Philosophy in Review XXXI (2011), no. 5
|
|
|
- Jessie Montgomery
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, eds. A World without Values: Essays on John Mackie s Moral Error Theory. Dordrecht: Springer pages US$ (cloth ISBN ) In 1977, John Leslie Mackie published Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, defending a form of moral skepticism known as moral error theory. This book has since exerted significant influence on moral philosophers either sympathetic to moral skepticism or unwilling simply to take for granted the falsehood or implausibility of that position. They will welcome the present collection s careful discussion of both Mackie s moral error theory and other moral anti-realist views. Several of the papers only tangentially deal with his error theory, so the book s subtitle is not entirely accurate. Some essays adopt a favorable approach to this position, others are instead very critical, and still others are rather neutral. As will become clear in what follows, the order of the essays is not in all cases the most natural one because some of them are not arranged according to their stand on the moral error theory or their thematic connection. The introductory chapter provides a good explanation of Mackie s moral error theory. The editors clear up some common misunderstandings, maintaining, for instance, that the theory s correct formulation is not ontological but linguistic, i.e., it is not the view that moral values, properties, or facts do not exist, but rather the view that moral claims are all false (or, perhaps more prudently, untrue ). This way of expressing the moral error theory permits us to distinguish it from moral noncognitivism: the moral noncognitivist too denies that the items in question exist, but also holds that moral utterances are not assertions because they do not express beliefs, and hence are not truthapt. The editors also correctly point out that the moral error theory does not by itself entail moral eliminativism, i.e., the view that we should abolish all moral language and thinking. For it is also logically consistent with moral fictionalism, whose most common version maintains that, because morality is useful in certain respects, we should continue to make moral utterances and have moral thoughts, while at the same time refraining from asserting such utterances and believing such thoughts. That is, even though moral realism is false, we should maintain the fiction that it is true. As the editors recognize, although in Ethics Mackie seems to advocate some kind of moral fictionalism, he treats this issue only briefly. (A question may arise with this kind of fictionalism: given that it is a noncognitivist view, can it be properly considered a moral error theory? The difficulty is, I think, merely apparent, for the fictionalist affirms that moral claims are truth-evaluable when made by moral realists because they assert these claims, whereas the fictionalist uses moral discourse not intending to aim at truth.) The first essay of the collection, John Burgess Against Ethics, is something of a curiosity. Originally written around the same time Mackie was finishing Ethics but not published until 2007, it defends anethicism, a view equivalent to the moral error theory. Burgess maintains that moral thinking involves a fundamental mistake and illusion (1) 354
2 because there are no objective moral values. He compellingly argues that the linguistic (i.e., noncognitivist) theories of emotivism and prescriptivism should be rejected because moral judgments are meant by ordinary people as assertions about supposed matters of objective fact. Finally, after making it clear that anethicism should not be confused with either nihilism or immoralism, he adopts an eliminativist view, recommending that moral language be abandoned. Next, Charles Pigden s Nihilism, Nietzsche, and the Doppelganger Problem, has two aims: to show that Nietzsche was a moral error theorist, and to defend the moral error theory from certain kinds of criticisms. The main criticism concerns the Doppelganger Problem : the error theorist affirms that all moral judgments are false, but the negation of a moral judgment X is a moral judgment, and if X is false, then not-x (its doppelganger ) must be true; therefore, the moral error theory is self-refuting. The solution to this problem consists in amending the error theory by claiming instead that non-negative atomic moral judgments are all false. Given that the main purpose of this contribution is to vindicate the moral error theory and given that Nietzsche s metaethical stance plays no necessary part in this defense, the discussion of whether Nietzsche was an error theorist seems beside the point and somehow distracts the attention from the main focus. In Patterns of Objectification, Richard Joyce examines Mackie s thesis of moral objectification/projectivism and its connection with the moral error theory. He claims that the minimal version of the thesis should not be interpreted as a premise in an argument to establish moral skepticism. Rather, it works as a tie-breaker between moral realism and moral skepticism insofar as its function is to explain away the contents of [the] promorality intuitions by providing an account of their origin that does not imply or presuppose their truth (45). That is, given that moral skepticism is counter-intuitive, to defend its preferability the error theorist needs to give a more convincing explanation of the origin of the intuitions that support moral realism. Although Joyce sympathizes with the idea underlying Mackie s strategy, he deems it poorly executed because the arguments in favor of the objectification thesis beg the question or are not based on empirical data. One version of Mackie s argument from queerness involves, in its first premise, the idea that moral judgments are queer, and hence different from other judgments, because they have some kind of special force built into them an internal prescriptivity. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, in Mackie s Internalisms, focuses exclusively on this premise and distinguishes several different types of internalism, in order to determine which if any could make Mackie s argument work. The type of internalism he claims could support the moral error theory is a form of motivational internalism which limits its claim to first-person present-tense moral thoughts which seem true. In Mackie s Realism: Queer Pigs and the Web of Belief, Jamie Dreier defends the provocative thesis that Mackie was a moral realist. This claim is based on a quite unusual way of conceiving of the distinction between moral realism and anti-realism, having to do with the different ways of explaining puzzling features of moral thinking 355
