginning of section 20 we find Scipio jr. looking back again. Scipio sr. is not enthusiastic but accepts this and formulates what Scipio jr. can learn from what he is again staring at: The earth is really as small as it seems, i.e. its apparent size from far above is an adequate representation of its status as a basis for evaluation. The corresponding rhetorical question sets the agenda for the following lesson: Is celebrity in the speech of men and gloria really worth seeking? No. It is clear that gloria is merely external, Schein, doxa. It is what one would even achieve with a fake record of heroic deeds or by winning the tour de France without getting caught. Virtus is not even a necessary condition for gloria. Of course, one may also deserve it. The lesson has two parts, one employing a spatial and another employing a temporal argument (as Macrobius distinguishes very clearly (1.10.3)). The first half of the spatial argument is: The earth is inhabited in only a few and small places. Most of its surface is covered by water, marshes and desert land. These patches (cf. quasi maculis, section 20) are isolated from each other. No gloria is to be expected from reputation among the antipodes because they will never know about you. The Roman Empire comprises just a small part of the northern hemisphere ( parva quaedam insula, section 21). The second half of the spatial argument is that even within the northern hemisphere no Roman name will ever be known on the other side of the Caucasus or the Ganges. The Caucasus, as Gruber notes, 25 is far East; not where we locate it, but rather the Western Himalaya, very roughly in line with the Ganges. Anyway, as to space, there is no hope of spreading one s gloria any farther than what has already been established to be quasi punctum. 23 For possible intermediate stages in this transition cf. the difference between aretai and and aretai politikai in Labarrière s contribution to this volume. For Macrobius, it is at least not obvious that there are political virtutes. Cf and and their discussion in Sophie Lunn-Rockliffe s contribution to this volume. Tension between theoretical and practical aretai can be felt as far back as book 10 of Aristotle s Nicomachean Ethics. 24 Freud (1917), p.6f. 25 Gruber (1978), 215f.

5 5 The temporal argument is: Even those few who will ever speak of you will not do so for long ( diu ) according to the relevant Milky Way standards, i.e. not even for one great astronomical year, which is then calculated in some detail. It is worth noting that this is what the period of gloria is set in relation to, not eternity. The conclusion is structured as a great contrast: Orient yourself by thinking of the high regions of the Milky Way; let the people talk: they inhabit only a small spot, they will die soon, and what they say about you, the hominum gloria, will be extinguished by oblivion ( oblivione posteritatis extinguitur ). Do not strive for human rewards (cf. praemiis humanis ). What exactly is the alternative? In the Milky Way, 26 there is no danger of oblivion, since it is a domus aeterna. But, most importantly (section 23): suîs inlecebrîs... ipsa virtus trahat ad verum decus. Virtue herself, by her own charms, should lead you on to true glory. Decus is not the same as gloria, at least verum decus is not. There is no hope of getting that with a fake record. To the excellent man, virtus has her own ways to make herself attractive. Whether it effects any gloria among men down on earth not does not matter. Now does that mean that approval by anyone is irrelevant? And does it mean that anything done for the Roman Empire is without value because the Empire is really so small? Of course not. The other heroes and, presumably, the summus deus 27 will approve of one s virtus (never without reason). And patriotic deeds are of real value just because they are in accordance with the cosmic order. The somnium is, after all, a brilliant piece of Imperial political ideology, a Überhöhung of patriotic deeds. Roman political and military virtus does not diminish in value because the Roman Empire looks small from far above it gains value by being declared independent of success, being made a matter of conscience and by being correlated to the cosmos. There is no argument parallel to the one about gloria of the kind that sub specie aeterni the effects of a heroic deed are negligeable, performing it does not take long and neither does the realization of virtus displayed by it, so on the whole it does not matter. Neither the sombre pessimism of Schopenhauer s The World as Will and Representation nor the jolly pessimism of the grand finale of Monty Python s Life of Brian is anything you can use to found an empire on. If there is any pessimism in the somnium it is rather selective. 28 So Scipio sr. can say towards the end of the somnium (29): Hanc [= animam] tu exerce in optimîs rebus! Use it [your soul], therefore, in the best pursuits! Sunt autem optimae curae de salute patriae, And the best tasks are those undertaken in defence [= promotion of salus ] 29 of your native land; 26 According to Janda (2005), the Milky Way as a place for the dead is a very ancient idea of Indo-European origin. 27 Section 17 summus ipse deus, section 26 princeps deus, deus aeternus. 28 So I share the concern expressed in Terry Irvin s contribution to this volume that vanity arguments threaten to prove too much. 29 Cf. section 13: omnibus qui patriam conservaverint, adiuverint, auxerint, certum esse in caelum definitum locum.

