F7 (DK 28B7; KRS; C7)

Transcription

1 Describe how Parmenides conceptions of being / what-is and non-being / what-isnot led him to conclude that reality is just one thing. How should his monistic approach be understood? Within his poem On Nature, Parmenides argues that reality is one unified, non-temporal and unchanging 1 thing. I will begin my essay by outlining the deductive reasoning that drove Parmenides to adopt this monistic approach. Granting the existential interpretation of the lexis being, I will then explore and dismiss the numerical reading of Parmenides monism, in both its material 2 and immaterial manifestations 3. Moreover, I intend to analyse Curd s 4 predicational approach. Advocating Waterfield s 5 interpretation, I will conclude by arguing that Parmenides was not promoting an ontological monism- that only one thing exists, but rather an epistemological truth- that only through reason can one gain genuine knowledge. On Nature (Peri Physeōs), which survives in fragmentary form, describes a young man s (presumably Parmenides) encounter with an unnamed Goddess. The Goddess reveals two truths about reality: monism (that reality is one thing) and immobilism (that there is no change). The poem naturally falls into three parts. Firstly, there is The Proem ; the introductory discourse. The second part of the poem is known as The Way of Truth (Alétheia) and the third section is named The Way of Appearance (Doxa). As emphasised by Robin 6, the Alétheia depicts Parmenides revolutionary logical thought, while the Doxa explains the mortals confused opinions. As demonstrated in F7 7, these opinions are grounded in sense-experience and habit. During my essay, I will focus on Parmenides monism, predominantly making reference to the Alétheia. Parmenides reaches his monistic conclusion by considering the meaning of the expressions is and is not. Thus, I feel it necessary to first disambiguate these terms before exploring Parmenides conceptual analysis. Although I recognise that there are various different interpretations of being / what-is and non-being / what-is-not, the most common readings include: 1) An existential (complete) sense of to be ; where X is means X exists. The term complete is employed because nothing else is needed to make the sentence meaningful. 2) A predicative or copulative (incomplete) sense of to be ; as in X is. (p). This is incomplete because a property (i.e. p) must be attached to X in order for a statement about X to have meaning. It should be noted that while I recognise that the complete and incomplete use of to be contrast syntactically, whereas the existential and predicative sense differ semantically, I use these terms interchangeably. 1 ADLURI, V. (2011) Parmenides, Plato and Mortal Philosophy; Return from Transcendence. 1 st ed. Great Britain: Continuum International Publishing Group. p POPPER, K. R. (1998) The World of Parmenides: Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment. 1 st ed. London: Routledge. p VLASTOS, G. (1946) Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge. Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, 77, p CURD, P. (1998) The Legacy of Parmenides; Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought. 1 st ed. United States of America: Princeton University Press. p WATERFIELD, R. (2000). The First Philosophers. 1 st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p ROBIN, L. (1928) Greek Thought and the Origins of the Scientific Spirit. 1 st ed. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & co., LTD. p. 85.Adluri, V. (2011). Parmenides, Plato and Mortal Philosophy; Return from Transcendence. Great Britain: Continuum International Publishing Group. p WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F7 (DK 28B7; KRS; C7).

