Anarchy, State of Nature, and Transgression

Transcription

1 Anarchy, State of Nature, and Transgression Essay on the conditions of possibility and the necessity of universal principles in international relations I. The Sceptical Range II.I Hobbes Leviathan II.II State of Nature in Internal Relations? III.I The so called Relativism III.II A Shared World of Diversity? There are basically three models of international relations: realism / scepticism, internationalism, and cosmopolitanism. (Dower; 13) The first two approaches dominated the discourse of international affairs for a long time and were limited to the category of power (Cohen; 4) and the question of just war. But the state of our modern world seems to require a new theory of international politics or at least to think the current approach over: The rise of welfare questions in international forums, and of low politics in diplomacy, parallels the increasing impact of international arrangements and transnational interactions on human well-being. (Beitz; 4) To an increasing extent there is a need for guidelines in international affairs. But is it possible to ground these regulations onto moral concerns? There is a wide range of arguments against the idea of an internal morality. 1 I understand the term international morality as the claim of the possibility of one universal set of values to act upon. It is the foundations of non-changeable principles that are therefore valid for everyone at any time. The most sceptic arguments are used in favour for the sovereignty of states, egoistic and / or national interests. I shall reject these proposals. Yet, another argument seems convincing to me showing the impossibility of universals. I called it pluralistic. In the discourse of this essay I first take a general look at the argumentative landscape of the sceptic view. I then analyse the Hobbesian argument, because it is very common and seems to be strong at the first sight. And third, I try to strengthen the pluralistic argument and sketch out the argumentative possibilities for transformation of the world order. And I am convinced that with the sceptical approach it is even possible to argue in favour for a global structure celebrating human diversity, which Dower labels solidarist-pluralist. (Dower; 25) 1

2 I. The Sceptical Range Does it make sense to look out for normative principles in international affairs? The realistic, also sceptic called, thinkers deny this for a variety of reasons. The reasons usually stem from the unreflective conviction that normative international theory is not possible, since [ ] it is thought to be inappropriate to make moral judgements about international affairs. (Beitz; 5) Beitz shows that the so called realistic view about the current situation is wrong, first because of non-stringent argumentation and second about their empirical assumptions and is in this sense unrealistic. One argument against international morality is improbability of moral states behaviour because competing national interests are now the main motives in world politics. (Beitz; 19) Because of means to survive or grow a moral attitude of states should be neither possible nor desirable. Despite the ambiguousness of national interests, which we will discuss later, this position is not convincing insofar as the welfare of one nation does not automatically exclude the others. And in the complex of problems such as environmental pollution or the internationalisation of trade fare this picture of one against the other is naively drawn. Another position involving the national interest of a state conflicting with morality is that of Machiavelli while he is arguing in favour for his prince. But still this is not a sceptical view onto international morality or their possibility. It is rather touching the inner state complications between the ruler and his people. (Beitz; 22f) If this position claims that rulers can act arbitrarily in order to secure national interest, than this must be proven. Because in domestic affairs, few would disagree that what people have a right to have done for them is limited by what they have a right to do for themselves. (Beitz; 24) Why should there be a difference regarding the actions of national rulers? Again we are delaying the question of what is meant with national interest. We will come back to this while examining the argument of Hobbes. The argument against international morality might mean moralistic claiming that either a certain moral attitude is not appropriate to some situation or that an exaggerated conviction might mislead and blind us while judging a situation. (Beitz; 20-1) This could certainly happen. But this worse influence of moralism does not mean that morality itself is not applying to international politics and that we must not judge political decisions by morality. It is insofar a reminder to judge and act by thought and not reflex. (Cohen; 7 & Beitz; 21) 2

