Organizing and Sustaining Hegemony: A Gramscian Perspective on the Islamic Community and Wahhabism in Bosnia

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1 Organizing and Sustaining Hegemony: A Gramscian Perspective on the Islamic Community and Wahhabism in Bosnia presented in the 2nd Annual South-East Europe Doctoral Student Conference, organized by South-East European Research Center of the University of Sheffield and CITY Liberal Studies, June 2007, Thessaloniki, Greece. Onder Cetin Islamic Studies, Leiden University and ISIM, Rapenburg 59, 2311 GJ Leiden, the Netherlands, o.cetin@isim.nl Abstract In the last fifteen years, Bosnia has drawn considerable attention due to the war and the continuing presence of the reformist salafi movement so-called Wahhabism in Bosnia. Within the broader framework of discussions regarding Bosnia s possibility to be a hotbed for terrorist attacks to the West and the Wahhabi influence superseding the moderate, Hanafi experience of Islam practiced by the Bosnian Muslims and represented officially by the Islamic Community, this paper raises two basic questions: (1) Whether and how can the IZ organize and sustain its hegemony vis-à-vis the so-called Wahhabi movement, and (2) What will the consequences of this struggle over hegemony in between religious representations and politics be in the private and public realms at domestic and regional levels? I argue that, against criticism accusing it to be silent and unnecessarily tolerant towards these groups, the IZ chose a different strategy to preserve its authority and the traditional identity of the Bosnian Muslims. Within the framework of the Gramscian approach on hegemony, its motive can be

2 regarded as a wise measure to strengthen to its own leadership on a consensual basis by revitalizing its legitimizing discourse and re-configuring necessary alliances horizontally and vertically, rather than applying coercion. Keywords Bosnian Muslims, Gramsci, Hegemony, Islamic Community (Islamska Zajednica), Wahhabism 1. Introduction In the last fifteen years, Bosnia and Herzegovina has drawn considerable attention due to the war and the continuing presence and the influence of the reformist salafi movement so-called Wahhabism. The prevalent position in these discussions has usually been guided by post-9/11 security strategies considering Bosnia as a hotbed for terrorist attacks to the West and the Wahhabi influence superseding the moderate, Hanafi experience of Islam practiced by the Bosnian Muslims and represented officially by the Islamic Community (Islamska Zajednica / IZ). Regarding the latter, a significant body of analyses has underlined the contestation of the authority of the IZ through the changes in the social terrain and social appropriation by the continuing Wahhabi praxis. While these works approached Wahhabism in the form of counter-hegemony, I regard the IZ and its representatives as intellectuals creating a counter-hegemonic bloc vis-à-vis the Wahhabi movement to sustain its hegemony over the masses through countermeasures. Within the framework of social movement theory, what leads this premise is the fact that a broad based Islamic social movement has not been created in former Yugoslavia, except the Young Muslims which was restricted to an elite circle. On the contrary, Wahhabi movement has created the social dynamics to lead the possible rise of an Islamic social movement on the ground. In this respect, it is rather the IZ which has to produce counter-hegemonic ideas for an ideological persuasion and social consent in the mass consciousness. 2

3 The nature of the aforementioned interaction raises two basic questions: (1) Whether and how can the IZ organize and sustain its hegemony vis-à-vis the so-called Wahhabi movement, and (2) What will the consequences of this struggle over hegemony in between religious representations and politics be in the private and public realms at domestic and regional levels? Here, I suggest an approach guided by the Gramscian theory of hegemony and a social movement theory as the analytical framework to discuss the role and effectiveness of discursive and material resources in the production of counter-hegemony such as the recent IZ resolutions on the interpretation of Islam in the field as a domestic frame and the promotion of the Bosnian experience of Islam by the Reis ul-ulama Dr. Mustafa Cerid in the context of the discussions on Euro-Islam and Islamophobia aimed at the regional and broader context. 2. Conceptual and Analytic Framework In an attempt to analyse and criticise the frames and representations of Islamisation in Bosnia, one must acknowledge a preliminary, but fundamental point on the role of Islam in the formation of the Bosnian Muslim identity. [1] As unequivocally identified by sociologist Esad Čimid, when compared to their fellow non-muslim Bosnians, what Islam particularly connoted for the Bosnian Muslims has rather been the aspiration of forming his own national distinctiveness, individuality, than mere religious impulses. [2] Here, I propose the need to acknowledge a second distinction between the seeds of a genuine Bosnian Islamic revival dating back to late 1970s and its rise with diversified components during 1990s. In the light of three main frameworks, namely (a) political opportunities structures, (b) mobilizing structures/resource mobilization, and (c) cultural framing, I argue that the first was a process which started mainly by the political opportunities provided by the state elites and continued to be promoted by the institutional framework of the IZ and the Young Muslims circles. I use Islamic revival to refer a 3

