THE IMPERATIVE OF VIRTUE ETHICS FOR A NEW SOCIETY

Transcription

1 THE IMPERATIVE OF VIRTUE ETHICS FOR A NEW SOCIETY BY NWANGUMA OKENNA MICHAEL DI/342 BEING AN ESSAY SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, DOMINICAN INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY IBADAN, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF BARCHELOR OF ARTS DEGREE IN PHILOSOPHY IBADAN JUNE 2010.

2 ATTESTATION This is to certify that the long essay titled: THE IMPERATIVE OF VIRTUE ETHICS FOR A NEW SOCIETY, submitted to the department of Philosophy, Dominican Institute of Philosophy and Theology, Ibadan, for the award of the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy of the University of Ibadan, is an original and insightful research work undertaken by Nwanguma Okenna Michael and was supervised and approved by Rev. Fr. (Dr.) Ben Faneye, O. P. MODERATOR: Date. Sign. Rev. Fr. Faneye, Benedict, O. P. Head of Philosophy Department, Dominican Institute of Philosophy and Theology, Ibadan, Nigeria. II

3 DEDICATION This project is fondly dedicated to my parents, Mr. Bartholomew Duru Nwanguma and Mrs. Grace Chinyere Nwanguama. It is also dedicated to you, the reader I hope you will find it an insightful introduction to contemporary virtue ethics and the need to learn and grow in the virtues. III

4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Thanks to the Triune God for bestowing on me undeserved love, wisdom and strength to accomplish this project. I remain ever grateful to my dearest mother, Mother Thrice Admirable, Queen and Victress of Schoenstatt, for guiding me through the difficult moments of the execution of this project. The stimulus to write this work came from Rev. Fr. Alfred Kistler. I am much indebted to him for his encouragement at every stage. Especially, I must thank Rev. Fr. Ben Fanaye, my moderator, for reading the entire manuscript in draft, and for taking the time to make many characteristically insightful comments. I am also most grateful to Anthony Onyeuwaoma, Rev. Fr. Magnus Ifedikwa Charles Agboeze, Cajetan Okeke, Lazarus Illigh and Stanley Obijiaku for being willing to take the trouble to read some of the more awkward bits and let me know whether people coming to virtue ethics for the first time would find it relevant. I remain grateful other friends who in one way or another contributed to the success of this project. Worthy of mention are my Schoenstatt Fathers group brothers, Chukwuwike Enekwechi, Ekenedilichukwu Uchenu, Victory Oforka, Raymond Gbadamosi and Damian Chilobe. I also remember profoundly the contributions of my dear father, Bartholomew Nwanguma, my good friend Oluwaseun Opeyemi Oni and other friends whose name I cannot mention here for want of space. I have you all in my mind for the good impact you have made in my life. IV

5 TABLE OF CONTENTS Attestation. II Dedication.... III Acknowledgement IV Table of Contents.. V INTRODUCTION I. Statement of the problem. 1 II. Aim and scope of the work.. 2 III. Methodology 2 CHAPTER ONE HISTORY OF VIRTUE ETHICS 1.1 What is Ethics? Division of Ethical Theories Normative Ethics Descriptive Ethics Metaethics Historical development of Virtue Ethics Greco-Roman Ethics- Aristotle s Ethics.. 8 V

6 1.3.2 Medieval Period- Aquinas Ethics Modern Period- Deontology and Utilitarianism th Century- Anscombe s Modern Moral Philosophy.. 19 CHAPTER TWO KEY CONCEPTS IN VIRTUE ETHICS 2.1 Human Flourishing Moral Education and Character Formation Types of Virtues Uncodifiability of Ethics CHAPTER THREE IMPERATIVE OF VIRTUE ETHICS FOR A NEW SOCIETY 3.1 Moral dilemma of our society today Virtue and social life The imperative of Virtue Ethics Conclusion Bibliography. 67 VI

7 INTRODUCTION I. Statement of the Problem Aristotle in propagating virtue ethics focuses on the inherent character of a person rather than on the specific actions the person performs. This approach to normative ethics which was the prevailing approach to ethical thinking in the ancient Greek and Medieval periods of philosophy, faded out during the early Modern period where virtue ethics was practically jettisoned and replaced by utilitarianism and deontology. It re-emerged in the late twentieth century heralded by Anscombe's famous article Modern Moral Philosophy (Anscombe 1958) which crystallized an increasing dissatisfaction with deontology and utilitarianism as the paradigm for normative ethical theories. Virtue ethics suffered rejection on the accusation that it lacked absolute moral rules which can give clear guidance on how to act in specific circumstances such as abortion, digital crimes, euthanasia and so on. Also some others reject virtue ethics because they believe different people, cultures, and societies often have vastly different perspectives on what constitutes a virtue. Since it is difficult to establish the nature of the virtues especially across different cultures and societies, it is erroneously held that virtue ethics can no longer hold true in many modern societies. 1

