Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, book 5
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1 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, book 5 (or, reconciling human freedom and divine foreknowledge) More than a century after Augustine, Boethius offers a different solution to the problem of human freedom versus divine foreknowledge, which appeals to the nature of time and God s eternity. He reaches this conclusion by way of an imaginary conversation with Lady Philosophy as he waits in his prison cell before his execution (in 524 AD). 1. No Chance, No Freedom? Boethius begins by asking if it is possible for an event to occur by mere chance i.e., an event that is purely random (indeterministic). The answer is no. For, a truly random event would have to be one that has no cause at all. But, this is just to say that a random event comes from nothing. As the famous adage goes, nothing comes from nothing, however. So, a truly random event is impossible. Clarification: Sure, we often CALL events random or chance events. But, we re speaking improperly when we do so. For instance, imagine a farmer who, by chance, finds some gold buried in his field. This event is not truly random. For, there IS a causal explanation (e.g., some thief was on the run and buried it there long ago, but was captured before he could retrieve it, etc.). In short, what we really mean when we say that this was a random event is that it was unexpected, or unforeseen, or unintended. [Imagine a pair of dice. Though the result of throwing them may SEEM random, strictly speaking, if we knew the angle and momentum of your throw, every detail about the table and the dice, the air current, and so on, we would be able to accurately calculate how the dice would land. When we say that the result is random we really mean unforeseen. Or consider the way that a computer generates a random number. It uses an algorithm that is SO complicated that we cannot predict the number generated. So, it SEEMS random to us the generated number is always unexpected. Nevertheless, one could calculate that number with certainty if they knew the mechanism (algorithm) that determined it.] But, then, if there is no such thing as true chance, and everything is really subject to the stream of causation, are we really free? For, the gold in the field, the pair of dice, a stone that inevitably falls to the ground indeed, all physical objects seem to just be entirely caught up in an inescapable interweaving of causes? (Pr. 1) (governed by physical laws) So then, are we, like the rock that falls, ALSO caught up in this chain of causes? Boethius asks, Is there any freedom of our independent judgment? Or does the chain of fate tie together the very motions of human minds as well? (Prose 3) 1
2 Yes, We Are Free: Lady Philosophy assures Boethius that humans do have free will. Unlike rocks that simply fall with no choice in the matter, we humans by nature have the ability to reason; i.e., the ability to discriminate or distinguish between things. We can JUDGE things, and come to the conclusion that some things are better, or worse, than others. Then, we can SEEK the better things and AVOID the worse things. 1 [Still, today, we might worry that the laws of physics dictate even our judgements and desires! When we compare things and weigh them up, one against the other, is it INEVITABLE that we come to the conclusion that we do about which one is better? For instance, imagine that you were trying to decide between W&M and UVA. If it is inevitable that you decided that W&M is better, then perhaps you did not make your choice freely. If it is NOT inevitable that you came to the conclusion that you did, then think for a moment about what that means: Given EXACTLY the same reasons and EXACTLY the same deliberation, you could have instead come to the conclusion that UVA was better, and then decided to go there. Was that outcome REALLY possible though?] 2. Freedom vs. Foreknowledge: Given that we do have free will, the question of how human freedom is compatible with divine foreknowledge arises once again (Pr. 3, 3-6). Recall that the idea is that there is no free will, since (because God knows everything we will do before we do it, and is never wrong) everything we do is necessary. Now Augustine said there is no problem, since the DIRECTION of the necessity is such that it does not jeopardize free will. The two possible directions of necessitation are: (1) God s knowledge Human choice (2) Human Choice God s Knowledge The FIRST option is the one that removes free will. Think of them like this: (1) If God knows that I will do X tomorrow, this knowledge causes me to do X. (2) If I will do X tomorrow, then this action causes God to know that I will do X. The solution is that (2) is true, but (1) is false. Boethius rejects this solution, writing: 1 [Lady Philosophy also goes on to say that freedom comes in degrees. The MOST free are those who align their desires with God; they are less free when moved toward Earthly things; and least free when enslaved by vices, or destructive passions. Yet, even these slaves are free in some sense, since they are captives of their own liberty. The implication seems to be that they are enslaved because they FREELY CHOSE to be (like addicts, who voluntarily begin taking a drug, but then cannot voluntarily quit).] 2
