Behavior Unbecoming a Woman: Aristotle's Poetics 15 and Euripides' Melanippe the Wise

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1 Ancient Philosophy 19 (1999) Mathesis Publications 89 Behavior Unbecoming a Woman: Aristotle's Poetics 15 and Euripides' Melanippe the Wise Robert Mayhew Aristotle's remarks about women are notorious. Perhaps most notorious is his claim that virtue is different in men and women-and greater in men. l This claim would seem to apply to intellectual virtue as well. In an infamous passage in Politics i 13, Aristotle says that whereas men possess the deliberative part of the soul (to ~OUAEU'ttK6v) and it has authority, women possess it, but it is lacking in authority (akupov, 1260a9-17).2 It seems the most a woman can aspire to is to run her household (with her husband, see Politics 1277b7-30). There are some recent exceptions to this portrayal of Aristotle's views on the intellectual capacities of women. For instance, Nichols 1992, Lindsay 1994, and Davis 1996 all argue that Aristotle in fact believes women possess much greater deliberative abilities than is normally claimed.3 Most notably, Swanson See Politics i 13, NE 1158bl1-28, 1161a22-25, Rhetoric 1361a4-10, HA 608a21-bI8. When I refer to men and women, I mean non-slave men and women. 2 Slaves lack it completely; children possess it incompletely or imperfectly. 3 In Politics i 13.l260a29-31, Aristotle writes: 'What the poet said about women one should consider true for all cases: "silence brings order to a woman" [Sophocles, Ajax 293], though this does not apply to a man'. Nichols argues: Aristotle finds support for the differences between men and women in Sophocles, who said 'Silence gives grace to women' (Ajax, 293). The words are spoken by Ajax, however, when he is maddened by excessive love of honor. And they are spoken to his wife Tecmessa when she asks her husband for an account of his mad activities. It is difficult to see in this story an illustration of the male's greater deliberative power. It is a madman, Aristotle suggests, who does not listen to the good advice of a woman. (1992, 31; see also Davis 1996,25-26.) Simpson 1998, 68n91 responds to such interpretation: The words from Sophocles are those of a man, Ajax, as quoted by a woman, Tecmessa, which he spoke to her when she tried to dissuade him from a foolish enterprise (Ajax 293). Some commentators therefore try to use this fact to argue that Aristotle is really hinting that the opposite of what he expressly says about the inferiority of women might in fact be true... But against this one may note, first, that the saying was a common one (as Tecmessa asserts) and so has no necessary connection with the drama; second, Aristotle deliberately extends its scope and corrects the poet, not by doubting what he says, but by strengthening it; third, the example is not anyway contrary to Aristotle's argument because he expressly allowed for exceptions (at 1.12.l259bl-3, when the man is constituted contrary to nature, as Ajax, having gone mad, manifestly is), and exceptions, precisely as exceptions, only prove the rule. On the Ajax passage, and on the claim that the deliberative part of the soul in women is ak1lpov, see

2 90 argues that Aristotle does not rule out the possibility of female philosophers, as most scholars do, since according to her reading of Aristotle, women are just as likely as men to possess reason (vouc;)4-the faculty of the soul which makes philosophy possible.s It is not my aim here to examine what I regard as the merits and/or flaws of the revisionist interpretations. Instead, I want to investigate a neglected, though possibly relevant, passage from Poetics 15, with the aim of better understanding Aristotle's views of women.6 The results may shed light on whether the revisionist position is correct. I. Aristotle Poetics a16-31 Discussing characterization in tragedy, Aristotle writes: Concerning characters (m,pt 'ta 11811), four things should be aimed at [by the tragic poet]: First and foremost, that they be good (XP11O'ta). There will be character when... speech (AOyoC;) or action (1tp&.~tC;) reveals a choice of whatever sort, and good character when the choice is good. Good character exists in each class of person. For there is a good woman and a good slave, even though the first of these classes is inferior (XEtpOV), and the second wholly base. Second, that they be appropriate ('to apllo't'tov'tu). For it is possible to be courageous in character, but it is not appropriate for a woman to be courageous and clever (8Etvr,v) in this way... 7 An example... of unbecoming (a1tpe1toue;) and not appropriate character is the lament of Odysseus in the Scylla and the speech of Melanippe (11 'tile; Fortenbaugh 1975, Nou<; is an ambiguous term, which may mean 'mind'. 