2 3) A fused sense 8 of to be, which combines 1) and 2). Clarifying this, X is Y entails that X has a certain predicate, while also indirectly grants the existence of X. 4) A veridical sense 9 of to be, which asserts that X is true or X really is. While Parmenides relies upon the terms is (being) and is- not (non- being) in order to construct his philosophy, he fails to actually specify how these words should be understood 10. Yet, as accentuated by Coxon 11, Parmenides isolates the notions is and is not from any specific subject and further completion. Moreover, agreeing with Henn 12, I hold that Parmenides is ultimately concerned with accounting for the existence of all things. Thus, I use the existential sense of to be when using the words is / being and is-not / nonbeing. I also grant that when Parmenides employs these terms he is referring to everything and anything that can be conceived. Parmenides uses two golden rules 13 in order to deduce that reality is one thing. I will first unpick these rules and then go on to explain how they are used. Rule-1 states what-is is and cannot not be. Rule-2 is reduced to what-is-not is not and must not be. Rule- 2 appears to mirror Plato s beard 14. The Goddess states that if something is not, then we cannot genuinely talk about it or imagine it 15. This is because in order to refer to X, there must be something to which we can refer. To say X does not exist, refers to X. Therefore, we cannot meaningfully talk about something which is not, because to refer to it implies its existence. Relying upon the same logic, Rule- 1 highlights the impossibility of saying something is and simultaneously that is not. It seems that Parmenides subscribes to an all-or-nothing principle ; something either is or it is not 16. To incorporate the possibility of partial being into a statement would automatically render that statement false. As accentuated by Papadis 17, Parmenides arguments relies upon three premises: being exists; non-being is impossible; being and non-being should not be confused. As highlighted within F5, this latter premise seems to represent typical mortal error 18. Utilising this conceptual analysis, Parmenides proposes his monism. Parmenides states that if reality consisted of a plurality of things, for instance A and B, it would be true that A is A and B is B. Yet, as A and B are distinct beings, it would also be true that A is not B. But, by claiming that A is and is not simultaneously, we violate the first rule. If A is then it is 8 MCKIRAHAN JR, R. D. (1994) Philosophy before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentary. 1 st ed. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. p KAHN, C. H. (1966) The Greek Verb 'To Be' and the Concept of Being. Foundations of Language, 2 (3), p KIRK, G.S; RAVEN, J.E and SCHOFIELD, M. (1983) The Presocratic Philosophers. 2 nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p COXON, A. H. (1986) The Fragments of Parmenides. 1 st ed. United States of America: Van Gorcum. p HENN, M.J. (2003) Parmenides of Elea: A Verse Translation with Interpretative Essays and Commentary to the Text. 1 st ed. United States of America: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. p WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F3 (DK 28B2; KRS 291; C 3). 14 QUINE, W.V.O. (1948) On What There Is. Review of Metaphysics, 2 (1), p WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F3 (DK 28B2; KRS 291; C 3) TARÁN, L. (1965) Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary and Critical Essays by Leonardo Tarán. 1 st ed. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. p PAPADIS, D. (2005) The Concept of Truth in Parmenides. Revue de Philosophie Ancienne, 23 (1), p WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F5 (DK 28B6: KRS 293; C 5).

3 impossible that A is not. To avoid this infringement, we must reject the pluralist view that both A and B exist. Consequently, Parmenides seems to propose a more radical form of monism than the monism commonly associated with the Milesians and Heraclitus. Parmenides does not appear to be supporting a reductionism (that everything is made out of one fundamental substance), but is rather asserting that reality consists of one thing. In order to explore what defines this single, eternal, indivisible, continuous, unchanging and complete thing 19, I will first consider the numerical interpretation of Parmenides monism, in its physical manifestation. Numerical monism is the view that there is only one thing in the universe 20. Popper 21 argues that Parmenides adopts a materialist position. He claims that according to Parmenides the one thing that exists is a spherical block of continuous matter. Popper s 22 view seems to be supported by F8, where Parmenides claims that whatis must be both all alike 23 and complete 24. A sphere is the only shape that can be conceived of as a single whole; it is simply one continuous surface. All other shapes are composed of distinguishable parts. For example, a cube consists of eight corners, six sides and a range of angles. Moreover, some of these distinct parts will be greater or smaller than other parts. Therefore, it seems that only a sphere would be able to fulfil the criteria that Parmenides assigns to what is. Parmenides claims that what is must not be/ somewhat greater in one part and somewhat smaller in another 25. However, as accentuated by Yuyz and Shi 26, it is the perceived boundaries that define a shape. By describing what is as being held in the bonds of a limit 27, Parmenides appears to support the view that the sphere has a boundary. Yet, when we conceive of a boundary, we imagine it to be something that partitions