RUSSIA. This issue is for your personal use only. Published monthly in Russian and in English by Trialogue Company Ltd.

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1 RUSSIA The circulation of this report has been strictly limited to the members of the Trialogue Club International and of the Centre russe d études politiques. This issue is for your personal use only. Published monthly in Russian and in English by Trialogue Company Ltd. Issue 7 (31), vol.3. July June 18, 2013 Artem Blashchanitsa, Aleksandr Cheban and Aleksandr Plugarev report from Moscow: A WAR OF EXTERMINATION: ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE SYRIAN CONFLICT ANNOTATION The conflict in Syria has entered its third year. It is posing an increasingly serious threat to international security. Reports are coming in that chemical weapons may have been used on the battlefield. If these reports are true, the use of WMD is turning the Syrian conflict into a veritable war of extermination, in which both of the warring factions may suffer horrendous losses. What is more, amid extreme instability in the country, chemical weapons may fall into the hands of terrorists, with catastrophic consequences on a global scale. The list of potential targets for WMD-armed terrorist groups includes the United States, other Western countries, and Russia as well. PIR Center experts Artem Blashchanitsa, Aleksandr Cheban and Aleksandr Plugarev have analyzed possible scenarios for the situation in Syria; assessed the risks of Syrian chemical arsenals falling into the hands of terrorists; and looked at the likelihood of those weapons being used during the civil war in that country. Their analysis suggests the possibility of the situation in Syria following the Iraqi scenario, i.e. a foreign military invasion if the use of WMD on Syrian territory is confirmed. Nevertheless, the authors believe that such a scenario is possible but not probable. -1-

2 THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN SYRIA: GROUNDS FOR SUSPICIONS First reports about suspected use of chemical weapons in Syria date back to late December but direct and incontrovertible evidence of such use has yet to be found. Such a state of affairs has been confirmed by a special UN commission for human rights violations in Syria, which has the authority to investigate these claims. On May 6, 2013 the Reuters news agency quoted Carla del Ponte, a member of the commission, as saying that rebel fighters may have used chemical weapons but she could not specify where or when such use may have occurred. Nevertheless, citing evidence obtained by neighboring countries from victims of the Syrian conflict, as well as from doctors working in field hospitals, the commission has made a preliminary conclusion that it was the opposition fighters, and not government troops, who may have used the sarin nerve gas during the Syrian conflict. The United States and Israel have a different view of the situation. The U.S. defense secretary, Chuck Hagel, and head of the Israeli military intelligence research division, Itay Brun, said last April that according to the intelligence data at their disposal, chemical weapons have been used in Syria on several occasions, apparently by the Bashar Assad regime. Experts working for the British and French defense ministries have also said there is evidence of chemical weapons use in Syria; they have found traces of sarin in Syrian soil samples, and suspect that the nerve agent was used by government troops. Turkey's Prime Minister Rejep Tayyip Erdogan has also accused the government in Damascus of using chemical weapons against its own citizens. He says that the field hospitals near the Syrian border have treated dozens of Syrians with symptoms suggesting sarin poisoning. A thorough investigation of these allegations in Syria itself has yet to be conducted. The Syrian government is in no hurry to issue the necessary permit to an international inspection team, fearing that its conclusions will be biased. The Syrian information minister, Omran al-zohbi, says his government has reasons to believe that any investigation will follow the Iraqi scenario, and that its conclusions will be used as a pretext for a regime change. The UN secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon, has allayed some of the suspicions of bias by not including any representatives of the permanent Security Council members, Turkey or the Arab countries in the team of inspectors. The group is made of experts representing Latin America, Asia and Scandinavia. Nevertheless, the precise dates for an inspection visit have yet to be determined. ASSESSING THE SYRIAN CHEMICAL ARSENAL Damascus supports the idea of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region, and is willing to join it but only on the condition that Israel does the same. Syria, along with Egypt, has on several occasions proposed the following bargain to Israel: Tel Aviv must relinquish its nuclear arsenal, and in return Cairo and Damascus will join the Chemical Weapons Convention. Israel has rejected the deal; Syria therefore refuses to relinquish chemical weapons, although it has never officially recognized that it has a chemical arsenal in the first place. According to the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Syria possesses the largest chemical arsenal in the Middle East, estimated at tens of tons of mustard gas, sarin, VX and other agents. As for delivery systems, Damascus has the Scud and the SS- 21 tactical missiles, as well as suitable artillery and aircraft. The R&D component of the Syrian chemical weapons program is based at a MoD research center in the Jamraya area near Damascus. Both of the Syrian chemical weapons storage facilities, and three out of four chemical weapons production facilities are in the areas that have seen clashes between government troops and rebels (see Figure 1). -2-