3 and language. Whereas the moral realist looks for such an explanation in the properties or facts referred to in moral judgments, the moral anti-realist in particular the moral expressivist looks for it in moral concepts and language. Mackie is a moral realist because he thinks that the moral properties themselves would have to account for the internal, necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation (82). Although I am uncomfortable with his distinction between moral realism and anti-realism which may in the end be just a terminological matter Dreier s analysis is penetrating, particularly when arguing that Mackie s mistake consists in locating morality s queerness in moral properties rather than in beliefs. In Mackie on Practical Reason, David Phillips defends Mackie s account of practical reason, particularly as a more plausible alternative than the instrumentalist approach of Bernard Williams. According to this approach, all genuine reasons are internal, so all reasons are desire-based. Williams thinks internal reasons are objectively authoritative, which is highly problematic insofar as it makes desires (which are arbitrary, contingent, and idiosyncratic) a source of authority. Mackie, by contrast, thinks internal reasons claims are authoritative in the same way as any other normative claim, namely, only relative to a given presupposed background. Hence, for Mackie, internal reasons are not the only or the main source of such a framework-relative authority, and no normative reasons claim is true in a framework-independent way. Don Loeb, in The Argument from Moral Experience, explores whether our moral experience, understood as our various ways of talking and thinking about morality, supports moral objectivism or realism. He first maintains that it is not entirely clear that we experience morality as a realm of fact. For instance, not only do people often talk about moral feelings and attitudes instead of moral beliefs, they also sometimes say that what we deem to be morally right or wrong is relative. Loeb then argues that, even if we do experience morality as a realm of fact, this by itself does not support moral objectivism. It would also be necessary to show that moral realism is the best explanation of our moral experience, which is a matter of dispute with the moral anti-realists, who claim that their theories can explain or accommodate many of the features of our moral experience. In Beyond the Error Theory, Michael Smith contends that the argument from queerness fails. Mackie s claim that the concept of a moral value is the concept of a feature of things that is both objective and prescriptive amounts to the claim that what is of moral value has the feature of being absolutely required by reason. Smith maintains that, even if we grant that Mackie s analysis is correct, there is nothing metaphysically or epistemologically queer about moral value. He tentatively favors the Constitutivist Approach, according to which those who hold moral beliefs are committed to holding that there are certain desires that are constitutive of being fully rational. It is possible to determine which desires these are by a process of reflective equilibrium, i.e., by getting our considered judgments about what reason requires us to desire in specific cases into equilibrium with our reflective judgments about what the most general intrinsic desires constitutive of being rational are that stand behind these more specific desires (136 7). 356
4 David Copp s Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness also opposes the moral error theory. He grants, but only for the sake of argument, the truth of the authoritative reasons proposal, and defends it against both Mackie and Joyce. According to that proposal, moral obligations are a source of reasons which are authoritative, i.e., genuinely normative or irrational to ignore. This implies that someone cannot be regarded as rational unless she is motivated in such a way that if she believes she has a moral obligation or reason to do something, she takes this obligation or this reason appropriately into account when deciding what to do (143). Copp argues that Mackie fails to show any metaphysical queerness about normative facts, and that Joyce rejects the authoritative reasons proposal by mistakenly thinking that only instrumental reasons are authoritative. The moral error theorist claims that everyday moral thought and language exhibit or imply a crucial commitment X, and argues that this central commitment is false or unfounded, so that the whole of morality is based on an error. In A Tension in the Moral Error Theory, Simon Kirchin questions whether there is such a universal commitment, focusing on Mackie s and Joyce s error theoretic stances. He reasons that everyday moral experience is messy, disorganized, cluttered, and lacks a unique and specific identifying point (168). The error theorist must cope with a tension: while needing to specifically identify the claims to which moral thought and language are essentially committed, the more he specifies these claims the less plausible it is that they will be central to all moral thought and language. I agree with Kirchin (and also with Loeb, above) that everyday moral experience is messy and disorganized. However, in many