'reason' (or 'intuitive reason '), 'thought', 'intellect', or 'understanding'. In the present context, the precise meaning is not important. It is enough to keep in mind that, as we shall see, for Euripides (and presumably for Aristotle) vou<; is a faculty or capacity connected to the wisdom of the character Melanippe. 5 According to Aristotle. in generation the male provides the form or soul, the female the matter. But Swanson 1992,47 points out that the male does not provide the whole soul. Reason in some sense comes from the outside (GA 736b27-29). However, Swanson suggests, 'Aristotle gives no indication as to whether males and females receive equal or unequal measures or kinds of rational soul from the outside; presumably, the amount or kind received varies from individual to individual regardless of gender' (1992, 49). This, she argues. leaves open the possibility of female philosophers. In fact, Swanson claims, women actually appear to be better qualified for the philosophical life: 'although Aristotle nowhere implies that one gender is more likely than the other to receive intuitive reason [vou<;i, he suggests that, if possessed, it is facilitated more hy female than by male nature. The inclination to privacy, quietude, or a "passive" way of life is both a female and a philosophical one' (1992, 61). 6 So far as I have been able to determine, the sole (and relatively scant) attention this passage has received is from some commentaries on the Poetics. 7 The third aim is that the characters be 'like' (0!10lOV, 1454a23). (Else 1957 and others point out that this can mean either 'like us' or 'like traditional heroes'. Else opts for the former [ D. The fourth aim is that each character be consistent.

3 91 MEAaV{1t1tll~ Pllcrt~). (l454a16-3l) 8 The first point to make in analyzing this passage is that by character, Aristotle does not mean good literary characterization. He has in mind good moral and intellectual character, not (simply) what it is that makes a character right for the stage. As he writes elsewhere, characters in a tragedy should ideally be people who are good. A tragic poet should present people not as they are, but as they should be.9 So the traits Aristotle mentions in this passage (i.e., courage, cleverness) are in some sense positive attributes or virtues. But when Aristotle says the (central?) characters in a play must be good, does he mean good according to his moral philosophy, or good according to common or traditional Greek moral standards? It is hard to say. On the one hand, it would seem the views of the audience must be important, given that a good play should evoke the right kinds of emotional response in the audience, and this depends on whether the audience believes the tragedy is befalling a good person or a villain, etc. In addition, in Poetics 25, Aristotle seems to put a lot of weight on what the audience believes. For example, he says that employing impossible events in a play may be justified if people happen to believe them, as in the case of many beliefs about the gods (l460b a1). Similarly, improbabilities in a play should be defended or explained 'with reference to what people say' (l461a9-10). On the other hand, Poetics 25 also makes a distinction between 'things as they were or are, things as people say and think, and things as they should be' (1460blO-11), which could be interpreted as a distinction between what should be-what is morally correct-and what people happen to believe is morally correct. Further, the purpose of tragedy is catharsis. Janko's interpretation of this controversial issue, which has become a widely accepted view (and which I believe is probably correct), is that 'catharsis can lead to virtue: our responses to the representation... of human action can habituate us to approximate more closely to the mean in our ordinary emotional reactions' (Janko 1992, 341). If this is right, then there is even more reason to believe that the good character Aristotle has in mind in Poetics 15 is probably the moral character he defends in his ethical writings. Of course, it need not be one or the other. Perhaps the conception of good character Aristotle defends and the conception held by the 'average' Greek were pretty close. It could be that there is a great deal of overlap between the two, and that Aristotle had in mind whatever is good according to his moral philosophy and according to the typical audience of Greek tragedy. In any case, I will leave this issue open here (though it will come back to haunt us later). The second point to make about the above quoted Poetics 15 passage is that good character is different in men and women. Women, Aristotle says, are infe- 8 Except where indicated, translations from the Greek are my own. 9 See Poetics 1448aI6-18, 1454b8-11, 1460b7-11, 1460b32-35, 1461b9-14, and Halliwe111987,