8 II. Aim and Scope of the Work This work aims to argue, in the line drawn by Elizabeth Anscombe, that a return to virtue ethics is not only relevant but also desirable to help modern society out of its plunge into moral decadence. In response to its critics, we shall show how virtue ethics is able to resolve specific moral dilemmas and establish that there is a necessary interplay between social life and the virtues. Consequently, this essay shall argue that virtue ethics can serve as paradigm for reconstructing our present morally decaying society in order to create a better one. III. Methodology To achieve the set aim, in chapter one, we shall trace the history of virtue ethics from the period of Greco-Roman philosophy and the Medieval era of philosophy to the era of its decline in the early Modern period. We shall then discuss how Anscombe was able to revive virtue ethics by showing dissatisfaction with the then prevailing deontology and utilitarianism. In the second chapter, we shall expose the key concepts of virtue ethics. Usually, concepts like eudaimonia, habit, character, types of virtues and the doctrine of the mean are either misunderstood or misapplied and so our aim shall be, as much as possible, to place this understanding in the right perspective. 2

9 Finally, in the last chapter, we shall show how consequentialism and deontology have failed to meet new moral challenges of our modern society. In this place, we shall argue that virtue ethics is able to meet these challenges. To meet modern society s moral and social challenge, there should be interplay between virtue and social life in order to facilitate the possible attainment of the goal of having a society with virtuous personalities promoting common good. This can be done without virtue ethics necessarily falling into moral relativism as its critics claim. Duty based moral thinking has failed to lead man to its promised ideal of a morally upright world. Virtue ethics is the viable alternative ethical theory that can lead us to the Promised Land the evolving of a virtuous man in a new society! 3

10 CHAPTER ONE HISTORY OF VIRTUE ETHICS 1.1 What is Ethics? Etymologically, ethics derives from the Greek word ethika, which designates character, custom, principles or standards of human conduct. It is sometimes called morals from Latin mores, meaning customs, and, by extension, the study of such principles, sometimes called moral philosophy. 1 To attempt a more technical definition, we can say ethics is the science of human conduct. There are two important elements of this definition, science and human conduct, which both require explanations. The sense of science used in the definition is not the same as the physical experimental science that rely on fixed empirical principles but it involves a broad sense of the word, which designates an intellectual enterprise that uses scientific methodology for its rational inquiry to attain truth. 2 Human conducts, on the other hand, pertains to the ability of man to make voluntary choices between alternative courses of action because they have decided that they ought to choose one alternative rather than the 1 Cf. "Ethics." Microsoft Encarta 2009 [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, Microsoft Encarta Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. 2 Cf. Oliver Johnson, Ethics: Selection from Classical and Contemporary Writers (Fort Worth: Library of Congress Cataloging-in- Publication Data, 1989), p.2. 4

11 other. 3 Ethics thus sets out to address the problem of how humans ought to act which is different from how they indeed act. 1.2 Division of Ethical Theories There are generally three divisions or approaches to ethical theories; although the conclusions arrived using one approach may bear on those of other approaches. It is thus useful that we distinguish between the three before we fully delve into the area that largely concerns us in this work Normative Ethics Normative Ethics prescribes how we should act. This level of theorizing includes sets of principles that can be used to decide what ought to be done. Normative ethical theories are concerned with the discovering of the things that are intrinsically good, and which principles of obligation are the true fundamental principles of morality. The basic assumption in normative ethics is that there is only one ultimate criterion of moral conduct. There are three dominant approaches to seeking out the foundational principle of moral conduct in normative ethics and they are deontological theories, consequentialist theories and virtue theories. Deontological theories reject the idea that rightness or 3 Cf. Oliver Johnson, Ethics: Selection from Classical and Contemporary Writers. Ibid. 5

12 wrongness of an act depends on its consequences, instead they posit that morality is duty based. Consequentialism argues that an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable. Virtue ethics holds that the cultivation of moral character and embodiment of virtues is the essential issue in ethics, rather than the establishment of rules based on duties or consequences Descriptive Ethics Descriptive ethics is sometimes referred to as comparative ethics because it derives from observation of choices made by moral agents. It is a form of empirical research into the attitudes or ethical actions of people. 4 It tries to answer the question: What do people believe is right? Through comparative studies of actions that different societies recommend, we are able to know how better it is to live. Consequently, descriptive theories are not about what one thinks but a description of what is. Example of this approach is Kohlberg s theory of moral development which describes the different stages of moral reasoning in a person. 4 James Feiser (2006), Ethics Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Oct, 2009) 6