3 Ha! As if the contention were which is the cause of which whether foreknowledge of future things is the cause of the necessity, or whether the necessity of future things is the cause of the foreseeing. (Pr. 3, 7-14) First, Boethius seems to think it somewhat blasphemous to think that we can somehow CAUSE God an eternal, unchanging being to know things: How utterly backwards it is to say that the outcome of temporal events is the cause of eternal knowledge! (ibid.) More importantly, Boethius thinks that the direction of causation is irrelevant, for EITHER WAY there is a necessitation that threatens free will. He writes, even though the cause of truth proceeds from only one side, there is present all the same a common necessity on both sides. (Pr. 3, 7-14) This is because, even if foreknowledge doesn t GENERATE or CAUSE the necessity of future events, it is nevertheless a sign that such things are necessarily going to occur. (Pr. 4, 9-14) In short, even if my knowledge of what will happen does not CAUSE it to happen, nevertheless, it will NECESSARILY happen otherwise, I wouldn t have knowledge. The belief seems to be that I can only KNOW that something is going to happen if it is 100% CERTAIN to happen. He writes, when I know that something will be, it is necessarily the case that that same thing will be. And so it happens that the outcome of a foreseen event cannot be avoided. (Pr. 3, 15-18) For, there can in no way be foreknowledge if necessity is absent; nothing can be grasped by knowledge unless it is a definite thing. For if things that are characterized by indefinite outcomes are foreseen as if they were definite, that would be the darkness of opinion and not the truth of knowledge. (Pr. 4, 21-15) In other words, if we are free, then there are multiple ways that the future could turn out; i.e., the future is indefinite. But, knowledge is by nature definite; it is SURE; it is CERTAIN. So, one simply cannot KNOW that something will happen unless it will DEFINITELY happen. In short, with respect to seeing the future, there are two options: (1) God knows the future (which entails that the future is definite; i.e., no free will). (2) The future is NOT definite (which entails God CANNOT have knowledge of it, since one cannot be certain of things that are themselves uncertain!). Or, in other words: How can one have knowledge (which is definite) of a future free choice (which, if it is truly free, is NOT definite)? 3
4 The hopeless result: There is no free will. In turn, punishments and rewards are always unjust (since no one is truly blameworthy or praiseworthy). The ideas of virtues and vices are meaningless. And it would be pointless to hope, or pray, for anything, since hopes and prayers have no force. 3. Boethius s Solution: Lady Philosophy disagrees. Boethius seems to think that: If X knows that P will occur, then P is necessarily going to occur (Pr. 4, 9-14). Knowledge of the Present: But, surely something similar does not apply when we see PRESENT things occurring. For instance, consider a case where you KNOW that a charioteer is presently driving a chariot. Isn t that something you can know? There is no problem of having definite knowledge of something indefinite, since (a) you know that the driver is driving the chariot, and (b) he IS DEFINITELY driving it. Nevertheless, the fact that he is DEFINITELY, presently driving the chariot does not entail that he did not choose to do so freely. 2 When you see present things, you are able to distinguish between necessary events (e.g., the Sun s rising) and voluntary ones (e.g., human choices). Both are necessary or certain in that they are both DEFINITELY happening however, there was only necessity in the event itself for ONE of those two events (namely, the Sun s rising). For THAT event, it was necessary before it even happened. (today we might say that the laws of nature guaranteed it.) So, we can watch a charioteer driving without imposing any necessity on his actions just by watching them. Similarly, perhaps God doesn t impose any necessity on OUR FUTURE actions when He sees them. Problem: Boethius objects that, while it is true that the charioteer s driving is DEFINITELY HAPPENING (this is how we can know that it is happening), our future free choices (since they have not happened yet) are NOT DEFINITELY going to happen (otherwise they would not be free). 2 [Mysteriously, Lady Philosophy adds, if all these were forced actions that were set into motion, the effect of the driver s skill would be all in vain. (Pr. 4, 15-16) Is that right? Sometimes people respond to the idea of a lack of free will like this: If the future is already set in stone, then I may as well just lay in bed and do nothing, since what is bound to happen is going to happen no matter what. But, that is absurd. The claim that the future is already determined is NOT the claim that certain things are going to happen NO MATTER WHAT as if what will happen somehow has NOTHING TO DO with your actions. No. Rather: Even if the future is already set in stone, you will NOT magically graduate college if you stay in bed. Similarly, even if the future is already set in stone, the charioteer will NOT win the race if he is not skilled at driving the chariot. Does that seem right?] 4
