SISA Report no The South Waziristan Agency: A Brief Status Report

Transcription

1 SISA Report no The South Waziristan Agency: A Brief Status Report Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud and Humaira Israr Oslo, April 2014

2 Centre for International and Strategic Analysis SISA 2014 All views expressed in the report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Centre for International and Strategic Analysis. The text may not be printed in full or part without the permission of the author. Queries can be directed to: Centre for International and Strategic Analysis Phone: (+47) E- mail: Internet:

3 Contents INTRODUCTION... 4 WAZIRISTAN... 4 OPERATIONS BY THE PAKISTANI ARMY AGAINST THE MILITANTS... 5 OPERATION RAH- E- NIJAT... 6 DAMAGE DONE BY THE OPERATIONS IN THE AGENCY... 7 INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT OF PEOPLE FROM THE AGENCY... 8 POST- MILITARY OPERATION EFFORTS FOR REHABILITATION... 8 CONCLUSION ENDNOTES

4 INTRODUCTION 1 Pakistan s Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) is a volatile region. It comprises seven agencies and frontier regions and became a safe haven for the Mujahedeen s of the anti- Soviet war in 1979, and a breeding ground for militants in the wake of the U.S- led war in Afghanistan in The Taliban from Afghanistan took refuge in FATA after the US invasion of The entry was made easy because of geographical, cultural and ethnic proximity. But this evolution alone, important though it was, cannot be taken as the sole reason for the rising militancy in FATA over the past decade. The archaic administrative system, alienation of the locals in the main stream of Pakistan, deprivation of social, educational and political rights, and the absence of justice all contributed their part in destabilizing the region. Taking advantage of the inherit weaknesses in the region a group emerged under the name of Tehreek- e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The South Waziristan Agency (SWA) became the TTPs first strong hold in FATA. From SWA they launched their attacks within FATA and later throughout Pakistan. The rapidly deteriorating law and order situation in FATA and in the country, led the Pakistani Army to launch military operations in SWA in order to clear the area off the militants. With many small operations, Pakistan s land and air forces together has struck hard at the militants bases in SWA since The constant turmoil has forced around 36, 000 families to flee and take a refuge elsewhere in the country. The Government of Pakistan, multilateral and bilateral donors are making efforts to help in the rebuilding and the restoration of peace in the South Waziristan Agency. Many developmental plans have been chalked out and projects are in the pipeline or in the implementation phases. WAZIRISTAN For administrative purpose, Waziristan was divided into two agencies, North Waziristan Agency (NWA) and South Waziristan Agency (SWA). SWA is the largest agency of FATA 1 The report has been funded through a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA). All views expressed are those of the author. 4

5 by surface total area of 6,620 km 2. According to census data from 1998, the estimated population of SWA was 429,841. The Agency is further divided into the three administrative subdivisions of Wana, Sarwakai and Ladha. These three subdivisions are further divided into eight tehsils: Ladha, Makin, Sararogha, Sarwakai, Tiarza, Wana and Toikhullah. SWA has two headquarters; Tank is winter headquarter whereas Wana is the summer headquarter. The main tribes in the SWA are Wazir and Mehsud. Geographically, the area is a mass of rugged hills and ridges. The inhabitants are mostly agriculturists. According to statistics available with the FATA Education Department , the literacy rate in the tribal belt is 36.66% for men and 10.5 % for women. 1 The region has seen little of political liberties. Universal adult franchise was introduced in Pakistan during general elections of 1970, but in FATA it was only introduced in However, even then, political parties were not allowed to campaign in the FATA region. 2 The area is under the administrative control of the Federal Government through the Governor of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP), who is answerable to the President of Pakistan. The Governor appoints Political Agents (PA) for administration of the agencies of FATA. Besides the administrative role, the PA also performs the role of executive, judge and revenue collector. The PA appoints the assistant PA and local representatives - maliks - for the administration of the FATA agencies. 3 OPERATIONS BY THE PAKISTANI ARMY AGAINST THE MILITANTS There have been four major Pakistani- led military operations against factions of Taliban in SWA since 2004, the most recent of which was operation Rah- e- Nijat. The first major operation was launched in the spring of 2004 against Taliban commander Naik Muhammad and thousands of his supporters in the area west of Wana. 4 Several months later, Pakistani Army troops attacked an area north of Wana against Chechens, Uzbeks, Arabs and several hundred local militants. However, as the army s casualties increased, the Pakistani Government pursued a series of peace deals with the local militants. The first of these deals was the Shakai Agreement which was signed between Pakistani Armed Forces and Naik Muhammad in It was nevertheless a short- lived agreement; Naik Muhammad was soon thereafter killed by U.S drones in 2004 near Wana. The second military operation was carried out in 2005 against Baitullah Mehsud and Abdullah Mehsud and their fighters. 5 Amid serious casualties the Pakistani Army 5