6 6 quibus agitatus et exercitatus animus velocius in hanc sedem et domum suam pervolabit [...]. a spirit occupied and trained in such activities will have a swifter flight to this, its proper home and permanent abode. This will happen more easily if the soul (by now: animus ) already tries to abstract itself from the body while it is still locked in it ( inclusus in corpore ) by contemplating what is outside ( extra ), beyond bodily needs and inclinations - in contrast to those who allow themselves to be enslaved by them ( quasi ministros ). The idea and imagery is strongly reminiscent of Plato s Phaedo (63c). What is not found in the Phaedo 30 is the idea that active military service and fulfilling your patriotic duties is the best preparation for overcoming your body. The intended link is clear enough, though: That s where you undergo hard training, learn to endure hunger, thirst and pain, do not lose your nerves in dangerous action and motivate yourself by thinking of something else than your personal needs. This link seems to be Cicero s contribution. If so, it is highly important because it turns metaphysics political. 5. Macrobius Boethius knew Macrobius commentary, which implies that he knew the somnium itself. Clearly, his model for the passage is Cicero, not Macrobius, even though he takes some formulations from there. The structure of the original is, of course, mirrored in the structure of the commentary. Most space is taken up by more complicated calculation of the great year and geographical and astronomical details (the Ganges is still mentioned (2.10.3)). Boethius will not draw on such details in book II of the consolatio. Conceptually, Macrobius simplifies slightly: the earth is not quasi punctum, but just punctum in relation to the sky (2.5.10, ). Eternity ( aeternitas, 31 perpetuitas (2.11.4)) seems slightly more important as that which the short diurnitas (2.10.3) of gloria (2.10.2f.) is compared to. More important is the following contrast, a little sharper than in Cicero, although surely not in contradiction with what Cicero writes: the minus perfectus (2.10.2) thinks that what is to be enjoyed about one s virtus, what is the fructus virtutis, is gloria (2.10.2). The sapiens, the man of perfectio, at the same time described as a fortis vir, thinks that the fructus virtutis is his own conscientia of what he has done (ibid.). 6. Boethius, consolatio II 7 th prose The structure of the 7 th prose of book II of the consolatio mirrors the structure of its model. It begins with an admonition, too. Lady Philosophy is not quite content with what Boethius says. Then, there are the two parts of the spatial argument in the same order. There is the temporal argument which culminates in the advice to forget about the crowd and to rather consider things eternal. There are two inserts within the insert: an argument from cultural difference 30 Neither is it found as early as section 18 where astronomy is recommended as in vita humana divina studia.

7 the famous si tacuisses story. The first part of the spatial argument begins as to be expected: The earth is just point-sized compared to the volume of the celestial sphere. There is a quantitative estimate of how much of its surface is inhabited by creatures known to us : one fourth. This estimate is missing in both Cicero and Macrobius, and Boethius attributes it to Ptolmey. Of this quarter of the earth, the greater part is covered by sea, marsh grounds and other desert places. So at best one can hope to spread one s gloria (or fama ) in an angustissima... area, in a minimo puncti quodam puncto, the point of a point. There is no mention of the antipodes here. The second part of the spatial argument is again that even within the inhabited bit of the northern hemisphere people will not know about Rome everywhere, so a fortiori they will not know about some particular Roman s deeds. Boethius mentions that Cicero remarked somewhere ( quodam loco ) that in his age news of the existence of Rome had not even spread to the other side of the Caucasus. It looks as if Boethius admits that times have changed in this respect. In fact, as Gruber shows, 32 the meaning of the term Caucasus had changed by the 6 th century AD to its present meaning. Consequently, Boethius does not mention the Ganges any more. Anyway, as a philosopher, he is rather more interested in unsurmountable obstacles for communication than in unsurmountable mountains. 7 Adde quod hoc ipsum brevis habitaculi saeptum plures incolunt nationes lingua, moribus, totius vitae ratione distantes ad quas [...] non modo fama hominum singulorum sed ne urbium quidem pervenire queat. Besides that the little compass of this small habitation is inhabited by many nations, different in language, fashions and conversation, to which by reason of the difficulties in travelling, the diversity of speech, and the scarcity of traffic, not only the Fame of particular men but even of cities can hardly come. This prepares the first, pretty philosophical, insert: a curious application of the fact of cultural difference. The observation that customs and moral judgements may differ dramatically had been commonplace in antiquity since, at least, Herodotus remarkably unexcited account of it. Boethius argues that if someone is interested in gloria, making his deeds known as widely as possible is no use, since in other cultures the very same deeds will count as morally irrelevant or even bad. Cicero does not make this point. Of course, Boethius himself would not say that the truth or falsity of moral judgements is relative to a culture: At the very end of the consolatio everything is said to be taking place under the eyes of one omniscient judge. But at the same time he can recognize the sociological fact that people differ in their moral judgements (many of them being in error) according to their respective cultures, and make use of it. Again, in his formulation of the temporal argument, Boethius is more radical than Cicero. Like the author of psalm 90 who compares the finite time span of a thousand years to the finite time span of one day, Cicero is content with the fact that a finite period of gloria is pretty short in comparison with the finite great year of years. Boethius adds: But years, as a finite time span, cannot be set into any proportion to eternity, so a fortiori, any period of fame 31 Cf. aeternam in Gruber (1978), 215f.

