Wednesday August , 2pm: Godric Smith and Tom Kelly, official spokesmen of the prime minister

Transcription

1 Wednesday August , 2pm: Godric Smith and Tom Kelly, official spokesmen of the prime minister 2.00 pm: MR GODRIC WILLIAM NAYLOR SMITH (called) Examined by MR KNOX LORD HUTTON: Yes Mr Knox. MR KNOX: My Lord, the next witness is Mr Godric Smith. LORD HUTTON: Yes. MR KNOX: Could you tell the Inquiry your name and occupation. A. My name is Godric William Naylor Smith. I am currently one of two of the Prime Minister's official spokesmen. Q. Since when have you worked in Downing Street? A. I joined Downing Street in January 1996 and have been working on the press side since that time. Q. Since when have you been one of the two official spokesmen? A. I was appointed to that post after the last election, in June I had been promoted to the post of Deputy Press Secretary in March Q. What are the principal tasks of your present job? A. I think they can be summarised as follows: firstly, to provide media advice to the Prime Minister as appropriate; to liaise with other Government departments on the coordination and presentation of Government policy; and probably most importantly to brief the press during Parliament in formal briefings at 11 o'clock and Q. Am I right in thinking those briefings take place on Monday to Thursday but not on Fridays? A. There are two briefings on Mondays and Thursdays, there is only one briefing on a Friday. Q. So there are no briefings on Tuesday and Wednesday, is that right? A. No, they are all week. Q. Every single day? Q. These briefings, are they on the record? A. They are on the record. Q. And are tape recordings kept? A. They are recorded by us and a summary of them is put on the website. Q. We will no doubt see one of those summaries in due course, but those summaries are effectively not word for word summaries but general summaries of what is said? A. They are an accurate reflection of what is said, yes. Q. Could you discuss what a typical day would involve your having to do? A. A typical day would involve reading the papers and being acquainted with media broadcasts before a meeting of Whitehall communications professionals at 8.30 at Downing Street. That is a meeting which is chaired by Alastair Campbell. If I am doing the briefing that day, I would then obviously be preparing myself for that. That may involve speaking to different departments, speaking to the Prime Minister, speaking to Government Ministers as appropriate. After that, obviously monitoring the news, acquainting myself with any further developments before repeating the process at Obviously, after that, dealing with calls as appropriate. Q. If false reports appear in the newspapers or on television, is it part of your job to put those reports right? A. I think that would depend. It is obviously an area which is very subjective and a judgment is taken as to whether something is of such importance that we need to raise it formally, if you like, at the morning briefing or the afternoon briefing. Q. Suppose it is of importance, would it be generally be your job to put things right at one of the briefings? A. Not necessarily. I think a judgment is always taken as to whether something is corrected by the department concerned, either by just a phone call to the journalist, whether a statement is issued by the department, whether a statement is issued by the Minister or whether something is said by Downing Street. Q. And who gives you the information on which you base your briefings? A. It is a combination of the Government departments concerned and, given I am reflecting the Prime Minister's views as well, in fact that is probably the primary purpose of the briefing, obviously the Prime Minister as

2 appropriate. Q. In other words you talk directly to the Prime Minister? Q. Would that be every day? A. I think if I am doing the briefing then I would expect to see him at some point during the day, yes. Q. I would like to ask you one or two questions about your involvement in the preparation of the September dossier. A. Certainly. Q. We know that in August 2002 the Iraq issue begins to bubble up, certainly in the United States, and on 3rd September the Prime Minister announced that the Government was going to make public its latest intelligence on the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. That is on 3rd September. We have had produced to us a first draft dossier which has a date, 5th September, 2002, written on it. There had been previous dossiers in June of 2002 but there is certainly a new one that comes forward on 5th September We have seen an , which I will not take you to unless you want to look at it, I think from Jonathan Powell which suggests there is going to have to be a substantial rewrite of the existing draft before a dossier was put into public circulation. Were you, at any point, told that you were going to play a part in the drafting of the new dossier? A. I think I would describe my role in the dossier as being very limited. This was clearly an issue which was being overseen on the presentation side at Downing Street by Alastair Campbell. I was not asked to play a formal role and did not see a need to do so, in those circumstances. Q. You say you were not asked to play a formal role. Were you at any stage asked to assist in the drafting of the dossier? A. I was not asked to formally to assist, no. I mean, I have no recollection of the which was shown to me last week, which reflects some comments that I made. I think I was obviously, at the time, making some observations about the tone of the document. Q. Well, can we put it this way: were you at any stage shown any drafts of the dossier? A. I was not routinely copied into drafts, no. Q. That was not my question, with respect. Were you at any stage shown any drafts of the dossier? A. I must have seen the first draft of the dossier in as much as I refer to it in this . I have to say my recollection of my part in the dossier is very sketchy, I think in large part because it was very limited. Q. Were you ever told by anyone what the purpose of producing this new dossier was? I think I can perhaps best explain it in this way: I had heard the Prime Minister express his concerns about the issue of weapons of mass destruction for many years. Those concerns had grown after the tragic events of He had obviously expressed the view that those concerns or the increase in those concerns were based on the intelligence assessments that were passing his desk and those that he was reading, and he wanted to share those with the British public. Q. Could I ask you, please, to look at CAB/6/2? This is a memo from Alastair Campbell. It looks as if it is written to John Scarlett. One of the recipients to whom it is copied is PMOS. That would be you and Mr Kelly presumably? A. It would. Q. Do you remember being copied in with this document? A. I do. Q. If you just go over the page to page 3, you will see the fourth paragraph down: "Our public line is that the dossier will set out the facts which make HMG judge Iraq/WMD to represent a real threat. It will be detailed and comprehensive. As to why we can't publish it now, it has to be cleared by all those who have helped to build the case. This involves important judgments, and we will take our time." I want to pause on the phrase "who have helped to build the case". Was that really what was involved in this? I do not mean in any sinister way but in a general way was this dossier really building the case for going to war? A. I think the dossier was explaining the case, if you like, as -- or phrase it in a different way, building the case, if you like, as to why the Prime Minister felt that the threat from Saddam Hussein was serious and why it had to be addressed. In respect of making the case for war, I would say that the Prime Minister did that in his statement to the House in March. Q. Can I ask you, please, to look at CAB/11/20? This is an from Mr Bassett to Mr Campbell. I think you are also one of the recipients.