3 Nationalism is claiming that the nation has an intrinsic value, is itself the greatest value. (Maxwell; 20) It is mainly derived of the German Idealism as in the later works of Fichte or Hegel s oeuvre. This idealism inspired the romantic thoughts of the Nineteenth Century. Because this statement is obvious untenable we move on to the next argument. Niebuhr is arguing that groups cannot act morally and are therefore amoral 2. This is due to the structure of a state leaving no space for morality. (Maxwell; 24) That argument is in my eyes not convincing and if Niebuhr s observations were right we should then discuss the conception of our society. The argument about the sovereignty of states assumes that morality cannot be applied to states action because they present separate and discrete political orders with no common authority among them. (Beitz; 25) This position is called International Anarchy. (Cf. Maxwell; 15-17) It is a claim for the autonomy of states due to the fact of a global ruler missing. This argument derives from Hobbes. It is criticized in many ways. For example Bull argues in his work The Anarchical Society that there is a society of states. There is a global order existing with a unique feature: it is anarchical. (Bull; 23-52) Second, the observation of lacking law or authority does not show, why moral judgements should not or could not apply in international politics. Furthermore the claim of sovereignty conflicts with the rights of smaller entities like minorities or single persons and larger entities such as humanity. (Maxwell; 19) Beitz argues that the argument of the autonomy and liberty of states seems convincing and is therefore influential because of an analogy of states and individual persons. But this is misleading. The analogy rests on the liberty of persons. (Beitz; 77) For this it is more appropriate to reflect about the concept of person in the beginning. The principle of self-determination which lies within the concept of autonomy fails as an argument, because it is too ambiguous. What is meant by self : the government or the inhabitants. A second ambiguity concerns the identities of groups eligible to claim a right of self-determination. (Beitz; 95) But there is also a more sophisticated argument, which the sceptic could hold in arguing that certain structural features of an anarchical world order rule out international morality s possibility. (Beitz; 13) This position is derived of Hobbes. There are two premises: first, there is a natural state of war between states, and 3

4 second, applying morality in international affairs must necessarily fit the interests of all states. (Beitz; 14) II.I Hobbes Leviathan In the natural condition, or the state of nature, all human beings are equal, because even the weakest can cause death to others. If there are two human beings and each one demands the same good for his or her own they become enemies. (Hobbes; Ch 13 3 ; 81) Due to the fact that such situations are taking place all the time this results in war. There are three principles which apply to this state of nature: competition which leads to invasions for the ends of property and goods, diffidence so each searches violently security, and for glory human beings are also waging war. (Hobbes; Ch 13; 81) Therefore they live in a permanent state of war. This does not mean actual battle but the possibility of violent acts at all times. Morality does not apply in this state, because where is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. (Hobbes; Ch 13; 83) This is due to the assumption of Hobbes that morality can only work if it is secured that every human being will act upon it. In order to prevent people to act otherwise there must be a kind of executive power. Because of this lack each human being can do what is in his [or her] own judgement and each has the liberty [ ] to use his [or her] own power [ ] for the preservation of his [or her] own nature. (Hobbes; Ch 14; 84) The state of nature ends when the human beings renounce their liberty by contract to a sovereign to whom the name Leviathan refers. One might move this picture into the context of our examination and arguing against moral judgement in international affairs. 4 Then one could argue that because there does not exist a contract in international relations, no prior sovereign a global Leviathan there is no morality. As the single human being in Hobbes state of nature, each state will use force when necessary, in a manner unrestrained by a consideration of the interests of other actors or of the international community. (Beitz; 28) Why should a state act out of moral interest if there is no favour in doing such? No state can be ensured that the others will act equally and follow moral principles, so why this should do. 5 The question that arises is whether international relations are a state of nature. And given they are one must analyse this state for the possibilities of an international morality because the presence of a state of nature 4

5 does not deny that there might be demand and possibility for such moral principles. (Beitz; 31-34) II.II State of Nature in International Relations? Beitz asks two questions: Is the Hobbesian description of international relations [ ] empirically acceptable? and does Hobbes state of nature give a correct account of the justification of moral principles for the international realm? (Beitz; 35) In order to answer the first question, Beitz rejects the four propositions allowing the analogy of Hobbes state of nature to be apply to international relations. Neither are states the only actors in international relations (I); nor are they equal in power the weakest is not able to defeat the strong (II); nor are they independent from each other and can deal with inner problems independently of the internal policies of other actors (III); nor are there no reliable expectations of reciprocal compliance due to the lack of a guarantee by a sovereign (IV). (Beitz; 36-49) The actual existence and action of transnational companies, the wide range of international associations, NGO s, the divergence of power of each state, global trade, ethnical minorities within foreign borders, and the actual practice of agreements, contracts, and alliances owing to shared interests deny these propositions. The analogy of the Hobbesian state of nature and international relations failed. The answer of the second question must first show that moral principles in international relations do suit every state s interests of self-preservation and second answer why the justification of such principles [should] appeal only to interests. (Beitz; 51) In order to examine the first point, Beitz asks what this self-preservation involves. Applied to the lives of the states inhabitants this concept sounds convincing. 6 Applied to the loss of territory or even the idea of statehood without harm to the people the theory is not convincing anymore. (Beitz; 51f) The problematic question about the concept of state cannot be largely discussed here. One would have to examination the features making a state a state. Is a state for example the whole of its inhabitants or does state mean government? Furthermore: What are the interests of a state? What has to be preserved in order to fulfil the idea of selfpreserving? And of what kind are the interactions between the people and the state? Who is in charge for whose interests? The idea of national interests often tends to sound like an ideological term and is then connected with the idea of the intrinsic value of a nation rather than a rational 5

