Agricultural Biotechnology: Intrinsic Objections, Monstrosity & Labelling

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1 Agricultural Biotechnology: Intrinsic Objections, Monstrosity & Labelling The List : Assorted Promises Herbicide tolerant, drought resistant, and Bt crops (May increase efficiency in food production) Slower ripening fruits and vegetables (E.g. the Flavr Savr tomato. May allow for more efficient food distribution, lower costs, greater choice for consumers) Leaner pigs, cows that produce more milk, neutraceuticals, Enviropig TM, etc. (May provide healthier, cheaper, more environmentally friendly and/or less bad for you food) 1

2 The List : Assorted Perils Loss of biodiversity through creation of GE monocultures Environmental implications of herbicideresistant/pesticide producing crops (e.g., superweeds ); dependency on chemically-intensive agriculture Social justice effects of intellectual property rights in plant and livestock varieties, e.g., those developed by third world farmers, such as neem Erosion of our capacity to view living things as subjects as a result of a reductionist view of life forms as composed of interchangeable parts. Limitations of Lists The list is a commonly seen device when it comes to evaluating technologies. And, to be sure, it has its uses. Yet the on the one hand/on the other hand, ledgerlike list structure arguably serves to prejudice analysis in the direction of consequentialism. (I.e., cost/benefit, risk/benefit analysis) Yet some people have (or believe they have) intrinsic, deontological objections to biotechnology... 2

3 Intrinsic Objections to Biotechnology Bioengineering, some say, is monstrous and unnatural: It involves the creation of bizarre and hideous things monsters every bit as much as the minotaurs, chimeras and gorgons of mythology Chimera, Han Dynasty, CE It amounts to playing God Earmouse, Jay Vacanti, 1997 Alba the GFP Rabbit, Eduardo Kac, 2000 The Beltsville Pig, modified to produce HGH, USDA,

4 Consequentialism Privileged? Mary Midgley: There is a strong tendency to see/portray the consequentialist side of such evaluations as eminently rational and objective. Conversely, says Midgley, there is a strong tendency to dismiss intrinsic objections as essentially irrational, as emotional, subjective, something that can t really be justified or argued about at all Midgley But should they be? The Role of Feeling in Morals Midgley s example: Objections raised in connection with the spread of Mad Cow disease (and its human consequence, Cruetzfeldt-Jacob disease) in the UK: You added leftover sheep brains to animal feed intended for cows, knowing that cows are herbivores. And you did so for no better reason than reducing your costs and thereby increasing your profits Well, you got what you were asking for didn t you? 4

5 You got what you were asking for The rational underpinning to this isn t simply some sort of causal claim ( feeding animal waste to herbivores may result in dangerous illnesses ). Nor is it necessarily a claim about intentions ( your wicked selfishness ought to be punished ). Instead, says Midgley, it can be understood as a legitimate moral claim based on a pre-theoretical understanding of the notions of nature and species You can t expect to go on forever exploiting living creatures if you don t pay some attention their needs. Neglecting the species-nature of cows is wrong in itself. It is a gross insult to the life of the animals. So it should come as no surprise that this insult upsets their health, with unpredictable further consequences Midgley: Such objections are not merely incoherent emotional exclamations. Instead, they carry with them reasons, which may be more or less inarticulate, but which are rightly expressed in emotional terms. 5

6 Playing God Similarly, critics like Midlgley argue that the charge of playing God need not be understood in divisive, narrowly religious terms only. Contemporary algenists (Joshua Lederberg) brag that species are no longer inscribed in hard bound volumes, but in loose-leaf notebooks, we are free to rearrange the pages at will. In the face of such apparent hubris, playing God may actually be a rather accurate description of biotechnology s self-image The Story So Far Not all objections to biotechnology are based on measurable harms and benefits; some intrinsic objections are based on feeling. And this, says Midgley, is as it should be: feelings may incorporate reasons that are rightly expressed in emotional terms. But: 1) Surely not all feelings incorporate reasons and 2) Perhaps we can rightly demand that others take our reasons seriously, but can we legitimately demand that they share our feelings? 6

7 A Case Study: GMO Labeling In liberal democratic societies, it is widely accepted that governments can require us to do things, provided that they do so either on the basis consensus or (at least neutrality) vis à vis competing values. Viewed from a consequentialist perspective, this suggests both a possible justification for mandatory labeling of GM foods and some limitations on that justification Labeling: Consequentialist Perspective J.S. Mill: If a product is or could be positively harmful (and especially if the hazard is not obvious), mandatory labeling may be justified. Similarly, if product information allows consumers to avoid potential bad consequences, regulators may be justified in requiring labeling 7

8 What these consequentialist considerations have in common, is that they can be evaluated (more or less) objectively food safety is a topic on which (presumably) there is social consensus; regulating in aid of food safety/harm prevention appears to be neutral between competing value perspectives. However: GMOs are (fairly) rigorously assessed for human food (and livestock feed) safety; there is very little evidence that they are not safe to eat. (Note, however, that does not entail that they are necessarily safe to grow) A Right to Know Even so, some GMO critics demand mandatory labeling based on a right to know. That may sound attractive, but consider: Aside from considerations like safety/harm, what is the moral basis of a generalized right to know? I may have an interest in knowing, e.g., whether your product is being sold cheaper by your competitors, but does that impose on you a duty to tell me? 8

9 Mandatory labeling imposes costs on producers (and may stigmatize food products that are in fact safe) While some consumers may have an interest in knowing whether or not foods contain GMOs, it is not obvious that producers are morally compelled to satisfy that interest on the basis of a right to know (again, excepting considerations like food safety). Consumer Sovereignty / Freedom of Exit Perhaps the strongest pro-labeling arguments are more political than moral in nature Religious freedom is a foundational commitment in liberal societies. Some religions prescribe dietary laws (Kosher, Hallal) Nearly every religion/value system proscribes cannibalism. (Does a chemical copy of a human transgene inserted into, say, a tomato, count?) 9

10 Similarly, some people may believe that biotechnology amounts to playing God or profaning a scared domain. Others may simply be distrustful of science and technology. (After all, they have been wrong before.) The liberal argument: We don t have to endorse any of these beliefs in order to endorse people s right to act on them. Consumer Sovereignty Redux The principle of consumer sovereignty: Everyone one has the right to make purchase decisions based on whatever substantive value commitments they happen to have. This principle is in the nature of a negative right: You have a right purchase whatever you want (so long as it is not illegal), and no one can force you to buy one thing rather than another 10

11 Complications By the same token, however, no one has any general obligation to actually supply you with what you want. (E.g., organic or Hallal or Kosher food) Vendors in a market economy do have limited duties to provide buyers with information: the contractual right not to be deceived about what you are buying; health and safety labels. But, again, these rights to information are limited (precisely because they impose costs on producers/vendors, and those costs have to be justified). Counter-Argument Possibly, GM foods are (or ought to be) an exception to the consequentialist harm principle: Throughout most of human history, you could tell just by looking (most of the time) whether this food x was allowed under your preferred dietary law; someone who distrusted food technology could register her protest by purchasing whole/organic foods only. Now, however, there is typically no way to tell just by looking whether a foodstuff is GM 11

12 So, Maybe So, perhaps mandatory GMO labeling could be justified on political grounds: Labeling is necessary to preserve consumer sovereignty and/or to allow protest of or freedom of exit from the technological food system. But we should be clear: This would be an obligation founded on preserving people s freedom to act on their beliefs (which may turn out to be objectively crazy or mistaken), not on a general right to know Moreover: Establishing this freedom doesn t guarantee that people will be able to act on it (e.g., that organic food actually will be available for purchase). 12