3 A. Hmm, hmm. Q. And it refers to "a Cabinet Office meeting at 2 pm today with John Williams on the dossier". Were you one of the people who attended that meeting or not? A. Not to my recollection, no. I cannot recollect going to any meetings at the Cabinet Office in respect of the dossier. Q. Then, if you go to CAB/11/21, you will see a memo from Daniel Pruce to Mark Matthews. Again, you are copied in on this. Q. Do you remember this at all? A. I do not remember the specifically. I mean, clearly there were observations being made by members of the communications team on some of the issues which related to presentation. Q. And you are one of them? A. I am certainly somebody who expressed a view, yes. Q. And it looks as if what is being considered is John's draft of 9th September, do you see that? A. That is right. Q. Do you recall John's draft of 9th September? A. I recall seeing a draft, yes, which I now know was John Scarlett's first draft, yes. Q. Just to pick up the point I was making a moment ago about building a case for going to war -- Q. -- could you just drop down to the paragraph beginning "On presentation". The presentation side as I understand it was really the side if not you, certainly those who were working with you were going to be looking at? A. Yes, absolutely. Q. Not the intelligence side but the presentation side? Q. Look at the second paragraph: "Much of the evidence we have is largely circumstantial so we need to convey to our readers that the cumulation of these facts demonstrates an intent on Saddam's part -- the more they can be led to this conclusion themselves rather than have to accept judgments from us, the better." Now, that certainly suggests that Mr Pruce regarded it as his job to try to get the public to come to their own conclusions, in very much the way the advocate tries to get the judge to come to the judge's own conclusions. Is there not some force in the suggestion that the way Mr Pruce appears to be looking at this job is to build a case, a bit like building a prosecution case? A. I think what we were dealing with here was a unique situation, where, for the first time, we were putting into the public domain intelligence of a magnitude which I do not think had been done before. In doing that necessarily there was going to have to be an interface between intelligence professionals and those involved in communication. I have to say, in respect of those views, they were not views that I shared. My view was that we were setting out to the public why the Prime Minister believed Saddam Hussein was a threat that had to be addressed, and the intelligence base upon which that judgment was being made by the Prime Minister; and it seemed to me, so far as I can recall, obviously, from the which I have seen in the last few days, that the drier the better. Q. You will see the last paragraph on this same page: "We also need to think, once we have John's further draft tomorrow, how we prepare the ground for the launch of the text to get expectations in the right place." Was it not one of your jobs as the Prime Minister's official spokesmen to ensure that was going to be the case, to get expectations in the right place? A. Having seen a subsequent that my colleague, Mr Pruce, sent, he refers to the need to get the media expectation in the right place as to for example the length of the document. I think the fact that that comes under "mechanics" probably explains that view. Q. Can I ask you to look at page 23 in CAB 11? At the foot of the page, there is an of 11th September, sent on 11th September at 10.04, do you have that? Q. Sent to Alastair Campbell. It is from Daniel Pruce again. You are copied in again. A. Hmm, hmm. Q. Now what is under discussion is the draft dossier, J Scarlett version of 10th September. A. Hmm, hmm.