13 1.2.3 Meta-ethics Meta-ethics can be defined as the study of the origin and meaning of ethical concepts and it is concerned with analyzing moral concepts. Geoff Sayre- McCord defines metaethics as an attempt to understand the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological, presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk, and practice. 5 We enter into the sphere of metaethics when we attempt to answer questions like: Is morality more a matter of taste than truth? Are there moral facts? How do we learn about the moral facts, if there are any? Do moral concepts have any meaning? We do metaethics when we reflect about what we are doing when we make a moral judgment; whether we are simply expressing our emotion or enforcing what is willed by God and so on. There is a close relationship between metaethics and normative ethics. Metaethics primarily does the work of conceptual analysis of moral concepts while normative ethics has the task of prescribing how one ought to act. 1.3 Historical development of Virtue Ethics I shall discuss the development of virtue ethics in the history of ethics. In the overall development of virtue ethics from the Greco-Roman era to the 5 Geoff Sayre-McCord (Jan 23, 2007), Metaethics Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (10 August, 2009) 7

14 contemporary period of the history of philosophy, thinkers like Aristotle, Aquinas and Elizabeth Anscombe occupy a central place. It was in Aristotle that Greek philosophy; most especially ethics reached its full and perfect maturity. In the medieval period, Thomas Aquinas is prominent among the philosophers that led the revival of the study of Aristotle and thus the continuation of his system of ethics. Virtue ethics in the modern and enlightenment era experienced great decline due to the rise of Kantian deontologism and consequentialism. The relevance of these ethical theories born of the enlightenment project was questioned by Anscombe in the 20 th century and she consequently proposed a return to virtue ethics. We shall treat in details the contribution of these outstanding philosophers in the history of virtue ethics Greco- Roman Ethics Aristotle Aristotle ( B.C.) was born at Stagira, in Macedonia. His father, Nicomachus, was the physician of Amyntas III (reigned c. 393 c. 370 BC), king of Macedonia and grandfather of Alexander the Great (reigned BC). He is said to be the founder of the Lyceum, an academy where lectures were given for free to the public. Aristotle wrote three major works in ethics: Nichomacean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics and Magna Moralia. Many scholars 8

15 agree that the earliest and most influential systematic account of virtue ethics appears in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle divides the sciences into three groups: Theoretical Science, Practical Science and Poetical Science. He insists that ethics is a Practical Science and thus when we ask the question what is good? we are not simply asking because we want to have knowledge, but because we will be better able to achieve our good if we develop a fuller understanding of what it is to flourish. His ethics is teleological in the sense that it starts by asking the question what is the end of human life? He answers that the goal is the attainment of the highest good, which according to him has three characteristics: it is desirable for itself, it is not desirable for the sake of some other good, and all other goods are desirable for its sake. Aristotle uses the term eudaimonia to designate the highest good of human life. Eudaimonia is commonly translated as happiness but Aristotle means little more than the ordinary understanding of happiness, he regards eudaimon as a substitute for human flourishing or well-being. Consequently, all man s actions are for the purpose of human flourishing which is the highest good or end, and all subordinate goals health, wealth, and other such resources are sought because they promote wellbeing, not because they are what well-being consists in. 9

16 The question usually raised from this point concerns how one can reach this highest good. To answer this question, Aristotle develops the concept arête (virtue) which designates excellence in fulfillment of a particular function. 6 He argues that it is the function (ergon) of man to reach the highest goal and it belongs to the proper activity of the rational part of the human soul in accordance with virtue to move for the good. Henry Sidgwick explains that: The term [virtue] cannot denote a mere natural feeling or susceptibility to feeling, such as anger, fear, pity, as these, considered merely as such, are not objects of praise and blame: it denotes a settled habit, formed by a course of actions under rule and discipline in which vicious excess and defect have been avoided, of experiencing the natural emotions just mentioned in a duly limited and regulated manner; so that the virtuous man, without internal conflict, wills actions that hit the happy mean in their effect. 7 From Sidgwick s explanation, we can understand that Aristotle s concept of virtue contains the idea of the golden mean which is a state or reasonable midpoint between two vices, namely, excess and defect towards which our actions should aim. Also, Aristotle describes ethical virtue as a hexis, habit or better translated settled disposition by which one holds himself in a stable 6 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk II, Chap I. (Based on the translation by W.D. Ross, with emendations by Daniel Kolak. Electronic HyperText Markup Language Version Copyright 1999) 7 Henry Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics (Boston: Beacon Press, 1931), P

17 equilibrium of the soul, in order to choose the action knowingly and for its own sake. To buttress these points Richard Kraut writes: In this respect, Aristotle says, the virtues are no different from technical skills: every skilled worker knows how to avoid excess and deficiency, and is in a condition intermediate between two extremes. The arithmetic mean between 10 and 2 is 6, and this is so invariably, whatever is being counted. But the intermediate point that is chosen by an expert in any of the crafts will vary from one situation to another. There is no universal rule, for example, about how much food an athlete should eat, and it would be absurd to infer from the fact that 10 lbs. is too much and 2 lbs. too little for me that I should eat 6 lbs. Finding the mean in any given situation is not a mechanical or thoughtless procedure, but requires a full and detailed acquaintance with the circumstances. 8 In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of virtue: intellectual virtues - those that pertain to the part of the soul that engages in reasoning, and moral virtues- those pertaining to the part of the soul that cannot itself reason but is however capable of following reason. He first discusses ethical virtue in general, then moving to a discussion of particular ethical virtues (temperance, courage, generosity, pride, good temper, modesty, friendliness, wittiness, and righteous indignation), and 8 Richard Kraut (July, 2007), Aristotle's Ethics in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (October, 2009) 11