the interior of the shape from what is not the shape. This leaves us questioning what lies outside the boundary. If all that exists is a finite sphere, our immediate instincts seem to prompt the view that nothingness exists beyond the limits of being. But, following Parmenides second rule, this conclusion must be rejected; nothingness cannot exist beyond what is. As a result, if we follow our common intuitions about boundaries, then the plausibility of the physical numerical interpretation of Parmenides monism becomes dubious. Nonetheless, it is arguable that this criticism is based on the incorrect assumption that space is infinite. Therefore, typical of the mortals 28, we have simply misunderstood and thus misrepresented reality. Furthermore, by rendering space infinite, we seem to violate Parmenides rules. This is due to the fact that if space is infinite, it would be incomplete. To be incomplete is analogous to having a lack. Having a lack would amount to the thing in question being in part nothing. Consequently, following Parmenides rules, it cannot be. 19 WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F8 (DK 28B8; KRS 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302; C 8) CURD, P. (1998) The Legacy of Parmenides; Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought. 1 st ed. United States of America: Princeton University Press. p POPPER, K. R. (1998) The World of Parmenides: Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment. 1 st ed. London: Routledge. p POPPER, K. R. (1998) The World of Parmenides: Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment. 1 st ed. London: Routledge. p WATRERFIELD, R. (2000). F8 (DK 28B8; KRS 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302; C 8) WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F8 (DK 28B8; KRS 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302; C 8) WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F8 (DK 28B8; KRS 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302; C 8) YU, S.X. and SHI, J. (2001) Perceiving Shapes through Region and Boundary. Interaction Technical Report. Robotics Institute, Carnegie Mellon University: CMU-RI-TR p WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F8 (DK 28B8; KRS 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302; C 8) WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F1 (DK 28BI; KRS 288, 301; C I). 30. F5 (DK 28B6; KRS 293; C 5) F8 (DK 28B8; KRS 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302; C 8). 52.

4 Conversely, if we render space finite we ensure that it is complete 29 and finished from every direction 30. Moreover, if we imagine Parmenides' sphere from the inside (as though we are standing in the O2 in London), and not from the outside (like imagining a helium balloon), it seems that the prerequisite for empty space beyond is no longer forced upon us. Yet, I want to stress that if we accept the physical numerical reading, then it is actually irrelevant whether or not it is possible for us to conceive of space as finite. If a sphere is the one thing that exists, then there could be no external observer (mind) to evaluate it. Accordingly, it appears that we have yet to undermine the physical numerical reading of Parmenides monism. However, Parmenides makes numerous references to the existence of thoughts 31. For instance, within F6, he states by thinking gaze unshaken on things 32 and within F7, Parmenides give the instructions to restrain your thinking from this way of seeking 33. Thus, he appears to directly oppose the conclusion that minds do not exist. Moreover, if only the sphere exists, Parmenides own thinking and philosophy must be rendered redundant. Therefore, I dismiss the physical numerical interpretation of Parmenides monism and turn towards analysing the immaterial numerical reading. As demonstrated by Vlastos 34, it is arguable that the Eleatic being is mind. This interpretation appears to be fuelled by F8: you will not find thinking apart from what-is 35. In addition, as explained by Guthrie 36, Vlastos 37 interprets F3 38 as indirectly arguing that the thought which knows must exist. Hence, it follows that if being is all alike and the numerical interpretation holds, then being must be a thinking thing. But, one cannot partake in the act of thinking without thinking of something 39.There is no such thing as an objectless thought. This is illustrated by the example of our inability to think about nothing. Moreover, through drawing on the claim within F4 that the same thing can be both thought and can be, 40 I intend to stress that Parmenides must perceive thinking and being as co-extensive, rather than identical. This is because being cannot simultaneously be thinking and the object of its own thought without violating the identity between thinking and being. If being is a thought, then it follows that being is not thinking. As a result, being is not identical to the activity of thinking. It seems that Parmenides must grant that something else exists in order for us to even think. This would lead us towards the rejection of the immaterial numerical reading of his monism. 29 WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F8 (DK 28B8; KRS 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302; C 8) WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F8 (DK 28B8; KRS 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302; C 8) WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F8 (DK 28B8; KRS 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302; C 8). 33; F1 (DK 28BI; KRS 288, 301; C I). 30; F4 (DK 28B3; KRS 292; C 4); F5 (DK 28B6: KRS 293; C 5). 1; F6 (DK 28B4; KRS 313; C 6). 