4 reorientation towards Islamic values. Here I adopt Bayat s approach [3], suggesting Islamic revival as the spread of (a) the institutions of Islam in general, such as mosques, Ulama, Islamic relief foundations, charities and NGOs, religious schools, (b) the Islamic proselytisation, in the form of Islamic literature, audio and video tapes, radio and TV, printed media, and (c) the growth of religiosity as a whole [4], by underlying that *r+evivalism emphasize religion at the expense of the political content. [5] Regarding the second phase, I argue that the so-called Islamisation of the 1990 s is mainly an imported phenomenon by the reformist salafi movement [RSM], which entered Bosnia during the war through several charity organizations and foreign warriors, particularly from the Arab world. This represents a different body, regarding its origins, dynamics and scope. In this respect, I interpret RSM in the context of the broader phenomena of Islamic activism. In accordance with Wiktorowicz s [6] definition of Islamic activism as the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes, the RSM represents a body of intellectuals trying to perform active piety and aim to cause a social change. [7] Here I use the term reformist salafi movement, generally to connote the followers of the so-called Wahhabi movement, in accordance with Esposito, Martin and Alibasic s definitions [8] referring their reformist character with salafi-orientation, which is the commonly used terminology in Bosnia today. As stated in the Encyclopedia of Islam [9], although al-wahhabiyya became the most widespread term, these groups call themselves al-muwahhidun. However, I will not use these as the first is not used by the representatives of this movement in Bosnia, while the latter is especially rejected. Since 1992, the aforementioned foreign structural agents have initiated to transform the existing cultural framing through their own structural resources as a part of their transnational advocacy network (TAN) of the global salafi jihad. [10] In this context, as pointed out by Tarrow [11], these networks, which *include+ those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services, resemble classical social movements in their attempts to both place 4

5 new issues on the agenda and make them resonant with indigenous cultural understanding. In the presence of these developments, IZ found itself with the great task, not only to sustain its hegemony vis-à-vis these newly emerged religious agents but also to maintain five-centuries-old tradition of the Bosnian Muslims. Here, I argue that despite the critics on the policy of IZ being too silent and too late, where it is suggested that more serious, even legal measures are needed to terminate their activities, the IZ has already presented its position during the war and adopted rather a Gramscian approach to sustain its hegemony on Bosnian Muslims and their religious experience. In accordance with Gramsci`s approach to the question of hegemonic domination, who makes a distinction between two forms of socio-political control, namely domination (dominio), exercised as physical coercion; and intellectual and moral leadership (direzione intellecttuale e morale) implying an internal control [12] constructed by hegemonic direction, the IZ opted to sustain its leadership by a consensual aspect of control. In this question of hegemonic domination, the IZ is faced with the task to react to new socio-political realities by constantly reaffirming its hegemony [13], through revitalizing its legitimizing discourse and re-configuring necessary alliances horizontally and vertically. [14] Before analyzing the role of discursive and material resources in the production of hegemony and counter-hegemony, I will first provide an analysis of the characteristics of the Islamic revival in Bosnia in Socialist Yugoslavia. 3. Islamic Revival in Socialist Bosnia Religion has historically been the common denominator of identity formation in the Balkans, dating back to the millet system in the Ottoman state, which categorized communities according to their religious belongings. Built on this traditional structure, it has been mainly the political opportunities provided by the Titoist elite and the international demonstration effect of the global Islamist wave which paved the way to an original Islamic revival in Bosnia. 5