8 8 has not just a short, but zero duration in relation to what it should be related to in order to rightly estimate its value. It is, by the way, no inconsistency that aeternitas in this passage is defined as interminabilis diuturnitas. This is book II, and Boethius the patient still needs to be prepared for the much more abstract, a-temporal conception of aeternitas in book V. It would be an inconsistency if the order were the other way around. The second insert is the famous anecdote si tacuisses, philosophus mansisses. Why here? In the sophisticated way Boethius presents it, it is about gloria. The idea is not that someone proves to be ignorant once he starts talking and would otherwise have passed as a philosopher. It is just the other way around: A wants to pass as a philosopher. B puts him to the test by trying to provoke him. A keeps quiet, which, as a philosopher, he should. But then he asks intellegis me esse philosophum?. So B s reply is: Intellexeram si tacuisses. Striving for the gloria of a philosopher is incompatible with being one. So the anecdote makes sense as an illustration of the praestantia of tacit conscientia of one s virtus. Would Cicero have liked the example? This is hard to say. Manageing not to strike back when being insulted does not exactly look like a paradigm case of the kind of virtus Cicero had in mind. The philosopher in question might be a Christian philosopher. 33 But not necessarily: perhaps, Cicero s Stoic brother Quintus (whom we know from De divinatione) would have liked the example. The frame of the insert from the somnium consists of the admonition at the beginning and of the conclusion of the 7 th prose. Both passages are tricky, as is to be expected at the beginning and the end of an insertion. It is useful to distinguish between Boethius the author and Boethius the patient. Boethius, the patient, begins apologetically, addressing Lady Philosophy: Scis, inquam, ipsa minimum nobis ambitionem mortalium rerum fuisse dominatam. Sed materiam gerendîs rebus optavimus quo ne virtus tacita consenesceret. You know yourself, I was hardly dominated by the ambition of mortal things. But I desired matter of action so my virtus wouldn t tacitly grow old. In book I, Boethius the patient is desperate of having lost his office, describing the situation in traditional terms of the Roman Republican constitution that sound completely anachronistic. 34 In order to keep in line with that, one may count his political activity as materia gerendîs rebus. It is worth noting that, differing from Cicero s somnium, the materia gerendîs rebus is not military activity during the expansion of the Empire, but modest administration under Theoderic. But perhaps it is not even necessary to keep the passage completely in line with book I: Boethius, the patient, may have made some progress already. He is definitely less emotional about what he has lost by now. However, Lady Philosophy is not content with the answer. She says (with some rearrangement of the text for clearness sake): [cupido] gloriae et optimorum in rem publicam fama meritorum; desire of glory, and fame of best deserts towards their commonwealth; hoc unum est quod praestantes quidem naturâ mentes... allicere possit 33 On the notorious question whether Boethius was one cf. De Vogel (1973). 34 Book I, 4 th prose.