cases, conceptual confusion and superficial reflection hide actual common commitments. It seems that at least the majority of ordinary people are actually or ultimately committed to moral universalism. For instance, although some students taking an ethics class say with apparent confidence that moral judgments are relative to socio-cultural frameworks, when pressed about an act such as the rape or murder of a child, they are reluctant to allow that such an act is neither good nor bad in itself but only relative to a given framework. They pause when confronted with the implications of their metaethical claims. More generally, ordinary people typically seem committed to moral realism, with differences arising from within the space of morality: what some regard as a moral matter, others regard as a matter of etiquette, but moral claims still seem to be intended as descriptions of objective moral facts or properties, which are the source of an objective prescriptivity. It should be noted, however, that Kirchin leaves things open : his purpose is not to deny the presence of a central, unfounded commitment in moral thought and language, but only to show that every version of the moral error theory which has so far been propounded must deal with the abovementioned tension. It is usually thought that moral realists are committed to moral internalism, according to which there is an internal, necessary, or conceptual connection between moral judgments and motivation. However, if moral judgments are beliefs and, à la Hume, we claim both that only desires, which are distinct from beliefs, can motivate and that reason cannot change a subject s existing desire set, then internalism is false. In 357
5 Business as Usual? The Error Theory, Internalism, and the Function of Morality, Caroline West contends that Mackie and Joyce s error theoretic stances are based on that line of argument, since [i]f internalism is a conceptual truth about morality, and internalism is actually false, then morality is nowhere instantiated (184). West aims to examine the various alternative attitudes we can adopt once we accept the falsity of moral internalism. She argues that moral abolitionism is psychologically unfeasible and that the business-as-usual stance (which she attributes to Mackie) is incoherent. There remain four options, among which, however, she does not choose. The first two (distinguishing between belief in theory and in practice, and non-revisionary moral realism) are variants of the business-as-usual alternatives that try to avoid the incoherence charge. The last two (revolutionary noncognitivist fictionalism and revisionary moral realism) are revisionary but not so much as to be psychologically impossible. An objection to West s quick overview of the remaining four alternatives is that fictionalism might well be considered a form of the business-as-usual stance and that, as noted above, Mackie is usually viewed as proposing a kind of fictionalism. In The Fictionalist s Attitude Problem, Graham Oddie and Daniel Demetriou critically examine Mark Kalderon s moral fictionalism, according to which, although moral judgments are truth-apt (factualism), they are not beliefs (noncognitivism). While to accept a non-moral proposition is to believe it, to accept a moral judgment is to express a noncognitive attitude, namely, to endorse it. One can thus be a moral fictionalist without being an error theorist. Oddie and Demetriou argue that, just as the nonfactualist faces the Frege-Geach problem he cannot explain how, in a valid argument, truth transfers from the premises to the conclusion so too does the noncognitivist factualist face the problem that he cannot explain how rational acceptance and rejection transfers from the premises to the conclusion of an argument. The same acceptance-transfer problem is faced by cognitivist fictionalism insofar as it too requires a double-attitude account of acceptance. Richard Garner, a well-known champion of moral anti-realism, closes the volume with Abolishing Morality. He attempts to determine whether the moral error theorist should be a moral abolitionist or a moral fictionalist. He opts for the first alternative because morality seems to cause more suffering than it prevents, and it is therefore desirable and useful to abandon moral language and thinking altogether. There are other means besides morality to promote, encourage, or motivate certain useful social practices, such as early training in empathy, strict surveillance, and legal penalty. Overall, this volume will be excellent reading for those interested in the strengths and weaknesses of Mackie s moral error theory in particular, or in the metaethical debate between moral realists and anti-realists more generally. Diego E. Machuca Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (Argentina) 358
THE FREGE-GEACH PROBLEM AND KALDERON S MORAL FICTIONALISM. Matti Eklund Cornell University
THE FREGE-GEACH PROBLEM AND KALDERON S MORAL FICTIONALISM Matti Eklund Cornell University [me72@cornell.edu] Penultimate draft. Final version forthcoming in Philosophical Quarterly I. INTRODUCTION In his
The Rightness Error: An Evaluation of Normative Ethics in the Absence of Moral Realism
An Evaluation of Normative Ethics in the Absence of Moral Realism Mathais Sarrazin J.L. Mackie s Error Theory postulates that all normative claims are false. It does this based upon his denial of moral
THE UNBELIEVABLE TRUTH ABOUT MORALITY
THE UNBELIEVABLE TRUTH ABOUT MORALITY Bart Streumer b.streumer@rug.nl 9 August 2016 Forthcoming in Lenny Clapp (ed.), Philosophy for Us. San Diego: Cognella. Have you ever suspected that even though we
A Rational Solution to the Problem of Moral Error Theory? Benjamin Scott Harrison
A Rational Solution to the Problem of Moral Error Theory? Benjamin Scott Harrison In his Ethics, John Mackie (1977) argues for moral error theory, the claim that all moral discourse is false. In this paper,
Hybridizing moral expressivism and moral error theory