4 Q. Presumably you would have been provided with a copy of that draft? A. To be absolutely honest with you I do not know which draft I was routinely being copied in on. I was not being routinely copied in on anything. Therefore I was probably being presented with a dossier and being asked for views. Q. Could I ask you to go over the page, to page 24? Q. Under the heading "Feel", do you have this: "Our aim should also be to convey the impression that things have not been static in Iraq but that over the past decade he has been aggressively and relentlessly pursuing WMD while brutally repressing his own people. Again the dossier gets close to this -- but I think some drafting changes could bring this out more". Presumably you read this -- is that a yes, just for the record? Q. Did you think Mr Pruce was somehow going well beyond his remit in offering these comments? A. Well, as far as I was concerned the person who was leading on the presentation of the dossier as regards Downing Street was Alastair Campbell. Q. But he was inviting comments from others. A. I do not know if he was inviting comments but I think people were giving comments. Q. They were being given drafts. A. It is not uncommon for drafts of documents to be circulated. Q. Mr Smith, I must be frank with you, people had been given drafts and then they are commenting on the drafts. Q. The reason they are given the drafts surely is so they can comment on them. A. I do not dispute that. Q. Then, if you drop down to the final paragraph on this page under the heading "Weapons": "Do you want to meet and discuss today? Separately I'm in touch with the FCO on production and distribution. We also need to develop a handling plan to get expectations in the right place before we launch." A. Again, I would come back to the point I made. I mean, in terms of how we briefed in advance on this document, I do not think we were doing anything other than saying what the Prime Minister would do, namely set out to the public -- given that this was an issue which was coming under a great deal of scrutiny in which there was a lot of public interest, that he would be setting out to the public the intelligence that underpinned his very firmly held belief that Saddam Hussein posed a threat. Q. Can I ask you, please, to go to CAB/11/25 and this time go to the top of the page, because you will see an from Philip Bassett which is sent shortly after the we just looked at, 11th September, 10.34, to Daniel Pruce. You are copied in. "Re draft dossier". You will see the concern expressed by Mr Bassett: "Very long way to go, I think. Think we're in a lot of trouble with this as it stands now." Do you recall this at all? A. I do not recall this, no. Q. Do you not recall the general thinking which this appears to suggest was present on 11th September was there was an awful lot of work that had to be done on this dossier before it could be released to the public? A. I think there is a difference between what I would describe as legitimate work that needs to be done on the presentational side, in terms of the dossier, and work on the intelligence side, if you like. Q. Is not the fundamental problem that is being referred to here that the dossier at the moment is nowhere near convincing enough, that is why "we are in a lot of trouble"? A. My view, throughout this, was that the Prime Minister saw intelligence assessments, we were carrying out work, i.e. the Downing Street communications directorate was involved in a piece of work that he believed was important and that he wanted to set out his -- or why he had such firmly held beliefs. Q. Mr Smith, I asked you about why he thought or why anyone would have thought you were in trouble on 11th September. What is the answer to that? A. Well, it was not a view I shared. Q. So you did not think you were in trouble on 11th September? A. My view was clearly this was an issue where people would have very strongly held views, I think that went without saying, but that given we were setting out to the public the intelligence which underpinned the Prime Minister's belief, that was what was guiding us. Q. Could I ask you to go to CAB/11/27? I am just trying to follow these s through chronologically because

5 there is one here from Tom Kelly to Alastair Campbell, again which you are copied in on, at 11.50: "This does have some new elements to play with, but there is one central weakness -- we do not differentiate enough between capacity and intent. We know that he is a bad man and has done bad things in the past. We know he is trying to get WMD -- and this shows those attempts are intensifying. But can we show why we think he intends to use them aggressively, rather than in self-defence. We need that to counter the argument that Saddam is bad, but not mad." Again, does this not rather show that an argument is being developed and what your remit is is to develop this argument in drafting this dossier? A. I think what that is doing is asking a question. It is not giving an answer. And I think what I need to stress, because I think it is important in this respect, is that everybody understood that nothing should happen to this document that John Scarlett, the head of the JIC, was not entirely happy with. Q. I am not for a moment suggesting otherwise. What I am trying to work out is what is the purpose of this document. Certainly you were being copied in on all these s, which seemed to give a fairly clear indication of what its purpose is. Can I ask you to look at the of the top of the page, the reply from Matthew Rycroft you are copied in on. He is replying to Mr Kelly's "Yes, part of the answer to 'why now?' is that the threat will only get worse if we don't act now -- the threat that Saddam will use WMD, but also the threat that Iraq's WMD will somehow get into the hands of terrorists..." So there is one answer or attempted answer to the problem: how do we make out or how do we establish there is a current threat rather than a future threat? Would it be fair to say that was one of the points that had to be addressed in this dossier: how to establish he is a current threat rather than a future threat? A. I do not think anybody at any point was trying to second guess the intelligence judgments that underpinned this dossier, not in any way, shape or form. It is certainly the case that both those arguments reflected in Matthew Rycroft's s were points that the Prime Minister made forcefully at the time of publication, firstly that the policy of sanctions was not working and that the more money that Saddam Hussein acquired illegally, the more capacity he had to use that money on illegal weapons. Q. Was it not one of the purposes of the dossier to establish that the threat had increased in recent months or certainly in the past year or so; is that right? A. That was the Prime Minister's view. Q. And therefore the purpose of the dossier was to get that view across? A. Well, in as much as the Prime Minister was setting out to the country why he felt that this was an issue which had to be addressed, then, yes. Q. Can I ask you, please, to go back to page 23 and just following through the sequence chronologically, there is an about two-thirds of the way down the page from you -- A. Hmm, hmm. Q. -- about the draft dossier. You say: "I think there is material here we can work with but is it a bit of a muddle and needs a lot more clarity in the guts of it in terms of what is new/old." A. Hmm, hmm. Q. Pausing there for a moment, is that what you saw to be a main concern, you had to establish what the new intelligence or the new information was? A. I think the is really written from the perspective of somebody looking at a dossier whose knowledge of the subject is pretty limited, which would certainly be where I was coming from at the time, and making some observations in respect of presentation, and saying that it is not unreasonable for somebody reading this dossier for the first time to say: well, what do we know already? And what is new? I think that is an entirely reasonable thing to say. Q. In other words, if you look at your next sentence: "In each area we need to distinguish between the two...", that must be the new and the old? Q. Surely the reason you needed to distinguish between the new and the old was to establish events had relatively recently taken place which now made it necessary to consider taking more aggressive action? A. Nobody was talking about taking any action at this point. We were seeking to get this resolved through the United Nations. But certainly, I mean the Prime Minister wanted to put before the public evidence which he had seen in recent months which indicated to him that this was a serious threat that had to be dealt with.