18 finally completing his survey by considering the intellectual virtues (practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom, deliberation, understanding, judgment, intellection, and so on) Medieval Ethics Thomas Aquinas Thomas Aquinas ( ) was born in the Castle of Roccasecca near Naples. He was of the family of the count of Aquino and his father had hoped that Thomas would one day enjoy high ecclesiastical position. He first studied at the Benedictine Abbey of Monte Cassino for nine years and at the age of fourteen, he entered the University of Naples to study the seven liberal arts. 9 It was in Naples in 1244 that he joined the Dominican friars. Aquinas taught theology at the University of Paris. We find Aquinas account on virtue in the Summa Theologiae, Disputed Questions on the Virtues and his Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics. Aquinas holds that all actions or movements of all things irrational and rational are directed towards some end. There are many ends actually sought like riches, honour, and pleasure, but none of these satisfies and gives complete beatitudo or 9 The seven liberal arts include the trivium (grammar, rhetoric and dialectic) and the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music) 12

19 felicitas. He argues that only through an uninterruptible vision of God, the ground and first cause of all being, that man can reach complete happiness. It is towards God that all things are surely, though unconsciously striving in their pursuit of good; but this universal striving after God, since he is essentially intelligible, exhibits itself in its highest form in rational beings. 10 God is thus the intrinsically desirable end of all rational beings. Aquinas argument is thoroughly systematic in that it proceeds from his natural law doctrine to his doctrine of virtues. Natural law consist of those universal principles in practical reason that function in a way analogous to principles in speculative reason. Speculative reason is that reasoning which begins from propositions in first principles, proceeds by way of theoretical arguments till it reaches a conclusion. In the practical realm, the first principle is that good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided 11. The intellect is able to apprehend this simply through Synderesis that unerringly prompts to the realization of the first principles in conduct. It is the disposition containing the precepts of the natural law, which are the first principles of human acts. 12 Consequently, the most general precepts of the natural law will be more substantive if it points out specific goods that are to be pursued. We have 10 Cf. Henry Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, P Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae, q. 94, a.2 12 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae, q. 94. a.1 13

20 pointed out that the good of the human being is, in a sense, rational activity itself. Here is where we can conveniently locate the importance of virtues which are dispositions by which we appropriate our specific good effectively. According to Aquinas, virtue is a habit that disposes an agent to perform its proper operation or movement. 13 Knowing that reason is the proper operation of human beings, it follows that a virtue is a habit that disposes us to reason well. Virtues can be acquired naturally through training and practice. Aquinas, like Aristotle, divides virtues into intellectual and moral. However, unlike Aristotle, he adds theological virtues. Concerning moral virtue which he describes as a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously 14, Aquinas accepts the Platonic-Aristotelian thesis that there are four moral virtues which are cardinal. These virtues are prudence, justice, courage, and temperance. Prudence pertains to the good of practical reasonableness of one's deliberations, choices and execution of choices. Justice is the steady and lasting willingness to give to others what they are entitled to. The virtue of temperance is that which integrates one's desires, particularly but not only for sexual pleasure, with reason, lest reason be enslaved by passion and becomes its ingenious servant, as it readily can. Temperantia [temperance] is the mean, for 13 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Virtue, a.1, translated by Ralph McInerny (Indiana: St. Augustine s Press, 1999), Pp Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae, q.55, a.4 14

21 example, between lust and frigidity or apathy. 15 And fortitude is the mean between recklessness or over-boldness and cowardice. The summary of Aquinas virtue ethics can be put as an effort to show precisely how prudence, justice, courage, and temperance are necessary for human flourishing Modern Ethics: The rise of Kantian Deontology and Mill s Utilitarianism Thomas Aquinas seems to be the loudest herald of virtue ethics in the history of medieval philosophy. From the Enlightenment to the Modern era, the prominence of Aristotelian-Aquinas virtue ethics was replaced by the ascendancy of utilitarianism and deontology, and with that virtue theory moved to the margins of Western philosophy. In the light of the history of virtue ethics, this section would have been named: the decline of virtue ethics, but I take it to mean the rise of utilitarianism and deontology. Consequently, I shall briefly discuss these approaches that overshadowed virtue ethics in the modern era. Generally, the reason for the apparent death of virtue ethics in this era can be given as the fact that 1.) The largely theocentric interpretation of reality of the 15 John Finnis (Dec., 2005), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Aquinas' Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy, (Nov., 2009) 15