9 This is the only thing which is able to entice such minds as [are] well qualified by nature nondum ad extremam manum virtutum perfectione perductas not yet fully brought to full excellence by the perfecting of virtues 9 The pasted section from the somnium is glued to this by: Quae [= cupido gloriae etc.] quam sit exilis et totius vacua ponderis, sic considera. which, how slender it is, and void of all weight, consider this: What is going on? Boethius, the patient, states an exception ( Sed ). He concedes that, as a rule, one should not care about mortal things. He is aware, though, that something he wanted to avoid involved caring about a mortal thing, i.e. about the occasion for action. So in this special case, caring about it is justified. What exactly did he want to avoid? The non-actualization of his virtus (no materia, no actualization of virtus ). The trouble starts with the question: Why did he want to avoid this? Because that would be undesirable in itself? Or because, in that case, nobody would talk about it? Does tacita just mean unactualized, or does it mean untalked about? Lady Philosophy, at least, concentrates on the second alternative, so it may be assumed that this is what Boethius, the patient, meant in the first place. There are two kinds of talented minds ( praestantes mentes ): semiperfect minds are motivated by the prospect of welldeserved 35 fama and gloria ; and (in this respect) perfect minds that are motivated by their intention of just actualizing their (in this case: fully developed) virtutes, never mind what the others will say. The insertion from the somnium is supposed to elevate Boethius the patient onto the stage of a perfect mind. Lady Philosophy agrees with Boethius, the patient, that occasions for action are an exception among mortal things : Even perfect minds will want them, but not as occasions for applause, but as occasions for actualizing their virtutes. What Boethius, the patient, wished for was already the right thing, but not why he did so. Would the average Roman in the first century BC or AD have agreed? Most probably: no. Scheible adduces plenty of evidence in order to confirm her claim that Boethius deviates strongly from general Roman sentiment about gloria. 36 Gruber presents more. 37 And with reference to the beginning of section 26 of Cicero s somnium, he argues that Lady Philosophy s combined condemnation of gloria and optimorum in rem publicam fama meritorum would probably not have found Cicero s assent. His interpretation of the passage is that Lady Philosophy tries to overcome a point of view in Boethius, the patient, that is similar to Cicero s. 38 Would Scipio sr. and Cicero at least have agreed with respect to gloria alone? This is not as easy to say as it may seem. The decisive question is: Whose talk? What is declared irrelevant is celebritas sermonis hominum (section 20), the in angustiis [...] gloria (section 22), the futurorum hominum [...] laudes (section 23), the ab iis qui postea nascentur sermo (section 35 Those that would be motivated by ill-deserved gloria would clearly not be praestantes. 36 Cf. Wie sehr Boethius [...] vom allgemeinen römischen Empfinden abweicht [...] : Scheible (1972), 71f. The passages she draws attention to are: Sallustus, Cat. 11,2; 3, 3-5; 10,5; 2,9 1, 3-4); Horace (c. 2,3, c. 3,30); Ovid (Metamorphoses 3,7,50; 3,3, 51). 37 Gruber (1978), 213.

10 10 24), the hominum gloria (where hominum is contrasted with what can be seen alte, i.e. the Milky Way), the sermones vulgi, sermo [...] ille [in] angustiis (section 25). One is easily over-impressed by the statement: suîs inlecebrîs [...] ipsa virtus trahat ad verum decus. It should not be isolated from its context in section 25. This is only the first half of a contrasting sentence. The other half is supposed to encourage Scipio jr. to just let the alii talk whatever they want. But the alii are not the heroes in the Milky Way (who don t praise and blame without reason), they are the vulgus down on earth. What the heroes praise is if someone is motivated by the thought of being able to actualize one s virtus instead of being motivated by the prospect of praise down on earth; but this does not exclude at all that he is motivated by the thought that this is exactly what the heroes will praise. Perhaps we should remove our Boethian (and Kantian) spectacles when reading the somnium. Is there any reason to worry if nobody praises one s actualization of virtus? 39 Boethius, the author s, answer is an unqualified no. Cicero s answer, as we can now see in contrast, is something like: There isn t if nobody down on earth does. But there would be, if there weren t even the convent in the Milky Way. The prospect of total oblivion would be really demotivating. Good luck the convent in the Milky Way exists. That is motivating. Scheible is right in ascribing to Boethius an even more radical devaluation of gloria. 40 Then, there is the strange metaphor of virtus growing old. Virtues, good dispositions, may be unactualized. It would be a moral mistake not to actualize them on occasion. Maybe they get perfected by regular actualization. But how can they possibly grow old? Virtues can t, virtus can. At least one component of it, as Cicero understood the term. On the one hand, virtus corresponds to Greek andreia, the power of a man, vir / anêr, which diminishes with old age and should therefore be actualized before. Ernst Neitzke, in his fine German translation of the consolatio, translates Tatkraft for virtus in Boethius the patient s lines at the beginning of the 7 th prose. A good German translation of Cicero s somnium translates virtus in section 25 as Tugend des Mannes. Macrobius mentions the fortis vir. On the other hand, virtus corresponds to Greek aretê. Karl Büchner, in his fine German translation of the consolatio, translates Tugend in Boethius lines. For Cicero, blending both components would be a good idea. In Lady Philosophy s answer, the andreia component has got lost. The plural virtutes, in virtutum perfectione in her reply has a definite Greek translation: aretai. Now even Neitzke cannot help translating Tugenden. The end of the 7 th prose is even trickier because, owing to the different function of the passage, it does not lead to the same conclusion as the end of Cicero s somnium: Quid autem est quod ad praecipuos viros, de hîs enim sermo est, qui virtute gloriam petunt [...] de fama post resolutum morte supremâ corpus attineat? Nam si, quod nostrae rationes credi vetant, toti moriuntur homines, nulla est omnino gloria, cum is cuius ea esse dicitur non 38 Gruber (ibid.): Die Philosophie versucht durch ihre Heilung den ähnlichen Standpunkt des Boethius zu überwinden und ihn dadurch vollkommen zu machen. 39 Note that the iudex at the end of book V judges, but does not praise. 40 Scheible (1972), 72: noch radikalere Entwertung.