6 Q. Then again on page 23, you will see the from Philip Bassett, this time at He says: "Agree with Godric." Then he makes some more comments. The final one is: "It needs to end. At the moment it just stops. A conclusion, saying something -- making a case which is compelling. At the moment, it isn't." A. That was obviously Phil's judgment. The point I would make is the person whose judgment was important here and guided us at all times was the Prime Minister. Q. I understand that. What I am trying to work out is what it all of you -- I do not mean Alastair Campbell necessarily, but there is obviously yourself, Daniel Pruce, Mr Kelly, Matthew Rycroft, Philip Bassett, you are all involved in this loop of s, are you not? A. Hmm, hmm. Q. And the subject under consideration is the draft dossier, and really your concern, at the time, which is reflected not necessarily individually but the general concern at the time is: well, this is not really strong enough. That is right, is it not? A. Well, I would argue that from the I sent I am making the observation that we need, if anything, to tone down the language and let the intelligence speak for itself. Q. Can I ask you, please, to go to CAB/11/35? This is an from you to Alastair Campbell. A. Hmm, hmm. Q. "Julian Miller rang me and said that he would like to come and show someone the latest thinking on the dossier tomorrow without getting any circulating copies just so as they are on the right track." I wanted to know, is there any reason why Mr Miller should have been calling you if you do not have much to do with the dossier? A. I do not recall the call. It may be the case that given Julian is deputy to John Scarlett on the JIC and it could be construed that Alastair's deputies are Tom and myself, he thought it appropriate to speak to me rather than speaking directly to Alastair. I think what is clear from the is firstly I was not in the next day of the meeting in any event, and that I thought it best that Alastair, given that he was the person involved from the Downing Street end in terms of the preparation of the dossier, was the person who had the meeting. I did not feel qualified to have it. Q. Would it be fair to say there was an awful lot of work that now had to be done, let us say from 11th September onwards, in relation to the dossier -- I just mean generally, an awful lot of work had to be done involving a lot of people? A. I think when you are presenting a document like this to Parliament, in the name of the Prime Minister, a document which contains intelligence in a way which has never happened before, then clearly an awful lot of work is going to have to be done in terms of giving thought as to how best you do that, what the proprieties are that should apply. So I would not disagree with that. I have to say to the best of my recollection I was not involved with that. I am not somebody who feels that I have to, if you like, intervene unless I am asked. Q. Perhaps I can put it another way: was there not quite a lot of pressure to get this dossier ready because it was certainly hoped there could be an announcement in relation to it by the end of September? A. It was the Prime Minister who was deciding, if you like, when he wanted to make it public; and so in terms of the Prime Minister, if you like, setting down a time line, we worked to that. Q. Could I ask you to look at BBC/4/69? Under the heading "Iraq -- Dossier" you will see this -- this is a lobby briefing of 16th September Q. Do you know if this was one of your lobby briefings or one of Mr Kelly's? A. I am afraid I do not off the top of my head. Q. Just so the sequence of events can be understood, look under the heading "Iraq -- Dossier", you will see this answer is given. As I understand it, this is one of the summaries typed up from your tapes? A. Correct. Q. "Asked whether the timing of the publication of the dossier, on the very morning of that Parliament resumed, was deliberate in order to do everything on one day, or whether it was because the dossier would not be ready before then, the Prime Minister's Official Spokesman said that the publication had been moved onto a faster track than originally intended and that had caused some difficulties. The intention was, as Jack Straw had said yesterday, to give people as good an insight as possible without compromising intelligence." Then you continue with other details. A. Hmm, hmm. Q. The next paragraph down you say: "Asked for details of the publication process, the PMOS said it would be

7 published at 8 am on Tuesday September 24th. Asked if there would be a news conference, or if it would be given to newspapers the night before, the PMOS said plans had yet to be finalised." So that would be a fair reflection of how events were turning out at the time? A. I do not disagree with that. Q. You see the reason I am asking this is one of the things that appears to have been said by Dr Kelly, certainly to Ms Watts and Mr Gilligan, is that there was considerable pressure in the -- he said the last week but it looks more like the last two weeks or so before the publication of the dossier, a considerable pressure to get it done and a lot of work being done with it. A. Well, I think when you have a date for publication no matter what the publication, there is going to be a lot of work done before that date. I would just repeat what I have said earlier, that I think this was a document which was, in many ways, unique. So it is probably the case that the intensity of that work was greater than it might otherwise have been for say just an ordinary green paper. Q. Can I ask you, please, to go to CAB/11/41? This is an from Alison Blackshaw. Can you explain, who is Alison Blackshaw? A. She is Alastair Campbell's personal assistant. Q. She is sending it to you and Mr Kelly: "John Scarlett is having a meeting at 6.30 pm to work up a strategy on Iraq. AC has gone home, and I wonder whether one of you two could attend instead." Did you attend or not? A. To the best of my recollection I think Tom attended, not myself. Q. Then, at page 43, I think in the same bundle, Mr Kelly -- we do not know quite what this is. There is a note from Tom Kelly to Mr Campbell, which you are copied in on; and there are various mechanical matters that appear to be dealt with, do you see that? A. I do. Q. One of the things that needs to be dealt with, you will see in the last paragraph which has not been retracted on