22 medieval era was replaced with a more humanistic view. 2.) The various advancements in science, technology and arts, necessitated that the scholastic definition of man on which virtue ethics stands be questioned. Consequently, the modern man revisited and reconstructed the traditional understanding of man. 3.) The other reasons will be found in the ethical thesis of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism This is the idea that the moral worth of an action is to be judged solely by its contribution to overall utility: that is, its contribution to happiness or pleasure as summed among all people. 16 It is thus a form of consequentialism, meaning that the moral worth of an action is determined by its outcome. The typical proponents were Jeremy Bentham (1789) and John Stuart Mill (1861). They claimed that an act is morally right if and only if that act maximizes the good, that is, if and only if the total amount of good for all minus the total amount of bad for all is greater than this net amount for any incompatible act available to the agent on that occasion Utilitarianism From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, (Nov., 2009) 17 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Feb., 2006), Consequentialism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Nov., 2009) 16

23 In his book, Utilitarianism, Mill argues that people desire happiness (the intrinsic good and the utilitarian end) and the overall happiness is a good to the aggregate of all persons. It thus follows that for one to determine what is good, the amount of pleasure derived has to be weighed against the pain it produces, and if pleasure overweighs pain, the action is judged to be praise-worth. Suffice to note that Mill, unlike Aristotle, equates happiness with pleasure. He also argues that cultural, intellectual and spiritual pleasures are of greater value than mere physical pleasure because the former would be valued higher than the latter by competent judges. A competent judge, according to Mill, is one who has experienced both the lower pleasures and the higher. 18 There are two types of utilitarianism: Act Utilitarianism says that an act is right insofar as its consequences for the general happiness are at least as good as any alternative available to the agent 19 while Rule Utilitarianism says that an act is right insofar as it conforms to a rule whose acceptance value for the general happiness is at least as great as any alternative rule available to the agent. Summarily, utilitarianism provides a standard of right action which is that a right action is that in which the pleasure derived is greater than the pain produced for the greater number of people. 18 Utilitarianism From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, (Nov., 2009) 19 David Brink (Oct., 2007) "Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy" Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Nov, 2009) 17

24 Deontology Deontology is from Greek deon, duty, and logos, science. Consequently, it focuses on the logic of the relationship between duty and the morality of human actions. The chief proponent of deontology is Immanuel Kant who died two years before Mill was born. He is famous for his Copernican Revolution in philosophy, the theory that in knowledge the mind does not conform to the world, the world conforms itself to the mind. 20 This in a computer language may mean: nothing can get into the mind except what has been programmed into it, and nothing can come out of the mind except what it has been programmed to deliver. Kantian ethics is systematic and can be summarized in these five points: 1.) There is a supreme moral principle and to reach it, the only adequate method is the a priori method of reasoning 2.) Man's rational will is pure and autonomous 3.) The human agent has both noumenal and phenomenal aspects 4.) Morality presents itself to human agents as a categorical imperative 5.) Morality gives rise to a notion of the highest good which consists in a world of universal, maximal virtue, grounding universal and maximal happiness. 20 Cf. Charles L. Reid, Choice and Action: An Introduction to Ethics (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1981), p

25 In his most influential work on ethics, The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that the most basic aim of moral philosophy is to seek out the foundational principle of metaphysics of morals. The second fundamental aim is to establish this foundational moral principle as a demand of each person's own rational will. Moral philosophy addresses the question: what ought I to do? To address this question one should draw on a moral viewpoint that is very widely shared and which contains some general judgments that are very deeply held. For Kant, this project can be best pursued through the a priori method, that is, without leaning on observations of human experience and their behavior. He believes that the only thing good without qualification is a good will. Explaining Kant s idea of good will, Robert Johnson says that: The basic idea is that what makes a good person good is his possession of a will that is in a certain way determined by, or makes its decisions on the basis of, the moral law. The idea of a good will is supposed to be the idea of one who only makes decisions that she holds to be morally worthy, taking moral considerations in themselves to be conclusive reasons for guiding her behavior. This sort of disposition or character is something we all highly value Robert Johnson (2008), "Kant's Moral Philosophy", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Nov, 2009) 19

26 Paul Guyer continues that good will is manifested in the performance of an action for the sake of fulfilling duty rather than for any other end; and what duty requires is the performance of an action not for the sake of its consequences but because of its conformity to law as such; thus the maxim, or subjective principle, of virtuous action can only be that 'I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law'. 22 Guyer s argument reveals that the moral law is vital and we cannot ignore them no matter how circumstances might conspire against any other consideration. Kant believes that our moral duty is a categorical imperative, an unconditional command on man s free rational will. Kant alleges that ordinary moral thought classifies moral duties into two toward ourselves as well as toward others. Hence, he recognizes four categories of duties: perfect duties toward ourselves, perfect duties toward others, imperfect duties toward ourselves and imperfect duties toward others. From here, he puts forward the humanity formulation of the categorical imperative when he stated that we should never act in such a way that we treat humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means only but always as an 22 Paul Guyer (2004), Kant, Immanuel. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved March 20, 2009, from 20