Fairfield University DigitalCommons@Fairfield Philosophy Faculty Publications Philosophy Department 1-1-2011 Hybridizing moral expressivism and moral error theory Toby Svoboda Fairfield University, tsvoboda@fairfield.edu
Contents. Detailed Chapter Contents Preface to the First Edition (2003) Preface to the Second Edition (2013) xiii
Alexander Miller Contemporary metaethics An introduction Contents Preface to the First Edition (2003) Preface to the Second Edition (2013) 1 Introduction 2 Moore's Attack on Ethical Naturalism 3 Emotivism
Norm-Expressivism and the Frege-Geach Problem
Norm-Expressivism and the Frege-Geach Problem I. INTRODUCTION Megan Blomfield M oral non-cognitivism 1 is the metaethical view that denies that moral statements are truth-apt. According to this position,
Shafer-Landau's defense against Blackburn's supervenience argument
University of Gothenburg Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science Shafer-Landau's defense against Blackburn's supervenience argument Author: Anna Folland Supervisor: Ragnar Francén Olinder
HERMENEUTIC MORAL FICTIONALISM AS AN ANTI-REALIST STRATEGY (Please cite the final version in Philosophical Books 49, January 2008)
1 HERMENEUTIC MORAL FICTIONALISM AS AN ANTI-REALIST STRATEGY (Please cite the final version in Philosophical Books 49, January 2008) STACIE FRIEND Birkbeck College, London Fictionalism has become a standard,
Moral Objectivism. RUSSELL CORNETT University of Calgary
Moral Objectivism RUSSELL CORNETT University of Calgary The possibility, let alone the actuality, of an objective morality has intrigued philosophers for well over two millennia. Though much discussed,
NON-COGNITIVISM AND THE PROBLEM OF MORAL-BASED EPISTEMIC REASONS: A SYMPATHETIC REPLY TO CIAN DORR
DISCUSSION NOTE NON-COGNITIVISM AND THE PROBLEM OF MORAL-BASED EPISTEMIC REASONS: BY JOSEPH LONG JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE OCTOBER 2016 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT JOSEPH LONG
On Searle on Human Rights, Again! J. Angelo Corlett, San Diego State University
On Searle on Human Rights, Again! J. Angelo Corlett, San Diego State University With regard to my article Searle on Human Rights (Corlett 2016), I have been accused of misunderstanding John Searle s conception
In Epistemic Relativism, Mark Kalderon defends a view that has become
Aporia vol. 24 no. 1 2014 Incoherence in Epistemic Relativism I. Introduction In Epistemic Relativism, Mark Kalderon defends a view that has become increasingly popular across various academic disciplines.
Terence CUNEO, The Normative Web. An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 263 pp., 46.99, ISBN
Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (2010), 333 337. Terence CUNEO, The Normative Web. An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 263 pp., 46.99, ISBN 978-0-19-921883-7. 1. Meta-ethics
A DILEMMA FOR MORAL FICTIONALISM Matthew Chrisman University of Edinburgh
A DILEMMA FOR MORAL FICTIONALISM Matthew Chrisman University of Edinburgh Forthcoming in Philosophical Books The most prominent anti-realist program in recent metaethics is the expressivist strategy of
finagling frege Mark Schroeder University of Southern California September 25, 2007
Mark Schroeder University of Southern California September 25, 2007 finagling frege In his recent paper, Ecumenical Expressivism: Finessing Frege, Michael Ridge claims to show how to solve the famous Frege-Geach
Psychological and Ethical Egoism
Psychological and Ethical Egoism Wrapping up Error Theory Psychological Egoism v. Ethical Egoism Ought implies can, the is/ought fallacy Arguments for and against Psychological Egoism Ethical Egoism Arguments
David Copp, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, Oxford: Oxford University
David Copp, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 665. 0-19-514779-0. $74.00 (Hb). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory contains twenty-two chapters written
Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism
Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism First published Fri Jan 23, 2004; substantive revision Sun Jun 7, 2009 Non-cognitivism is a variety of irrealism about ethics with a number of influential variants.
Is it right to worry about the Frege-Geach problem?
Winner of the 2016 Boethius Prize Is it right to worry about the Frege-Geach problem? Miles Fender The Frege-Geach problem has been a significant point of contention in metaethical discourse for the past
Huemer s Clarkeanism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXVIII No. 1, January 2009 Ó 2009 International Phenomenological Society Huemer s Clarkeanism mark schroeder University
The Limits of Normative Detachment 1 Nishi Shah Amherst College Draft of 04/15/10
The Limits of Normative Detachment 1 Nishi Shah Amherst College Draft of 04/15/10 Consider another picture of what it would be for a demand to be objectively valid. It is Kant s own picture. According
Introduction to Cognitivism; Motivational Externalism; Naturalist Cognitivism
Introduction to Cognitivism; Motivational Externalism; Naturalist Cognitivism Felix Pinkert 103 Ethics: Metaethics, University of Oxford, Hilary Term 2015 Cognitivism, Non-cognitivism, and the Humean Argument
Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument by Michael Huemer (2000)
Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument by Michael Huemer (2000) One of the advantages traditionally claimed for direct realist theories of perception over indirect realist theories is that the
CRUCIAL TOPICS IN THE DEBATE ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL REASONS
CRUCIAL TOPICS IN THE DEBATE ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL REASONS By MARANATHA JOY HAYES A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
Constructivism and the error theory. Hallvard Lillehammer
Constructivism and the error theory Hallvard Lillehammer 1. Introduction According to the error theory, morality presents itself to us as though it were something to be discovered, but in fact it is not.