page 43, is: "We also need to finalise the Q and A material, and we should have drafts from both the CIC and others by this evening." The Q and A material is something that would be provided to you as one of the official spokesmen, and the purpose of that is that you would have this in front of you in order to be able to field questions from the press at the lobby briefings, is that right? A. I would sometimes use it, other times I would not. But yes, by and large it is to assist communications professionals who are receiving media enquiries. It is to enable them to answer them as best they can. Q. Can you go, please, to page 52? This is an from Mr Pruce. You will see the final paragraph of that, written to Mr Campbell. I am going to ask you a question arising out of it. A. I am not sure I am seeing the same thing you are referring to. Q. Sorry, 52. This is from Daniel Pruce to you and Mr Kelly. Do you just want to read this for a moment? (Pause). You will see the penultimate paragraph: "Julian Miller will take in a further round of comments this afternoon and send over a final draft to us this evening." Did you see a final draft that evening? Do you remember looking at it? A. As I say, my recollection of this period in relation to the dossier is pretty sketchy and I think that indicates I was not taking a draft by draft interest in this. I cannot recall, to be honest. Q. We know that you had to have a Q and A prepared to assist you in fielding questions. I think you can see that at CAB/11/92. Rather, you can see the beginnings of it. There might be some other script. This is an from Mr Kelly to you: "File: dossier draft doc. This is a rough draft of what could be a core script for Tuesday -- whether we go up on Today, or do a briefing. I think the key point in our favour is the systematic nature of what Saddam is up to. The weakness, obviously, is our inability to say he could pull the nuclear trigger any time soon. But the basic message of it by then it would be too late does deal with that I think." Do you recall seeing that? A. I have subsequently been shown it, I do not recall it from the time, no. Q. Then, over the page at 93, you might like to reconsider your last answer. I am not sure if it is necessarily about the same thing. You will see: "Subject: Re Tuesday core script. "V good script -- particularly page 2 on nukes. I think we might be best letting TB be the first Ministerial voice on Tuesday am when he stands up in the House and getting, say, Ann Taylor, on to talk the credibility of the intelligence if she would be up for that. Not convinced now we have TB foreword to the dossier we need to do an early morning brief but can discuss. "We need also to think through whether we brief post Cabinet", and so forth. Q. That does suggest, does it not, first of all you obviously did look at this core script and you thought it was a jolly

8 good script; is that right? Yes, I take it. I think the point I should make here is what we are doing essentially here as communications professionals at this point is having a discussion about the handling of the document. This is the conversation we would have about the handling of all sorts of documents, but obviously with one as important as this, it was even more important that we got it right. When I say I do not recollect, I mean that in a way that is not disowning any of these comments at all. It is just simply the fact that this sort of dialogue happens all the time. I cannot simply recollect making a particular view at that point. Q. Does this not suggest that you as the official spokesman, you are quite closely concerned with the presentation of the dossier, if not the writing of the dossier, at least the presentation of the dossier when it is finally produced to the public; is that not right? A. Of course. I mean, I think there is bound, as I think I have said already, to be, of a document of this sort, an interface between the intelligence professionals and the presentation professionals. The key point is whether any of the judgments and analyses of the communications professionals in any way, shape or form undermine the intelligence judgments which are contained in the document. I do not believe for a minute that happened. I think what I am talking about here is basically saying that we should let the Prime Minister be the first person to speak on this, which -- we should not have a minister on the radio in the morning basically previewing it. Q. If you go over the page, to page 94, this is from Mr Kelly to you: "I am now converted to this strategy too -- the Blackpool route." Then he goes on to say what he thinks the best way of dealing with it is. Is not the reality that the dossier was being prepared really to build the case or prepare the best case the Government could prepare and you, as one of the official spokesmen, were trying to work out the strategy to assist in the presentation of the best case once the dossier was put before the public? A. Well, I would not agree in terms of setting out the best case. What we were seeking to do was to set out the intelligence judgments that underpinned the Prime Minister's belief and very strongly held conviction that Saddam Hussein was a serious threat who had to be dealt with. Now, clearly, it is perfectly proper, I think, for communications professionals to advise on issues in relation to tone and structure and the handling, but what we must not do, and I do not believe anybody did do, is in any way, shape or form compromise the intelligence judgments in that document. Q. Could I ask you, please, to go to page 115? This is an from Mr Pruce. You are one of the people to whom it is sent. Do you see that? A. I do. Q. "Here is a first draft of the Q and A..." Then, over the page at page 116, you will see what I understand to be the Q and A, is that right? A. That is right. Q. If you go to page 117, as I understand the way that works, you take the last question on 117. The question is: "What is new in this report?" Do you see that? A. Hmm, hmm. Q. "Material based on secret intelligence which has never been released before. The Executive Summary spells out (paras 4 and 5) the most important areas which go beyond previously published material." Presumably, that therefore was the instruction you were being given. Presumably this is information provided by others and not worked out by yourself, is that the case? A. That is the case. I think the