Tuesday August , evidence from Alastair Campbell, Prime Minister s Office

Transcription

1 Tuesday August , evidence from Alastair Campbell, Prime Minister s Office am LORD HUTTON: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Yes, Mr Dingemans. ALASTAIR JOHN CAMPBELL (called) examined by MR DINGEMANS MR DINGEMANS: Can you give his Lordship your full name. A. Alastair John Campbell. Q. What is your occupation? A. I am the Prime Minister's Director of Communications and Strategy. Q. How long have you held that post for? A. Since 2001, and prior to that I was his press secretary. Q. You will need to keep your voice up. A. Prior to that I was his press secretary. Q. When did you become his press secretary? A. In Q. Before that, your experience was? A. I was a journalist. Q. Can you give a brief description of your current role? A. My role is to assist the Prime Minister and the Government in the development of communication strategy for the Government as a whole and also on specific issues as they arise. Q. Throughout the course of your evidence I am going to be referring to some documents that you very kindly supplied to us. You have also supplied to us copies or redacted copies of your diaries. Can you just, first of all, explain how you keep your diaries? A. I write a diary not every day but several times a week. It is not intended for publication. It is a series of observations about what I do and what I witness. Q. When we come to those extracts, I will make it clear I am dealing with parts from the diary. Can I start off with the dossier, which was published on 24th September 2002 by the Government? When were you first aware that a dossier was being written or produced? A. I had been aware for some months of a different dossier on the general issue of WMD. Q. Right. A. On the specific Iraq dossier, I became aware of that during -- the intention of doing one during August, when the Prime Minister and I were both on holiday and we were discussing the way that the Iraq situation was developing. Q. Can I take you to a document, which is CAB/3/82, which is the first draft that we have seen of the dossier dated 20th June Q. We know, from the dossier as published, this forms, I think it is chapter 2 or 3 of the subsequent dossier. Q. Did you see this document at the time? A. I was aware of that document on -- probably September 5th, at that first meeting that I had with John Scarlett and others about the dossier that subsequently replaced this. Q. Right. Was it ever intended to publish an earlier draft of the dossier? A. What was intended, several months earlier, was -- Q. Giving us a timescale; you have mentioned August. A. Easter -- I beg your pardon. In Easter there was a document commissioned on the general issue of WMD relating to four countries, one of which was Ira Q. At some time, I cannot recall exactly when, but a decision was taken effectively to drop that. Q. Right.

2 A. Then, during August and into September, the decision was taken to do a WMD dossier focused exclusively on Iraq. Q. The decision to drop it, it has been suggested in various media outlets that was because there was nothing new in it. Was that the reason or what was the reason to drop it? A. No, there were two reasons really. The first was that it was not a terribly good document overall as a document, as something that you would want to put into the public domain. The other reason was that the fear that doing it at the time it was being suggested was actually going to ramp up, if I can use that phrase, the issue at a time when, in fact, the Prime Minister and the Government were trying to calm it. And then the September -- by September the Prime Minister took the view that this Iraq -- exclusively Iraq dossier should be put into the public domain. Q. Can I just take you to an article in The Guardian on 5th September 2002 which is BBC/4/59 which in the column on the left-hand side, it is an appalling reproduction, suggests that: "A dossier on Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical warfare capabilities was drawn up in March by the Cabinet Office's joint intelligence committee..." Then after some discussion, it was not published. Then it goes on to say: "Last Monday, a Whitehall source said that the long-awaited dossier 'would no longer play a role'. There was 'very little new to put into it', he said. The following day, Mr Blair announced that a dossier would be published in a matter of weeks." Were you aware of any discussions with the media about the publication of the dossier at this stage? A. No, I was not. Q. Do you recall when the Prime Minister's announcement that there was going to be a dossier was made? A. I think it was made on September 3 at a press conference in Sedgefield. I cannot remember if that is the exact date. It was the first press conference he did following a visit to Africa. Q. You had discussed with him beforehand, in August I think you told us about, the proposal to put together a dossier. Had there been any discussions between you and the Prime Minister leading up to his announcement? A. There had. The background to those discussions was the fact that, as I say, during August this issue had really built up quite significantly and seriously, particularly in the United States, and the Prime Minister came back from holiday and there was really a sense of frenzy in the media about the issue of Iraq. I can remember, on the flight out to Mozambique it was, discussions about how we could try to calm that because the sense was being given we were about to take military action. And then on the flight back to Sedgefield there was a further discussion about how the Prime Minister would deal with the issue at the press conference. That was where he said: look, I think we are going to have to make clear that we are going to publish this dossier focused on Iraq's WMD; and he duly announced it at the press conference. Q. If I may turn to your diary extracts. Q. For 3rd September, what were the questions, towards the bottom of your entry, that you considered to be the toughest at this stage? A. The: why now? Q. In what sense do you mean that? A. Why was this such an important issue to the British Government now? Why Iraq? Why only Iraq, as it were, that was being singled out? The answer which I think the Prime Minister gave was that it was a unique threat. And I think -- what the Prime Minister sought to do in his answers was to explain -- this is something I think he had been trying to explain for a considerable period of time, that he was seeing all this intelligence material coming in, which made him more and more concerned about Iraq as a threat, Iraq's WMD as a threat. And he wanted to put some of that into the public domain. Q. Was there anything that you identified as being the toughest question?

