1/10. Primary and Secondary Qualities and the Ideas of Substance
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1 1/10 Primary and Secondary Qualities and the Ideas of Substance This week I want to return to a topic we discussed to some extent in the first year, namely Locke s account of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. However, there are a number of reasons for returning to it now. Firstly, I want to connect Locke s account of the distinction to his discussion of our ideas of substances. Secondly, I want to present a much fuller account of the distinction as Locke describes it than we had before. Thirdly, I want to set out some of the bases of Berkeley s criticism of Locke s distinction, a criticism that is based on the way in which Berkeley connects the distinction to an account of our ideas and, particularly, to whether we have a coherent idea of substance. Let s look first of all at what Locke says about our ideas of substances and how he relates his account of these ideas to the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. In beginning to discuss the topic Locke makes the point that a certain number of simple ideas are constantly presented together by us with the effect that they come to be put under the title of a single name so that we come to speak as if there is only one simple idea in some cases where many have been combined together. A prime example he gives of this is the notion that we have that our ideas reside in something in general which we term a substance. The idea of substance in general is effectively described by Locke as a notion we refer to without
2 2/10 having any clear sense of what it involves other than a general sense that it is a support for other things. From this general and obscure idea that the kinds of things we encounter in the world are sorts of substances although these sorts are nothing other than the way certain simple ideas co-exist together. Locke s account of this role the distinction between kinds plays in our thinking is not limited to the description of bodies since he takes it that mind itself is only a general term for classing together the distinct operations of thinking, knowing and doubting. The notion we have of body is no clearer than that of mind in the sense that we do not in our simple idea of the substance of body have included any real sense of how it acts as a support for all the accidents that arise from it. What we can generally say when we distinguish kinds is that ideas of certain sorts all belong together and are unified in a sense in their common connection though how they are unified is something of which we can have no real idea. After making these initial points Locke goes on to point out that a large part of our complex ideas of sorts of substances consist in the simple ideas of the powers that certain things have to produce certain ideas in us. Fire, for example, produces in us the ideas of heat and colour, which are grounded on the qualities that the fire must possess in order to lead us to have the ideas in question. Some notions of power are presented to us immediately (as in the example given) whilst some arise only mediately (as when we note the effect of the fire on something else such as
3 3/10 its power to make wood change colour and consistency). Qualities of certain sorts operate and exert force upon us and in an earlier chapter Locke described the idea of quality in general as including this ability to effect us in these ways. Generally looked at they involve combinations and so our ideas of such qualities are in fact complex ideas but Locke introduces now a looser sense of simple ideas to name the powers simple by which he means that we so constantly bring them together in our thinking that our automatic tendency is to treat them as simple. Having made the point that we distinguish our complex ideas of sorts of substances by generally referring to the powers different substances are thought to include Locke moves on to indicating why we tend to distinguish things in this way and his explanation of this habit he thinks we have leads him to introducing into his account of substances the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. When it comes to complex ideas of substances it is the secondary qualities of them, which we mainly rely on, to distinguish them from each other. Having made this point Locke now divides our complex ideas of corporeal substances specifically and says that they are of three kinds. The first element of our ideas of corporeal substances, are ideas of primary qualities. Whilst Locke says that the primary qualities are in the bodies whether we are aware of them or not he does also indicate that we initially come to be aware of them by means of the senses. The list of primary qualities he gives is that of the bulk, figure,
4 4/10 number, situation and motion of the parts of bodies (though the last is usually given as motion or rest ). These primary qualities are the basis, on Locke s view, of secondary qualities, which latter are just the powers substances have to give us ideas by means of our senses. Finally, the third element of our ideas of corporeal substances consists in the capacity of bodies to give or receive changes such that the substance gives us different ideas than we possessed before and this last element is the sense that the substance possesses active and passive powers. So most of the parts of the complex ideas involved in our conception of corporeal substances are made up of powers. The ideas we have of secondary qualities however are ones that Locke believes do not resemble the qualities that are the cause of our having these ideas. So the idea of the secondary quality of colour is one that he thinks would, if we had sufficient insight into the intrinsic make-up of bodies, be one that would be replaced by what he calls a texture of parts of size and figure. Locke further adds that when it comes to our idea of the substance of body we are no better off than with regard to the idea of the substance of mind. The ideas of the primary qualities of bodies include cohesion of solid parts and the impulse of motion whilst those of mind are thinking and will and the power of putting body into motion (and hence liberty). There are also some ideas common to both body and mind such as existence, duration and mobility. The substance of the thinking thing and the substance of the solid thing are
5 5/10 both unclear since we do not know what it is that thinks or how the solid thing coheres. Before we look at Berkeley s response to Locke s account let s in conclusion just remind ourselves of the basic primary/secondary quality distinction in Locke. The primary qualities in bodies are said to be inseparable from bodies whatever else happens to them. Sense will find them in every particle of matter we can perceive and the mind will assume them even in cases where perception is no longer possible. The secondary qualities, by contrast, are only powers to produce sensations in us by means of primary qualities and the ideas we have of these qualities do not resemble the qualities themselves. When we turn to Berkeley s account of our ideas then the picture presented is initially the same as Locke s since he states that ideas are in the mind either because of the action of the senses on us or due to our observation of the operation of the mind itself which repeats Locke s distinction between ideas of sense and ideas of reflection. Further Berkeley repeats the distinction between simple and complex ideas when he describes the idea of an apple as a complex idea made up of simple ideas of sense. This description of ideas of sense is contrasted with the basic foundational idea of reflection, which latter is understood to be a perceiving and active sense of self. It is after laying out these notions that are common ground between his account and Locke s that Berkeley begins to describe an