Håkan Salwén. Hume s Law: An Essay on Moral Reasoning Lorraine Besser-Jones Volume 31, Number 1, (2005) 177-180. Your use of the HUME STUDIES archive indicates your acceptance of HUME STUDIES Terms and
THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL ARGUMENT AGAINST MATERIALISM AND ITS SEMANTIC PREMISE
Diametros nr 29 (wrzesień 2011): 80-92 THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL ARGUMENT AGAINST MATERIALISM AND ITS SEMANTIC PREMISE Karol Polcyn 1. PRELIMINARIES Chalmers articulates his argument in terms of two-dimensional
METAETHICAL MORAL RELATIVISM AND THE ANALOGY WITH PHYSICS
Praxis, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2008 ISSN 1756-1019 METAETHICAL MORAL RELATIVISM AND THE ANALOGY WITH PHYSICS ALEXANDRE ERLER LINCOLN COLLEGE, OXFORD Abstract This paper deals with a specific version of
Miller, Alexander, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, Oxford: Polity Press, 2003, pp.
Miller, Alexander, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, Oxford: Polity Press, 2003, pp. xii + 316, $64.95 (cloth), 29.95 (paper). My initial hope when I first saw Miller s book was that here at
WHY THERE REALLY ARE NO IRREDUCIBLY NORMATIVE PROPERTIES
WHY THERE REALLY ARE NO IRREDUCIBLY NORMATIVE PROPERTIES Bart Streumer b.streumer@rug.nl In David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker and Margaret Little (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Essays in Honour of Jonathan
Ethics is subjective.
Introduction Scientific Method and Research Ethics Ethical Theory Greg Bognar Stockholm University September 22, 2017 Ethics is subjective. If ethics is subjective, then moral claims are subjective in
R. M. Hare (1919 ) SINNOTT- ARMSTRONG. Definition of moral judgments. Prescriptivism
25 R. M. Hare (1919 ) WALTER SINNOTT- ARMSTRONG Richard Mervyn Hare has written on a wide variety of topics, from Plato to the philosophy of language, religion, and education, as well as on applied ethics,
ARE THE MORAL FIXED POINTS CONCEPTUAL TRUTHS?
DISCUSSION NOTE BY DAAN EVERS AND BART STREUMER JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE MARCH 2016 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT DAAN EVERS AND BART STREUMER 2016 Are the Moral Fixed Points
PROSPECTS FOR A JAMESIAN EXPRESSIVISM 1 JEFF KASSER
PROSPECTS FOR A JAMESIAN EXPRESSIVISM 1 JEFF KASSER In order to take advantage of Michael Slater s presence as commentator, I want to display, as efficiently as I am able, some major similarities and differences
TWO ACCOUNTS OF THE NORMATIVITY OF RATIONALITY
DISCUSSION NOTE BY JONATHAN WAY JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE DECEMBER 2009 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT JONATHAN WAY 2009 Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality RATIONALITY
Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly *
Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly * Ralph Wedgwood 1 Two views of practical reason Suppose that you are faced with several different options (that is, several ways in which you might act in a
Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic
In Philosophical Papers 29 (2000), 121-53 Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons We propose to break some new ground in metaethics by sketching a view
A Semantic Paradox concerning Error Theory
Aporia vol. 26 no. 1 2016 A Semantic Paradox concerning Error Theory Stephen Harrop J. L. Mackie famously argued for a moral error theory that is, the thesis that our statements concerning objective moral
From Necessary Truth to Necessary Existence
Prequel for Section 4.2 of Defending the Correspondence Theory Published by PJP VII, 1 From Necessary Truth to Necessary Existence Abstract I introduce new details in an argument for necessarily existing
Putnam: Meaning and Reference
Putnam: Meaning and Reference The Traditional Conception of Meaning combines two assumptions: Meaning and psychology Knowing the meaning (of a word, sentence) is being in a psychological state. Even Frege,
ON LEAVING ROOM FOR DOUBT: USING FREGE-GEACH TO ILLUMINATE EXPRESSIVISM S PROBLEM WITH OBJECTIVITY
Faraci 1 ON LEAVING ROOM FOR DOUBT: USING FREGE-GEACH TO ILLUMINATE EXPRESSIVISM S PROBLEM WITH OBJECTIVITY David Faraci [The Frege-Geach] problem itself, while possibly a devastating objection to expressivism,
The Error in Moral Discourse and What to do about it
The Error in Moral Discourse and What to do about it A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities. 2011 Philip Brown School of
THE MEANING OF OUGHT. Ralph Wedgwood. What does the word ought mean? Strictly speaking, this is an empirical question, about the
THE MEANING OF OUGHT Ralph Wedgwood What does the word ought mean? Strictly speaking, this is an empirical question, about the meaning of a word in English. Such empirical semantic questions should ideally
Van Fraassen: Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism
Aaron Leung Philosophy 290-5 Week 11 Handout Van Fraassen: Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism 1. Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism What is scientific realism? According to van Fraassen,
Hume s emotivism. Michael Lacewing
Michael Lacewing Hume s emotivism Theories of what morality is fall into two broad families cognitivism and noncognitivism. The distinction is now understood by philosophers to depend on whether one thinks
Annotated List of Ethical Theories
Annotated List of Ethical Theories The following list is selective, including only what I view as the major theories. Entries in bold face have been especially influential. Recommendations for additions
BELIEF POLICIES, by Paul Helm. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Pp. xiii and 226. $54.95 (Cloth).