3 A. You have obviously -- this is September 3 -- I beg your pardon: what new evidence was there? That is right, I beg your pardon. Q. Can you help us: what was identified as the toughest question? A. Sorry: what new evidence was there? He said the debate had got ahead of us so we were going to do the dossier earlier, in the next few weeks. Q. Right. What was meant by that that sort of recording? Obviously when people record diaries they are not writing everything down. A. That refers back to the point I made earlier, that the debate, particularly in the United States, had really moved on to a different level; and there was a real sense of this now moving ahead of us, and the public, I think through the media, getting the sense we were about to take military action. And what he was saying there was that any case that we make for why Saddam Hussein's regime is a serious and credible threat has to be based on evidence, and he wanted to share as much of that evidence as possible with the public. Q. Turning then to 5th September, can I take you to a document called CAB/11/13? This appears to be a memo from John Williams, you can see that at the top, of the press office -- in fact we have heard from him -- dated 5th September It is copied to, amongst others, you. Q. If you go down the page it says: "I have looked at the 'capping' piece for the Iraq dossier as a newspaper sub would. I offer the following suggestions and would be happy to discuss why I believe they will make the document easier for Ministers to defend in interviews." Q. Was that a document that was produced for your meeting on 5th September? A. Was that dated the 5th? Q. Yes. If you look at the top right-hand corner. A. It may have been, but the -- by then -- what the meetings of the 5th and the 9th are about were agreeing the process by which the WMD dossier was going to be produced. And by then, because of the discussions I was having with John Scarlett, the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, that would not actually have been relevant to the discussions that we were having. Q. If we go to CAB/11/14 we can see at least, you know, the gist of what he is writing. There are a series of bullet points et cetera about the threat posed, the regime being uniquely dangerous, which I think was a point you have just made. A. I am not sure that is part of John William's note. I think that is part of a document that the Cabinet Office prepared for that discussion, which was an outline of the points to make in the dossier, I think. Q. On the 5th September? I think it was. It does not look like the thing I recall John -- I can check on that, but I do not think it is. Q. Then CAB/11/16, we can see, through an that is part redacted, that there were a list of people attending a meeting at 12 o'clock "today". If we look at subject it says: "Meeting with Alastair Campbell re Iraq dossier at 12 noon." Q. We can see a number of those people. David Manning we have heard from. John Scarlett, I think you have told us, was chairman of the JIC. Q. Julian Miller we have heard evidence from. He was deputy to John Scarlett? A. That is right. Q. Tom McKane and Desmond Bowen, are you able to say who they were? A. Tom McKane at that point was in the Cabinet Office; I think he is now back in the Ministry of Defence. Desmond Bowen at that time was in the Ministry of Defence; I think he is now in the Cabinet Office.

4 Q. And Paul Hammill, CIC, what does that stand for? A. The CIC is the Coalition Information Centre, which is a unit we set up within the Foreign Office which is activated at times of international crisis. Q. Then Edward Chaplin, Stephen Wright and John Williams we can see from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. John Williams was from the press department? A. And Edward Chaplin and Stephen Wright are policy officials. Q. And arrangements are made for everyone to be let in. LORD HUTTON: May I ask you: was this a meeting of the Iraq Communications Group? A. No, it was not, my Lord. It was an ad hoc meeting to discuss the Iraq dossier and the arrangements for it. The Iraq Communications Group evolved, I think it actually was not formalised until later in the year, November or December. But the people -- the kind of people who were at this meeting became part of the Iraq Communications Group. LORD HUTTON: So this was a forerunner of that group, is that correct? A. That is right. LORD HUTTON: Yes. I see. Thank you. MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to your diary entry for 5th September 2002? Q. It is about six lines down. You were having a discussion, I think, about the questions that you could not really answer at the time. Was anything said about whether there was much to have been said in addition to what had been said before, at the time? A. I do not recall that. I do not recall the detail of that. That discussion was about whether to recall Parliament, and the Prime Minister felt at that time that the press conference had steadied the public debate on this in the way that he had wanted to. That was what that discussion was about. Q. Right. Then, turning down, you relate, I think, the meeting that you had had with various people, and we have seen their names from the , to go over the dossier. And what did you record at the time that you needed to show in relation to the dossier? A. That it had to be revelatory; we needed to show it was new and informative and part of a bigger case. Q. Was anyone offering to help write it full time? A. John Williams offered to write it full time. Q. Did you accept that offer? A. No. Q. What was the reason for that? A. The decision was taken, either at that meeting or certainly by the 9th, that John Scarlett, I think if we go on to the 9th, I mean he talked about -- he used the word "ownership", that John Scarlett felt he ought to have ownership of the dossier. And I emphasised, and this was spelt out in the minute that I circulated following these meetings -- Q. Which was on the 9th? A. On the 9th. Q. We will come to that. A. I beg your pardon. Q. You emphasised; you can make the point, please. A. I emphasised that the credibility of this document depended fundamentally upon it being the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee; and that was the touchstone of our approach right through this from that moment. So John Williams was very kindly, not criticising him at all, he was saying -- he is a very experienced writer, he was offering to write it full time. I made the point and John Scarlett made the point that was not sensible, it should be written by John Scarlett.