question anybody, to be honest, looking at this document would have asked first off is: what is new in here? What is it that makes the Prime Minister so concerned about the threat that Saddam Hussein poses? What is the new intelligence, if you like, that underpins that? I think it was important. I think one of my earlier s brought that, that people could differentiate between what was old and what was new. Q. Could I ask you, please, to go to page 119. You may or may not be able to help with this, but look at the last entry on page 119: "Could Iraq mount a CBW attack on the UK Mainland?" You will recall a moment ago I showed you an from Jonathan Powell which said there needed to be a penultimate paragraph, he did not quite say where, making it clear there was not a current and immediate threat. As far as I can see from the dossier, no such paragraph was put in. I do note in fairness this is one of the items you seemed to be asked to cover as part of the Q and A. Do you recall the genesis of this last paragraph on page 119: "Could Iraq mount a CBW attack on the UK

9 Mainland"? A. I cannot say I recall reading this Q and A with the degree of thoroughness perhaps you are implying I ought to have done. What I can recall in respect of this particular point is on the flight to America, when the Prime Minister met President Bush at Camp David, he made the point very clearly that no-one has said that Saddam Hussein posed a direct threat to the United Kingdom but his belief was that we would not be able to avoid being drawn into a conflict in the region. Q. We know that on 24th September the dossier was published and the Prime Minister gave a speech in the House of Commons saying, I can quote from an extract, that: "Saddam has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons which could be activated within 45 minutes". We know also there was substantial press activity. Certainly the Evening Standard, the Sun and the Daily Star all had big headlines saying, "Either at 45 minutes", or I think in the Sun's case something like: "He's got them, let's get him". A. We all like to express ourselves in different ways. Q. To what extent would newspapers, when they talk to you at these briefings, either informally or formally, to what extent would you give them a steer as to the type of thing that you think is important? A. Well, I think in respect of this document the document spoke for itself. I think my previous s indicate that we should not have any pre briefing, that we should take out the assertions and the rhetoric and we should, in effect, let the intelligence judgments that are being brought forward by the JIC speak for themselves. The question that journalists always ask in respect of news is by definition: what is new? And this was obviously something that was new. Q. It is a point which Mr Gilligan commented on, but after 25th September, when you have these headlines, many of which focus on the 45 minutes point, the 45 minutes claim appears, so far as one can make out, to disappear from public view in the press and on the television. I wonder if you can help on this. Presumably it is your job, as one of the official spokesman, to present or rather to represent the case the Government believes to be correct? A. That is right. Q. Presumably at the briefings you get you will be given information as to an idea on what particular lines you should be adopting in the press briefings, is that right? A. Up to a point, yes. Q. And therefore, presumably, the Government, one would expect, give you all relevant instructions or information or points which they want to have highlighted which they might think are not being properly highlighted? A. Well, in respect of this, I think the fact that we did not keep coming back to this particular point shows several things really. Firstly, that it was not a point that we were labouring, but we certainly were not rowing back from it. Secondly, if you like, that the media dynamic had shifted, and shifted fairly quickly, on to the diplomatic process, and I did not think it appropriate to, if you like, at a briefing, reiterate what was already on the public record and set out by the Prime Minister. Q. Just so far as those things which you yourself were told, you yourself never received any, as it were, instructions or any direction to the effect that you ought to be reiterating this 45 minutes point? A. Neither reiterating it nor not mentioning it. Q. We know that on 9th February The Independent led with the story that: "Intelligence agencies in the United States and Britain believe that their intelligence was being politicised." We see that at BBC/4/121. A. Right. Q. Again, a related story appears on 24th February 2003 in The Observer which reports disagreement between the Intelligence Services and Downing Street and refers to fairly serious rows between one member of the JIC and Mr Campbell. I think you can see that at CAB/1/357. I do apologise, I think -- yes, this is a letter from the BBC which sets out the various press coverage. I think there will be a reference to an Independent article. Is this page 357? I think 357, "Unease in the Security Services", perhaps. "For example: "Peter Beaumont..." Do you see that? A. I do. Q. Were you told that you should put out any briefing to deny these two stories? A. I do not recollect that, no. I mean, it certainly does not reflect any knowledge of any relationship that I know that Alastair Campbell had with anyone on the JIC. Q. But I am just asking you, you were not told: we have to deny these stories? A. No, and I think in respect of -- if I can just give a short explanation which the Inquiry may find helpful, when I say