6 Although they were subjected to repression in the first years of Socialist Yugoslavia, after the expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform in 1948, Muslims became one of the fundamental elements of Tito s foreign policy [15] alongside federal politics based on power balance between nations of Yugoslavia, where they were used as a factor of balance and stability in between Serb and Croat nationalisms. This opened a new phase concerning the nationalization of the Bosnian Muslim identity by recognizing its distinctiveness, which was culminated in their recognition in the sense of a nation in 1971 census. While this policy promoted a secular Muslim nationalism, the Islamic Religious Community s (Islamska Vjerska Zajednica u SFRJ/IVZ) loyalty was beyond question. Beside the fact that it had been managed by leaders recruited from World War II Partisan veterans dedicated to Titoist brotherhood and unity, as Perica [16] noted, lack of a position as the custodian of national identity, which was enjoyed by the Christian churches under the legitimacy of Ottoman millet system, did not only provide the Communist leadership to keep the Muslim ulama under direct control, but also strengthened the monopoly of the IVZ as the only authoritative figure on the religious affairs of the Bosnian Muslims. What would essentially challenge the IVZ was rather a movement from below, namely the Young Muslims which actually identified its ideological character as a moral and spiritual one, rather than a national and political one. [17] Having achieved the ultimate control of the official Muslim ulama in 1947 and repressed the only aforementioned opposition in 1949, the 1950s and 60s can be regarded as the golden decades of the Titoist elite with reference to the triumph of secularization vis-à-vis the visibility of religion in the socio-political realm. [18] However, the following two were going to be marked by an opposing process, namely the growing consciousness of the Islamic identity among the Muslims. Beside the advantages achieved due to their instrumental position in Tito s non-alignment policy, liberalization in reference to religious freedom in Yugoslavia following the conflict between Tito and Aleksandr Rankovid, which resulted with the latter s loss of all his authority in 1966 opened the way to a growing visibility of Islam in 6

7 social and later political context. This led not only a rise in the number of mosques [19], religious educational institutions or the number and circulation of publications [20], but also led the engagement of the old Young Muslims in the activities of IVZ such as writing in its periodicals Preporod and Takvim under pseudonyms and organizing lectures and meetings in Tabački Mesdžid in Although these developments fuelled the anxieties of the ruling elite and aroused suspects and conspiracy theories among non-muslims towards Bosnian Muslims, which opened the way to 1983 trial of 13 Young Muslims, the official ulama remained loyal to Titoist ethos of Brotherhood and Unity. [21] Indeed, this had been a common point of criticism of the Young Muslims and the subsequent imams movement within the IZ calling for institutional reforms in , namely the institutional structure and policy. As Alija Izetbegovid, as a Young Muslim underlined, their criticism was mainly on clergymen s perception and representation of formalistic views on Islam, arguing that there was no imagination or courage to make a radical step towards progress and renaissance. [22] In other words, the IZ was criticized for behaving like a state body formed of organizational specialists. The following years did not only witness the declaration of the IZ as an independent organisation vis-a-vis the state in 1990, but also challenges to three points defined in its Memorandum of 1991 [23]: the crisis emerged in the first years of 1990s could not be resolved in a peaceful manner, which led not only changes of the existing borders among the republics but rather drew borders within the republics, while the IZ, a unique religious administration of the Muslims in Yugoslavia found itself in a defensive position to sustain its hegemony before the Bosnian Muslims. 4. Mujahedeen Importing The True Islam (!) Following the legal measures of the Pakistani government in synonymous with the Arab-Afghan warriors frustration with the intramujahedeen fight in Afghanistan, Bosnia seemed to be a fertile ground for the displaced Arab-Afghan mujahedeen. [24] The easiest way for the warriors to enter Bosnia legally and easily travel in the ground was 7