5 LORD HUTTON: May I ask you, Mr Campbell, this meeting on 5th September, the Inquiry has been given a copy of a dossier or a draft dossier dated 5th September 2002 which is at CAB/3/7. Had you seen that document? A. This, as I recall, is the note from -- unless this is the same document Mr Dingemans showed me earlier. MR DINGEMANS: No. A. This, I think, is a note from Tom McKane's team at the time, about the kind of thing that would form the outline of a WMD dossier. LORD HUTTON: Well, it looks like a fairly detailed draft dossier. A. How -- can somebody tell me how long it is? MR DINGEMANS: Because it is very difficult for me to read it all on screen, let me give you the paper extracts; it is probably easier. It runs from pages 7 to 20 on that. You can see parts of it had been redacted in the copies we have been given. I would say this is either the Iraq section of the earlier document -- Q. Right. A. -- or it is what Tom McKane was putting forward for that meeting. Q. Right. A. But the point about that meeting, as I think I recorded in the minute I did on the 9th -- Q. Yes. A. -- is that all of these papers, as it were, are now redundant. There is a new dossier to be done by John Scarlett, and for him to take all of this information, all of this material, and to turn it into a new dossier. LORD HUTTON: Yes. But do you think you saw this document which is headed "Iraqi WMD programme" and is dated 5th September? A. If it had been presented at that meeting, which I cannot recall, then in all likelihood I would have done. But, as I say, the point about that meeting was actually to agree a new process for a new dossier. LORD HUTTON: Yes. MR DINGEMANS: Can I then take you to another document dated 5th September? That is CAB/11/17, which was an from Jonathan Powell to you. We start at the bottom of the page, simply working our way up in chronological sequence. You can see, at about you had the meeting at 12, what did you decide on dossiers? And there is a first comment that has been redacted. Up the page you say you will come back on the first; that is obviously irrelevant. You say: "Regarding the dossier, substantial rewrite with JS..." Who is that? A. John Scarlett. Q. "... and Julian M..." A. Miller. Q. "... in charge, which John Scarlett will take to the US next Friday, and be in shape Monday thereafter. Structure as per TB's discussion." I imagine that is the Prime Minister? Q. "Agreement that there has to be real intelligence material in their presentation as such." A. Hmm. Q. If one is talking in terms of a substantial rewrite, it at least suggests you have seen the document or the earlier document we have seen on 5th September. A. I think that is referring to the document you showed me earlier. Q. Right. A. But effectively all of these documents are now in the hands of John Scarlett to turn into a new document. Q. Right.

6 A. That is what was agreed on the 5th and the 9th. Q. Because, I mean, one point in relation to the 5th September document, the document that you have now got in the hard copy or my copy of the hard copy as it were -- Q. -- in that there is no reference to the 45 minute claim? A. I mean, I do not know that. This -- I do not recall this document forming a substantial part of our discussion. Q. We then turn to 6th September. There is an or a note from John Williams, it is CAB/11/19, if I could take you to that. At the bottom we can see John Williams, and to you at the top he says: "I have spoken to Jack and Michael Jay..." Can you help us? A. Jack is the Foreign Secretary. Q. So Jack Straw? A. And Sir Michael Jay, the media secretary of the Foreign Office. Q. "... about the media friendly editorial job that will need to be done when John Scarlett and his team have produced the dossier. They would both be happy for me to devote whatever time necessary doing so. On the timetable we were discussing yesterday, John's team will produce by the end of the week and I could work on it full time the week after. "I think it would be good for the Foreign Office if we could do it that way." Certainly by 6th September, I am going to take you to your of 9th, it looks as though no final conclusion had been reached about whether John Williams was going to be fully involved? A. John Williams at some point was obviously going to be involved because he is the senior press person at the Foreign Office. This was something being coordinated across the departments. But part of our discussion was about the writing of the dossier and at one point I offered John Scarlett, a member of my staff, if he wanted it to help him write it. John Williams was volunteering for the job; so was somebody else at the Foreign Office. John Scarlett was absolutely clear the word was "ownership", he wanted ownership of the dossier and the best way to have that was to write it. Q. Can I now bring you on to 9th September. On 9th September you may recall the IISS dossier was published. Q. Can I take you to a document at CAB/11/20? This is an from Philip Bassett to you, amongst others. Can you tell everyone who Philip Bassett is? A. Philip Bassett is a senior special adviser who works for me in Downing Street. Q. And: "Importance: High." "Jim Poston..." Can you remind us? A. He was the then head of the CIC. Q. "... says there's a [Cabinet Office] meeting at 2 pm today [with] John Williams on the dossier. Should we have someone there, to stay part of the process as it goes along? Any takers?" If we look at CAB/1/266, I hope this shows that you chaired the meeting on this day. Is that right? A. No, what has come up is my evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee. Q. Your memo to the Foreign Affairs Committee. If you look, it is the second entry down. That is a different meeting. Q. Right. A. That is the meeting with John Scarlett and others that led to the -- my minute of September 9. Q. Right. Which I will come to. Q. So there are two meetings going on this day relating to the dossier. One, John Williams is dealing with at 2 o'clock in the Cabinet Office, is that right? A. Well, that would suggest that. I am not aware that I replied to that . Q. I have not seen a reply to it. A. I do not think I did reply to it.