4 92 rior. So a good man is not the same as a good woman. Aristotle makes this point more fully in the Politics: 'it is necessary that both [men and women] have a share in the virtues, but they are different virtues' (1260a2-3). For example: 'the moderation of a woman and a man are not the same, nor is their courage or justice... 1bere is a ruling and a serving courage, and similarly for the other virtues' (1260a21-24). This distinction seems to apply to intellectual virtue as well, or at least to prudence (CPPovT\crl(;): Household management also differs for a man and a woman; for it is the function of the man to acquire and of the woman to guard. But prudence is the only virtue peculiar to ruling [and one type of ruling is that of man over woman]. For it would seem that the other [virtues] are necessarily common to being ruled and ruling, but prudence is not a virtue of being ruled, rather true opinion is. (iii b24-29) So, virtue and character are different things in men and in women. More specifically (and referring to the Poetics 15 passage), being courageous or clever-both virtues or positive attributes-is not the same in a man and a woman. A corollary point is that character must be appropriate (to apilottovta). (Similarly, he later says that character must not be unbecoming [&1tPE1tfJ~].) For the verb apllo1;w (Attic apllottw), LSJ gives: 'be adapted for' and (the impersonal) 'is fitting'; for the participle it gives: 'suitable', 'fitting', 'appropriate'. Here are some examples of Aristotle's use of the word: mythological explanation is appropriate to Aesop, but not to a serious scientist (Meteorology 356b9-17); shame is not appropriate to every age, only to the young (NE 1128b 15-16); it is not appropriate for a proud man to flee danger (1123b31); and, in the friendship of man and wife, each should get what is appropriate (1161a24).10 Each case involves intellectual character or virtue among (in some sense) unequals. The same is true of the use of 'appropriate' in the Poetics 15 passage. It refers to what good character is appropriate to a person given who he or she is: male or female, freeman or slave, king or farmer, etc. Similarly, what is it to be unbecoming (&1tPE1tfJ~) or to be becoming (1tP 1tw)? For the former, LSJ gives 'unseemly', 'improper' (in writing), 'unbecoming', 'indecent', and for the latter, 'to be distinguished', 'to be fitting or proper'. In Aristotle, &1tPE1tfJ~ appears most of all in the Rhetoric and the Poetics. For example, he claims it is unbecoming for the young to use maxims (Rhet. 1395a2-6), and also refers to the improper use of epithets (Rhet. 1406a 10-14). And in the Poetics, he says that using words improperly can lead to comic distortions, and thus we should make use of them in an appropriate (to apllottov) way (1458b 13-17). In Rhetoric iii 7, Aristotle discusses what is proper or becoming (to 1tP 1tov) in the context of rhetoric. He writes: There is a style appropriate (awottoucru) to each class and moral state. By 'class' I mean, for example: according to age, 10 See also NE 1123a b a aI7. Pol. 1338b3. Rhet. 1387a28.

5 93 boy, man, and old man; or, woman and man; or, Spartan and Thessalian. And by 'moral state' I mean that by which someone is the kind of person he is in life, for lives are not the same kind in accordance with every moral state. So if a person speaks words that fit a moral state, he will create that character. For a rustic and an educated person would not say the same thing nor in the same way. (1408a26-32) To say that someone or something is unbecoming seems virtually the same as saying it is not appropriate, though it may be that the former is especially applicable to speech, and the latter to character generally. In any case, as Poetics 15 makes clear, an action or speech is unbecoming and/or inappropriate when (for example) a woman engages in an action or makes a speech which is appropriate for a man, but not for a woman. As an example of an inappropriately courageous (or manly) man-i.e., a man who is not courageous in the way a man should be-aristotle mentions the lament of Odysseus in the Scylla. Ianko 1987, 110 comments: 'In the Scylla, a lost dithyramb by Timotheus..., Odysseus lamented the members of his crew who were devoured by the monster. This example gives the opposite of a manly woman-a man weeping in a womanly way'. Scholars generally assume (1) that Aristotle refers to the speech of Melanippe as an example of an inappropriately clever woman-i.e., a woman who is too clever for a woman-and (2) that this speech is from Euripides' lost Melanippe the Wise (MEA!XvlJUtll il LOcp1l). I accept these assumptions. ll Before turning to Melanippe the Wise, we need to consider some additional terminology. What is it to be clever (onv6<;)? What is cleverness (Onv61:11<;)? LSI gives a broad but related range of meanings for OEtv6<;: fearful, awful and terrible; strong and powerful; clever and skillful. ~ tv61:11<; denotes cleverness, shrewdness, and (in rhetoric) intensity and forcefulness. 