32 WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F6 (DK 28B4; KRS 313; C 6). 33 WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F7 (DK 28B7; KRS 294; C 7) VLASTOS, G. (1946) Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge. Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, 77, p WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F8 (DK 28B8; KRS 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302; C 8) GUTHRIE, W. K. C. A. (1965) History of Greek Philosophy: Volume II The Presocratic tradition from Parmenides to Democritus. 1 st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p VLASTOS, G. (1946) Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge. Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, 77, p WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F3 (DK 28B2; KRS 291; C 3). 39 ROBINSON, J. M. (1968) An Introduction to early Greek Philosophy: the chief fragments and ancient testimony, with connecting commentary. 1 st ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. p ; FRASER, A. C. (1959) John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 1 st ed. New York: Dover Publications, INC 40 WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F4 (DK 28B3; KRS 292; C 4).

5 However, it is arguable that the apparent distinction between the object of thought and thinking is merely a typical mortal error. By creating this division, we have incorrectly described the essence of being. Offering further support for this position, within F8 Parmenides states that it is common for the mortals to wrongly propose in their minds two forms 41, when in reality there is only one. Accordingly, thinking and the object of thought could just be one thing. Additionally, when Parmenides himself separates thoughts from thinking 42, it is arguable that he is adopting an approach that is analogous to the method that was later employed by Wittgenstein 43. Parmenides may have intentionally used the language of the mortals as steps, enabling them to climb up beyond their mistakes and reach genuine knowledge. This argument is strengthened by alluding to Parmenides style of writing. By using hexameters, Parmenides seems to be mimicking the style of Homer and Hesiod. As the mortals would have been well- acquainted with the writing of these poets, it seems that Parmenides deliberately used an array of methods that were directed towards increasing the mortals ability to relate to and thus understand his philosophy. Nonetheless, emphasising the fact that the immaterial reading is a manifestation of numerical monism, it would have to be the case that only one thinking thing could exist. Yet, as demonstrated by F12 44, Parmenides explicitly rejects solipsism. Within this fragment 45, Parmenides seems to construct an argument that is parallel to Rorty s 46 eliminative materialism. Parmenides claims that it is only once the mortals come to understand the truth about reality, will they stop nourishing conventional names for things that do not actually exist. As a direct result of this, these meaningless names will die out. The very nature of this argument relies upon the assumption that other minds must exist. Without the minds of the mortals, these incorrect names could not have been constructed. Moreover, adding further substance to this argument, within F3 47 the Goddess instructs Parmenides to pass on the truth. But, if there are no other beings that exist, then this would be an impossible and thus meaningless request. Therefore, I dismiss the immaterial numerical interpretation of Parmenides monism. Yet, before I turn towards analysing the predicational reading, I want to briefly draw on the more general issue that undermines both the material and immaterial numerical interpretations of Parmenides monism. If we say that being is one thing (material or immaterial), all we can say is that it is being. To attribute properties to being would be to admit a reality of difference. This is because properties are distinct from being itself. Clarifying this, if we grant the existence of a sphere and render the sphere blue, then we accept the existence of two things, i.e. the sphere and the colour blue. However, this tautology (being is being) seems to directly conflict with the fact that Parmenides does assign properties to what is. For instance, within F8 48, he lists the general properties of being. These include unborn and imperishable 49, alone of its kind 50 etc. As a result, it appears that the numerical reading of his monism does not hold. 41 WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F8 (DK 28B8; KRS 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302; C 8) WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F3 (DK 28B2; KRS 291; C 3). 6-8; F5 (DK 28B6: KRS 293; C 5). 8-9; F6 (DK 28B4; KRS 313; C 6); F8 (DK 28B8; KRS 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302; C 8) WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1961) Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus. 1 st ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. 44 WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F12 (DK 28B19; KRS 312; C 20). 45 WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F12 (DK 28B19; KRS 312; C 20). 46 RORTY, R. (1965). Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories. Review of Metaphysics, 19 (1), p WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F3 (DK 28B2; KRS 291; C 3) WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F8 (DK 28B8; KRS 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302; C 8). 49 WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F8 (DK 28B8; KRS 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302; C 8). 3.