7 Q. Do you know whether or not the meeting went ahead? A. I do not. Q. Also on 9th September there was another meeting, which was probably the more significant meeting because that is what you refer to the FAC, is that right? Q. You were in the chair for the planning meeting for the WMD dossier, is that right? A. That is correct. Q. And can I then take you to your diary entry? Picking it up at about four lines down. Q. Who was the meeting with? A. First of all there was a meeting, one on one, myself with John Scarlett. Q. Right. What were you discussing then? A. We were discussing the dossier -- Q. Right. A. -- and the process that was going to lead to my minute of September 9th. We were then joined by three very senior SIS officers who had asked to -- for that meeting, and actually used that meeting to indicate that they were very unhappy at two press reports, one in the Financial Times and one in the Daily Telegraph, which suggested that the SIS were unhappy at their involvement in the dossier process. Q. What was the gist of their comments to you about whether they were happy or not? A. That these stories did not remotely reflect their views or the views of the leadership of the agencies, who were perfectly content to cooperate with the Prime Minister on the dossier. Q. And at the meeting, did you agree the process for writing the dossier? A. We did. Q. What was the agreement? A. The agreement was that John Scarlett would be in sole charge of the writing of the dossier and that we, at No. 10, would give him whatever support he asked for. LORD HUTTON: Just going back to this meeting with the three senior SIS officers, did you receive any indication that there might have been unhappiness in the lower ranks of the intelligence agencies about the writing of the dossier, about what would be in it? A. Not at that stage. LORD HUTTON: Yes. MR DINGEMANS: You say "not at that stage". I will come to it later but as you have opened that issue up, did you become aware of unhappiness within lower ranks in the intelligence agency? A. Well, only through what I was reading in the newspapers, which was obviously causing us and indeed the leadership of the agencies some concern; and at a later point, which I think I recorded in my diary, John Scarlett again coming to see me to assure us this was not the view of the agencies. And the leadership of the agencies said to me: there may well be people down the ranks who are not happy with this but you have to know that it is not the view of the agencies at the top. Q. Right. We will come back to that, if I may. On 9th September, following that meeting that you have just outlined to us, you produced a document. Can I take you to CAB/6/2? Q. And who is this from and to? A. It is from me to John Scarlett. Q. Right. And we can see, from the top right-hand corner it is copied into a number of different people, including some people who have been redacted. Q. I mean, perhaps you can just explain what you say is the central thrust of this memorandum? A. The purpose of the memorandum is to ensure that everybody on that copy list, which basically

8 means anybody of significance to this process in all of the relevant Government departments and all of the agencies, understands that this is a new project and that it is being led and directed by John Scarlett, and the JIC. And I make the point that the work -- that its credibility depends fundamentally upon that. It also makes the point that it is a new dossier, and I say: "Therefore, the rush of comments on the old dossier are not necessary or totally relevant. People should wait for the new one, which will be more detailed and substantial." It then explains the structure that we had agreed for the document. It then goes through -- can I read this paragraph? Q. Yes, of course, the important points you want to extract from this document. A. It says: "The media/political judgment will inevitably focus on 'what's new?' and I was pleased to hear from you and your SIS colleagues that, contrary to media reports today, the intelligence community are taking such a helpful approach to this in going through all the material they have. It goes without saying there should be nothing published that you and they are not 100 per cent happy with." I then explain nobody should be talking to the press about this. "Partial leaks, or running commentaries on an out of date document help nobody. "Our public line is that the dossier will set out the facts which make HMG judge Iraq/WMD to represent a real threat. It will be detailed and comprehensive. As to why we can't publish it now, it has to be cleared by all those who have helped to build the case. This involves important judgments, and we will take our time." Q. I think, at the bottom of the page, you say: "In the meantime...", you deal with how the process is going to work. Perhaps you can help us with this. A. This is in -- "We agreed that by the end of today, you should have most of the draft material together, with the Agencies providing the sections relevant to the middle part of your structure, and the FCO providing the more historical material." Q. At the bottom of the page you identify you were going to chair a team. What was the purpose of that team? A. What I said was I would chair a team to go through the document from a presentational point of view and to make recommendations to John Scarlett. It was at that point that we were discussing and I offered the use of a single full time writer to help him; and John Scarlett, at that point -- then or that day -- certainly said to me that he wanted "ownership" and the best way to have that was for him to write it, for him and his team to write it. Q. Right. Now, in relation to that meeting, which I think you have said to his Lordship was not a meeting of the Iraq Communications Group, you were in the chair of that meeting, is that right? A. That is correct. Q. And the subsequent round table meetings, did you have any further round table meetings with John Scarlett? A. I had a number of meetings with John Scarlett; and I will certainly have had meetings at which both John and I attended. These were the two, as it were, formal meetings at which -- which is why I wrote out a minute from them. Q. Following the second meeting? A. Following the second meeting, yes. Q. You are in the chair and John Scarlett's position was -- I mean, was he effectively an equal to you at that meeting? A. Absolutely. Q. Can I then take you to the 10th September? We have now dealt with 9th September and your memorandum in relation to that. Then, on the 10th September, at 12.25, we can see, at CAB 11/21, an from Daniel Pruce to Mark Matthews. Perhaps you can just help us, first of all, with the people involved in this. Who is Daniel Pruce? A. He is a Foreign Office press officer based in Downing Street. Q. And Mark Matthews? A. He is a press officer in the Foreign Office.