6 negotiated a peace agreement with Baitullah Mehsud; similar to the agreement with Naik Muhammed. This settlement also fell apart. 6 Accordingly, a third operation, Zalzala, was launched in SWA in January 2008 against Baitullah Mehsud and his supporters. Operation Zalzala cleared most parts of SWA and the army seized computers, weapons, improvised explosives devices and propaganda material. According to a report, security forces destroyed over 40,000 houses in SWA in January 2008 alone. In addition, operation Zalzala displaced roughly 200,000 locals, causing significant local animosity against the Pakistani Army/ State. 7 After military successes in the southern parts of FATA, Pakistani security forces began limited operations against militants elsewhere in the country. There was some cooperation among militant networks operating in northern parts of FATA and Provincial Administered Tribal Areas (PATA); that is, those led by Faqir Muhammad, Mullah Fazalullah and Sufi Muhammad. Baitullah Mehsud provided some fighters and assistance to the insurgents in Bajaur and Swat as part of his strategy to better coordinate the insurgency within the Pakistan Taliban. A series of attacks on government agencies, including the Inter- Services Intelligence (ISI), the Frontier Corps (FC) and army personnel, motivated the army to retaliate. 8 OPERATION RAH- E- NIJAT The failure of the operation Zalzala became very apparent as Baitullah Mehsud ran a current of terror in the years 2008 and 2009 from his base in SWA. Thereafter, the Pakistani military launched a fourth operation, Rah- e- Nijat, on October 17, 2009; around 30, 000 Pakistani soldiers pushed into SWA against Taliban militants. The Pakistani military had several objectives for the operation Rah- e- Nijat, among which were goals to secure key lines of communications, and to destroy the hide outs of the terrorists and their infrastructure in SWA. 9 Both the Pakistani Army and Air Force conducted initial targeting operations in SWA during the summer of 2009, with some assistance from the US military and the CIA. 10 The 11 th Corps was in overall command, with three divisions: the 7 th based in Miram Shah; the 9 th in Wana; and the 14 th forward deployed to Jandola. In addition, two Special Services Group (SSG) battalions and two infantry brigades were deployed from the 6

7 eastern border with India, as well as the FC and other units. Pakistan utilized armored units such as battle tanks, as well as infantry units equipped with heavy artillery and mortars that conducted regular foot patrols. The main objective of these operations was to destroy TTP strongholds at Ladha, Makin, and Sararogha as the command and control structure of the Taliban existed in these areas. By December 2009, Pakistani ground forces controlled most of Ladha, Makin, and Sararogha. 11 The operation resulted in the Pak Army temporarily clearing several key areas (including Ladha, Makin, and Sararogha) but it failed to hold a lot of territory. 12 Nevertheless, operation Rah- e- Nijat forced the TTP to take refuge in North Waziristan Agency (NWA). Hundreds of thousands of local residents fled the area ahead of the operation. 13 DAMAGE DONE BY THE OPERATIONS IN THE AGENCY Militancy and the ensuing military operations in SWA have caused colossal damage not only to infrastructure and the economy, but also to the human dimension, both socially and psychologically. According to a report published by the Planning & Development Department FATA Secretariat in April 2009, the tentative cost in infrastructure, social and environmental costs in the aftermath of the military operations ran in the hundreds of millions of USD. 14 Even before these operations the SWA had a high poverty rate. The Pakistani military operations and U.S drone strikes in the area forced the inhabitants to flee the region and take refuge elsewhere. Over 60 Government school buildings, healthcare centers, telecommunication facilities and electricity and other infrastructure were also damaged in the operation. 15 According to UNICEF estimates, nearly 60% of the total IDPs living in refugee camps are children. The tribal region faces thus an uphill task to educate its youth in the wake of both militancy and the subsequent military operations. Schools, particularly girl's schools, have been primary targets of the militant groups in FATA. Furthermore, students and teachers are facing continuous threats from various militant groups, in effect forcing them to stay away from schools and other educational institutions. 16 According to figures, 447 out of 638 schools in SWA have been fully or partially 7