6 Alternatively, interpreting Parmenides monism as a predicational monism seems to overcome the challenges that face the numerical reading. Predicational monism is the view that being can only be one thing; being consists of a predicational unity which defines what it is 51. As accentuated by Stokes 52, on this monistic view, it is possible to have a plurality of such unified beings. Using Curd s 53 distinction between external and internal negations, I will discuss how this pluralism is possible without violating Parmenides rules. According to Curd 54, an internal negation is a negation of an integral part of the definition which identifies the essence of being. It is this negation that Parmenides rules prohibit. Conversely, external negation refers to a negative predicate that is not included in the definition of being. For example, sand is not water would be an external negation, rather than an internal negation. This is because not being water makes up no part of the definition of sand. Thus, if Parmenides is merely arguing that every existing thing is what-it-is and cannot be what-it-is-not, it seems we have accounted for his acceptance of the existence of numerous minds and can consequently explore the differences between beings. However, utilising Wedin s 55 plenum example, I will show the difficulty with rejecting the existence of the void, while simultaneously allowing for the existence of more than one being. As the predicational reading of Parmenides monism incorrectly permits both, I question its viability. Wedin 56 asks us to conceive of two distinct plena; A and B. Each plena completely fills the region that it occupies. Yet, this leaves us questioning how we can recognise that A and B are separate. If there is no void, it is difficult to comprehend how A and B can be separated. If they cannot be separated, we have little ground to claim that two plena exist rather than one (a plenum). An immediate reaction might be to argue that these two beings can be separated by their boundaries. However, we then need to consider how these boundaries can be identified. Using the example of a fish being everywhere bounded by water, it is arguable that because these two beings have different compositions, their boundaries are evident. Thus, where fish ends, water simply begins. Yet, it appears more difficult to prevent the boundaries from blurring between beings with the same composition. In order to avoid this, without granting the existence of the void, it seems to be the case that each being could only be placed next to another being that is constituently different from itself. Moreover, every being would also have to be completely fixed in order to prevent the possibility that the same type of being could come into contact and as a result merge. But this creates an extremely restricted world, where no being would be able to access another being that was not directly next to it. 50 WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F8 (DK 28B8; KRS 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302; C 8) CURD, P. (1998) The Legacy of Parmenides; Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought. 1 st ed. United States of America: Princeton University Press. p. 66; p STOKES, M. C. (1971) One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy. 1 st ed. United States of America: Harvard University Press. p CURD, P. (1998) The Legacy of Parmenides; Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought. 1 st ed. United States of America: Princeton University Press. p CURD, P. (1998) The Legacy of Parmenides; Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought. 1 st ed. United States of America: Princeton University Press. p WEDIN, M. V. (2014) Parmenides Grand Deduction: A Logical Reconstruction of the Way of Truth. 1 st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p WEDIN, M. V. (2014) Parmenides Grand Deduction: A Logical Reconstruction of the Way of Truth. 1 st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 117.