6 principle. Is it unlikely in at least the democratic states that people give their leader carte blanche to do anything and everything on the nation s behalf; as Maxwell puts it. (Maxwell; 15) But, if national interest matters in justification prescriptions for state behaviour then this must derive from the interest of persons and the status of a person. (Beitz; 53) I fully agree with Beitz that it is more convincing that instead of doing the hard task in defining states interests it is much more appropriate to move the concept of person into the centre of concern and appeal directly to the rights and interests of all persons affected by the choice. (Beitz; 55) To respond to the second question is more difficult. It touches the metaethical question how morality or ethic is possible at all. So Beitz rejects this point and asks the sceptic to explain altruistic acts of every day life with the use of self-interest only. Beitz sketches out another picture that seems to explain these acts more adequate. In this explanation we act out of the view that we are among other human beings who also have interests and we treat them as such. In regarding this, it is possible to explain moral behaviour without the need of self-interest that the Hobbesian sceptic has. (Beitz; 58f) If this view can be applied to international relations is, of course, another question. III.I The so called Relativism The so-called cultural relativism is the assumption that different cultures have divergent views about norms and values and according to this the possibility for establishing one global principle of values is lacking. Rather to term this view relativism I prefer pluralism 7. I think the label relativistic is too often used just to discredit ways of thought as an attempt to avoid a serious examination. 8 Because of the cultural diversity there are no rational grounds for holding one social morality superior to another when their requirements conflict. (Beitz; 17) There are two points. First, the conflict can occur about the ranking of social goods. At this stage, the cultural relativistic argument does affect the valuation of things, but not the existence of an international political theory at all. (Beitz; 18) The second stage does affect the principles of the theory. Given that the divergences of ethical values or views on morality are very wide and even excluding each other, then there is no possibility for a consensus and one has to be chosen in favour for the other. But on 6

7 which foundation, by what kind of legitimation, could this be done? The choice would be arbitrary, in this sense a subjection of others, and therefore cultural imperialism 9. Beitz replies to this argument, that after having learned from others, we must be prepared to acknowledge that some conception of morality is the most reasonable one available [ ] and go forward to see what principles result. (Beitz; 19) In my option that is a simple thought. Of course one can do this in academic studies just as it is on epistemological ones. (Beitz; 19) But in order to establish an international policy on the foundations of universal principles this approach seems to me quite too pragmatic. It is enough, in establishing standards for conduct, that we be able to regard them as the most rational choices available for anyone appropriately situated. (Beitz; 19, italics by T.P.) But, on which foundations are these rational choices done? And I think Beitz recognizes these troubles when he is discussing the questions of practical application. This [being assured to intervene] is especially important in view of the difficulties of formulating principles of justice appropriate to societies whose socioeconomic and cultural characteristics differ significantly from those of the societies to which western theories of justice are typically addressed. (Beitz; 90) Of course decisions need to be done. But while deciding one should not forget, that it is done on thin foundations which could proven to be false and concerned to be immoral in later times. Now let us take a look at the quotations of Beitz in the last paragraph. By which legitimation Beitz demands to act upon the most reasonable moral principles? What features single out rational choice as the preferable manner for making decisions? Could there be the possibility that Beitz, embodied in the discourse of science, just did to what the tradition of western philosophy 10 conditioned him? Let us take a look at the theoretical background of this question. For example Foucault, inspired especially by Nietzsche and Heidegger, 11 developed a theory about the construction of social reality. This means that we are embodied in discourses e.g. natural science, medicine, ethical theories which produce power and through this direct our view at the world, our system of beliefs and the paths we think in. The individual, with his [or her] identity and characteristics, is the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces. (Foucault; 73-1) A similar thought is found at Lyotard. [N]o self is an island: each exists in a fabric of relations [ ] a person is always located at nodal points of specific communication circuits [ ] Or better: one is always located at a 7