'Clever' (onv6<;) is often, but certainly not always, associated with what is wise (crocp6<;), and very often refers to one's ability to speak well.l2 II Let me briefly defend these assumptions. First, in the line referring to Melanippe's speech, Aristotle does not say that the speech is inappropriately clever; he says it is inappropriate. Why assume it is an example of inappropriate cleverness, rather than of inappropriate courage, which is also mentioned? It is of course possible that Melanippe's speech was also meant as an example of courage, but it is more likely that Odysseus' lament illustrates courage, and Melanippe's speech cleverness--one example for each attribute. Further, as we shall see, Melanippe the Wise is a play that stresses female intelligence (as the title suggests), thus making it an excellent illustration of Aristotle's point about cleverness. Second, Aristotle never mentions Melllllippe the Wise, and Euripides wrote two Melanippe plays, the other being Melanippe the Captive (also lost). I believe that Aristotle in Poetics 15 is referring to a speech from Melanippe the Wise, and for the simple reason that, as mentioned before, this play-and especially the speech of Melanippe-better fits the theme of cleverness mentioned by Aristotle. (Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that fr. 660M of Captive Melanippe also reveals the cleverness of Melanippe.) 12 In Sophocles, e.g., one can be called skilled and wise with respect to speech, and nevertheless be unworthy (see OT 545, Philoetetes 440, and OC 806). Cleverness can be associated with wisdom, but there is no necessary connection. One can lack wisdom on an important issue, and still be able to

6 94 In Aristotle, however, cleverness is related not to wisdom, but to prudence (cpp6vllo"ti;). His most informative remarks are found in NE vi 12: There is a capacity called cleverness (OElvo'tll'tu). This is such as to be able to do the things that contribute to the goal one has set, and to achieve it. If the goal is fine (KUAO<;), the cleverness is commendable; but if the goal is base, the cleverness is villainy. This is why both prudent people ('tou<; cppovif,lo'l.l<;) and villains are called clever (Onvou<;). Prudence is not the same [as cleverness], but it does not exist without this faculty (1 144a23-29).13 Prudence, according to Aristotle, is the intellectual virtue concerned with human action-with deliberating about how to achieve good aims. Prudence is not concerned with astronomy or metaphysics, for example (see NE vi 7). When the end one aims at is good, then prudence and cleverness coincide; but when the aim is bad, one may be called clever, but not prudent. Let us consider the term O"ocpo<; (wise), which is found in the title of the play that concerns us. According to LSJ, O"ocpo<; is a very broad term which can mean: skilled in arts and crafts, clever in practical matters, prudent, wise, learned. In Euripides, the term has a broad range of meanings,14 but this is not the case for Aristotle. For Aristotle, 0"0cp6<; is usually associated with theoretical-i.e., philosophical and scientific-knowledge. IS He regards wisdom (O"ocpiu, which he discusses in NE vi 7), as the most complete form of knowledge. Wisdom always involves reason (vou<;). The wise man knows the truth about first principles and what follows from them. His knowledge is of the highest things-things that are outside our capacity to change (e.g., the motion of the planets, the nature of the Prime Mover). According to Aristotle, cleverness is good or bad depending on the goal one aims at. But clearly, in our passage from Poetics 15, he has in mind the positive sense of cleverness. He is speaking of cleverness as a virtue or positive characteristic. The speech of Melanippe must be an example of a cleverness that aims at a fine or noble end, but which is employed or possessed by Melanippe in a way or to a degree that is in some sense improper for a woman. For a fuller picture of argue skillfully for one's (false) position. But, one can be wise and yet noi so skillful at arguing for one's (correct) position. See, e.g., Plato, Euthyphro 3c, Prolagoras 341a-b, and Theaelelus 164c-d. 13 See also MM 1197b17-27; cf. NE 1145b17-19, 1152a6-14, MM 1204a Lo<p6~ can refer generally to being intelligent or prudent (e.g., a wise man shows restraint or remains home when drunk). See, e.g., Heracles 202, Bacchae 641, Cyclopes 538, fa 749, Hecuba It can also refer to being clever-and usually in an evil way (e.g., by plotting evil deeds or tricking people). See, e.g., fa 744, Heracleidae 616, Phoenician Women 1408, Hippolytus 1076, Medea 285, Finally, it can also refer to being wise about the gods or philosophy. See, e.g., Bacchae 395, Rhesus 65, Heracleidae 856, Orestes , Andromachae 245, Medea 686, 827, See Phys. 196a9, 222b17, Meteorology 349a20, Mela. 981a25-26, 981b5, 982a6-19, NE 1137alO, 1141a2, 1141b4. (But cf. the opening of NE vi 7, where Aristotle recognizes that 'wisdom' is used to describe expertise in the arts.)