9 Q. And Matthew Ryecroft? A. He is a member of David Manning's team. Q. Paul Hammill? A. The Coalition Information Centre. Q. And Godric Smith? A. Prime Minister's spokesmen. Q. You have obviously introduced yourself. We can see a series of comments Daniel Pruce makes on "John's draft of 9th September". Do you know what that was a reference to? Was that a reference to John Williams's document I showed you? A. I do not know. I do know that I did not reply to this or the exchanges that it generated; and I think this is part of the office chatter that I referred to in my note, to say comments on out of date documents are irrelevant, people should wait for the new one. LORD HUTTON: Well, who was the John there that is referred to in that first line? A. I do not know, my Lord. I do not know if that is Williams or Scarlett. It could be -- I mean, that -- I am just reading through now to see. (Pause). That looks like John Scarlett, I think. MR DINGEMANS: You see, what we have, and I have been through this process a number of times, is we have a dossier on 20th June. Q. I think I have shown you that. Then we have one on 5th September. Then we go to the 10th/11th September. We have not been given a copy of a dossier on 9th September. Do you recall whether or not at 9th September there was a dossier? A. No, there was not. The first draft of the John Scarlett dossier -- I beg your pardon, it is 9th September. It was 10th September. I beg your pardon. That cannot have been John Scarlett's then. This must have been referring to something else that went to that meeting. Q. You see, it talks as if it is referring to a dossier. "On content. "In general I think we should personalise the dossier..." If you are talking about a draft of another document, it is a slightly unusual comment to make. A. All I know is the draft of the dossier that came to me from John Scarlett came to me on September 10th. Q. Continuing the next comment: "The personal witness statements are very powerful. Are there more we can use to illustrate Saddam's repression... "We make a number of statements about Saddam's intentions/attitudes. Can we insert a few quotes from speeches... "In the public's mind the key difference between this text and the IISS text will be the access to intelligence material." It rather looks, is this a fair comment, that he is referring to a draft of the dossier? A. It does. I accept that. But I cannot explain the date on the , given that I did not receive John Scarlett's draft until September 10th, unless that is -- I am sorry to be -- I am sorry to be -- not to be clear on this. He calls it "John's draft of 9th September" but his is dated September 10th. Q. Yes. A. So it could be he is commenting on that. But the point I made earlier is that there are -- this is reflecting -- the only people in Downing Street authorised by the Prime Minister to deal with John Scarlett on this were myself, Jonathan Powell and David Manning, no-one else. I do not recall responding to this at all. Q. Unless he is referring to the draft which we have of 5th September; I think I have shown you that briefly, in fact you have my hard copy of it. A. Do you want it back? Q. Do not worry, I can live without it. As far as 5th September, unless he is referring to what was written in 5th September, and it is only in manuscript we have that, unless that was the dossier he was referring to? A. I just do not know, I am afraid. I am sorry.

10 Q. Can I take you to CAB/11/22. A possible explanation, as you rightly pointed out, was he just got the date wrong, as it were. Q. You see this is an from Felicity Hatfield. Can you explain to everyone who she is? A. She is one of my secretaries. Q. To Alison Blackshaw; who is she? A. She is my personal assistant. Q. It is subject "John Scarlett's office 'telephone call'". It rather suggests there is a telephone call. You will see it says this: "A draft dossier will be ready at 1800 hours. They'll send one over." We do not need to know how it got over. That rather suggests the 10th September dossier was not produced until 1800 hours. A. It does. Q. Which, if one goes back, suggests the comments you are being copied into are on an earlier dossier. A. I accept that. But I do not know what that is commenting on. Q. Because the earlier dossiers, certainly the ones we have seen to this point, do not at this stage have the 45 minute point in. A. That is correct. Q. Can I then take you, very briefly, to your diary entry for 10th September. I think you make a note about receiving the dossier. Can you just tell us what happened? A. It simply records I received the dossier and I read it at home. Q. Right. And that dossier, can I take you to DOS/2/2? Now, this is a dossier that has 10th/11th September 2002 in the top right-hand corner. Q. Again, we do not know whose writing that is. I think someone suggested it might be Mr Scarlett's, so I will ask him about that. A. The date? Q. Yes. A. I do not know. Q. You do not know. It has a foreword in it, at the moment. And it also has, if we turn to -- this includes the 45-minute point in the dossier. Q. I think that accords with your recollection, which was the dossier you saw on 10th September had the 45 minute point in it? A. Correct. Q. Do you know where that had come from? A. I did not, no. Q. If we go to DOS/2/7, to support your recollection down we have: "Envisages the use of weapons of mass destruction in its current military planning, and could deploy such weapons within 45 minutes of the order being given for their use." LORD HUTTON: When you say you do not know where that came from, can you elaborate on that a little? You did not know where the entry of 45 minutes had come from in the sense you did not know what it was based on? A. I knew it had come from the JIC but I was not aware either of the raw intelligence on which it was based or of the sourcing. What is more, I did not make any effort to find out. LORD HUTTON: No. MR DINGEMANS: Can I just then, at the moment, come back to the issue about dissatisfaction of members of the intelligence staff about some of the comments being made --

