Contents. Detailed Chapter Contents Preface to the First Edition (2003) Preface to the Second Edition (2013) xiii

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1 Alexander Miller Contemporary metaethics An introduction Contents Preface to the First Edition (2003) Preface to the Second Edition (2013) 1 Introduction 2 Moore's Attack on Ethical Naturalism 3 Emotivism and the Rejection of Non-Naturalism 4 Blackburn's Quasi-Realism 5 Gibbard's Norm-Expressivism 6 Mackie's 'Error-Theory', the Argument from Queerness and Moral Fictionalism 7 Judgement-Dependent Accounts of Moral Qualities 8 Naturalism I - Cornell Realism 9 Naturalism II - Reductionism 10 Contemporary Non-Naturalism - McDowell's Moral Realism Notes Appendix: Sense, Reference, Semantic Value and Truth-Conditions Bibliography Index vi xi xiii

2 Preface to the First Edition (2003) Preface to the Second Edition (2013) vi xi xiii 1 Introduction What is Metaethics? Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism Strong Cognitivism: Naturalism Strong Cognitivism: Non-Naturalism Strong Cognitivism without Moral Realism: Mackie's Error-Theory Weak Cognitivism about Morals without Moral Realism: Response-Dependence Theories Non-Cognitivism Internalism and Externalism, Humeanism and Anti- Humeanism Further Reading Flowchart of Main Metaethical Theories 8 2 Moore's Attack on Ethical Naturalism Moore's Strong Cognitivism and Account of 'Natural' 9 Moore on 'natural' 9 Was Moore a strong cognitivist? The Naturalistic Fallacy and the Classical Open-Question Argument Three Objections to the Classical Open-Question Argument 14 Frankena's objection 14

3 vii The 'no interesting analyses' objection 15 The 'sense-reference' objection Can the Open-Question Argument Be Salvaged? 17 Baldwin's 'open-question' argument 17 Darwall, Gibbard and Railton's 'open-question' argument Further Reading 23 3 Emotivism and the Rejection of Non-Naturalism Introduction to Ayer's Emotivism Ayer's Argument Against Non-Naturalism Some Better Objections to Non-Naturalism 28 The a priori supervenience of the moral on the natural 29 The role of 'perception' in moral deliberation 30 Non-naturalism and moral motivation 31 Epistemological bankruptcy Clarificatory Comments on Emotivism 33 Metaphysical and epistemological solvency 33 Emotivism and subjectivism 33 Emotivism and the 'speech-act' fallacy Problems for Emotivism 35 The implied error problem 35 The Frege-Geach problem 37 The problem of the schizoid attitude 39 The problem of mind-dependence The Moral Attitude Problem and the Open-Question Argument Revisited 39 The implicit elimination of moral judgement 42 Emotivism and the open-question argument Further Reading 47 4 Blackburn's Quasi-Realism Introduction Blackburn's Arguments For Projectivism 49 Metaphysical and epistemological solvency 49 Supervenience and the ban on mixed worlds 49 Moral judgement and motivation Blackburn's Response to the Frege-Geach Problem The Central Objection to Blackburn's Solution to the Frege-Geach Problem Commitment-Theoretic Semantics and the Frege- Geach Problem How Compelling is the Central Objection? 63 Situation 1 64

4 viii Situation 2 64 Situation 3 65 Situation Blackburn's Response to the Problem of Mind-Dependence 67 Zangwill's objection to Blackburn Ambitious Quasi-Realism and the Construction of Moral Truth McDowell on Projection and Truth in Ethics Quasi-Realism and the Moral Attitude Problem 81 Emotional ascent 81 Stable sentiment 82 Higher-order sentiment Further Reading 86 5 Gibbard's Norm-Expressivism Norm-Expressivism Introduced The Frege-Geach Problem Revisited Gibbard's Solution to the Frege-Geach Problem Comments and Objections 97 Blackburn's objections 97 Ambiguity and logical operators 98 Mind-independence 99 Gibbard and the moral attitude problem 100 Norm-expressivism and the normativity of norms 100 Commitments and plans Further Reading Mackie's 'Error-Theory', the Argument from Queerness and Moral Fictionalism Introduction Error-Theories, Cognitivism and the Rejection of Moral Realism An Example of an Error-Theory: Locke on Colour Mackie's Conceptual Claim The Argument from Queerness Wright's Objection to the Error-Theory Joyce's Revolutionary Moral Fictionalism Responding to the Argument from Queerness Dispositionalism as a Response to the Error-Theory about Colour Appendix: Kalderon's Hermeneutic Moral Fictionalism Further Reading 132

5 ix 7 Judgement-Dependent Accounts of Moral Qualities Introduction Judgement-Dependence and Judgement-Independence Colours are Judgement-Dependent Shapes are Not Judgement-Dependent Moral Qualities are not Judgement-Dependent Judgement-Dependence and Categoricity Further Reading Naturalism I - Cornell Realism Introduction Harman's Challenge 145 Cornell Realism 145 Harman Sturgeon's Reply to Harman 147 Reductionism and non-reductionism 147 Sturgeon's examples of explanatorily efficacious moral facts 149 Where Harman goes wrong More on Harman and Sturgeon Program Explanation Vindicatory Explanation Copp on Explanation and Justification in Ethics Moral Twin-Earth and the Revived Open-Question Argument Moral Program Explanation Evaluated Vindicatory Explanation Evaluated Further Reading Naturalism II - Reductionism Methodological Naturalism and Substantive Naturalism Hegemonic and Non-Hegemonic Naturalism Varieties of Revisionism Tolerable Revisionism and Vindicative Reductionism Railton's Realist Account of Non-Moral Value Railton's Account of Moral Rightness 195 Generality 198 Humanization 198 Patterns of variation Wiggins on Substantive Naturalism Problems for the Full-Information Analysis of Non- Moral Value 207 Problem (a) 210 Problem (b) 210 Problem (c) 210

6 x Problem (d) 211 Response to Problem (a) 211 Response to Problem (b) 213 Response to Problem (c) 214 Response to Problem (d) Internalism and Externalism in Moral Psychology Rationalism and Anti-Rationalism Analytic Moral Functionalism and Smith's 'Permutation Problem' A Reply to the Permutation Problem 234 After Indow and Ohsumi, Conclusion Further Reading Contemporary Non-Naturalism - McDowell's Moral Realism 'Disentangling' and the Argument Against Non- Cognitivism Second Nature Secondary Qualities, Cognitive Access and Working from Within Humean and Anti-Humean Theories of Motivation Scientism, Curiosity and the 'Metaphysical Understanding' Further Reading 276 Appendix: Sense, Reference, Semantic Value and Truth-Conditions Notes Bibliography Index

AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY. For my mother and father, John and Isabella METAETHICS. Alexander Miller. polity

For my mother and father, John and Isabella AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY METAETHICS Alexander Miller polity Copyright Alexander Miller 2003 The right of Alexander Miller to be identified as Author of