8 damaged by militants. 17 Therefore, in October 2009, only one- third of the total children in the region were enrolled in primary schools. But besides depriving the locals of their source of income, homes and education, the operations have also severely affected the local population psychologically. The military operations by the Pakistani Army resulted in a strong resentment among many people against the army and the government. 18 According to CARE an international NGO that, among other things, works on IDPs thousands of internally displaced people, especially women and children, are in desperate need of psychological assistance. Doctors say some 70 per cent of them suffer from Post- Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). In relation to this worrisome evolution, Dr. Jawad Ali of Islamic Relief was quoted saying: We have been examining about 200 patients per day. Out of them, 70 per cent, mostly women and children, suffer from mental problems caused by the shelling and destruction they have seen back home. 19 According to the mental health program of the Federal Ministry of Health, children displaced in the wake of the military operations have complained about myriad psychological problems including depression, phobias, acute stress disorder, post- traumatic stress syndrome and insomnia. 20 INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT OF PEOPLE FROM THE AGENCY On- going operations in the SWA, along with the U.S drone strikes in the area, forced the locals to flee to other relatively safer places in Pakistan. The Pak Army also issued evacuation orders during the counter- terrorist and counter- insurgency operations. According to the local elders in the Mehsud areas of the SWA, nearly 100,000 people have been displaced because of the military operations in the Agency. 21 Some of the IDPs of SWA have moved to the adjacent settled areas of the Tank and D.I khan, others to Bannu and Peshawar, while the majority of them have taken refuge in Karachi. Most of these IDPs are in host communities whereas few have taken refuge in camps. 22 POST- MILITARY OPERATION EFFORTS FOR REHABILITATION The military strategy was built on traditional counterinsurgency doctrines and had four phases. Clear and Hold were the two phases that were to be done by the army. Rebuild and Transfer were the third and fourth phases that were to be undertaken by the civilian administration and the political government. However, regardless of these efforts, people are reluctant to return. 23 Many multilateral donors like the World Bank 8

9 (WB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the UN and many bilateral donors like United states, United Kingdom, etc.; along with the Government and Army of Pakistan are striving hard for the reconstruction of infrastructure in the area. As such, a number of efforts and plans have been chalked out for development in SWA. The Planning and Development Department FATA Secretariat envisaged a Sustainable Development Plan for development of FATA with a total cost of US$ 1.9 billion over nine years: Multilateral and bilateral donors are working on various projects in the infrastructure, economic, industrial, social, agricultural, judicial, educational and energy sectors. The total reconstruction requirement is calculated to be US$ 2.6 billion. 24 The prevalent injustice in the FATA region was widely recognized as an inherit dimension of the crisis in FATA, enabling the insurgents to present themselves as a viable alternative to provide quick justice. Recognizing this problem, the Government of Pakistan, in line with the recommendations of the Post Crisis Needs Assessment (PNCA) made an amendment in the Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) of 1901 in August 2011 to enable the citizens of FATA to have the right of appeal and bail. The FATA tribunal was thus established in February 2012, providing a channel through which the citizens of FATA could seek justice. 25 The FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA) in collaboration with the army and various United Nations agencies started the return process of IDPs in late According to official reports, 15,000 families have been sent back to their homes thus far. Furthermore, according to FDMA, 27,819 displaced families of SWA were living in D.I Khan and 13,517 families in Tank, while an unspecified number of unregistered people had shifted to other areas. The political administration and the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) signed a contract in June 2010 to make profile of the IDPs and design South Waziristan Resident Facilitation Cards (SWRFC) for some 200,000 individuals. The total cost of the project amounted to US $ 0.73 million and the NADRA was bound to provide cards to facilitate movement of local people to their area. 26 9