8 through humanitarian organizations, which they usually did. Several organizations engaged in fundraising activities both for relief operations and supplying weapons for the Bosnians and providing the necessary link for the warriors to enter Bosnia. [25] These organization usually used Croatia to enter Bosnia, until the relations between Croatia and the Bosnian government in Sarajevo deteriorated in September When the mujahedeen arrived first in 1992, as Alibašid [26] points out, they brought hope and courage to Bosnian Muslims who felt alone in their fight against aggressors. However, they have gradually become a problem, especially after Beside several confrontations with UN Peacekeeper forces [27], the reports of independent operations against Croat armed forces and atrocities committed against Croatian civilians were deteriorating the relations between the two allying forces. [28] Furthermore, their emphasis on the religious character of the war were not only creating conflict between the two parties, but also creating problems in their relations with local Muslim community. These conflicts even paved the way to the order by the-then chief of staff of the Army of B-H, Sefer Halilovid at the end of May 1993 to disarm the groups and offer humanitarian work or some other type of work for which they came, not the missionary or military work, or to be sent back to where they came from. However, this decision was going to be halted by Alija Izetbegovid [29], who on the contrary provided them an independent unit, Kateebat al-mujahideen on 13 August 1993, within the general boundaries of the Bosnian army, but to a direct responsibility to himself. [30] The need for their assistance for Bosnian Muslims, who were under an arms embargo against a Serb army which kept the ammunition of the Yugoslav army, provided their existence in Bosnia mainly under despite the Dayton agreement in 1995, which required the deportation of foreign warriors. However, it was mainly the political atmosphere of 9/11 which determined a change in the Bosnian policy towards mujahedeen. In this new political scene, Bosnians witnessed the deportation of 6 Algerian-origin Bosnian citizens to Guantanamo in January 2002, freezing of the accounts of 10 humanitarian organizations in the same year, and recently the decision to strip 8

9 citizenship of 367 individuals in April 2007, suspected to be granted illegally. Indeed, following a war, in which Bosnian Muslims were drifted into somewhat because of their religious identity, the remaining mujahedeen made their best to transform the dominant socio-cultural framing by drawing benefit from the general rising interest in religion through their mobilizing structures. Through the remaining humanitarian relief organizations, not only the destructed mosques started to be reconstructed, but also education and publication projects [31], alongside the instances of money-in exchange for-indoctrination style activities have been realized through education centers [32] and youth organisations [33]. Furthermore, several media channels have particularly been instrumental in the transmission of salafi approach among Bosnian Muslims, namely magazines (such as SAFF published by the pro-salafi youth organisation Active Islamic Youth), visual media channels (such as Radio Naba broadcasting from Visoko and Radio-TV Vogošda, Igman TV and RTV Glas Bosne) and websites (such as and They especially brought new cultural framings and related discussions into the agenda of Bosnian Muslims. Beside fierce discussions on the local practices of Bosnian Muslims which were often regarded by these groups as religious innovations (bid`ah), such as mawlid celebrations, tawhids or relatively fast performance of prayers, they also introduced visual symbols in public life such as niqab or long beards. However, since 1992, these interpretations have often caused conflicts between Bosnian Muslims performing the traditional, Hanafi way of rituals and those adopting a salafi interpretation. These conflicts moved to a further stage when differences not only started to disrupt the classical order in Bosnian mosques but also evolved into physical conflicts between the two groups. While in a recent case the doors of the Careva Mosque was locked probably the first time in its history to prevent possible clashes with the congregation and the followers Jusuf Barčid [34] who intended to give religious lectures in February 2007 [35], it was reported that in several cases Wahhabi young men were beaten up by Bosnian mosque-goers [36]. These conflicts were even turned into more violent ones, where three 9

10 people were injured in a clash between the two groups in Novi Pazar`s Arab Mosque in November [37] 5. The IZ In Between Critics And Challenges Regarding rising conflicts, the IZ has been the mostly criticized in recent debates due to alleged passivity. Furthermore, it has been rather the Bosnian Muslims, who criticized their religious leadership, such as several professors at the Faculty of Islamic Studies and Gazi Husrev Beg Madrasa in Sarajevo, beside former Wahhabis such as Jasmin Merdan. [38] The IZ, which has been criticized not to take a measure on time and keep silent, has indeed attempted to take the initiative in the midst of the war with an almost forgotten fatwa dated 13 November 1993, [39] concerning the obligation of honouring the principles of the Hanafi madhab. Despite current requests to adopt a coercive approach by implementing legal measures, the IC usually initiated to sustain its hegemony by stimulating its legitimizing discourse and reconfiguring alliances horizontally and vertically to gain the consent of the members of the traditional congregation and also followers of the salafi-oriented movements. The only exception was its later request from legal authorities not to register any organization or institution with the attribute Islamic in its name, which can be regarded as an impliedly coercive instrument. [40] However, the developments on ground revealing that this fatwa had been ignored by some segments of the society opened the way to new initiatives. Rijaset, the leadership of the IZ, issued two subsequent resolutions entitled The Resolution of the Rijaset on the Constitutional Changes and the Interpretation of Islam on 26 March 2006 and Amended Resolution of the Rijaset on the Interpretation of Islam on 8 November [41] By these resolutions, the IC underlined its determinacy to protect the uniqueness of the centuries-long tradition of Bosnian Muslims and support for an institutional interpretation of Islam in this region, based on Qur'an and Sunni and the traditions of the Bosnian Muslims, while calling (a)ll those who want to make interpretations outside the institutional set-up, perhaps some 10