3 Figure 1. Suspected chemical weapons sites, and areas of armed clashes between Syrian government troops and rebels. Source: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) ACCESSING THE RISKS The Syrian information minister insists that his country would never use chemical weapons. Nevertheless, the United States and the countries which have formed the socalled Friends of Syria group, have expressed fears that Damascus might use WMD against its political opponents. Speaking in August 2012, U.S. President Barack Obama said that the use of chemical weapons would be a red line for the United States; once it would have been crossed, Washington would reconsider its stance on the Syrian conflict. If reports of the Syrian government s use of chemical weapons are confirmed by the international team of inspectors, proponents of a regime change in Syria will gain a very serious argument in favor of such an approach. As the regional situation becomes increasingly unfavorable for official Damascus, some believe that the Assad regime may transfer its chemical weapons and delivery systems to the Hezbollah terrorist organization. The United States and Israel say Iran may put pressure on Assad to convince him to arm Hezbollah with chemical agents. Tehran is the main Syrian ally and donor. As a matter of fact, the civil war in Syria has long become an arena of religious confrontation. The main antagonists on this arena are the pro-opposition Sunni Salafist groups, and Hezbollah, a Shi a organization backed by Iran. The leader of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, said on May 1 that his organization, which had previously provided support to the Assad regime near the Syrian-Lebanese border, would now use all its military strength to back the Syrian -3-

4 government so as to make sure that the country does not fall into the hands of America or Israel, or the Takfiri [i.e. infidels who support Al Qaeda]. A far more serious threat, however, is the possibility of chemical weapons being seized by rebel fighters. There is no accurate information about the size of the Syrian stockpile of chemical weapons and precursors. This lack of information makes it more difficult to keep track of the state of the Syrian WMD arsenals. The world's secret services - especially the U.S. and Israeli agencies - are keeping a very close watch on the Syrian chemical weapons sites. Nevertheless, there is still a real threat of those weapons falling into the hands of rebels or Islamist terrorists. On April 21 the United States announced the decision to double the amount of assistance provided to the Syrian opposition, and called on the Friends of Syria group to follow suit. The move apparently reflects Washington's understanding of the seriousness of this threat, and its determination to support the non-salafist forces in the country. But supporting this particular section of the Syrian opposition will not help the United States to prevent chemical weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. The U.S. policies aimed at speeding up the collapse of the Assad regime will only speed up the collapse of Syria itself. Once that happens, the risk of Syrian WMD ending up in the hands of terrorists will increase even further. That is why, in addition to backing the non-salafist opposition in Syria, Washington also wants to achieve a relatively peaceful transition of power to an interim government capable of taking control of the Syrian chemical arsenals, as well as chemical weapons development and manufacturing sites. THE RUSSIAN POSITION Russia is trying to pursue a careful but pragmatic policy on the Syrian conflict. The key points of that policy are as follows: Russia does not support the use of force to resolve the conflict; Russia believes that a peaceful settlement would require negotiations involving all the parties involved in the conflict, i.e. both opposition representatives and the government; Any incidents of chemical weapons use must be thoroughly investigated without delay. If there is no strong evidence to support allegations of chemical weapons use, the subject must not be used to politicize the situation and stoke up anti-assad sentiment; Foreign powers must not meddle in the Syrian conflict settlement process; they must respect the country s sovereignty and territorial integrity. One of the priorities of Russian policy on Syria is to prevent the use of chemical weapons during the civil war in that country, and to make sure that those weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorists. Speaking in December 2012, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that the Syrian chemical weapons would pose the greatest threat if they were to fall into the hands of rebels. In an official Russian statement on Syria of May 6, 2013, the Foreign Ministry s spokesman A.K. Lukashevich said that according to the aforementioned report by Carla del Ponte, it is the pro-opposition fighters, not government troops, who are suspected of using chemical agents. Moscow is therefore inclined to doubt claims in the Western media that the Syrian government may also be guilty of using chemical weapons. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR SYRIA AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE The Syrian conflict has lately become one of the key topics of closer Russian-U.S. dialogue. In particular, the issue was raised during State Secretary John Kerry's visit to Moscow last May. The two sides have failed to reach an agreement to stop supplying weapons to the Syrian government and opposition. For Russia, delivering the S-300 SAM systems is primarily a question of fulfilling its contractual obligations and protecting its business reputation. Back in March 2012 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made it clear that Russia was not trying to keep Bashar Assad in power, but rather advocating measures to enable the Syrian people freely to express their will on the question of who should run -4-