BELIEF POLICIES, by Paul Helm. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xiii and 226. $54.95 (Cloth). TRENTON MERRICKS, Virginia Commonwealth University Faith and Philosophy 13 (1996): 449-454
Varieties of Objectivity: What's Worth Keeping?
Western University Scholarship@Western Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository January 2017 Varieties of Objectivity: What's Worth Keeping? Lori Kantymir The University of Western Ontario Supervisor
Right-Making, Reference, and Reduction
Right-Making, Reference, and Reduction Kent State University BIBLID [0873-626X (2014) 39; pp. 139-145] Abstract The causal theory of reference (CTR) provides a well-articulated and widely-accepted account
Let us begin by first locating our fields in relation to other fields that study ethics. Consider the following taxonomy: Kinds of ethical inquiries
ON NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORIES: SOME BASICS From the dawn of philosophy, the question concerning the summum bonum, or, what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality, has been accounted the
A CRITIQUE OF THE USE OF NONSTANDARD SEMANTICS IN THE ARBITRARINESS HORN OF DIVINE COMMAND THEORY
A CRITIQUE OF THE USE OF NONSTANDARD SEMANTICS IN THE ARBITRARINESS HORN OF DIVINE COMMAND THEORY A PAPER PRESENTED TO DR. DAVID BAGGETT LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LYNCHBURG, VA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
REASON AND PRACTICAL-REGRET. Nate Wahrenberger, College of William and Mary
1 REASON AND PRACTICAL-REGRET Nate Wahrenberger, College of William and Mary Abstract: Christine Korsgaard argues that a practical reason (that is, a reason that counts in favor of an action) must motivate
AGAINST THE BEING FOR ACCOUNT OF NORMATIVE CERTITUDE
AGAINST THE BEING FOR ACCOUNT OF NORMATIVE CERTITUDE BY KRISTER BYKVIST AND JONAS OLSON JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY VOL. 6, NO. 2 JULY 2012 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT KRISTER BYKVIST AND JONAS
Reply to Kit Fine. Theodore Sider July 19, 2013
Reply to Kit Fine Theodore Sider July 19, 2013 Kit Fine s paper raises important and difficult issues about my approach to the metaphysics of fundamentality. In chapters 7 and 8 I examined certain subtle
A METAETHICAL OPTION FOR THEISTS
A METAETHICAL OPTION FOR THEISTS Kyle Swan ABSTRACT John Hare has proposed prescriptive realism in an attempt to stake out a middle-ground position in the twentieth century Anglo-American debates concerning
Realism and Irrealism
1 Realism and Irrealism 1.1. INTRODUCTION It is surely an understatement to say that most of the issues that are discussed within meta-ethics appear esoteric to nonphilosophers. Still, many can relate
Ayer s linguistic theory of the a priori
Ayer s linguistic theory of the a priori phil 43904 Jeff Speaks December 4, 2007 1 The problem of a priori knowledge....................... 1 2 Necessity and the a priori............................ 2
xiv Truth Without Objectivity
Introduction There is a certain approach to theorizing about language that is called truthconditional semantics. The underlying idea of truth-conditional semantics is often summarized as the idea that
BENEDIKT PAUL GÖCKE. Ruhr-Universität Bochum
264 BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES BENEDIKT PAUL GÖCKE Ruhr-Universität Bochum István Aranyosi. God, Mind, and Logical Space: A Revisionary Approach to Divinity. Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion.