11 humanitarian organizations or others [to] harmonize their programmes with the Council of Elders of the Islamic Community. Here, it was also stated that the mosques are open to everyone, while approval of the imam is required to do anything in an organized fashion. Although, the IZ aimed to strengthen its leadership, it has abstained to exclude the dissident individuals and groups and conduct a kind of witch-hunt, by underlying that the IZ is not, and will not be a police force, adding that it will act through its resolutions, through sermons, through advice, through the education of those, of course, who are willing to listen. [42] The IZ has even denied to name and stigmatize these dissidents, but rather preferred to blame those who have not understood the Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks. [43] Beside these attempts to form a horizontal alliance at the domestic level, the IZ has also initiated to create a vertical alliance in synonymous with the debate on Euro-Islam with the initiatives of the Reis-ul Ulema Dr. Mustafa ef. Cerid. Particularly, following his Declaration of European Muslims [44] in August 2005, Cerid has attempted to portray the Bosnian experience as a genuine form of the so-called European experience of Islam. As its reflection in Bosnia, reminding Bosnian Muslims how preservation of their renowned moderate stand could promote their image can be regarded as an important factor that led them to react to these newly emerged dissidents. Now, they were not only figures which sew discord among them within the mosques and on the streets, but also an obstacle in their attempt to regain their positive image on the way to the European Union, which had already been damaged because of them in relation to the global issue of terrorism. However, the aforementioned resolution of November 2006 was found inadequate and euphemistic by some Bosnian Muslims, such as Prof. Esad Durakovid, professor at the Institute for Eastern Studies in Sarajevo, who stated that it has not even named the threat that is looming over Bosnia-Hercegovina, while it is necessary to act more adequately and with more urgency. [45] Such a request has already been pronounced by Prof. Adnan Silajdžid, who even proposed that socalled Wahhabi s activities in B-H must be penalized. [46] Furthermore, the strongest accusations came from another professor from the 11

12 Faculty of Islamic Sciences, Resid Hafizovid, who accused the IC for being indulgent, by delineating the situation as follows: Bosnian Muslims have been infected by a new lethal virus, as a recurrence of the recent aggression [ war+ which manifests itself in the form of an arrogant, rigid, aggressive, and anachronistic phenomenon called Wahhabism. The reactions of the so-called Wahhabis, on the other hand, were mainly against stigmatization. While Adnan Pezo [47], the former leader of the Bosnian youth organization Active Islamic Youth (AIO), condemned the extremists within the Islamic Community, who create stereotypes while avoiding dialogue, Barčid claimed that the recent events in Novi Pazar occurred as a result of the rigidity on the part of Islamic Community top officials, who do not want to offer different possibilities to the people. [48] Given the strategy of the IZ to sustain its hegemony vis-à-vis the RSM not only before Bosnian Muslims, but also the members of this RSM, the next section will be devoted to the analysis of the overall picture in Bosnia and how it can evolve in the following years. 6. Concluding Remarks While Bosnia witnessed an Islamic revival in 1970s, it occurred mainly within the borders drawn by the state and the IZ behaving like a state agency, where the two intervened when it goes beyond the limit. However, the reformist salafi movement, which entered Bosnia in 1992 with an additional agenda to teach the Bosnian Muslims the true Islam achieved to operate within the framework of Islamic activism, which aim to cause a social change. [49] Despite fundamental changes in the opportunity structure after 9/11, RSM achieved to establish their own mobilizing structures, mainly alternative education centers, youth organizations, or websites as potential channels for proselytizing, beside the introduction of the aforementioned symbols of cultural reframing, including ordinary 12

