1 BonJour Against Materialism Just an intellectual bandwagon?
2 What is physicalism/materialism? materialist (or physicalist) views: views that hold that mental states are entirely material or physical in nature, and correlatively that a complete account of the world, one that leaves nothing out, can be given in entirely materialist terms. Lurking here is the difficult issue of what sorts of entities or properties count as material or physical. Is there any good way to delimit the realm of the material that does not preclude further discoveries in physics, but also does not trivialize the category by allowing it to include anything that people in departments labeled Physics might eventually come to study?
3 Why is physicalism dominant? 1. Because Cartesian dualism is wrong. 2. Because of the success of science that assumes materialism. 3. Because the material universe is causally closed. 4. Because naturalism is true. 5. (Materialism is just an intellectual bandwagon/religious conviction)
4 There is a presumption of physicalism BonJour: One of the oddest things about discussions of materialism is the way in which the conviction that some materialist view must be correct seems to float free of the defense of any particular materialist view. Daniel Stoljar (SEP entry on Physicalism): The first thing to say when considering the truth of physicalism is that we live in an overwhelmingly physicalist or materialist intellectual culture. The result is that, as things currently stand, the standards of argumentation required to persuade someone of the truth of physicalism are much lower than the standards required to persuade someone of its negation.
5 1. Cartesian dualism is no good BonJour concedes that there are problems with some versions of dualism, especially Cartesian interactionist substance dualism. This is an argument from elimination. BonJour claims that such arguments in philosophy are weak, especially when the subject matter is poorly understood. (I would suggest that BonJour is perhaps overlooking the main reason to be a materialist here: the absence of a coherent, conceptually-clear alternative.)
6 2. The success of materialist science materialist science trying to understand the observable phenomena in terms of material particles following laws has been a highly successful project. BonJour concedes that This undeniably has some modest weight. How strong is this argument?
7 3. Causal Closure We believe that the material universe is causally closed: material things are never causally affected by anything non-material physical science can in principle give a completely adequate explanation of any physical occurrence, without needing to mention anything nonphysical. Stoljar (SEP): The Argument from Causal Closure is perhaps the dominant argument for physicalism in the literature today. But it is somewhat unclear whether it is successful.
8 Doesn t rule out epiphenomenal souls, etc. Epiphenomenalism: conscious phenomena are sideeffects of material processes that are incapable of having any reciprocal influence on the material world. Main problem for epiphenomenalism: it becomes difficult or seemingly impossible to see how verbal discussions of conscious phenomena such as this chapter and many others can be genuinely about them in the way that they seem obviously to be.
9 Why accept Causal Closure? Thus, given the premise of causal closure, the inference to physicalism is very strong. But is there a good reason to accept the premise? BonJour can t find any good reason to accept causal closure, except on the basis that materialism is true. Thus to argue for the truth of materialism or for a strong presumption in favor of materialism by appeal to the principle of causal closure is putting the cart in quite a flagrant way before the horse.
10 Is there an alternative to causal closure? If Cartesian dualism is true, then what will physics look like? If some kind of property dualism is true, what will physics look like? (Like quantum mechanics!!!)
11 4. The appeal to naturalism What is naturalism? A view that is hard to pin down, or make precise, BonJour says, despite eagerness to fly the naturalist flag. For some, naturalism is the same as materialism Methodological naturalism says that it is rational to be guided in one s metaphysical commitments by the methods of natural science (Stoljar) If we endorse methodological naturalism, then should we be physicalists? What s the argument?
12 4. The appeal to naturalism 1. We should let natural science tell us what the world is like, what kinds of entity it contains, etc. 2. Natural science reveals a purely physical world of material particles, fields, etc It is rational to accept physicalism
13 BonJour s responses 1. Why think that the methods of natural science exhaust the methods of reasonable inquiry? This claim could not be proved using such methods! 2. Physics tells us about the physical aspects of reality. How could it tell us that there are no other aspects? Surely this is a question that physics itself cannot address?
14 Conclusion BonJour concludes that there is no good argument for physicalism. Thoughts? (I would suggest that BonJour is perhaps overlooking the main reason to be a materialist here: the absence of a coherent, conceptually-clear alternative.)
15 Problems for physicalism There is only one materialist view of mental states that can be taken seriously (functionalism) Eliminative materialism is not serious J.J.C. Smart s psycho-physical identity theory isn t serious either, apparently. And functionalism is hopeless! But the deepest problem for the functionalist is that the characterization of mental states in terms of causal role says nothing at all about consciousness or conscious character. There is no apparent reason why a state that realizes a particular causal role would thereby need to have any specific sort of conscious character (the point made by the familiar reversed spectrum cases) or indeed any conscious character at all.
16 In particular, BonJour argues that functionalism cannot account for either: a. phenomenal qualities (qualia) or b. conscious intentionality.