27 end in itself. 23 Generally, deontology holds that at least some acts are morally obligatory regardless of their consequences for human welfare. Descriptive of such ethics are such expressions as duty for duty's sake and let justice be done though the heavens fall th Century Ethics: Anscombe s Modern Moral Philosophy Utilitarianism and deontology continue to be the predominant schools of thought in normative ethics. The contemporary resurgence of virtue ethics in the latter half of the twentieth century is often traced to the seminal paper of Elizabeth Anscombe titled, Modern Moral Philosophy (1958). Some philosophers took up Anscombe's call for a return to virtue as a new way of thinking about normative theories. Prominent among these scholars are Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Williams, Paul Ricoeur, Michael Slote, Rosalind Hursthouse and Martha Nussbaum. Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe (18 March, January, 2001) was an original and formidable British analytic philosopher in her own right. She is widely recognized as the most brilliant of Wittgenstein s students, 23 Robert Johnson (2008), "Kant's Moral Philosophy", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Nov, 2009) 21

28 his closest friends, as well as the unsurpassed translator and interpreter of his works. Anscombe critiqued modern moral philosophy's pre-occupation with a law conception of ethics, which deals solely with obligation and duty. She says: the concepts of obligation, and duty moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of "ought," ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it. 24 To justify her charge, she started by criticizing Mill's greatest happiness principle and Kant's categorical imperative. In Aristotle's sense, the term "moral" is used in connection with a moral subject-matter: namely that of human passions. But it has now acquired a special so-called "moral" sense, that is, a sense in which they imply some absolute verdict (like one of guilty / not guilty on a man) on what is described in the "ought" sentences used in certain types of context: not merely the contexts that Aristotle would call "moral"-passions and actions-but also some of the contexts that he would call intellectual. 25 The ordinary terms like "should," "needs," "ought," "must" acquired this special 24 G. E. M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy in Philosophy, Vol. 33, No. 124 (Jan., 1958), Published by: Cambridge University Press, p Cf. G. E. M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, p. 7 22

29 sense by being paralleled in the relevant contexts with "is obliged," or "is bound". The cause of this change is found in history when religion (especially Judaism and Christianity) introduced a law conception of ethics. She argued that naturally it is not possible to have such a conception unless you believe in God as a law-giver and if such a conception is dominant for many centuries, and then is given up, it is a natural result that the concept of "obligation" be given up. It is as if the notion "criminal" were to remain when criminal law and criminal courts had been abolished and forgotten 26, she argued. It is within the framework of Judeo-Christian ethics that Mill and Kant found their consequentialism and deontology respectively. She thus claims that the major mistake made by modern moral philosophers is that they try to provide an account of morally right or morally wrong that really has no content outside of the legislative arena provided by the divine. 27 Anscombe writes: It would be most reasonable to drop it [that is the concept of obligation]. It has no reasonable sense outside a law conception of ethics; they are not going to maintain such a conception; and you can do ethics without it, as is shown by the example of Aristotle. It would be great improvement if, instead of morally 26 Ibid. p Julia Driver (July, 2009), "Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Nov, 2009) 23

30 wrong, one always named a genus such as untruthful, unchaste, unjust. 28 It is from here that Anscombe called for a return to an alternative way of doing philosophy. Taking her inspiration from Aristotle, she called for a return to concepts such as character, virtue and flourishing, that is virtue ethics. Julia Driver summarizes her argument in simple modus ponens form: (1) If religiously based ethics is false, then virtue ethics is the way moral philosophy ought to be developed. (2) Religious based ethics is false. (3) Therefore, virtue ethics is the way moral philosophy should be developed. 29 Anscombe's suggestion that we place virtue more central in our understanding of morality was taken serious by a number of philosophers. This has resulted in a body of theories and ideas that is known as virtue ethics. 28 Cf. G. E. M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, p Cf. Julia Driver (July, 2009), "Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe", Op.Cit. 24

31 CHAPTER TWO KEY CONCEPTS IN VIRTUE ETHICS 2.1 Human flourishing To better understand virtue ethics, we need to look at the key concepts associated with it. Aristotle opines that to deal with the problem of ethics adequately, we have to ask the fundamental question: why do we do anything at all? 30 Every action aims at some good. Sometimes we do things for their own sake; sometimes we do things for the sake of another end and other times we do things both for their own sake and because they are means to achieving something else. The end of human life and the greatest good is eudaimoniagood done for its own sake. The proper human end, eudaimonia is loosely translated as happiness, where happiness is understood in terms of completion, perfection, or well-being. The way in which Aristotle arrives at this conclusion is quite brief; man naturally wants to live a fulfilled life and this is necessarily connected to how we should morally live. What makes life worth living is eudaimonia; and to live a life which can be characterized by eudaimonia is 30 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk I, Chap. 1, 1094a, 1-3, translated by Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 25