13 examples in daily lives, such as Islamic kindergartens and halal butcher shops. Against these newly emerged agencies and representations of Islamic activism, the IZ, which enjoyed the granted status of the representative and the guardian of the Bosnian Islamic experience since its establishment in 1878, faced the great task of re-establishing its hegemony in post-war period. However, while it has often been criticized to act like a state agency in Tito s Yugoslavia, today it has started to be criticized for not acting like a state agency and take an effective measure. However, I ve tried to show that it opted a different strategy to preserve its authority and preserve the traditional identity of the Bosnian Muslims. Within the framework of the Gramscian approach on hegemony, its motive can be regarded as a wise measure to strengthen to its own leadership on a consensual basis rather than applying coercion. In case of applying the later, it would be easier for these groups to put themselves in the place of a victim and IC as a betrayer on the way to the Islamic mission. [50] For instance, a similar strategy had already been realized in Daghestan and Chechnya, where in 1999 Daghestani authorities adopted an anti-wahhabi legislation in September 1999, which could not diminish tensions but led several hundreds of Wahhabis to Chechnya, where they did not only challenge the state but after combined with the forces there returned to Daghestan to overthrow the Daghestani government. [51] While the IZ was criticized especially by the Muslim intellectuals, aggressive indoctrination efforts targeting the very essence of Bosnian Muslim identity with disrespect aroused irritation especially among ordinary believers, which was sometimes culminated into physical attacks inflamed on the side of the Bosnian Muslims. Thus, it would not be wrong to argue that such activities also fuelled an antipathy towards internal pluralism in religious interpretation, even by exceeding the line that the IZ wants to draw. Today, it is clear that in the regional context, the domestic and regional political authorities should be deliberate on an updated scenario in case of a tension in Kosovo, where impatience is growing in both sides. However, regarding the domestic context, it is mainly within the framework of political and security bodies, who should deal with 13

14 possible security threats. At this point, what must also be kept in mind is the need to take a wise measure which should carefully distinguish between different types of the so-called Wahhabis, not to violate religious freedom while penalizing any criminal activity. References [1] Bringa T. Islam and the the Quest for Identity in Post-Communism Bosnia. In: Shatzmiller M, editor. Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States. Montreal & Kingston: McGill&Queen s University Press; p [2] Cimic E. The Bosnian Crossroads. In Mojzes P, editor. Religion and the War in Bosnia. Atlanta: Scholars Press; p [3] Bayat A. Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing Islamic Activism in Iran and Egypt. Comparative Studies in Society and History Jan; 40(1): [4] Karčid F. Islamic Revival in the Balkans. Islamic Studies. 1997; 36 (2-3): ; and Alibašid A. Traditional and Reformist Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina. C-SIS Working Paper No.2. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, Centre of International Studies; Available from: [5] Bayat A. Islamism and Social Movement Theory. Third World Quarterly. 2005; 26 (6): 893. [6] Wicktorowitz Q. Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Indiana: Indiana University Press; p. 2. [7] Bayat. op.cit. p [8] Esposito JL, editor. The Islamic World, Past and Present. Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press; pp ; Martin RC, editor. Encyclopedia of Islam and the Millenium World. Vol. 2. New York, Detroit, San Diego: MacMillan Reference USA and Thomson-Gale; p. 727; Alibašid, op.cit., p. 21. [9] Bearman PJ, Bianquis TH, Bosworth CE, Heinrichs WP, editors. Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition, Vol. XI. Leiden: Leiden Brill; p. 39. [10] For Sageman s definition of global salafi jihad, see, Sageman M Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania; p