7 95 what Aristotle has in mind, we need to take a look at (what is left of) Euripides' Melanippe the Wise. 16 II. The fragments from Euripides' Melanippe the Wise Before turning to the relevant fragments, let me provide some background. Melanippe's father was Aeolus, son of Hellen, son of Zeus. Her mother was Hippo (i.e., Horse), daughter of the centaur Cheiron. Her mother and maternal grandfather are especially important. In Homer, Cheiron is described as the most just of the centaurs, and he has some connection to medicine. Hippo, we learn from the fragments, had a knowledge of prophecy, astrology, cosmology, and pharmacology.j7 As we shall see, Melanippe (i.e., Black Mare) has inherited a predisposition toward such relatively advanced forms of knowledge or (as the title of the play suggests) wisdom. We know, rather abstractly, the main action of (much of) the play from a papyrus containing a brief hypothesis of it (fr. 665aM). Melanippe's father Aeolus is in temporary exile for murder. While he is away, Poseidon seduces or rapes Melanippe, and as a result she gives birth to twin sons. Here is what follows: In expectation of her father's return she gave the infants when she had borne them to her nurse to place in the ox -stable, in accordance with their father's instruction. Upon the ruler's homecoming, some of the ox-herds saw the infants being watched over by the bull and suckled by one of the cows. Taking them to be the monstrous progeny of the cow, they brought them to the king [Aeolus] who, following his father Hellen's opinion, decided to burn up the infants and instructed his daughter Melanippe to furnish them with funeral apparel. Melanippe put the apparel on them, and also interceded for them with an ambitious [or proud] speech (A,oyov... <PtAOnllOV ).18 How the action of the play is resolved is unclear. Cropp (in Collard 1995, 241) writes: The continuation is unknown, but presumably the truth emerged..., Aeolus threatened to punish her..., and Melanippe asserted her innocence... [Captive Melanippe probably] starts with Melanippe blinded and incarcerated by her father and the 16 The fragments of this play can be found in Collard 1995, which contains text, translation, and commentary. The fragments from Melanippe the Wise, with translation and conmlentary, are primarily the work of MJ. Cropp. I follow the fragment numbering of Collard, which follows Nauck and others. If the fragment number is followed by an N, it is taken from Nauck 1964; if it is followed by an M, it is taken from Mette On Cheiron, see Iliad iv and xi ; on Hippo, see frs. 665a-c.l6-2IM, 482N, 484N. In general, see Collard 1995, and Cropp (unpublished typescript). 18 Translations from Melanippe the Wise are Cropp's, in Collard 1995, with occasional revisions.