11 Q. -- and take you to an at CAB/3/21 specific about Dr Kelly. We have been given a redacted version. This is 10th September, Q. You can see the subject is "Dossier -- Iraq". Given the timing, at 11.41, that rather suggests he is not commenting on the 10th/11th September dossier because that is not published until 6 o'clock, as far as we can see. Q. The person who sends it says this: "I have just spoken to Dr David Kelly... about the growth media amount page 8 top para line 2. It states UN inspectors could not account for up to 20 tonnes... In fact tonnes was missing. UNSCOM could not account for a further tonnes which Iraq claimed it used in BW work. But Iraq has not revealed its production documents therefore this amount is unaccounted for. The existing wording is not wrong -- but it has...", and the person, Mr Lamb, suggested it was just a typo for "a lot of spin on it". Q. Were you aware of comments of this nature being made at the time amongst Defence Intelligence personnel? A. No. And that is the first time I have seen that . Q. And the only other document, can I take you to MoD/4/9, which was a document which is dated in July 2003, and it is for a briefing, but this relates to concerns that were expressed contemporaneously. You can see that concerns were expressed into three main groups: recent production of agent; the 45 minute claim; and Saddam and the importance of CBW. Q. One can see in relation to the 45 minutes claim, if I can just deal with that -- Q. -- that concerns had apparently related to the level of certainty expressed in the foreword and executive summary: "By this stage in the drafting process, following consultation with the DIS, the main text said 'intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so'. This reflected the language in the 9 September JIC paper." Which supports your suggestion of where it has come from. Q. "The executive summary expressed the point differently, as a judgment. The personnel concerned did not share this judgment. But it was agreed by the JIC." Q. That, at the least, indicates there were some people who were unhappy with some of the wording that was going on; you were not aware of that? A. I was not aware of that. Q. Finally, on this subject, can I take you to MoD/4/11, which was a letter of 8th July 2003 written to Mr Howard. Q. And it is from a former intelligence officer who is writing, having read the Foreign Affairs Committee report -- Q. -- wondering whether he had obligations in relation to putting the record straight, as he saw it. But what he says in the second paragraph is this: "Your records will show that as [he gives the pneumonics to describe what he was doing] and probably the most senior and experienced intelligence community official working on 'WMD', I was so concerned about the manner in which intelligence assessments for which I had some responsibility were being presented in the dossier of 24 September 2002, that I was moved to write formally to your predecessor, Tony Cragg, recording and explaining my reservations."

12 We have not seen the formal letter beforehand. We now do not need to because that shows something had been written before. Were you aware of this sort of level of commentary? A. No. Q. All right. Can I then take you to your diary on 11th September. This dossier that we have is published 10th/11th. Q. I think it shows that you have had a meeting with John Scarlett. Is there anything you want to tell us about that? It appears to suggest you had a long chat with him. A. I said, "The drier the better, cut the rhetoric". Q. That is referring to the dossier? A. That is referring -- and I think I referred to this in my evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee. I think there were areas where the language was too colourful. And I also said the more intelligencebased it was, the better. Need to separate IISS from what was new in this. In other words, we needed to have a clear explanation of where the material information in this dossier took things forward from what was in the IISS report and then gave some suggestions later re the different structure. That was how the -- in what was now quite a fast-moving drafting process towards publication, how Julian Miller and his team were going to structure the document according to the structure that had been agreed on 5th and 9th September, and I then had a meeting about that. Q. Right. A. It is at that stage, I think, that I first showed that draft to the Prime Minister. Q. Right, around 11th September? A. 11th September, late in the day. Q. Can I take you some s making the rounds on 11th September, CAB/11/23. This is from Philip Bassett, you told us he was the press officer -- A. He is a special adviser in Downing Street. Q. He is replying, at 327, to Godric Smith at If you go down to the bottom, at there is Daniel's Pruce's , it is to you and copied to others. It is subject: "Draft Dossier (J Scarlett version of 10th September)." Daniel Pruce is? A. He is a Foreign Office press officer based in Downing Street. Q. He said: "It is getting there, but needs more work. My initial thoughts on this latest draft." He talks about ownership, which I think was a point you made. A. I think that is a separate point. That was the point who should sign the foreword. John Scarlett's point about ownership was he had to own the whole document. Q. And: "The foreword is good but whose voice is it? Do we need a Minister to sign it off?" That is what starts the process running, I suppose, until the Prime Minister -- A. It is not actually. Danny Pruce is a very, very good press officer, but this is him making contributions effectively above his pay grade. The foreword process was already under discussion between myself, the Prime Minister and John Scarlett. I think all these s actually are from people who are meaning perfectly well, but actually are not terribly closely involved in the process. Q. If we continue to page 24, his , your comments would be the same; he says: "Feel: "Our aim should also be to convey the impression that things have not been static in Iraq but that over the past decade he has been aggressively and relentlessly pursuing WMD while brutally repressing his own people. Again the dossier gets close to this -- but I think some drafting changes could bring this out more." A. It is a perfectly fair point but I think it is one that we would have had already. Q. Right. And if we go back to 23, going up the page, because of the way the s work. Godric Smith, I think you have told us he is the Prime Minister's official spokesman? A. That is right. Q. "I think there is material here we can work with but it is a bit of a muddle and needs a lot more