17 The Mary argument Mary is a neuroscientist who knows all the physical facts about the physiology of human colour vision. 2. Mary has never had a colour experience, since she has only ever lived in a black-and-white environment. 3. According to physicalism, all facts are physical facts, expressible in the language of physics. 4. There is a real fact concerning what it is like to have each type of colour experience (e.g. red). 5. Assume that physicalism is true. 6. Mary doesn t know what it is like to have colour experiences The fact of what it is like to have a red colour experience is a physical fact (from 3, 4, 5) 8. Mary knows what it is like to have a red colour experience. (from 1, 5) 9. Contradiction (6, 8). 10. Physicalism is false. (5, 9)
18 Challenges to Mary Mary gains something, but doesn t learn any new facts. She gains some kind of ability? Maybe a new conceptual or representational ability? 2. Mary doesn t learn any new facts, because she already knew all the facts. What she gains are new phenomenal concepts for describing old facts. Phenomenal concepts can be acquired only from the relevant experiences
19 The Mary argument 1.1 While in the room, Mary is given colour samples, one red one green, labelled only as A and B. Will she be able to give them their usual names? Suppose Mary is told that one of the samples is green and the other red. Will Mary know which of the following claims is true? 1. A is green and B is red 2. A is red and B is green Surely it is a fact that (2) is true and (1) is false?
20 Moreover, according to BonJour, it still seems quite clear that Mary doesn t know which statement is true, until she sees (e.g.) freshly-mown grass. Does this refute the no new fact response?
21 New knowledge, old fact? You philosophers are really amazing! The idea that I already know the facts I am interested in indeed all facts of that general kind is simply preposterous.
22 Conscious intentional content One crucial feature of such conscious thoughts is that when I have them, I am in general consciously aware of or consciously understand or grasp what it is that I am thinking about (and also what I am thinking about it). This conscious grasp of the propositions one is thinking about is rarely if ever merely disquotational, BonJour says. This conscious grasp is of narrow content only, i.e. subjective meaning.
23 Mary again! Suppose that Mary studies me as a subject and comes to have a complete knowledge of my physical and neurophysiological makeup as I am thinking these various thoughts. Can she determine on that basis what I am consciously thinking about at a particular moment? This question can be broken into two: a. Does a physical description of my brain state tell Mary this? b. Does adding knowledge of causal connections to external objects help? (Functionalists see this as essential.)
24 For (a), BonJour says clearly no. One thing that seems utterly clear is that she could not do this merely on the basis of knowing my internal physical characteristics No real argument given here. The main problem with (b), BonJour thinks, is that we have introspective access to our own propositional meanings (narrow content only). But we surely have no such first-person access to external causal connections?
25 Causal relations to external things may help to produce the relevant features of the internal states in question, but there is no apparent way in which such external relations can somehow be partly constitutive of the fact that my conscious thoughts are about various things in a way of which I can be immediately aware. But if these internal states are sufficient to fix the object of my thought in a way that is accessible to my understanding or awareness, then knowing about those internal states should be sufficient for Mary as well, without any knowledge of the external causal relations.
26 Could thoughts be transparent?... if we were simply material, that would prevent us from knowing anything at all, there being nothing so inconceivable as the idea that matter knows itself. It is impossible for us to know how it would know itself. Blaise Pascal, Pensées (1669) Perception, and that which depends upon it, are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is to say, by figures and motions. Leibniz, Monadology (1714) Sec
27 Diagonal thoughts The notion that thoughts are transparent, so that Mary (or Laplace s demon) could logically deduce our belief-contents from physical descriptions of our brain states, has long seemed (to me) to lead to contradiction. The problem is that a thinking machine (a transparent thinking being) could form thoughts about itself. Then one can construct a diagonal thought that is easy to grasp, but not graspable by the machine (on pain of contradiction).
28 Analogue, using a similar diagonal property Theorem: Some properties of natural numbers are not expressed by any well-formed formula, or wff (with one free variable) of that language. Take a formal language of arithmetic (call it L). Every wff in L has a Gödel number, a code number. Then, for any given wff of L (with one free variable), it s always meaningful to ask whether it is satisfied by its own Gödel number. Define a natural number p to be inclusive (w.r.t. L) just in case: (i) p is the code number of a wff Φ with one free variable, and (ii) p satisfies Φ. Then inclusive is a well-defined property of natural numbers. Now suppose that inclusive is expressed by a wff of L, say Ψ. Then there is also a wff Ψ, expressing the property of being noninclusive. The wff Ψ has a code number, say g. We then see, of course, that g satisfies Ψ if and only if it does not, which is a contradiction.
29 1. Assumption: there exists a machine that has beliefs roughly equal to that of a human. 2. The subjective proposition of each belief logically follows from the complete physical state of the machine. 3. The machine s intentional states are effectively sentences of a language L -- a very special language that needs no semantics. 4. L includes existential physical propositions, of the form at least one thing has the property P, where P is any physical property 5. Definition: An inclusive state is a sentence S in L such that, when the machine is in state S it is considering an existential physical proposition, and the state S itself has the property P in question. 6. Inclusive is a physical property, and also not a physical property. 29
30 inclusive is a physical property S is inclusive The machine in state S is thinking Some state has P, and P is a physical property Given a state S, physically defined, Laplace s demon can infer the semantic content of S, and whether or not P(S) holds. Hence the demon can infer from S s physical description whether or not S is inclusive. 30
31 inclusive is not a physical property 1. Assume that being an inclusive state is a physical property. 2. not inclusive is also a physical property. 3. The machine can form the thought: Some states are not inclusive. 4. There is some state D in L whose meaning is Some states are not inclusive. 5. D itself is inclusive if and only if D is not inclusive. (Contradiction) 6. Inclusive is not a physical property. 31
32 It is impossible for us to think that a physical system can be aware that it is a physical system. Pascal (modified) 32
33 What is the alternative? Yes, things get sketchy.
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