8 96 infants exposed and rescued by herdsmen. One cannot tell if this reflects the end of [Melanippe the Wise]... Many scholars... conclude that Hippo averted the threatened punishment of Melanippe in [Melanippe the Wise], but it could be that Aeolus acted drastically against his daughter (e.g. by blinding her) and that Hippo appeared only in time to reveal his error... This would give a tragic twist to the ending and exhibit the suppression of Melanippe's (as of Hippo's) excessive knowledge. (See also Webster 1967, ) Whatever the actual ending, we are primarily concerned with Melanippe's defense of her children, for her 'ambitious speech' in their defense is very likely the one Aristotle refers to in Poetics 15. The hypothesis says that Melanippe delivers the prologue in the play, and goes on to quote much of it, from the beginning (fr. 665a-cM). In it, Melanippe presents her genealogy, and devotes much space to her mother Hippo. She also speaks of Poseidon and her twin sons. Perhaps the most significant part of the prologue, from the point of view of this essay, is the opening line: 'Zeus, as is stated by the truth (ZEU~, (O~ A. }"EK1:a.t 1:fl~ aalleda~ U1to), sired Hellen' (665a-c.I-2M = 481N). Interestingly, two later sources (Plutarch and Lucian) claim it was not Euripides' first choice for an opening. Two characters in Plutarch's Amatorius (in his Moralia) are discussing faith (1ticr'w;) in the gods, and the effects of demanding proofs for their existence. At one point one of them says: You have no doubt heard about Euripides, and how there was an uproar when he wrote this as the beginning of his Melanippe: 'Zeus, whoever Zeus is, for I do not know him except from stories' (ZEU~, ocr'tt~ 0 ZEU~, ou yap otoa 1tAllV A6y~ [= 480N]). But he got another chorus..., and changed the line to what is written now: 'Zeus, as is stated by the truth' (756c-d). (See also Lucian, Juppiter Tragoedus, 41.) Cropp (in Collard 1995, ) claims the first of these (665a-c.I-2M) is certainly the authentic opening line, suggesting the second was a parody or the like (see also Webster 1967, 147). But we cannot be certain of this. The line 'Zeus, whoever Zeus is' is clearly Euripidean. For instance, Euripides uses the same words at Heracles 1263, and similar expressions in Trojan Women and Orestes 418 (cf. Aeschylus Agamemnon 160). Also, we should not accept the claim of van Looy, cited by Cropp, that fro 480N does not suit Melanippe's character. As we shall see when we look at some of her other sophisticated and unorthodox claims concerning cosmology, it fits her perfectly. 19 Let us move on to somewhat firmer ground. There is one other part of the pro- 19 See van Looy 1964, and Cropp (in Collard 1995, ). They also object that this line does not fit the opening of a play. Although this is a stronger objection to the authenticity of the line, some skepticism on the issue is still justified. As Pickard-Cambridge nl writes: 'The true history of these lines must remain uncertain,'

9 97 logue worth mentioning: They call me Melanippe; Cheiron's daughter bore me to Aeolus. Now she became plumed with tawny horse-hair by Zeus because she sang oracular songs to men, telling them cures and deliverances from their pains. She was swept away by a dense squall of mist, quitting her place of inspiration, the Corycian mountain. This young prophetess is known by men as Hippo owing to the alteration of her body. That is the story concerning my mother. (665a-c.13-22) In the opening of the play, Melanippe reminds us that Hippo was punished for her sophisticated knowledge in religion and medicine. Specifically, she was punished for prophecy in a way that made any future prophecy impossible (i.e., by being transformed into a horse, and thus rendered incapable of human speech).2o Let us turn now to five fragments, most of which are likely parts of Melanippe's defense of her children, and all of which are relevant to our discussion. The first is fro 483N (= Aristophanes' Lysistrata 1124), which scholars often regard as the opening of Melanippe's defense: 'Although I am a woman, I am intelligent' (literally, 'VODe; is in me' [VODe; 8' EVEO'tt flol]).21 She begins her defense of her children by claiming to possess VODe;22 Cropp (in Collard 1995, 269) points out that the comments of Dionysius of Halicarnassus show that the next fragment (484N) 'was part of Melanippe's defense of the babies, supporting her argument that their birth must have been natural'. Here is the fragment: 'This story is not mine, but from my mother. Heaven and Earth were once a single form; but when they were separated from each other into two, they bore and delivered into the light all things: trees, winged creatures, beasts reared by the briny sea, and the human race.' Here we get a further reminder of her connection to her mother (to whom she appeals) who is an expert on such intellectual issues. This argument was most likely leading up to an assertion of the impossibility of monstrous births, and thus of the natural birth of her twins (see Webster 1967, 148 and Collard 1995,269). In any case, although this fragment has a mythic (and perhaps Orphic or Hesiodic) ring to it, it also sounds presocratic (see West 1983, and Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983,21-43, and for instance, Anaxagoras DK 59Bl and B4). In fact, some ancient sources connect Anaxagoras and Euripides. (Diodorus Siculus i 7.7 cites this passage as evidence for a connection between the two.) Now however 20 Cropp (unpublished typescript) writes: 'the story of Hippo being silenced by Zeus... has a potential dramatic relevance if Melanippe's sophia was an issue in the play'. 21 Nauck 1964 gives four lines for ff. 483 (Aristophanes' Lysistrata ). On which lines should and should not be considered an actual part of Melanippe the Wise, see Collard 1995,251 and 269. Cropp (in Collard) claims 1124 alone belongs to the play (cf. Henderson 1987, 197); I think 1125 might belong as well, but I cannot get into that issue here. 22 Judging from his plays, it seems Euripides thought that although wisdom in women was not the norm, it was at least possible. See, e.g., Medea , Hippolytus , Helen 1049, Suppliant Women 294.