10 that we make judgments in respect of what we deny, clearly there are an awful lot of things that are written about the Government that are inaccurate or we believe are inaccurate but a judgment has to be taken as to whether, if you like, they are worth denying. Sometimes you could find yourself in a position where the very fact that you give a denial of itself ensures that the story continues. So, for example, people might have ignored this story, I do not know. I do not know whether anyone followed it up. The fact that Downing Street issues a denial, in essence, can legitimise the story for other media outlets. Q. As I understand it, you were on a family holiday from 24th to 31st May 2003, is that right? A. I was. Q. It was in that period that Mr Gilligan's broadcast appeared on the Today Programme. At least on the following day, major newspapers carried similar stories and there was quite a bit of coverage in the Sunday papers as well. Now, when you got back from holiday, did you have any discussions with anyone about Mr Gilligan's article or indeed about any of the other press articles that began appearing at this time? A. Well, it was clear that this issue was dominating the news agenda almost to the exclusion of everything else, as far as we were concerned. Now, I recollect that my colleague, Mr Kelly, was with the Prime Minister at the G8. I am sure I would have spoken to him. I think Alastair Campbell was going to a funeral in America; and I am sure I would have spoken to him; but essentially my job or the job I saw I needed to do on return from holiday was basically to get myself up to speed, having missed the broadcast. Q. And were you told which of these various stories you should focus on? A. Well, it was not so much which story as which claim. Q. Which claim in that case. Were you given an idea as to which claim you should focus on? A. Well, I think it was so obvious I do not think I needed to be told as such; but clearly there was a very serious charge being levelled against the Government that was tantamount to misusing intelligence to mislead Parliament. Q. That was really Mr Gilligan's piece in that case? Q. We know from Mr Campbell there was a lunch between certain members of the Government and BBC executives on 12th June He believed you were one of the people there. A. I was, yes. Q. At this stage, Mr Campbell had written privately to the BBC asking them to withdraw the allegations -- A. That is right. Q. -- that had been made by Mr Gilligan. Was there any attempt made at this lunch to try to settle these differences in an informal way? A. No, the issue did not come up in fact. I have to say, I wondered whether the Prime Minister would raise it. In the end he did not. It was on the day of the reshuffle. It was an unusual event and I think perhaps the weight of the unsaid meant that not very much was said at all. Q. On 19th June 2003 Mr Gilligan gave evidence in front of the Foreign Affairs Committee. A. Hmm, hmm. Q. You are obviously aware of that now. Were you aware of it at the time? Q. Did you have a look at his evidence at the time? A. I would have skimmed it. I do not think I read it in a fantastic amount of detail, no. Q. As I understand it, the real sting of Mr Gilligan's charge was that the Government knew that the information being added to the dossier was probably false, and indeed they had ordered the dossier to be sexed up, and those are very serious allegations indeed. A. I would not disagree with that. Q. Can I just ask you to look at Mr Gilligan's evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, just briefly. It is at FAC/2/145. One of the things that seems to emerge from Mr Gilligan's evidence in front of the Foreign Affairs Committee is that he does not really seem to repeat the particular allegation which I have just been making. If you look at page 145, at the foot of the page there is an entry: "Mr Pope: Just on this issue of the 45 minutes, I want to be very clear about what your source is alleging. Is your source alleging that the 45 minutes did not exist in the assessment that was inserted by Alastair Campbell?" He is being asked really in terms: was this sort of really put in there by Mr Campbell. "Mr Gilligan: I will quote his words again. He said, 'It was real information. It was the

11 information of a single source'. My source did not believe it was reliable. He believed that that single source had made a mistake, that he had confused the deployment time for a conventional missile with the deployment time for a CBW missile. He did not believe that any missiles had been armed with CBW that would therefore be able to be fireable at 45 minutes' notice. He believed that claim was unreliable. "Mr Pope: But that view was not necessarily shared by the Joint Intelligence Committee because they did have, albeit a single source, evidence of the 45 minutes. Mr Gilligan: That is right, absolutely, yes. "Mr Pope: Has your source made any wider allegations or expressed concerns about No 10 in general and Alastair Campbell in particular interfering in intelligence assessments? "Mr Gilligan: He expressed concern that Downing Street had spoiled its case against Iraq by exaggeration. I want to make it clear that my source, in common with all intelligence sources I have spoken to, does believe that Iraq had a weapons of mass destruction programme. His view, however, was that it was not the imminent threat described by the Government." It is fair to say there that Mr Gilligan really seems to be rather backtracking from the very serious allegation he undoubtedly does appear to have made in his original broadcast on 29th May. A. It would appear so. If I could make one observation which I think may be helpful to the Inquiry in terms of how I felt about this particular charge. I always regarded the charge that we had inserted intelligence against the wishes of the Intelligence Services as referring, if you like, to the generic or the collective, so that therefore those parts of the Intelligence Services which were equipped to make those judgments about what went in the dossier, i.e. the Joint Intelligence Committee, which is why it was so important to us that the denial that we issued was issued with the authority of the JIC. I never saw this, if you like, as the fact that some people within the Intelligence Services were unhappy. I always thought that the charge was that we had done this against the issues of the Intelligence Services, e.g. those parts of the Intelligence Services involved in this, and in that respect I regarded that as the JIC. Q. It is fair to say that Mr Gilligan, certainly, is not suggesting there that the JIC was unhappy with what went in, rather the reverse, is he not? A. Well, I am not sure that was entirely clear from what had been reported heretofore. Q. You see the reason I mention it is this: you are one of the official spokesmen and therefore it is very important you know as it were what is being said in the press and what lines can be put out. But despite that, it seems that on 26th June, you put out a press briefing which appears at CAB/1/181, or maybe you or Mr Kelly puts out a press briefing, setting out a series of questions