8 post through which various kinds of messages pass. (Lyotard; 15) Lyotard calls these circumstances the social bond. (Lyotard; 13) This is a linguistic bond, which means that it is performed through the participation of language games 12 of which each game has a different set of rules. (Lyotard; 40) They are in a sense incommensurable. This circumstance affects the relationship of descriptive and prescriptive or normative statements. In rejecting the common legitimation of science as done by the entlightment, which Lyotard takes as an example, in the manner that it grounds the legitimation of science and truth in the autonomy of interlocutors involved in ethical, social, and political praxis, he states, that there is nothing to proof that a prescriptive statement describing a real situation is true, it follows that a prescriptive statement based upon it [ ] is just. (Lyotard; 39-40) Following this, there is no way of self-legitimation of political theory because there is no external point of view, no view without perspective. (Cf. Simons; 53) There is no pre-existing, transcendental set of principles [ ] rather, normative principles and forms of practice emerge historically out of human activity. (Falzon; 58) Dower admits, that the postmodern 13, as he calls this position, attacks against the idea of one reason or universal values are powerful and striking. (Dower; 35) I think he is right. It might be that Beitz because his book was published in 1979 was not aware of the post-structural criticism, which aroused at this time, and the consequences for ethics. But Maxwell at least should have recognised it. But yet she does not even mention it. Instead she is constructing a prescriptive content of the pluralistic argument and takes this construction as a mean of critique: Our Western culture is advanced and civilized; the others are not up to performing morally in the international arena, and so this excuses us Westerners from needing to try. (Maxwell; 122) Owing to this assumption she calls the pluralistic argument based on Western arrogance and states following rejection: But it can easily be objected that other societies moral ideas are just as good, or better. (Maxwell; 29) Right, that is just the point of the pluralistic argument. And the question, who is supposed to choose the right, the best, the universal true one and with the behalf of which measurements? III.II A Shared World of Diversity? I think it is possible to agree about and establish certain principles shared in the global community. I am not sure if they should be called or legitimated as principles 8

9 of morality or rather pragmatic, directed at the situation, approaches. It would be a way of making decisions with the knowledge that it might be overcome someday and could proof false. And thus the attitude of a fundamentalist falls away. If a understand the post-structural argument right, 14 then it even supports the idea of the cosmopolitan idea which Dower calls the solidarist-pluralist: a cosmopolitan who believes in solidarity throughout the world for promoting the essential conditions of well-being, but at the same time does not wish to promote any culturally specific ideals but rather to respect cultural diversity and a plurality of values. (Dower; 25) In this the pluralistic argument is used against any approaches of universality, which tend to be dogmatic. Also the idea of a (rigid) world government, a kind of a global superstructure, does hardly hold up. I agree with Dower that with an optimistic view of this kind of critic, it is possible to celebrate [ ] the diversity of human life. (Dower; 35) The distinction between the claim that individuals, groups and governments have obligations or responsibilities towards people, groups and other governments (Dower; 10) and the approach to some kind of new world order is convincing at least in a world of increasing interdependences. Therefore in rejecting the possibility of one universal morality the possibility of a cosmopolitan society is, as far as I see, not affected. In a certain sense it also strengthens this idea. Dower claims that respecting diversity which probably is the best feature of the pluralistic position is itself a demand for a universal value. (Dower; 43) I am not sure about this claim. Certainly, the diversity of cultures is something to regard, perhaps it can be called a value, but is it a universal one? If it were a fixed idea, universal, then following scenario could be possible: The last few people of a certain culture decide to give up their traditions and move to another place. Because there is this value of diversity these people are now forced to live in a fenced reservation and to keep on practicing their culture. But, one can argue that there is also the value of individual liberty. Now there is a value conflict and the discussion starts about the limitations of universal values. I know this example is highly constructed. I just wanted to point out my difficulties with the term universal. A remains of metaphysical thought seems to be exist within this term, a kind of external truth through all times for which I think the conditions of the possibility are not given. I do not deny the needs of some principles of living together. But rather to search for a perpetual system of values, excluded from transformation, I would prefer to discuss these principles every now and then. Living together is not a stage but a 9