7 Nonetheless, through highlighting the different ways in which something can be classed as the same, Aristotle 57 suggests that even if we reject the existence of the void, it is unnecessary to construct a completely stationary world. Within one of category of same, Aristotle 58 emphasises the distinction between a type of species (i.e. the general kind) and a token of a species (i.e. a particular concrete instance). He creates a criterion of individuality, claiming that while each token within a given species has a mutual nature, each token is a numerically distinct being. As it is the ontological boundary that makes up the nature of each token, the tokens cannot merge. Illustrating this, to be a token of the type human being means to be an individual human. Part of the notion of being an individual human is to have a boundary and remain continuous. Thus, even if we placed two qualitatively identical humans next to each other they would still remain as two tokens. Aristotle 59 states that solid objects and animals make up this category of same. Moreover, as stressed by Sachs 60, Aristotle suggests that the void is not necessary for movement. This is because bodies are able to move into what is full, if and only if another body is displaced from that position at the same time. Consequently, it seems that if we interpret the predicational reading in this way we overcome the problem of merging and not being able to access other beings. Yet, according to Aristotle 61, boundaries do not apply to beings within another category of same. Aristotle 62 places fluids within this category. Drawing on the example of water, we do not identify individual water particles but rather recognise that the ultimate substratum of all is the same. As any number of particles can make up the water, merging seems evident. Moreover, merging is part of the nature of these kinds of being. However, unlike Aristotle, Parmenides fails to clarify the nature of what exists. This leaves us to question when boundaries apply. As a consequence, we do not have an explanation for how we can prevent the implausible phenomena of merging from occurring. Hence, I encourage the rejection of the predicational reading of Parmenides monism. As a direct result of the inherent flaws surrounding the ontological interpretations of Parmenides monism, I hold that Parmenides conceptions of being / what-is and nonbeing / what-is-not do not lead him to conclude that only one thing exists, rather they are used to highlight an epistemological truth. Following Waterfield s 63 interpretation, I hold that Parmenides uses his conceptual analysis of is and is not to offer us a choice between two possible paths of enquiry and thought. Since the way of is not is impossible, we are directed towards the way that is. As emphasised in F7 64, this is the way of reason. Parmenides entire poem seems to be dedicated towards promoting an ancient form of rationalism. He urges us to be skeptical of our senses and use rational deliberation to recognise that only logically necessary propositions are true. I hold that his consideration of the terms is and 57 ARISTOTLE (350B.C.E) Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. [Online]. Available from: [Accessed 18/11/2015]. 58 ARISTOTLE (350B.C.E) Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. [Online]. Available from: [Accessed 18/11/2015]. Book V, Chapter. 6 & Chapter ARISTOTLE (350B.C.E) Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. [Online]. Available from: [Accessed 18/11/2015]. Book V, Chapter SACHS, J. (2004) Aristotle s Physics: A Guided Study. 4 th ed. London: Rutgers University Press. p ARISTOTLE (350B.C.E) Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. [Online]. Available from: [Accessed 18/11/2015]. Book V, Chapter ARISTOTLE (350B.C.E) Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. [Online]. Available from: [Accessed 18/11/2015]. Book V, Chapter WATERFIELD, R. (2000). The First Philosophers. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F7 (DK 28B7; KRS 294; C 7).