5 their country. For his part, Kerry essentially recognized the Assad government as a legitimate and full participant of the future reconciliation process. He backed the Russian idea of holding an international conference on Syrian settlement, in which both of the warring factions are to take part. Taking into account the results of the Russian- U.S. talks on Syria and the current situation, the following scenarios are possible: 1. The international conference fails to take place or ends without any results It is very likely that the international conference will either fail to take place, or that its results will have no discernible effect on the situation in Syria. The organizers of the conference will hardly succeed at getting all the participants in the Syrian conflict to sit down around the same table. If the peace conference fails, the situation in the region will continue to deteriorate. The United States and its allies will continue to provide support to the opposition forces, while Russia and Iran will continue to back the Syrian government. There will be a growing number of radical Islamists coming to the country, and the danger of chemical weapons use or proliferation will also increase. Against that backdrop, the United States will move to increase its military presence in countries which border on Syria, and give them financial support to strengthen their borders and prevent the spread of WMD beyond Syria. Unless this trend is reversed, sooner or later the Syrian conflict will spread beyond Syria and affect neighboring countries. Syria itself, meanwhile, will break up into several warring fragments. 2. The international conference leads to a breakthrough The scenario that hinges on a successful outcome of the conference is extremely optimistic, and very unlikely. It is difficult to imagine the conference taking place at all, let alone yielding any positive outcome. But this scenario will become possible if the United States, Russia and other countries manage to exert effective diplomatic pressure on both of the warring factions and force them to agree to a ceasefire. By the time the conference begins, the opposition forces and the Syrian government must arrive at an understanding that there is no acceptable military solution to the current situation. That situation has reached a dead end; it is therefore important to make sure that at least the dead end is a peaceful stalemate as opposed to a pointless bloodbath, with a growing risk of chemical weapons use. The United States, Russia and Iran might then be able to reach a compromise, and identify some mutually acceptable (or equally inconvenient, but practical) way of safeguarding their own interests in that conflict. If the negotiations succeed, the next logical step after forming a national reconciliation government must be for that government to declare all existing chemical weapons arsenals and sites, and to begin eliminating those arsenals - possibly with international help. 3. Military invasion of Syria if chemical weapons are used on its territory In early May U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel confirmed that Washington was reviewing its stance on the possibility of conducting a military operation on Syrian territory. Clearly, if the international team of inspectors confirms that Syrian government troops have used weapons of mass destruction, the existing balance of power will shift. Russia and China will have to withdraw their political support for the Assad government. The United States, on the other hand, will gain broad international support for a legitimate military operation to secure all known Syrian chemical weapons sites. Little is known about the Syrian chemical weapons stockpiles. There is, therefore, a real possibility that not all of these stockpiles will be taken under strict international control, and that some of them will end up in the hands of radical Islamists. The situation in Syria, meanwhile, will probably unfold according to the Iraqi scenario. For now, however, this particular scenario remains unlikely. -5-

6 First, there are serious suspicions that it was the opposition forces, and not government troops, who have used chemical weapons. The Syrian government has already asked the UN to investigate one suspected case. If these suspicions are borne out by international findings, the Syrian opposition will lose international support, and the Assad government will have a good chance of changing the situation in the country in its own favor. Second, even though the international team of UN inspectors is ready to begin the investigation, it is currently unable to gain access to Syrian territory. The Western countries demand that all suspected cases of chemical weapons use be investigated. Damascus insists, however, that the UN commission only investigates the incident which has been referred to the UN by the Syrian government. The government fears that unless its conditions are met, the results of the investigation will be fabricated. It does not look as though the parties will find a compromise any time soon, and it is not clear whether or when the inspection will be able to proceed. Third, the Assad government is perfectly aware that desisting from the use of chemical weapons is its only chance of avoiding a foreign invasion, which would inevitably lead to its defeat. Especially since government troops have clear superiority in heavy weaponry, they should not need chemical weapons in any case. Fourth, even though Washington says it is ready to conduct a military operation if the use of chemical weapons in Syria is confirmed, at present the United States would rather much prefer a peaceful resolution of the Syrian crisis. A military operation would require hundreds of thousands of troops and cost billions of dollars to pay for the operation itself and the subsequent measures to secure and destroy the Syrian chemical weapons arsenals. Amid the growing threat posed by Iran, Washington cannot afford to become tied up in Syria for the next five or ten years, and will try to avoid the military invasion scenario, if at all possible. Circles close to Barack Obama insist that Washington does not want to get involved militarily in the Syrian conflict. It is therefore safe to dismiss President Obama s words about the red line, or to write the whole thing down to changing circumstances. Despite the recent statement made by the White House that the U.S. intelligence has concluded on Syria s government use of chemical weapons against opposition, PIR Center sources in Washington say that the United States is currently reviewing its uncompromising and irreconcilable attitude to Bashar Assad. At the very least, Washington is sending signals that it realizes the possibility of radical opposition forces using chemical weapons as an act of provocation. In this connection, Washington is emphasizing the importance of cooperation with Moscow on the Syrian problem - at least in such areas as information exchange on Syrian chemical weapons, and any signs of them falling into the wrong hands. Another possibility to be taken into account is that Moscow may be providing assistance to the Assad government in monitoring access to Syrian chemical weapons sites using space surveillance. There have also been signals in recent weeks that countries which have little liking for Assad - especially Qatar - are softening their stance on reports of possible use of chemical weapons by Syrian government troops against the opposition and civilians. Finally, there have been some visible changes in the attitude of several European countries, which have come to see the radical Syrian opposition as a greater evil than the Assad regime. They seem to prefer Assad to remain in power - especially if he manages to wrest control of Aleppo away from the rebels because he is seen as the only effective leader Syria has at the moment, regardless of all the negative emotions attached to his name. CONCLUSIONS The situation in Syria remains extremely tense. There is a clear threat of chemical weapons being used especially by the armed fighters of the Syrian opposition, if they manage to gain access to such weapons. The government has no obvious motive to use chemical arsenals because that would only prove accusations of irresponsibility and inhumane attitude leveled at the Assad regime, and destroy what is left of its credibility. Nevertheless, if the regime finds itself on the brink of survival, it cannot be ruled out that events will take a dangerous turn, with no holds barred. Also, amid extreme instability in Syria, chemical weapons may end up in the hands of terrorists, with catastrophic consequences for international security. The Western countries, especially the United States, and possibly Russia would be the prime targets of WMD-armed Islamist terrorists. That is why it would be in the best interests of the United States, Russia and all the other countries for the warring factions in Syria to agree to a ceasefire as soon as possible, and Russian-U.S. cooperation is extremely important to achieve that goal. -6-