11 11 exstet omnino. Sin vero bene sibi mens conscia terreno carcere resoluta caelum libera petit, nonne omne terrenum negotium spernat quae se caelo fruens terrenîs gaudet exemptam? But what have excellent men (for of these I speak) who seek for glory by virtue [...] to expect [...] by fame after final death hath disolved the body? For if, contrary to our belief, men wholly perish, there is no glory at all, since he to whom it is said to belong is nowhere extant. But if a guiltless mind freed from earthly imprisonment goeth forthwith to heaven, will she not despise all earthly traffic who, enjoying heaven, rejoiceth to see herself exempted from earthly affairs. It is puzzling how closely connected virtus and gloria appear in qui virtute gloriam petunt. After all, the idea of sections 20 to 25 of Cicero s somnium was to contrast virtus (the conscientia of which could be enjoyed independently of others) and gloria (which depended on others). Probably, those qui virtute gloriam petunt are the semiperfect minds discussed before. Possibly, they have a tendency to emphasize the vir component in virtus ( de hîs enim sermo est relates to viros as much as to praestantes ), and there is a touch of criticism of this in Lady Philosophy s formulation. What follows is a somewhat hasty argument via Aristotle s Categories: gloria is a quality someone has and can therefore not exist without him. This is simply wrong: Glory is not like a cat s grin. But even if it were true, the same point could even more easily be made for virtus. So a perfect mind is no better off than a semiperfect mind if nothing remains of him. On the other hand, if even a perfect mind were affected, that is some good motivation for considering immortality in the sentence that follows. The terreno carcere resoluta is an allusion to the metaphor of the body as the soul s prison in Plato s Phaedo, 63c, and corresponds to inclusus in somnium section The whole sentence takes up the pervolare in section 29 of Cicero s text. Scipio jr. is advised in section 19: haec caelestia semper spectato, illa humana contemnito. [K]eep your gaze fixed upon these heavenly things, and scorn the earthly. However, this advice is closely linked ( enim ) with the over-estimation of gloria among humans down on earth. And the context is Scipo jr. is turning his eyes back to earth while Scipio sr. wants to explain the sructure of the heavens to him. In Boethius consolatio there is no qualification whatsoever in the condemnation of terrenum negotium or terrena. All of it is to be despised. Although Scipio sr. wants to teach his grandson that the earth is really as small as it seems from the Milky Way, it is hard to believe that Cicero would have agreed with this. For Cicero, there is nothing wrong with a conscientia of one s own deeds of virtus down on earth and of some approving reminiscence of how the Empire could be served well. What follows in the consolatio is the 7 th poem of book 2, a meditatio mortis with no exhortation whatsoever. 42 The subject of gloria is not continued in the 8 th prose or elsewhere in the book. No political use is made of the celestial vision. Such use made sense in a time of 41 Cf. also section 14, custodia corporis in section 15 and corpore laxati in section Details: O Daly (1991), 145f; Scheible (1972),

12 12 expansion of the Roman Empire, but not under Theoderic. And without it, making use of the somnium does not make sense at the end of the book, but rather as a preparatory exercise in order to clear up some misunderstanding about gloria. The somnium ends with a call for military action, as an exhortation for the final conquest of Carthage. In the context of the consolatio a similar moral would have been doubly absurd: Conquest was not on the Romans agenda in 525 AD. And in particular, an exhortation for it adressed to Boethius the prisoner would have been completely pointless. So the insert from the somnium changes its character due to what it cannot be used for and for what is lacking. If Cicero politicizes Greek virtues, Boethius takes this back again, in a way rehellenizing and deromanising Cicero s text. But only in a way, for times have changed. Accordingly, virtus becomes strangely gender-neutral, monastic. One should not overlook the fact that the whole passage is copied from the speech of a man and pasted into the speech of a woman. Finally, the scenario is less social: There is no doubt that the heroes in the Milky Way in Cicero s somnium lead some kind of social life and that their approval of virtus is shared approval (cf. in hunc coetum in section 16). This is the praemium set for the bene meritîs de patria (section 26). In Boethius, there are no heroes in the Milky Way. The soul s enjoyment seems to be rather solitary. There is, but only at the end of book V of the consolatio, the omniscient iudex. But, as has been pointed out, they make all the difference with respect to the value of gloria. 8. Epilogue: Some 1250 years later In 1772, 16-year-old Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart composed an azione teatrale called Il sogno di Scipione, using a libretto by Pietro Metastasio ( ), who skilfully condenses the vanity argument into a short, operatic dialogue: Scipione: Emilio: Scipione: Oh stelle! É la terra? [...] E tanti mari E tanti fiumi e tante selve e tante Vastissime province, opposti, regni, Popoli differenti? E il Tebro? E Roma? Tutto è chiuso in quel punto. Ah, padre amato, Che piccolo, che vano Che misero teatro ha il fasto umano! 43 At first listening, it is a bit disappointing that Mozart banned the text to a completely unspectacular recitativo. On the other hand, this is dialogue. A vanity argument is simply not suitable for an aria or a duetto. And perhaps, at the age of 16, Mozart was not quite in the mood for vanity arguments anyway. 43 The text is available at It reads: O stars! And earth? And so many seas? And so many rivers and forests and vast provinces, opposed kingdoms, different peoples? And the river Tebro? And Rome? It s all included in this point. O dear father, what a small, vain and poor stage has human glory!