8 is-not stands as an exemplar of the kind of logical path he wishes us to follow. Thus, it seems fitting that his monism is devoted to his epistemological quest. However, I want to stress that Parmenides does not completely dismiss sensory experiences 65. He rather advises that we know the phenomenal world. Parmenides seems to argue that although a posteriori methods cause illusionary truths, the beliefs and opinions that arise from this form of enquiry have practical utility. Through drawing on F2 66 and F6 67, I intend to highlight the textual support which grounds the argument for Parmenides monism displaying reason as the one thing that can enable the acquisition of knowledge. Within F2 68, the Goddess states: The point from which I start/ Is common; for there shall I return again. Firstly, it should be noted that this description is consistent with both the characteristics of reason and of knowledge. Unlike a posteriori methods, where we use an array of different senses, the methodology of rational deliberation is constant. Moreover, as accentuated by Plato 69, unlike beliefs, knowledge is tied-down to the truth. Thus, as the truth is fixed 70, it follows that we can incessantly return to knowledge. By having the Goddess explicitly link reason and knowledge together, it is arguable that Parmenides gives rationality a divine status; he is encouraging the mortals to recognise its superior use in the obtainment of knowledge and truth. Furthermore, within F6 71, the Goddess states: By thinking gaze unshaken on things which, though absent, are/ present. Parmenides seems to be arguing that to reach genuine conviction one cannot focus on things that are subject to change. As things are merely contingent within the cosmos, it follows that if we were to rely solely upon sense experience, stable apprehension would be impossible. Conversely, as reason is a form of pure awareness and is separate from the cosmos, reason allows us to access entities that are not concretely present. Thus, I hold that Parmenides is arguing that reason is the one path that exists which allows the distinction between knowledge and belief. His monism is being used to promote this line of enquiry. Furthermore, it seems that by understanding Parmenides monism as an epistemological monism we are able to acknowledge his important scientific contributions. As accentuated by Popper 72, Parmenides identified that the morning star and the evening star are identical, while he also revealed that the moon is illuminated by the sun 73. As these discoveries advocate pluralism (i.e. relying upon the existence of light, night, stars etc), it appears that they would directly conflict with the numerical reading of Parmenides monism. Moreover, focusing on the latter discovery, Cosgrove 74 claims that it requires the acceptance of the constant interplay between the presence/ being and absence/ non-being of two contraries; light and night. But, the idea of something coming-to-being and ceasing to exist is rejected by the ontological readings of Parmenides monism. Therefore, it seems that only the epistemological interpretation accounts for Parmenides discoveries. Yet, it is arguable that 65 WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F1 (DK 28BI; KRS 288, 301; C I) WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F2 (DK 28B5; KRS 289; C 2). 67 WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F6 (DK 28B4; KRS 313; C 6). 68 WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F2 (DK 28B5; KRS 289; C 2) 69 PRITCHARD, D. (2007) Recent Work on Epistemic Value. American Philosophical Quarterly, 44 (2), p WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F1 (DK 28BI; KRS 288, 301; C I) WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F6 (DK 28B4; KRS 313; C 6). 72 POPPER, K. R. (1998) The World of Parmenides: Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment. 1 st ed. London: Routledge. p WATERFIELD, R. (2000). F16 (DK 28BI5; C 15); F9 (DK 28BI0; KRS 305; C 9) COSGROVE, M. R. (2014) What are True Doxai Worth to Parmenides? Essaying a Fresh Look at his Cosmology. In, INWOOD, B. (ed.). Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy; Volume XLVI. 1 st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 8.

9 Parmenides astronomical contributions rely upon empirical observations. For instance, it seems necessary to observe the position and nature of both the moon and sun before we are able to identify how they interact. This brings into question whether the epistemological reading of Parmenides monism holds. If we grant that senses can led us towards scientific truths, reason can no longer be labelled as the only way in which one can gain knowledge. However, it should be noted that his discoveries are placed within the Doxa. As the Doxa is dedicated to displaying the confused opinions of the mortals, it is arguable that Parmenides remains consistent in claiming that sensory experiences can be deceptive. I hold that Parmenides is claiming that while a posterior methods are useful, in the sense they provide us with the objects of contemplation, before we can base truths upon them, it is first necessary to test their philosophical viability through rational deliberation. Therefore, I hold that Parmenides discoveries support the epistemological interpretation of his monism; reason is the only route to genuine knowledge. In conclusion, adhering to the golden rules, incorporating the all-or-nothing principle and relying upon the assumption that being exists, Parmenides utilises deductive reasoning to propose a form of monism. I reject the physical numerical reading of Parmenides monism on the grounds that it disregards Parmenides explicit acceptance of the existence of minds. I also dismiss the immaterial numerical interpretation as it seems to be incoherent and forces Parmenides to accept solipsism. Additionally, I highlight that both the physical and immaterial approaches conflict with Parmenides assignment of specific properties to whatis. Moreover, I hold that the predicational interpretation of Parmenides monism should also be precluded. This is because it fails to explain how we can separate similar beings without constructing an implausible picture of reality or granting the existence of the void. Thus, moving away from the ontological readings of Parmenides monism, I promote an epistemological approach. I hold that Parmenides is arguing that there is only one way that exists which allows us to discover the truth- this is the way of reason. This view is supported by the text and acknowledges Parmenides astronomical discoveries.