A Review of Neil Feit s Belief about the Self
A Review of Neil Feit s Belief about the Self Stephan Torre 1 Neil Feit. Belief about the Self. Oxford GB: Oxford University Press 2008. 216 pages. Belief about the Self is a clearly written, engaging
Henrik Ahlenius Department of Philosophy ETHICS & RESEARCH
Henrik Ahlenius Department of Philosophy henrik.ahlenius@philosophy.su.se ETHICS & RESEARCH Why a course like this? Tell you what the rules are Tell you to follow these rules Tell you to follow some other
The Greatest Mistake: A Case for the Failure of Hegel s Idealism
The Greatest Mistake: A Case for the Failure of Hegel s Idealism What is a great mistake? Nietzsche once said that a great error is worth more than a multitude of trivial truths. A truly great mistake
Philosophy of Science. Ross Arnold, Summer 2014 Lakeside institute of Theology
Philosophy of Science Ross Arnold, Summer 2014 Lakeside institute of Theology Philosophical Theology 1 (TH5) Aug. 15 Intro to Philosophical Theology; Logic Aug. 22 Truth & Epistemology Aug. 29 Metaphysics
Luck, Rationality, and Explanation: A Reply to Elga s Lucky to Be Rational. Joshua Schechter. Brown University
Luck, Rationality, and Explanation: A Reply to Elga s Lucky to Be Rational Joshua Schechter Brown University I Introduction What is the epistemic significance of discovering that one of your beliefs depends
SAVING RELATIVISM FROM ITS SAVIOUR
CRÍTICA, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía Vol. XXXI, No. 91 (abril 1999): 91 103 SAVING RELATIVISM FROM ITS SAVIOUR MAX KÖLBEL Doctoral Programme in Cognitive Science Universität Hamburg In his paper
A Case against Subjectivism: A Reply to Sobel
A Case against Subjectivism: A Reply to Sobel Abstract Subjectivists are committed to the claim that desires provide us with reasons for action. Derek Parfit argues that subjectivists cannot account for
Lecture notes, Phil 4830, spr 03. Anti-Realism
Lecture notes, Phil 4830, spr 03. Anti-Realism Important background concepts/distinctions: evaluative vs. descriptive sentences/predicates Ethics : studies philosophical questions pertaining to or arising
Ethical non-naturalism
Michael Lacewing Ethical non-naturalism Ethical non-naturalism is usually understood as a form of cognitivist moral realism. So we first need to understand what cognitivism and moral realism is before
2 FREE CHOICE The heretical thesis of Hobbes is the orthodox position today. So much is this the case that most of the contemporary literature
Introduction The philosophical controversy about free will and determinism is perennial. Like many perennial controversies, this one involves a tangle of distinct but closely related issues. Thus, the
Explanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch s Analogy Alex Worsnip University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Explanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch s Analogy Alex Worsnip University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Forthcoming in Thought please cite published version In
Ayer and Quine on the a priori
Ayer and Quine on the a priori November 23, 2004 1 The problem of a priori knowledge Ayer s book is a defense of a thoroughgoing empiricism, not only about what is required for a belief to be justified
Skepticism is True. Abraham Meidan
Skepticism is True Abraham Meidan Skepticism is True Copyright 2004 Abraham Meidan All rights reserved. Universal Publishers Boca Raton, Florida USA 2004 ISBN: 1-58112-504-6 www.universal-publishers.com
Emotivism. Meta-ethical approaches
Meta-ethical approaches Theory that believes objective moral laws do not exist; a non-cognitivist theory; moral terms express personal emotional attitudes and not propositions; ethical terms are just expressions
Has Nagel uncovered a form of idealism?
Has Nagel uncovered a form of idealism? Author: Terence Rajivan Edward, University of Manchester. Abstract. In the sixth chapter of The View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel attempts to identify a form of idealism.
Are There Reasons to Be Rational?
Are There Reasons to Be Rational? Olav Gjelsvik, University of Oslo The thesis. Among people writing about rationality, few people are more rational than Wlodek Rabinowicz. But are there reasons for being
Hume s Law Violated? Rik Peels. The Journal of Value Inquiry ISSN J Value Inquiry DOI /s
Rik Peels The Journal of Value Inquiry ISSN 0022-5363 J Value Inquiry DOI 10.1007/s10790-014-9439-8 1 23 Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +Business
Moral Discourse: Categorical or Institutional?
Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University Philosophy Theses Department of Philosophy 8-12-2016 Moral Discourse: Categorical or Institutional? Calvin H. Warner Georgia State University
The Subjectivity of Values By J.L. Mackie (1977)
The Subjectivity of Values By J.L. Mackie (1977) Moral Skepticism There are no objective values. This is a bald statement of the thesis of this chapter The claim that values are not objective, are not
MORAL SKEPTICISM FOR FOXES
MORAL SKEPTICISM FOR FOXES DANIEL STAR During the metaethics panel at the Justice for Hedgehogs conference, the audience was presented with something of a spectacle: three moral realists speaking up for,
INTERPRETATION AND FIRST-PERSON AUTHORITY: DAVIDSON ON SELF-KNOWLEDGE. David Beisecker University of Nevada, Las Vegas
INTERPRETATION AND FIRST-PERSON AUTHORITY: DAVIDSON ON SELF-KNOWLEDGE David Beisecker University of Nevada, Las Vegas It is a curious feature of our linguistic and epistemic practices that assertions about
Review of Nathan M. Nobis s Truth in Ethics and Epistemology
Review of Nathan M. Nobis s Truth in Ethics and Epistemology by James W. Gray November 19, 2010 (This is available on my website Ethical Realism.) Abstract Moral realism is the view that moral facts exist
SWINBURNE ON THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA. CAN SUPERVENIENCE SAVE HIM?