13 13 The influence of the virtus / gloria contrast in Cicero s somnium in 18 th century philosophy can hardly be overrated, though. It is found in French writers of the period, 44 but also in Kant s Groundwork to Metaphysics of Morals: Good will would still shine like a jewel even if it had no observable effect. 45 It is very well possible that the somnium as a whole influenced the end of the second Critique where Kant says that there are two admirable things, the starry sky above me and the moral law within me. 46 It may be safely assumed that Kant read the somnium as a schoolboy. For systematic clarification, it is useful to see if Kant s distinction between heteronomy and autonomy 47 is foreshadowed in Cicero, Macrobius or Boethius. One is tempted to say: While striving for gloria is heteronomy, conscientia virtutis is autonomy. However, according to Kant, both are only different kinds of heteronomy. For if you do something in order to feel good about it even if nobody else notices, you still follow your inclination ( Neigung ) for feeling good about something. Consistently, Kant not only promises no heaven, but even denies that I myself can ever find out whether or not I really acted autonomously. 48 This is more radical than what the ancient authors would have dreamt of. In Kant, there is no immediate conscientia virtutis because even its status as fructus virtutis would detract from its moral value. On the other hand, Kant s Achtung fürs Gesetz ( reverence for the law ), characterized as the only selbstgewirktes Gefühl ( self-produced feeling ) 49 seems to be a remarkable functional equivalent to conscientia virtutis : Both are conceived of as internal motivating factors for moral action as opposed to external motivation. Cicero s and Boethius texts may thus turn out to be stations on a long way. They are, themselves, further apart than one might think at first sight: In Cicero, we have a mixture of internal and external motivation, in Boethius it is more clearly internal, in Kant it is so internal that you can t even see it from inside. For Cicero, just being worthy of beatitude / happiness ( der Glückseligkeit würdig ) 50 would be too little. Some assurance of it as the result of virtus is much better. But then, even Kant postulates heaven in the Second Critique, because the factual distribution of happiness on earth feels just too absurd. 51 Only the assurance is gone as a result of the First Critique. Is it really there in Cicero? After all, Scipio s dream is only a dream. The status of the somnium as a whole as a text in the tradition of Plato s myths and dream narratives cannot be discussed here, though. Still, there can be no doubt that even today, Cicero s and Boethius texts provide a fascinating access to thinking about the complications of moral motivation. 44 Cf. Labarrière s contribution to this volume. 45 AA 4:394, 25: [Er] würde er wie ein Juwel doch für sich selbst glänzen [...]. 46 AA 5:162, 35f: der bestirnte Himmel über mir und das moralische Gesetz in mir. 47 Cf. the end of part II of Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA 4: At the beginning of part II of Grundlegung, AA 4: 407, AA 4:401 footnote. 50 Second critique, AA 5:130, Second Critique AA 5: 124, ,07.