10 However, it is worth mentioning that the people of SWA are unhappy with the efforts of the government for rehabilitation. Reportedly, There is a lack of coordination between various departments that has been hampering service delivery to IDPs, said M. Nazir a local resident. 27 We appreciate the gesture shown by the government and public while hosting the internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Swat. But at the same time we question as to why we have been ignored even though we were displaced thrice from our hometowns? complained Mushtaq Ahmad Wazir, the president of Wana Welfare Association (WaWA), through a letter sent to the top political leaders of the country, as well as civil society organizations and the media. It recalled how SWA had been suffering ever since the first military operation. 28 The reason for reluctance among the IDPs to return to SWA is the questionable security situation in the Agency. After the launch of Operation Rah- e- Nijat on 17 th October, 2009, the army claimed that that took control of Sararogha. 29 In the aftermath of this operation, former Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani claimed that peace had been restored in the Agency and that the army would remain in SWA until people of the area were satisfied. 30 But later on, reports stated that only the Sararogha subdivision (tehsil) has been declared as cleared. The remaining five tehsils including Shawal, Sarwakai, Tairza, Makeen and Ladha had not been cleared so far: Army has control over the main roads and strategic hilltops while TTP s supporters have safe havens in the valleys. They (militants) are using hit and run tactics and targeting security forces with improvised explosive devices, said a resident of Ladha subdivision. The tribesmen said that the Taliban are still present in Ladha, Makeen, Kanigoram, Karama and other areas, which is the main reason why the locals are hesitant to return to their homes in SWA. 31 According to the FATA Research Council (FRC), the military's concept of 'clear' is to secure towns and major roads. 32 The security report for the third quarter of 2013 issued by FRC stated that the third quarter was quite peaceful in the Agency. Another major development is that the Pak Army is in tacit peace negotiation with the local Taliban in the Agency s sub- division Wana. 33 Wali ur- Rahman, the leader of the Mehsud branch of the TTP, claimed that the organization controlled 70-80% of SWA. 34 Another government official who spoke on customary condition of anonymity told the author: Although, army claims that the whole 10

11 of SWA is cleared from the militants but the Ladha sub division is still no go area along with some other areas of the Mehsud tribe. Army is still present in these areas and movement is only allowed under heavy military protection. 35 The success of operation Rah e- Nijat is questionable, as it has failed to deliver the ultimate objective of clearing the area of insurgents and securing peace in the country as a whole. When the new government came into power in May 2013, it decided to hold an All Parties Conference (APC) to try to tackle this problem by national consensus, as dealing with militancy and terrorism was one of the main points of its core manifesto. Therefore, an APC was called on September 2013 in which all the influential leaders of the government and the opposition called to revise the political stance on US drones. It was most importantly an initiative for discussing the possibility of holding peace talks with the Taliban as an effective policy option for Pakistan. As all these developments were taking place and all the ruling political parties and the federal government were determined to negotiate with Taliban, a US drone strike occurred and killed the leader of biggest Pakistani Taliban group, Hakimullah Mehsud, 36 causing the negotiations to be put on hold. Presently, negotiations between the government and the TTP s current leadership are underway, but under dense clouds of mistrust at both ends. CONCLUSION Realistically speaking, Operation Rah- e- Nijat has not yet accomplished the objective of clearing the region of the militants as TTP- led militants are still present in the area; running bases and training camps. Furthermore, the operations in the Agency have forced the militants to flee to other safer places in the tribal area. As such, although the military is present in SWA, the perils of an escalation of violence from militants are still loud and clear. Deterrence against the militants and development of the region alongside the rehabilitation of IDPs of the Agency, are currently on top of the to- do list of the Government and the Armed Forces of Pakistan. IDPs are reluctantly but slowly returning to their homes due to the improving law and order situation. 11