5 The Hierarchy of Perception: In answer, The Lady suggests that we need to first consider the hierarchy of perception among living things: Understanding Reason Imagination Sensation (God; views the one simple form itself in the pure vision of the mind ) (human beings; Capable of abstract thought, contemplates universals) (creatures that move; Can think of things without sensing the material) (creatures w/o self-motion, e.g., shellfish; Only perceives material things) Each thing in the hierarchy possesses all of the modes of perception that are below it. For instance, human beings have reason, imagination, AND sensation. But, they cannot really grasp any of the modes of perception ABOVE it. For instance, an animal cannot contemplate universals, so they would deny their existence. [We ll learn more about universals, but for now think of them as forms or properties that can simultaneously exist in many objects. For instance, lots of things are red; lots of things are chairs; lots of things are trees. We see the similarities between lots of objects and are able to abstract away the concept of what they all share i.e., what s universal to them.] An animal would think it silly that you are somehow claiming to see something that is present among ALL of a group of things i.e., something that is universally present when the only things that exist are particular, individual objects. But, similarly, the human mind is confused when it claims that, since WE can only ever have definite knowledge of definite things, NOTHING AT ALL can ever have definite knowledge of indefinite things. We are only saying this because we cannot comprehend the mode of perception above our own. In short, we just don t understand how free will is compatible with foreknowledge because we re too finite and limited to understand. God is much greater, and for Him, somehow they re compatible. This may not seem very satisfying. But, The Lady elaborates by explaining what is entailed by God s eternity. God s Eternity: First, it is important to understand that being eternal does NOT mean enduring THROUGH all times, with no beginning or end (this is, for example, how Plato viewed the universe itself). The Lady calls this a perpetual being. To be eternal is to have ALL times present to one s self simultaneously. There is no coming to be or passing away; no yesterday or tomorrow; no things that used to be, or things that are yet to come. Rather, absolutely everything is present all at once. 5
6 So, strictly speaking, God doesn t FORE-know anything! Rather, when He sees our future (things that are GOING to happen to us), to Him it is perfectly PRESENT; He sees what IS happening from his lofty position. In this way, the charioteer analogy really was accurate. We see a present event that is DEFINITELY happening but was nevertheless voluntary. With God s foreknowledge, it is no different: Because to Him it is the present, what God foresees will DEFINITELY happen. So there is necessity in THAT sense. But, there is not necessity in the EVENT ITSELF. The result is that, for future events, although they do happen, nevertheless they could have not happened before they did ever come into being. (Pr. 6, 25-32) Summary Knowledge entails certainty. (i.e., one can only know things that are definite ) To FORE-know with certainty that something will happen entails necessity. (i.e., if one foreknows P, then P is definite. But, if P is indefinite, then one cannot foreknow P) To PRESENTLY know with certainty that something is happening does NOT entail necessity. (i.e., one can know that P is definitely presently happening, even when P is the result of a voluntary choice, such that not-p was possible prior to that moment) God is eternal. (i.e., all times are simultaneously PRESENT for God) Therefore, God s knowledge is PRESENT knowledge, and so does not entail necessity. [Put a bit more technically, he says we must distinguish between two kinds of necessity: (1) Simple necessity (e.g., all human beings are mortal; the Sun rises) (2) Conditional necessity (e.g., IF you know that a man is walking, then it is necessary that he is in fact walking). (2) does not entail (1). With (2), the necessity does not flow from the thing s NATURE, but rather from the CONDITION (of knowledge). In this way, the same future event seems to be necessary when it is referred to divine knowledge, but complete and absolutely free when weighed in the balance of its own nature. (ibid.) In short, in God s mind, there IS necessity. In the event itself, there is not.] So, we do have free will. You re free to come to class Friday, or not. Does this mean that you can CHANGE what God knows? Yes and no. You CAN freely alter your course of action, but this doesn t make God switch back and forth in what he believes, or knows. Rather, the divine gaze runs on ahead of everything It anticipates and embraces your changes in its single stroke. (Pr. 6, 37-43) So, good news: Freedom, moral responsibility, punishment & reward, hope and prayer are all left intact. Whew! 6
7 I suspect that beneath your offensively and vulgarly effeminate façade there may be a soul of sorts. Have you read widely in Boethius? Who? Oh, heavens no. I never even read newspapers. Then you must begin a reading program immediately so that you may understand the crises of our age, Ignatius said solemnly. Begin with the late Romans, including Boethius, of course. Then you should dip rather extensively into early Medieval. You may skip the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. That is mostly dangerous propaganda. Now that I think of it, you had better skip the Romantics and the Victorians, too. For the contemporary period, you should study some selected comic books. You re fantastic. I recommend Batman especially, for he tends to transcend the abysmal society in which he s found himself. His morality is rather rigid, also. I rather respect Batman. from A Confederacy of Dunces, by John Kennedy Toole 7
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