10 Bibliography 1. ADLURI, V. (2011) Parmenides, Plato and Mortal Philosophy; Return from Transcendence. 1 st ed. Great Britain: Continuum International Publishing Group. p ARISTOTLE (350B.C.E) Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. [Online]. Available from: [Accessed 18/11/2015]. Book V. 3. COSGROVE, M. R. (2014) What are True Doxai Worth to Parmenides? Essaying a Fresh Look at his Cosmology. In, INWOOD, B. (ed.). Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy; Volume XLVI. 1 st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p COXON, A. H. (1986) The Fragments of Parmenides. 1 st ed. United States of America: Van Gorcum. p CURD, P. (1998) The Legacy of Parmenides; Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought. 1st ed. United States of America: Princeton University Press. p FRASER, A. C. (1959) John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 1st ed. New York: Dover Publications, INC. 7. GALLOP, D. (1984) Parmenides of Elea: Fragments A Text and Translation with an Introduction by David Gallop. 1st ed. Canada: University of Toronto Press. p GUTHRIE, W. K. C. A. (1965) History of Greek Philosophy: Volume II The Presocratic tradition from Parmenides to Democritus. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p HENN, M.J. (2003) Parmenides of Elea: A Verse Translation with Interpretative Essays and Commentary to the Text. 1 st ed. United States of America: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. p KAHN, C. H. (1966) The Greek Verb 'To Be' and the Concept of Being. Foundations of Language, 2 (3), p KIRK, G.S; RAVEN, J.E and SCHOFIELD, M. (1983) The Presocratic Philosophers. 2 nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p MCKIRAHAN JR, R. D. (1994) Philosophy Before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentary. 1 st ed. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. p PAPADIS, D. (2005) The Concept of Truth in Parmenides. Revue de Philosophie Ancienne, 23 (1), p PLATO. (2010) The Last Days of Socrates. Translated by ROWE, C. London: Penguin Group. p POPPER, K. R. (1998) The World of Parmenides: Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment. 1 st ed. London: Routledge. p PRITCHARD, D. (2007) Recent Work on Epistemic Value. American Philosophical Quarterly, 44 (2), p QUINE, W.V.O. (1948) On What There Is. Review of Metaphysics, 2 (1), p ROBIN, L. (1928) Greek Thought and the Origins of the Scientific Spirit. 1st ed. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & co., LTD. p ROBINSON, J. M. (1968) An Introduction to early Greek Philosophy: the chief fragments and ancient testimony, with connecting commentary. 1 st ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. p RORTY, R. (1965). Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories. Review of Metaphysics, 19 (1), p SACHS, J. (2004) Aristotle s Physics: A Guided Study. 4 th ed. London: Rutgers University Press.

11 22. STOKES, M. C. (1971) One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy. 1 st ed. United States of America: Harvard University Press. p TARÁN, L. (1965) Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary and Critical Essays by Leonardo Tarán. 1 st ed. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. p VLASTOS, G. (1946) Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge. Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, 77, p WATERFIELD, R. (2000). The First Philosophers. 1 st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p WEDIN, M. V. (2014) Parmenides Grand Deduction: A Logical Reconstruction of the Way of Truth. 1 st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1961) Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus. 1 st ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. 28. YU, S.X. and SHI, J. (2001) Perceiving Shapes through Region and Boundary. Interaction Technical Report. Robotics Institute, Carnegie Mellon University: CMU- RI-TR p. 1-8.