13 clarity in the guts of it in terms of what is new/old. In each area we need to distinguish between the two and better source (as much as we can) to intelligence. It needs to be more factual if anything, less assertion based, with the rhetoric stripped out..." Q. Then Philip Bassett's comments, he agreed with Godric. Is this right, it is starting off lower down with Daniel Pruce and getting more in accordance with pay grades as we work our way up? A. I think the top pay grade is in the middle. And actually -- Godric's point I think -- if I took any of them on-board, it would have been that one. But the reality is I receive an awful lot of s that I do not read, because they are sifted for me and at this -- by this time, in terms of the people who were centrally involved in this process, it was myself in No. 10 with Jonathan Powell and David Manning being kept informed, and it was John Scarlett in the JIC. Q. Right. Just CAB/11/25 to give you the opportunity to comment on this . We can see at the bottom of the page, the that we have looked at before, 11th September. Q. But there appears to be an earlier comment. This seems to be from Philip Bassett to Daniel Bruce. Q. And the comment is this: "Very long way to go, I think. Think we're in a lot of trouble with this as it stands now." Did you see any of these s? It appears to have been sent to Daniel Pruce and yourself. A. I do not recall seeing it. Again, it falls in the same category as the others that I have just mentioned. Q. Right. And then I think, at this stage, the Foreign Secretary made some comments. If we go to CAB/11/34, one can see also on 17th September this is an from Mark Sedwill; can you help me who he is? A. He was, at that time, the Foreign Secretary's private secretary. Q. This is to Charles Gray. A. A colleague in the Foreign Office. Q. You are copied in, we can see that from the list further down. Q. The says: "Charles. "The Foreign Secretary has now had a chance to go through the draft dossier and he has endorsed the comments I made earlier on it (see below) and has the following additional points." He makes a series of points on the draft dossier. Q. If there is anything you want me to highlight in that, just identify it for me. This is a reasonable summary, just makes points about the foreword: "Should be in narrative form by the Prime Minister. "Executive summary, very good." Then some specific points on sections 1 and sections 3? I think that is the type of that would certainly have been drawn to my attention, and I do recall seeing it. Q. Right. Turning then to 12th September. At CAB/11/35 you get an from Godric Smith, who you have told us is the Prime Minister's official spokesman on the dossier. He says this: "Julian Miller rang me and said that he would like to come and show someone the latest thinking on the dossier tomorrow without getting into circulating copies just so as they are on the right track. [Something blanked out] I said I thought it was best in the [circumstances] if he spoke to you if you were around tomorrow and were up for it. It is more presentational than content driven. Can Alison let him know if you are on for that..." Does that reflect the sort of contribution you were having to the dossier at this stage? A. It does. I was speaking regularly and meeting regularly John Scarlett and Julian Miller; and I think in my diary records the next day I had a meeting with Julian Miller. Q. Right. In fact, on 12th September, can I ask you, looking at your diary, was there anything you learnt about new sources? A. The 12th -- I beg your pardon.

14 Q. Yes. There was a meeting I attended. Q. Who was at the meeting? A. The meeting was with the Prime Minister, Jonathan Powell, David Manning, myself, the head of the SIS and a senior SIS officer. Q. Yes. A. The last of these explain that there had been a new source in recent weeks who had given them new information. We were being told this because the information was important, but also it was being emphasised this was information that could not go into the dossier. Q. So this was not the 45 minute point? A. No, it was not. This was other information. Q. Too important to be put in the published dossier, as it were? LORD HUTTON: Why could it not be put into the dossier? A. From memory, my Lord, it was -- LORD HUTTON: Would you like to look at your diary entry -- A. It was for reasons of source protection. LORD HUTTON: Yes. Right. A. And what C, the head of SIS said, was there was some material in there which could be used through what he called "through assertion", in other words not necessarily specifically linked to indicate it as intelligence, but that was not the 45 minutes point. MR DINGEMANS: No. A. Then I made the observation, at the end of that, that it was the sort of thing that would be good to put into the dossier but we were not in a position to do so. Q. Turning then to 13th September, I think you tell us you had a meeting with Julian Miller. Your diary may help with that. What was the gist of that meeting? A. That was to see how Julian's team were progressing in terms of putting this document together according to the structure that had been agreed on the 5th and the 9th. And he was simply showing me where the various parts were being put together and showing me how far he had got in that process. Q. Right. Did you have any particular concerns that you recorded about the dossier? A. I was concerned, at that stage, that in too many parts of it we were relying too much on assertion. Q. What do you mean by that? A. What I mean by that is that it -- without necessarily the explanation to underpin a claim that is being made. Q. Right. Turning then on to 16th September. Can I take you to CAB/11/38? This is from Felicity Hatfield. I think you explained she was one of your secretaries? Q. To Alison Blackshaw, and I think you explained she was your personal assistant, is that right? Q. It has: "Subject: Draft" and then it has a Word document which has "ACTB foreword DO". Was that your of the draft dossier foreword for the Prime Minister, as it were? A. I presume it must have been. Q. Can I take you on to CAB/11/39, this may help: "Dossier foreword by TB." Q. And who had, in fact, drafted that aspect of it? A. I prepared a draft based upon a discussion with the Prime Minister, and with others, about what should go into that draft. Q. Right. Can I take you to an answer you had given to the Intelligence and Security Committee at