32 precisely the aim of morality. The difficulty with this claim concerns the proper sense in which the concept eudaimonia is used. Eudaimonia is usually translated in English as happiness. I call this translation loose because it can easily give a misleading impression. This is because happiness suggests a feeling of contentment or pleasure. In Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle warns that eudaimonia is not a feeling but it is achieving one s full potential. 31 Gerard J. Hughes proposes to translate the noun eudaimonia as the fulfilled life or simply fulfillment because it makes more sense of many of Aristotle s questions and argument. He says that a fulfilled life is enjoyable, and well regarded by good people; but its point consists in the living of it, and doing so precisely because it is worthwhile. 32 The problem with fulfillment is its vagueness. If our ultimate aim is fulfillment, it may seem that what is one man s fulfillment may differ from what is another man s fulfillment. Is there only one supreme end for all men or is eudaimonia relative from man to man? There has been heated debate concerning this question by some neo-aristotelians. Aristotle defines the supreme good as "an end of action which 31 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk X, Chap. 1, 1173a, Gerard J. Hughes, Aristotle on Ethics (London: Routledge Publications, 2001), p.22 26

33 is desired for its own sake, while everything else is desired for the sake of it." 33 Anthony Kenny puts the question that springs from this definition thus: Is the "single end" in question an end which is, or ought to be, common to every choice of every man? Or is it merely an end which governs every choice of each particular man, but which perhaps differs from man to man? 34 To clarify the foreseen problem Aristotle adds: If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. 35 Peter Geach argues that the claim of a single supreme end is fallacious because the fact that every road leads somewhere does not mean that there is somewhere to which all roads lead. 36 Georg Henrik von Wright, acquits Aristotle of the seeming fallacy in his The Varieties of Goodness, where he points out that Aristotle does not accept the conclusion that there is one and only one end of all chains of practical reasoning. If he does then he contradicts himself. 37 Clearly, eudaimonia, for Aristotle, is at least one supreme end but he also admits that there are ends, other 33 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk I, Chap. 2, 1094a, Anthony Kenny, Happiness, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 66 ( ), p Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk I, Chap 2, 1094a, Cf. Peter Geach, "Good and Evil", Analysis Vol. 17 (1956), p Cf. Georg Henrik von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness (1963) quoted in Anthony Kenny, Happiness, p

34 than it, which we pursue for their own sake. 38 Von Wright mentions pleasure and honour among them. Consequently, Kenny explains that when Aristotle says that eudaimonia is never chosen for anything but itself, whereas other things are chosen for its sake, he does not mean that on some particular occasion honour and pleasure are chosen both for their own sakes and for the sake of happiness, but that on some occasions they are chosen for their own sakes, and on other occasions for the sake of happiness. 39 W. F. R. Hardie answers this question by making the distinction between dominant and inclusive end. In his seminal work The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics (1965), Hardie explains dominant end as the object of a single prime desire while inclusive end is the orderly and harmonious fulfillment of a number of independent desires. 40 In other words, a dominant view about eudaimonia claims that in the end there is just one ultimate answer to the chain of Why do we do X? On the other hand, the inclusive view maintains that there are in fact many answers, all equally ultimate; or, slightly different, that the ultimate answer is a package of activities, rather than just one single kind of activity. 41 For instance, the desire for money is a dominant desire but the life of man 38 Cf. Anthony Kenny, Happiness, p Cf. Anthony Kenny, Happiness, p Cf. W. F. R. Hardie, "The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics", Philosophy, Vol. 40, No. 154 (Oct., 1965), p Gerard J. Hughes, Aristotle on Ethics ( London: Routledge Publications, 2001), p.27 28

35 consists in the successive pursuit of a number of unrelated aims. So if happiness is considered as a dominant end, it seems not to be true that all men seek happiness. Anthony Kenny rejects the claim made by some scholars that happiness should be considered as an inclusive end in all cases. He rejects the claim because it is possible that happiness is renounced in favour of some other goals. He cites the example of a daughter who from the first moment at which she is of age to manage her own life, decides to forgo the prospect of marriage and creative work in order to nurse her parents that are confined to bed. It is unconvincing to say that such person is seeking her own happiness in so far as she is doing what she wants to do. Kenny thus concludes that not every longterm goal consistently pursued is capable of constituting an ideal of happiness. Aristotle considers eudaimonia only as a dominant end and he attributes to it characteristics which make it peculiarly a human thing. He beliefs that eudaimonia must be perfect (which mainly distinguishes it from pleasure) and self-sufficient (which by itself, and without anything else, makes life choiceworthy and complete). Aristotle beliefs that eudaimonia is identical with philosophical contemplation. This claim about contemplation has been rejected by many scholars because it limits to a few (most probably philosophers) those who are able to reach the ultimate end. Aquinas moves to correct the apparent ambiguity found in Aristotle s nature of the ultimate end by arguing that the 29