that you want the BBC to answer. A. That is correct. LORD HUTTON: Sorry, this is CAB/1? MR KNOX: CAB/1/181. If I can ask you to look at page 182: "In answer to further questions about the BBC, the PMOS said that there were a number of questions still outstanding." Q. "Did the BBC still stand by the allegation it had made on 29th May that No. 10 added in the 45-minute claim? "Did it still stand by the allegation made on the same day that we had done so against the wishes of the intelligence agencies? "Did it still stand by the allegation made on that day that both we and the intelligence agencies had known that the 45-minute claim was wrong?" Those three really are the most serious allegations. Then the next one is about ordering the "sexing up". A. Yes, that is right. Q. What seems slightly strange is that if you had looked at Mr Gilligan's evidence would it not perhaps have become apparent that this dispute was perhaps being blown up more than was necessary given that Mr Gilligan himself did not seem to be standing by what he had initially said and all you needed to do was speak to the BBC and say: surely Mr Gilligan is withdrawing those three claims, look at his evidence before the FAC? A. Well, I think we had got to the point where private correspondence with the BBC, asking them to withdraw those claims, had proved unproductive. So as a consequence of that, Alastair Campbell had made the points that he had made at the Foreign Affairs Committee hearing. Now, you draw my attention to what Mr Gilligan said at the Foreign Affairs Committee, I agree those are interesting points. They were not points that the BBC were prepared to acknowledge publicly. Q. On 29th June 2003, and I can take you to the document if you need to be reminded, but Mr Campbell put out a press announcement effectively saying that he was prepared to let the matter of the argument between the BBC and the Government be rather -- rather leave the matter to the Foreign Affairs Committee to decide effectively the

12 dispute between the BBC and the Government. Do you recall that? A. I recall him putting out a statement on the Sunday, which essentially indicated we did not think there was much point carrying on the correspondence in the light of what was being said by the BBC. Q. Can I take you to 4th July 2003? Can you recall anything -- this is Friday 4th July. We know now that Dr Kelly had come forward on 30th June and written a letter to his line manager saying he had had some contact with Mr Gilligan. Can you recall when you first found out about this matter? I was first aware on Friday 4th when I was told privately by Alastair Campbell. Q. And can you recall what Mr Campbell told you? A. To the best of my recollection, he said that somebody had come forward of their own volition who thought that they could potentially be the source of Andrew Gilligan's story; that this individual had done so because a colleague had pointed out similarities between his views and the views expressed by Mr Gilligan at the Select Committee. He also said, as far as I can recall, that the individual concerned was not a member of the Intelligence Services. Q. Did you express any views on how the matter should be handled? A. No, I do not believe I did. I mean, I was interested to hear of this development. I think I asked Alastair: what happens now? He said that it was being handled by the MoD and we would obviously just have to wait and see. Q. Over the weekend did you have any communication about this matter with anyone? A. I spoke to my colleague, Mr Kelly, who was, if you like, the duty PMOS over the weekend. I called him on Sunday evening. We often speak on Sunday evening, just so that one can appraise the other of how the weekend had gone. And it was clear that obviously Tom had found out about this as well. Q. On Sunday 6th July, the BBC put out a press announcement. Can I ask you to look at CAB/1/376? Presumably, as official spokesman, you would have read this or taken an interest in this announcement? A. Yes, I watched Gavyn Davies deliver it live on television. Q. Can I ask you to go over the page to page 377, in the fourth paragraph down beginning "Finally..." "Finally, the Board wishes to place on record that the BBC has never accused the Prime Minister of lying, or of seeking to take Britain into war under misleading or false pretences. "The BBC did not have an agenda in its war coverage, nor does it now have any agenda which questions the integrity of the Prime Minister." When you read that, what was your reaction? A. My reaction to the statement was, to be honest, one of surprise that the board of governors said as much as they said on the eve of a report from the Foreign Affairs Committee which had not come out. I think we had made the point in respect of, if you like, accusing the Prime Minister of lying that we felt that the charge of inserting intelligence against the wishes of the Intelligence Services knowing it probably to be wrong was tantamount to that. Q. Exactly. But you see what is rather peculiar, or might be thought to be peculiar, is that instead of clarifying the dispute and saying well, you did say this in the past but are you now backing down, in other words you did say what Mr Gilligan said in the past but now, in the light of your statement, you are presumably withdrawing that, no such question appears to be asked of the BBC. That is fair to say, is it not? I mean, I think we had been seeking to resolve this privately for several weeks; and I think, if you like, the moment for that had passed and we were on the eve of a major report from the Foreign Affairs Committee. Q. On Monday 7th July, the Foreign Affairs Committee was due to report. Can you recall if you went to any meetings on Monday 7th July? I was at a meeting with the Foreign Secretary in Alastair Campbell's office from 9 o'clock, where we read the Foreign Affairs Committee report and -- Q. Can I just stop you there, Mr Smith. Before that meeting, did you have any meetings with anyone else, before that meeting? A. Yes, I had the standard 8.30 meeting of communications professionals in the study in Downing Street. Q. Did you meet Ms Pam Teare from the MoD at that meeting? A. I did. Sorry, the reason I started on the second meeting was I thought you were referring to the Foreign Affairs Committee. Q. I apologise. A. I did, yes. Q. You met Miss Teare at that first meeting? A. I recollect that I did, yes.