15 ISC/1/46? It is the second and third parts of it. Michael Mates MP has asked this: "I'm absolutely certain from what John Scarlett and other have said that you didn't interfere in any way with this [he is talking about the dossier] and I hope the committee will say so in terms, as far as the body of it is concerned. What about the foreword, did you draft that?" You say this: "The foreword, again the process is that it would normally be that there would be I, Jonathan Powell, others would have ideas and we'd probably have a discussion with the Prime Minister, on that one the Prime Minister was very 'hands on' in terms of what was produced and what was sent over to John Scarlett. "Michael Mates: But you played a part in that? Okay." What the documents appear to show is you say you had a discussion with the Prime Minister about the foreword? Q. And you have then produced the draft foreword and then ed it on? A. I think the process was I had a meeting with the Prime Minister who -- and this tends to be if I am writing something as a draft for the Prime Minister how we would do it, where he will express his thoughts as to what it should say and how it would say it. I, based upon that, will go and draft something. I do not recall doing this, but I will probably have shown it to David Manning and to Jonathan Powell. I certainly showed a draft to John Scarlett. I think what happened was then I showed it to the Prime Minister, he had some thoughts and comments. I think there was another version. Then John Scarlett made some detailed comments and they were all incorporated then it was signed off. Q. That is 16th September. If we go to DOS/2/58, we have here the draft dossier of 16th September. Now, just to keep the chronology, we have seen something on 20th June, 5th September, then 10th to 11th September, although it looks like you sent it on the 10th? A. 10th. Q. And then this is 16th September. And this dossier does not, at this stage, include the foreword. If we go to page 59, you can see "Contents: Executive Summary". DOS/2/59. Sorry about that. A. Okay. Q. We can see there "Contents: Executive Summary". Q. Et ceter A. But what we are missing is the foreword? Q. Which we have just tracked on the . Did you see this document? A. This is a more up-to-date draft of the dossier? Q. Yes. A. I will certainly have seen that, I am sure. Q. Can I take you to DOS/2/72. We can see here "Recent intelligence": "Intelligence has become available from reliable sources complimenting various aspects. Confirmation that chemical and biological weapons play an important part in Iraqi military thinking." Q. "Iraqi attempts to retain banned weapons systems and his willingness to use." The reference to 45 minutes is the: "Iraqi military may be able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so." Q. Which appears to be a slightly weaker assessment in terms of words. It still includes the 45 minutes. It has still come from the Intelligence Services, but the wording is slightly weaker than that which we saw on 10th September. First of all, do you agree with that, that the wording is slightly -- A. Can you remind me what the 10th September was. Q. I can take you back to that aspect, if you like, which was at DOS/2/7. A. "Could", "could deploy", yes. Q. You remember I showed you the bullet point?

16 Q. It looks, on one view, slightly stronger than you see it on 16th September? Q. Were you party to any of these discussions which had led to a sort of slight reduction in the prominence of the 45 minute claim? A. No. Q. Right. A. I was involved in -- as I think I quote in my witness statement -- pointing out a slight inconsistency in the way that was expressed. I do not know if that refers to those two parts, but that is -- that is referred to in my witness statement. LORD HUTTON: Was that an inconsistency within a dossier itself or an inconsistency between two dossiers? A. No. The point I made to John Scarlett was that I thought that one could be in -- one was expressed slightly differently to the other. LORD HUTTON: Was that within the same dossier? A. Within the same dossier. LORD HUTTON: Yes. A. And John Scarlett undertook to check that against the raw intelligence and he duly did; and I could not -- I had no part in what he actually wrote ultimately, but I pointed out that inconsistency. MR DINGEMANS: Right. Can I take you to your diary entry for 16th September, which -- does that help you recollect whether you had any further discussions this day about the dossier? A. Simply that that -- we had a discussion there, which clearly we were discussing the fact that the Americans were thinking of doing their own version of this. Q. Yes. A. That was obviously going to have potential implications for the one that we were doing. Q. Right. And who was the discussion with? A. John Scarlett. Q. Can I take you to BBC/4/69 which is an extract from the lobby briefing for 16th September. If we go down halfway, "Iraq dossier" and the Prime Minister's official spokesman is: "Asked whether the timing of publication of the dossier, on the very morning of that Parliament resumed, was deliberate in order to do everything on one day, or whether it was because the dossier would not be ready before then, the PMOS said that the publication had been moved onto a faster track than originally intended and that had caused some difficulties. The intention was, as Jack Straw had said yesterday, to give people as good an insight as possible without compromising intelligence. It was expected to take up until the morning of 24th September to get the dossier ready." Then he was asked about, you know, publication process? Q. So, at that stage, the actual date for publication has become known? A. That would appear so. Q. Did that lead to a lot of -- we have seen what are said to have been comments made by Dr Kelly to journalists at the time. One of the comments was that there was a bit of a rush in the last couple of weeks. Do you recall, from your own experience, whether that was right or not? A. No, I think the -- I have been involved in an awful lot of Prime Ministerial events and documents and publications and there is always, in the final stage towards publication, lots of last minute discussions and details to be addressed, but I would say that of all of the things that I have been involved with the attention to detail that was paid in this one was absolutely meticulous. Q. Right. Then, can I take you back to CAB/1/266. Just so that you are orientated, this is your memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Committee?