12 ENDNOTES 1 FATA prepares to boost literacy rate through enrollment drive by Mureeb Mohmand, The Express Tribune, Sep 8, prepares- to- boost- literacy- rate- through- enrollment- drive/ 2 Party election in FATA: one hundred years in the making by Shoaid ur Rehman Siddique, Business Recorder, April 17, /br- research/ party- elections- in- fata- one- hundred- years- in- the- making.html 3 The evolution of conflict inn FATA by Ihsan ullah tipu Mehsud and Quyyum Khan, Centre for International and Strategic Analysis, Oslo October 2013, Page 3, 18_SISA7_Evolution- of- conflict- in- Fata_ITM.pdf 4 Taliban insurgency in Pakistan: a counter insurgency perspective by Muhammad Amir Rana, April 2009, page 4. 5 Military operation in FATA and PATA: implications for Pakistan by Zahid Ali Khan, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabab. year 2012, page 133, files/ _ pdf 6 A risky gambit: The Pakistani army campaign in South Waziristan by Robert Matthews, Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria. Nov 5, 2009, risky- gambitthe- pakistani- army- campaign- in- south- waziristan&catid=15:articulos&itemid=9 7 Over 4,000 Houses Destroyed in Waziristan Operation, by Zulfiqar Ali, Dawn Report, 8 Nov houses- destroyed- in- waziristan- operation- report 8 Three Others Killes in Bajaur Ambush, by Anwar ullah Khan, ISI Official, Dawn, 28 March killed- in- bajaur- ambush 9 Military Operation in FATA and PATA: implications for Pakistan by Zahid Ali Khan, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad. page 135, files/ pdf 10 Army Embarks on Rah- i- Nijat Finally, by Sailab Mehsud, Karachi, Dawn, October 18, embarks- on- rah- i- nijat- finally 11 Counterinsurgency in Pakistan by Seth G. Jones, C. Christine Fair, Rand Corporation page Ibid page Military operations in FATA and PATA: implication for Pakistan, by Zahid Ali Khan, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad. page 137, files/ _ pdf 14Cost of conflict in FATA, P & D Department FATA Secretariat, Peshawar, April Massive collateral damage done in South Waziristan, Dawn, published on April 11, collateral- damage- in- south- waziristan 16 Crises of IDPs in FATA, issues challenges, and way forward by Nawaf Khan, FATA Research Center, January page 14, content/uploads/2014/01/research- report- on- crisis- of- IDPs1.pdf 17 Pakistan violence feeds illiteracy, by Ashfaq Yousafzai, Al Jazeera, 4 January, Military operations in FATA and PATA: implications for Pakistan by Zahid Ali Khan, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, April 19, page 136, files/ _ pdf 19 Cost of conflict in Pakistan by Center for Research and Peace Studies, page 19 Reports/Cost- of- Conflict- in- Pakistan.pdf 20 Military operations in FATA and PATA: implications for Pakistan, by Zahid Ali Khan, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, April 19, page files/ _ pdf 21 Is it time to go back home by Zia Ur Rehman, Sep of- south- waziristan/ 22UNHCR Report 27 may, Sheet%2027- May pdf 23 PAKISTAN: IDPs from South Waziristan begin hesitant return, IRIN, December 9, idps- from- south- waziristan- begin- hesitant- return 12

13 24 Fifth progress report From Recovery To Sustainable Development Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), page 30, June Dividends of Peace, MDTF results 2013, World Bank in FATA secretariat to help Waziristan IDPs, The News, 25 August, Persisting crises of IDPs in FATA by Nawaf Khan, FATA Research Center. Jan 29, crisis- of- fata- idps/ 28 Monetray, Procedural issues: disputes mar IDPs return to South Waziristan by Zulfiqar Ali, Dawn, June 8, procedural- issues- disputes- mar- idps- return- to- south- waziristan 29 Major towns in South Waziristan under our control: Pak army, The Times of India, 17 Nov, towns- in- South- Waziristan- under- our- control- Pak- army/articleshow/ cms?referral=pm 30 Army to remain in South Waziristan unless people are satisfied, The Nation, June 20, Jun- 2013/army- to- remain- in- south- waziristan- unless- people- are- satisfied- army- chief 31 South Waziristan operation: Only Sararogha cleared in three years by Zulfiqar Ali, Dawn, August 6, waziristan- operation- only- sararogha- cleared- in- 3- years 32 South Waziristan under army control: says army chief, The National, Dec 9, asia/south- waziristan- under- control- says- pakistan- army- chief 33FRC (Family Registration Certificates) Annual Security Report content/uploads/2014/01/annual- security- report2013.pdf 34 TTP official remark on Group s control in Waziristan published in January 15, 2014 chrome- extension://gdjpkkdchehgfeemkgkgokjaeafihgmj/newtab/override_newtab.html) 35 Ihsan Ullah Tipu Mehsud, The author interviewed the official in Peshawar in January Peace prospects in FATA in the post Hakimullah Scenario, FATA Research Centre Guest Lecture Report Nov 2013, content/uploads/2013/12/guest- lecture- report.pdf 13