7 This article was written by PIR Center experts Editor: Julia Fetisova (с) Trialogue Club International: (с) Сentre russe d etudes politiques: crep@pircenter.org Moscow - Geneva, July 2013 Excerpts from the Membership Terms and Conditions at the Trialogue Club International [ ] 3. The rights of the Club members 3.1. Individual club members are entitled to: Receive a copy of the Russia Confidential exclusive analytical newsletter by in chosen language (English or Russian). According to the Club Terms and Conditions, the transfer of the bulletin to third parties is not allowed. [ ] 3.2. Corporate Club members are entitled to: Receive two copies of the Russia Confidential exclusive analytical newsletter by in chosen language (English or Russian) or in both languages simultaneously. Share the bulletin with the other representatives of the corporate member. According to the Club Terms and Conditions, the transfer of the bulletin to third parties is not allowed. [ ] 4. The duties of the Club members 4.1. All members of the Club must: Not to share the Russia Confidential analytical newsletter, as well as the Password to the Club section of the PIR Center web-site with individuals and legal entities who are not members of the Club. [ ] 6. Russia Confidential 6.1. The Russia Confidential exclusive analytical newsletter is issued by the Trialogue Ltd by PIR Center s order for the Club members private use only The newsletter contains exclusive analytical materials on international security, foreign and domestic policy of Russia and the CIS, prepared by the PIR Center s staff and invited experts specially for Russia Confidential The newsletter materials are confidential and must not be quoted and transfer to the nonmembers for at least 30 days since the day of issue days after the day of issue the Trialogue Ltd can remove the exclusive and confidential status of the material, after which in such cases it is to be published in other PIR Center s editions and can be used by the Club members for quoting The newsletter is disseminated via between the Club members once a month in Russian or in English, depending on the choice of the Club member The Club member can also receive a paper copy of the newsletter in chosen language. -7-

8 Dear Members of the Trialogue Club International, In 2013 the Trialogue Club celebrates its 20 th Anniversary! Today the Trialogue Club is a unique community of leading diplomats, experts, businessmen. In 2013 the Club members will attend 5 Club meetings with leading Russian and foreign experts on international security, will receive 4 issues of the Security Index journal, 12 issues of the Russia Confidential analytical bulletin and will receive invitations to all PIR Center s events as well as several pleasant surprises for our permanent members. As you know, we welcome and appreciate when the Club members recommend the Club membership and participation in the Club meetings to others. Apart from the fact that such recommendation automatically opens the door to membership in the Club, it is also rewarded by us in one of two ways, which are described below. I hope that you will be interested in this offer. Sincerely, Dr. Dmitry V. Polikanov Chairman of the Trialogue Club International Rewards for bringing a new member to Trialogue Club International Option 1 Membership fee discount for the next period 5% for 1 new individual Club member 10% for 1 new corporate Club member 10% for 2 new individual Club members 15% for 3 new individual Club members 20% for 4 or more new individual Club members 20% for 2 new corporate Club members 30% for 3 new corporate Club members 35% for 4 and more new corporate Club members Option 2 Lump-sum compensation in cash 100 USD for 1 new corporate Club member 200 USD for 2 new corporate Club members 300 USD for 3 new corporate Club members 500 USD for 4 and more new corporate Club members -8-