6 6/10 argument for a position that is quite different from Locke s. The ideas of reflection he founds on the basic notion of self he rightly understands to depend on the existence of minds though he goes on to add that without a mind there would also be no production of complex ideas of sense. This leads him however to next propose a reductive analysis of the understanding of expressions that refer to the complex ideas of sense as when he states that when we say a sensory object exists we can mean no more than that it affects our senses in some way. This claim is the basis of his general statement with regard to sensory objects that their esse is percipi or, in other terms, that such objects as we refer to by the complex ideas of sense, have no existence separate from the minds that can think of them. Berkeley s initial argument moves from one thesis to another: he starts from a phenomenalist claim and moves to an idealist one. Phenomenalism is a claim concerning meaning: effectively it reduces object-talk to sensation-talk. Idealism, by contrast, is an ontological claim: it states that what fundamentally exists are minds and ideas that are dependent on minds. Berkeley endorses both these theses and uses the phenomenalist one to help to persuade us to accept the idealist one. The objects of sense are identified with our complex ideas and since complex ideas are produced by a combination of sensory inputs together his assertion is that without such combination taking place the object in question would not exist. Berkeley further assumes that anyone who asserts the realist claim
7 7/10 that there are objects that are distinct from our ideas is guilty of abstracting these ideas from our perceptions. Such a claim involves, says Berkeley, the conception of something without attending to the conditions of its cognition. This basic conception that the esse of sensory objects lies in their percipi leads Berkeley to the assertion that there is no other substance than mind or, as he also calls it, spirit. Berkeley next responds to the suggestion that some of our ideas may resemble something that exists beyond them, a key reason for Locke assuming that there are primary qualities. Berkeley denies this with his claim that an idea is like nothing else except an idea but rather than just contenting himself with this he moves on to examining Locke s doctrine of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Berkeley correctly assumes that by primary qualities are meant extension, figure, motion or rest, solidity and impenetrability whilst all other sensible qualities are assumed to be secondary. However Berkeley states that a consequence of this distinction is that the ideas of the secondary qualities do not resemble anything outside the mind whilst the ideas of the primary qualities do exist outside the mind and reside in something called matter. Now, whilst we have seen that Berkeley is right in the claim that ideas of secondary qualities don t resemble the secondary qualities, it is still the case that the secondary qualities themselves are taken to exist as powers in the things by Locke. However, more immediately important is the fact that
8 8/10 Locke, as we have just noted, does not assume the existence of matter or, at any rate, rests nothing in his argument upon any clear conception of the substance of body. Berkeley argues that the different kinds of qualities are in fact inseparably united together, an argument he takes it will show that all the qualities exist only in the mind. One of the reasons he gives for this claim of inseparable unity is that we cannot form an idea of a body without it possessing some colour as without this it would not be perceptible but the colour depends only on the mind. Here, it seems to me, Berkeley makes a number of errors with regard to Locke s doctrine. Firstly, whilst we may not be able to imagine a body, that is, to be in any perceptible connection with one, without the body having colour, this does not establish that the body could not exist without colour (in the sense that it was, for example, transparent). Secondly, the secondary qualities of corporeal substances are not themselves ideas and are distinct from the ideas we have of secondary qualities. Indeed, if there was not a difference between the idea of the secondary quality and the secondary quality itself then Locke would not be able to claim that the idea did not resemble the quality. So even if the idea of the secondary quality is always part of the way we perceive the corporeal substance this does not entail that the secondary quality, which is the power to produce in us the idea of colour, would be inseparable from the sensory object itself.
9 9/10 Another reason Berkeley gives for the assumption of the unity of the two types of quality, is that both undergo relative variation so the same water can appear hot and cold at once to different hands and the same extension appear to occupy different areas when examined from different angles. However, the cases are still distinct in the sense that the ideas of warmth and cold are essentially relative to sensory experience as such and have no other way of being conceived whilst the sense that any body must have extension applies a property to bodies independent of any particular sensory qualities. Berkeley eventually admits this when he goes on to state that this argument doesn t prove there is no extension in an object but only that we don t know which extension of the object is the true one, a quite different point. Berkeley next moves to his general idealist argument by focusing on the idea that matter is the substratum of extension and of corporeal substances generally. In doing so Berkeley repeats Locke s problems with the notion of substratum and uses these problems to rule out what he calls material substance though we have not seen Locke to be committed to the existence of anything like this. So Berkeley has not, I would suggest, provided any real direct arguments against the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. The basic reason Berkeley rejects it is due to Locke s suggestion that the ideas we have of primary qualities resemble these qualities, a suggestion that entails that the qualities are distinct from
10 10/10 our ideas of them and can be related to them. It is this relation that Berkeley attempts to rule out and the basis of his rebuttal of Locke is that it is only the ideas we have of the qualities of which we have immediate awareness, not the supposedly distinct qualities that the ideas are said to be of. Berkeley argues that there is no necessary connection between the putative bodies that exist outside the mind and our ideas. Berkeley s point is that we could have all the ideas we have now without the existence of any bodies external to us, and this shows that the hypothesis of the ontological reality of such bodies is one that is unnecessary. Subsequently, Berkeley adds the point that should such bodies exist it still does not follow that they would be capable of producing in us any correct impression of themselves since we know of no way of accounting for action of matter on mind. So even if these bodies existed we would not be able to explain their action upon us.
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