36 ultimate end of man can only consist in that which is perfectly good, which is God. 42 Many virtue ethicists prefer to translate eudaimonia as human flourishing. Eudaimonia in this sense is not a subjective, but an objective, state. It characterizes the well-lived life, irrespective of the emotional state of the person experiencing it. It consists of exercising the characteristic human quality -- reason -- as the soul's most proper and nourishing activity. Aristotle, like Plato before him, argued that the pursuit of eudaimonia was an activity that could only properly be exercised in the characteristic human community-- the polis or city-state. 43 In this context the proper goal of human life is living-well by practicing the virtues within the human community. 2.2 Moral Education and Character Formation The next problem we need to resolve is what consist in living well and what is the general method for discovering what human flourishing consists in? Aristotle in answering these questions employed what has come to be called the function argument. He asks what is the proper function (ergon) of human 42 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae Virtue Ethics (June 2008), Wikipedia online encyclopedia, (April, 2009) 30

37 being? Hughes explains that humans are organisms, and hence they too will have an inbuilt function (ergon) and an inbuilt goal (telos) which is achieved when they function properly. Humans will live fulfilled lives if they function properly. To function properly is to exercise the capacities to be found in the human soul, and to exercise them well. 44 In Aristotle s anthropology, the soul is analyzed into a related series of capacities: the nutritive soul is responsible for growth and reproduction, the locomotive soul for motion, the perceptive soul for perception, and so on. The proper ergon of man consists in activity of the rational part of the soul in accordance with virtue. 45 The good of man is that which sets him off from other species; this precisely is man s capacity to guide his actions using reason in order to live a better life. If we reason well, we will live well and living well is what eudaimonia is about. For Aristotle, doing anything well requires virtue, and hence living well consists in activities caused by the rational soul in accordance with virtue. The function argument brings us to a fundamental question what is virtue? This question becomes important because granted that doing anything well consists in exercising certain skills which are called virtues; it does not by itself allow us to conclude that such qualities as courage, temperance, justice, as 44 Gerard J. Hughes, Aristotle on Ethics (London: Routledge Publications, 2001), p Cf. Richard Kraut (July 2007), Aristotle s Ethics, Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (April 2009) 31

38 they are normally understood, are virtues. This can only be true if we can argue that actualizing precisely these skills is what eudaimonia consists in. "Virtue" (arete) can be simply defined as excellence in fulfillment of a particular function. Aristotle speaks in particular of two kinds of arête, distinguished by the fact that some belong to one s moral character (for example, courage, or generosity), and others to one s skill at thinking (such as being good at planning, or quick to grasp the point of something). 46 Moral virtue has to do with the nonrational part of the soul which has more in common with reason (capable of either obeying it or opposing it); and these virtues of character arise through habituation. The sense of the use of habit (hexis) has to be properly understood. Bill Pollard in an essay Can Virtuous Actions be both Habitual and Rational? outlined three features of habit as actions that are repeated, automatic (that is, does not involve deliberation) and responsible (that is, the agent has particular control over). 47 Such understanding of habit can be misleading. Hexis, for Aristotle is no mindless routine but a settled disposition an active condition in which one holds oneself in a stable equilibrium of the soul when acting. Habit (hexis) has a basis in human nature, in that we are naturally capable of 46 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Bk II, Chap. 1, 1103a, Bill Pollard, Can Virtuous Actions be both Habitual and Rational? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), p

39 developing it. But although we are by nature capable of acquiring such habits, we do not develop them automatically. The development of a hexis comes about only by some form of training which produces good character. Modern virtue ethics takes its insight from the Aristotelian understanding of character and virtue. Character is also about doing and character traits are stable, fixed, and reliable dispositions. In other words, if an agent possesses the character trait of kindness, he or she is expected to act kindly in all sorts of situations, towards all kinds of people, and over a long period of time, even when it is difficult to do so. Moral education and development are very important to the acquisition of good moral character which develops over a long period of time. To be virtuous does not just consist in studying textbooks of ethics and morality (acquisition of knowledge) but in performing just acts because by this way we become good. True virtue requires choice, understanding, and knowledge; that is, a virtuous agent has to put all these to bear when performing an act. Aristotle faces a little difficulty when he tries to modify Plato s view that virtue is knowledge. It seems what Plato means by knowledge here is the faculty to make right moral judgment. If this is the case, it appears to be unclear what Aristotle considers as the prerequisites of moral training, which must be met by any of his students. What exactly does he expect his students to have before they 33