17 SWINBURNE ON THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA. CAN SUPERVENIENCE SAVE HIM? SIMINI RAHIMI Heythrop College, University of London Abstract. Modern philosophers normally either reject the divine command theory of
BOOK REVIEW: Gideon Yaffee, Manifest Activity: Thomas Reid s Theory of Action
University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy Philosophy, Department of 2005 BOOK REVIEW: Gideon Yaffee, Manifest Activity:
Deflationary Nominalism s Commitment to Meinongianism
Res Cogitans Volume 7 Issue 1 Article 8 6-24-2016 Deflationary Nominalism s Commitment to Meinongianism Anthony Nguyen Reed College Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans
Ethical Consistency and the Logic of Ought
Ethical Consistency and the Logic of Ought Mathieu Beirlaen Ghent University In Ethical Consistency, Bernard Williams vindicated the possibility of moral conflicts; he proposed to consistently allow for
In his book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, J. L. Mackie agues against
Aporia vol. 16 no. 1 2006 How Queer? RUSSELL FARR In his book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, J. L. Mackie agues against the existence of objective moral values. He does so in two sections, the first
EXTERNALISM AND THE CONTENT OF MORAL MOTIVATION
EXTERNALISM AND THE CONTENT OF MORAL MOTIVATION Caj Strandberg Department of Philosophy, Lund University and Gothenburg University Caj.Strandberg@fil.lu.se ABSTRACT: Michael Smith raises in his fetishist
THE CASE OF THE MINERS
DISCUSSION NOTE BY VUKO ANDRIĆ JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE JANUARY 2013 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT VUKO ANDRIĆ 2013 The Case of the Miners T HE MINERS CASE HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD
CAN WE BELIEVE THE ERROR THEORY?
CAN WE BELIEVE THE ERROR THEORY? Bart Streumer b.streumer@rug.nl Journal of Philosophy 110 (2013): 194-212 Published version available here: https://www.pdcnet.org/jphil/content/jphil_2013_0110_0004_0194_0212
Introductory Kant Seminar Lecture
Introductory Kant Seminar Lecture Intentionality It is not unusual to begin a discussion of Kant with a brief review of some history of philosophy. What is perhaps less usual is to start with a review
What God Could Have Made
1 What God Could Have Made By Heimir Geirsson and Michael Losonsky I. Introduction Atheists have argued that if there is a God who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, then God would have made
Divine command theory
Divine command theory Today we will be discussing divine command theory. But first I will give a (very) brief overview of the discipline of philosophy. Why do this? One of the functions of an introductory
MARK KAPLAN AND LAWRENCE SKLAR. Received 2 February, 1976) Surely an aim of science is the discovery of the truth. Truth may not be the
MARK KAPLAN AND LAWRENCE SKLAR RATIONALITY AND TRUTH Received 2 February, 1976) Surely an aim of science is the discovery of the truth. Truth may not be the sole aim, as Popper and others have so clearly
ARE ALL NORMATIVE JUDGMENTS DESIRE-LIKE? Alex Gregory
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy Vol. 12, No. 1 September 2017 https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i1.212 2017 Author ARE ALL NORMATIVE JUDGMENTS DESIRE-LIKE? Alex Gregory I f I come to think that
On A New Cosmological Argument
On A New Cosmological Argument Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss A New Cosmological Argument, Religious Studies 35, 1999, pp.461 76 present a cosmological argument which they claim is an improvement over
Jeu-Jenq Yuann Professor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy, National Taiwan University,
The Negative Role of Empirical Stimulus in Theory Change: W. V. Quine and P. Feyerabend Jeu-Jenq Yuann Professor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy, National Taiwan University, 1 To all Participants
Philosophical Ethics. Distinctions and Categories
Philosophical Ethics Distinctions and Categories Ethics Remember we have discussed how ethics fits into philosophy We have also, as a 1 st approximation, defined ethics as philosophical thinking about
Lecture 3. I argued in the previous lecture for a relationist solution to Frege's puzzle, one which
1 Lecture 3 I argued in the previous lecture for a relationist solution to Frege's puzzle, one which posits a semantic difference between the pairs of names 'Cicero', 'Cicero' and 'Cicero', 'Tully' even
A Theory of Metaethical Prescriptivism
Chapter Five A Theory of Metaethical Prescriptivism Abstract: In the philosophical literature and in standard dictionaries, there is a general distinction between descriptions and prescriptions. In this