15 [11] Tarrow S. The New Transnational Activism. Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; p. 7; cf. Attanassoff V. Islamic Revival in the Balkans. Unpublished MA Thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School; p. 19. Available from: stinet.dtic.mil/cgibin/gettrdoc?ad=a445286&location=u2&doc=gettrdoc.pdf [12] Femia JV. Gramsci`s Political Thought. Hegemony, Consciousness and the Revolutionary Process. Oxford: Clarendon Press; p. 24. [13] Casci R. Organising and Sustaining Hegemony: A Gramscian perspective on Suharto`s New Order Indonesia. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Waikato: University of Waikato; p. 31. Available from: adt.waikato.ac.nz/uploads/approved/adtuow /public/02whole.pdf [14] Casci, Ibid, p. 24. [15] Malcolm N. Bosnia. A Short History. London: Papermac; p [16] Perica V. Balkan Idols. Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States. New York: Oxford University Press; p. 74. [17] Filandra Š. Bošnjadka politika u XX. Stoljedu. Sarajevo: Sejtarija; p. 215; See, also, Behmen O, editor. Young Muslims Sarajevo: The Young Muslims Association of Citizens; n.d. p [18] Cohen LJ. Bosnia s Tribal Gods : The Role of Religion in Nationalist Policies. In: Mojzes P, editor. Religion and the War in Bosnia. Atlanta: Georgia: Scholars Press; p. 49. [19] See, Perica. op.cit. p. 78; Karčid. op.cit. p. 570; Ramet SP. Balkan Babel. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; p [20] Karčid. op.cit. p [21] See the speech of Reis-ul Ulama Naim ef. Hadžiabdid in the opening ceremony of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Community on 18 May 1985, in Perica. op.cit. p. 81. [22] Trhulj S. Mladi Muslimani. Sarajevo: GIK OKO; p. 60. [23] Glasnik 1991, vol [24] Kohlmann EF. Al-Qaida`s Jihad in Europe. The Afghan-Bosnian Network. Oxford, New York: Berg Publishers; p. 18. [25] Kohlmann. ibid. p

16 [26] Alibašid, op.cit. p. 12. [27] For the October 1992 incident, see Kohlmann. op.cit. p [28] Ivo L. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Terrorism. National Security and the Future Autumn/Winter; 2 (3-4). Available from: Also see, Kohlmann, op.cit., p. 81. [29] Current affairs program, Pednica, Bosnia-Hercegovina Federation TV. 4 January [30] Kohlmann. op.cit. p [31] Such as the Family Library financed by High Saudi Committee. See, Alibašid. op.cit. p. 15. [32] Such as the King Fahd Cultural Center in Sarajevo, Cultural Center in Hadžidi near Sarajevo and Cultural Center in Bugojno in central Bosnia. [33] Such as Furqan and Active Islamic Youth. While the former was closed in 2002, for the latter s current position, see, Saff. Sarajevo. 22 November 2006: [34+ The deceased leader of the Bosnian Wahhabi community in Barčidi near Tuzla. [35] BHTV 1. Sarajevo. 22 February [36] Such as recent cases occurred in Barčidi in March and recently in Sarajevo on 12 April [37] See, [38] Nacional. Zagreb, on 15 August 2006, pp [39] Glasnik. 1994, Vol. 1-2, p [40] This law was enacted in [41]Available from: emid=79. [42] Interview with Reis-ul Ulema Mustafa ef. Cerid. TV Hayat. Sarajevo. 18 November [43] Interview with Reis-ul-Ulema Mustafa ef. Cerid. Nezavisne novine. Banja Luka. 17 February

17 [44] Available from: [45] Oslobođenje. Sarajevo. 18 November [46] Interview with Adnan Silajdžid, Oslobođenje. Sarajevo. 11 November [47] Interview with Adnan Pezo, by Senad Hadžifejzovid. Hayat TV. 18 November [48] Interview with Jusuf Barčid, by Suzana Stambol. BHTV1. 8 November [49] Bayat. op.cit., p [50] For instance, concerning the decision to review the citizenships given during the war, Abu Hamza accused the Bosnians for selling *the mujahedeens] for American interests, European interests. Current affairs program, Public Secret. BHTV October [51] Lanskoy M. Daghestan and Chechnya: The Wahhabi Challenge to the State. SAIS Review. 2002; 22(2): Appendix List of Acronyms AIO Aktivna Islamska Omladina (Active Islamic Youth) IZ Islamska Zajednica (Islamic Community) IVZ Islamska Vjerska Zajednica u SFRJ (Islamic Religious Community in SFRY) RSM Reformist Salafi Movement 17