10 process; therefore a perpetual self-transformation of society should affect the principles too. We should keep in mind that the framework of living together is not as solid as it might seem. Post-structural critic does not dismiss the idea that are normative frameworks in terms of which we judge and act. (Falzon; 58) But this dialogical ethic instead of prescribing foundationalistic sets of rules is promoting the creation of normative principles, the transformation that takes part in the historical process. Because every set of rules has its limits it should be thought over if at some time tremendous frictions occur at the normative borders. (Cf. Falzon; & Simons; & Butler 15 ) For criticism within a society national or cosmopolitan the post-structural theory is effective. Judith Butler 16 for example criticizes identity politics. In analysing the circumstances of living especially for non-heterosexual people she had an important influence for the establishing of gender politics and gender studies. Because there is no right internal state policy, I think there is the need for a system or structure allowing minorities and subcultures to find their space to live in. Within this criticism the current concepts of state, government and society at all have to be examined again, for they are European concepts. 17 And perhaps these thoughts are leading towards a global society Dower sketches out as plurastic-solidar. This is certainly not meant as an end, as a final stage, which we reach one day and then say: Well, all is done. I think it should be seen as a foil, which enables to transformation through performative practices and what Foucault called transgression of limits on current circumstances. Notes 1 At this place we cannot concern the possibility of morality at all. But until this meta-ethical problem is not solved, the idea of international morality is in a weak position. For example Beitz is just assuming that a general morality theory can exist and examines whether international scepticism is consistent with our basic ideas about the nature and requirements of morality. (Beitz; 17) I think this assumption is not a stronghold until argued for. 2 Maxwell labels this the immorality of groups. (Maxwell; 23) I think amoral is more apt. We would not call animals for example immoral, because they lack the conditions of possibility of moral behaviour. 3 Because of the fact that there are many reprints of the original Leviathan and they differ in layout, I also name the chapter, when citing. 4 In fact, there is a controversy, if Hobbes himself referred to international relations as the state-ofnature being similar to the state of the individuals. (See for example Tommy L. Lott: Hobbes on International Relations ; in T. Airaksinen & M.A. Bertman (eds.): Hobbes: War Among Nations; Aldershot 1989; pp ) We are interested in the argument used by sceptics and are therefore at this place not concerned with the question whether it is Hobbes view at the international state not. 10

11 5 There seems to be a parallel to the famous prisoners dilemma. 6 But self-defence is in common moral principles not unjust anyway. 7 I adopt it from Maxwell s label Cultural Pluralism. (Maxwell; 26) 8 Some thoughts about polemics in scientific discourse can be found in a late Interview with Michel Foucault: Polemics, Politics, and Problemizations in: Paul Rabinow (ed.): The Foucault Reader; London 1991; Beitz suggests intellectual imperialism, but I think cultural is better because I am not sure about the link inter intellect and morality. Perhaps this term itself refers to the non-neutral attitude preferring rational or sophisticated cultures. 10 I am aware of the fact that the term western philosophy is an intervention and than there are different traditions within. I referred to this as the main assumption of rationality as the framework of philosophy which (almost) all of these traditions shared. 11 It is especially the idea of the historical determination of values and our systems of beliefs or, to say it with Heidegger our Geworfenheit, which inspired Foucault. 12 Lyotard borrowed this term from Wittgenstein. (Cf. Philosophical Investigations; 6) 13 I guess Dower took this term from Lyotard. I am not sure about the postmodern concept. So I would rather refer to the methodical term post-structural. 14 Of course I cannot embrace the whole of post-structural thought and therefore I can merely refer to the outlined argument. I take the fact of involvement of Foucault and Lyotard in political writings and Derrida s appreciation of the UNESCO as hints that I am not mistaken. 15 Butler has a unique concept of universality allowing her to keep this term. Although I prefer to avoid this term I share Butlers concerns: It is the futural anticipation of a universality that has not yet arrived, one for which we have no ready concept, one whose articulations will only follow, if they do, from a contestation of universality at its already imagined borders. (Butler; 49) 16 For an account of Butler s political influence see for example the chapter Queer politics Butler als politische Philosophin ; in: Paula-Irene Villa: Judith Butler; Frankfurt / Main 2003; pp Cf. Derrida; 21: So I think we have to interpret, to analyse the history of the academic models in Europe, in the United States, in the world, from a philosophical point of view. Philosophical refers to a dialogue between the disciplines rather than one method. References Beitz, Charles R.: Political Theory and International Relations; Princeton Bull, Hedley: The Anarchical Society; London 1980 / reprint. Butler, Judith: Universality in Culture ; in: Martha C. Nussbaum (ed.): For Love of Country?; Boston 2002 / reprint; pp Cohen, M.: Moral Scepticism and International Relations ; in: Beitz, C.R. (ed.): Political Theory and International Relations; Princeton 1985; pp Derrida, Jacques: Ethics, Institutions, and the Right to Philosophy; Oxford Dower, Nigel: World Ethics The New Agenda; Edinburgh Falzon, Christopher: Foucault and the Social Dialogue; London Foucault, Michel: Questions on Geography ; in: Power / Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, ; Brighton Hobbes, Thomas: Leviathan; reprint of the edition of 1651; Oxford without year. Lyotard, Jean-Francois: The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge; Manchester 2001 / reprint. Maxwell, Mary: Morality among Nations; New York Simons, Jon: Foucault & the Political; London & New York