14 Appendix: Structured synopsis of the main passages 14 Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio (translation: Stahl, slight changes: N.St.) [2.5.10] Huius igitur ad caelum brevitas, cui punctum est, ad nos vero immensa globositas, distinguitur locîs inter se [...] Insignificant as it is in comparison with the sky it is only a point in comparison, though a vast sphere to us it is divided into regions [...] [2.10.2] Virtutis fructum sapiens in conscientia ponit, minus perfectus in gloria. The wise man places the reward of virtuous deeds in his own consciousness of them while the less enlightened man places it in reputation. Unde Scipio, perfectionem cupiens infundere nepoti, auctor est ut, contentus conscientiae praemio, gloriam non requirat. Accordingly, Scipio the Elder, trying to make his grandson truly enlightened, [...] urges him to find satisfaction in his own knowledge of his services and not to look for glory. [3] In qua appetenda quoniam duo sunt maxime quae praeoptari possint, In the quest for glory there are two things which may be sought above all others: ut [a] et quam latissime vagetur [b] et quam diutissime perseveret, that the fame reach as far as possible, and that it last as long as possible. [a] postquam superius de habitationes nostrae angustiis disserendo Hence [...] by {explaining} in the preceding passage about the narrow limits of our habitation totius terrae, quae ad caelum puncti locum obtinet, {he teaches that} [of the whole earth] [which in comparison with the sky is but a point] minimam quandam docuit a nostri generis hominibus particulam possideri, the men of our race occupy only a minute portion, nullius vero gloriam vel in illam partem potuisse diffundi, [...and that] no man s reputation can extend over the whole of even that small part, si quidem Gangen transnare vel transcendere Caucasum Romani nominis fama non valuit, if [...] the great name of Rome herself has not been able to pass the Ganges or to cross the Caucasus, spem quam de propaganda late gloria ante oculos ponendo nostri urbis angustias amputavit [he removes the first hope, that of an extensive reputation, by revealing] {the limitations of Our City}; [b] vult et diurnitatis auferre, Now he desires to remove the hope of a lasting reputation as well ut plene animo nepotis contemptum gloriae compos dissuasor insinuet so that he, the possessor of glory but not its advocate, may instill a contempt for it in his grandson s mind [4] Et ait nec in hac ipsa parte, in quam sapientis et fortis viri nomen serpere potest, aeternitatem nominis posse durare [...] He says that the fame of a wise and brave man cannot endure for long even within the small area over which it can spread [...]. [2.11.4] Idem agere perseverat, instans dissuasioni gloriae desiderandae. The grandfather steadfastly continues the same argument, insisting that glory is not to be sought after. Quam cum locis artam nec in ipsis angustiis aeternam supra docuisset, He showed above that its area is circumscribed and that in addition it is not eternal; nunc solum perpetuitatis expertem, now he informs Scipio that it is so far from being eternal sed nec ad unius inegri anni metas posse propagari docet that it cannot even be prolonged to the span of a single year.

15 Cicero, somnium Scipionis, translation: Keyes [A- Admonition] [16] [Scipio jr.] stellarum autem globi terrae magnitudinem facile vincebant. The starry spheres were much larger than the earth; Iam verso ipsa terra ita mihi parva visa est, indeed the earth seemed to me so small ut me imperii nostri quo quasi punctum eius attingimus paeniteret. that I was scornful of our empire, which covers only a single point, as it were, upon its surface. [A] [20] [Scipio sr.:] sentio te sedem etiam nunc hominum ac domum contemplari; I see that you are still directing your gaze upon the habitation and abode of men. quae si tibi parva ut est ita videtur, haec celestia semper spectato, illa humana contemnito. If it seems small to you, as it actually is, keep your gaze fixed upon these heavenly things, and scorn the earthly. tu enim quam celebritatem sermonis hominum aut quam expetendam consequi gloriam potes? For what fame can you gain from the speech of men, or what glory that is worth seeking? 15 [B: space 1] Vides habitari in terra rarîs et angustîs in locîs, You see that the earth is inhabited in only a few portions, and those very small et in ipsis quasi maculîs ubi habitatur vastas solitudines interiectas, while vast deserts lie between those inhabited patches, as we may call them; eosque qui incolunt terram you see that the inhabitants non modo interruptos ita esse ut nihil inter ipsos ab aliis ad malios manare possit, are so widely separated that there can be no communication whatever among the different areas; sed partim obliquos, partim transversos, partim etiam adversus stare vobis. and that some of the inhabitants live in parts of the earth that are oblique, transverse, and sometimes directly opposite your own. A quibus expectare gloriam certe nullam potestis. From such you can expect nothing surely that is glory. [21] [...] hic autem alter subiectus aquiloni, quem incolitis, cerne Examine this northern zone which you inhabit, quam tenui vos parte contingat. and you will see what a small portion of it belongs to you Romans. Omnis enim terra quae colitur a vobis [...] parva quaedam insula est For that whole territory which you hold is really only a small island circumfusa illo mari quod Atlanticum, quod magnum, quem Oceanum appellatis in terrîs, surrounded by that sea which you on the earth call the Atlantic, the Great Sea, or the Ocean qui tamen tanto nomine quam sit parvus vides. Now you see how small it is in spite of its proud name! [C: space 2] [22] ex hîs ipsis cultîs notîsque terrîs num aut tuum aut cuiusquam nostrum nomen Do you suppose that your [n]ame or that of any of us could ever go beyond those settled and explored regions vel Caucasum hunc quem cernis transcendere potuit vel illum Gangen tranatare? by climbing the Caucasus, which you see there, or by swimming the Ganges? quis in reliquîs orientis aut obeuntis solis ultimîs aut aquilonis austrive partibus tuum nomen audiet? What inhabitants of those distant lands of the rising or setting sun, or the extreme North or South will ever hear your name? quibus amputatîs cernis profecto Leave out all these and you cannot fail to see quantîs in angustiis vestra se gloria dilatari velit. what a narrow territory it is over which your glory is so eager to spread.

16 Boethius, consolatio philosophiae II, 7 th prose, translation: I.T. [A ] Admonition Tum ego: Then I [= Boethius, the patient] said Scis, inquam, ipsa minimum nobis ambitionem mortalium rerum fuisse dominatam. Thou thyself knowest that the ambition of mortal things hath borne as little sway with me as with any, Sed materiam gerendîs rebus optavimus quo ne virtus tacita cosenesceret. But I desired matter of action, lest old age come upon me ere I had done anything. Et illa: To which she [= Lady Philosophy] answered: Atqui hoc unum est quod praestantes quidem naturâ mentes This is the only thing which is able to entice such minds as, being well qualified by nature, sed nondum ad extremam manum virtutum perfectione perductas allicere possit, are not yet fully brought to full excellence by the perfecting of virtues: gloriae scilicet cupido et optimorum in rem publicam fama meritorum; I mean desire of glory, and fame of best deserts towards their commonwealth; Quae quam sit exilis et totius vacua ponderis, sic considera. which [, however,] how slender it is, and void of all weight, consider this: 16 [B : space 1] Omnem terrae ambitum, sicuti astrologicis demonstrationibus accepisti, thou hast learnt by astronomical demonstrations that the compass of the whole earth ad caeli spatium puncti constat obtinere rationem, compared to the scope of heaven is no bigger than a pin s point id est ut, si ad caelestis globi magnitudinem conferatur, nihil spatii prorsus habere iudicetur. Which is as much as to say that, if it be conferred with the greatness of the celestial sphere, it hath no bigness at all. Huius igitur tam exiguae in mundo regionis quarta fere portio est, sicut Ptolmaeo probante didicisti, quae nobis cognitis animantibus incolatur. And of this so small a region in the world only the fourth part is known to be inhabited by living creatures known to us, as Ptolemey proveth. Huic quartae, si quantum maria paludesque premunt quantumque siti vasta regio distenditur cogitatione subtraxeris, vix angustissima inhabitandi hominibus area relinquetur. From which fourth part, if thou takest away in imagination the seas, the marsh grounds, and all other desert places, there will scarcely be left any room at all for men to inhabit. In hoc igitur minimo puncti quodam puncto circumsaepti atque conclusi de pervulganda fama, de proferendo nomine cogitatis? Wherefore, enclosed and shut up in this smallest point of that other point, do you think of extending your fame and enlarging your name? Aut quid habeat amplum magnificumque gloria tam angustîs exiguîsque limitibus artata? But what great or heroical matter can that glory have, which is pent up in so small and narrow bounds? [C : space 2] Adde quod hoc ipsum brevis habitaculi saeptum plures incolunt nationes lingua, moribus, totius vitae ratione distantes ad quas [...] non modo fama hominum singulorum sed ne urbium quidem pervenire queat. Besides that the little compass of this small habitation is inhabited by many nations, different in language, fashions and conversation, to which by reason of the difficulties in travelling, the diversity of speech, and the scarcity of traffic, not only the Fame of particular men but even of cities can hardly come. Aetate denique Marci Tulli, sicut ipse quodam loco significat, nondum Caucasum montem Romanae rei publicae fama transcenderat [...] Finally, in the age of Marcus Tullius, as he himself writeth, the fame of the Roman commonwealth had not passed the mountain Caucasus [...] Videsne igitur quam sit angusta, quam compressa gloria quam dilatare ac propagare laboratis? Seest thou therefore how strait and narrow that glory is which you labour to enlarge and increase? An ubi nominis transire fama nequit, Romani hominis gloria progredietur? Where the fame of the Roman name could not pass, can the glory of a Roman man penetrate?