10 98 unreliable the ancient sources may be-and however uncertain we are about Euripides' own evaluation of these ideas-there is no denying that he had an interest in the sophisticated philosophical and religious views of his time N is not the only fragment from Melanippe the Wise that suggests such an interest in contemporary ideas. And however we take it (i.e., as mythological or scientific-philosophical), it does present (for its time) a sophisticated view of the world. The next fragment (485N) is a paraphrase from Dionysius of Halicarnassus: 'If a girl exposed the children because she had been raped and was in fear of her father, will you then commit murder?' Dionysius says that this was one of Melanippe's arguments aimed at 'saving her children' (see the full presentation of fro 485 in Nauck 1964). Since Melanippe must have spoken this line before her identity as the mother of the children was revealed, then the following interpretation is surely correct: 'In the course of her defense, she actually suggest[s] that the twins might have been exposed by some poor girl in fear of her father, and that, if so, Aeolus would be guilty of murder if he put them to death' (Pickard-Cambridge 1933, 114). Melanippe is, in effect, challenging her father (who is just back from exile for murder) on a rather important moral issue, namely, on whether a particular act of killing is justified or an act of murder. 24 Although we cannot be certain which of Euripides' two Melanippe plays the next fragment (506N) comes from, it most likely belongs to Melanippe the Wise. 25 Even if it does belong to our play, however, its context is unclear. (Nevertheless, these are almost certainly the words of Melanippe [see Collard 1995, 278].) But whatever the fragment's context, it is worth presenting here. Melanippe begins by describing (an aspect of) the traditional conception of justice: 'You think that wrongdoings leap up to the gods on wings, then someone inscribes them on Zeus' folded tablet, and Zeus looks at them and enacts justice on men?' She then rejects this view of justice: 'Not even the entire sky would suffice if Zeus were writing down men's sins, nor he himself to examine them and send punishment to each. The fact is that Justice is somewhere here close by, if you want to see her.' Though this passage does not deny the existence of 23 Guthrie 1965, 325, in a special note on such a connection, writes: Euripides entered with zest into all the intellectual excitements of his time, and his plays are full of allusions to the physical theories current in Athens. These are bound to reflect his acquaintance with Anaxagoras, but undoubtedly with others too, and it is not always easy to pin down a line of his verse to one particular philosopher as its source. On the unreliability of the ancient sources, particularly the ancient Vita, see Lefkowitz 1981, ch. 9 and Lefkowitz does not, however, deny that Euripides was familiar with these ideas or interested in them. 24 For an example of a controversial case of charging one's father with murder, see Euthyphro 4a-e. 25 In some cases a fragment is attributed to 'Euripides' Melanippe', and it is not always clear which Melanippe play is meant. On the widely accepted view that fro 506N belongs to Melanippe the Wise, see Webster 1967, 147 and Collard 1995,278.

11 99 god(s)-or even Zeus per se- it does sound presocratic, or perhaps more accurately, Sophistic, in its apparent rejection of the traditional Olympian view of di vine justice.26 Finally, let us consider fr. 487N: 'I swear by holy aether, Zeus' dwelling' (ollvullt b' lepov ai8 p', olk1lotv dt6~). The context is unclear, and this line may very well not be a part of Melanippe's defense.27 But it is important in that it seems to fit with some of the other fragments, and especially with 506N. Zeus appears to have been demoted: Melanippe is swearing not by Zeus, but by aether, a central concept in much presocratic cosmology.28 Now aether is sometimes connected to Zeus and religion, even in Euripides.29 In fact, lines of the prologue of Melanippe the Wise (665a-cM), which refer to the punishment of Hippo, mention aether in a more religious context. Nevertheless, the reference to aether in fro 487N may very well have had, to a fourth century Be audience, a scientific ring to it, especially if the line occurs in Melanippe's defense of her children. In any case, Aristophanes thought the line represented a deflation of Zeus, for he criticizes it at least three times: at Frogs 100 and 311, and at Thesmophoriazusae 272. Let us look at the first of these. Early in the Frogs, Dionysus and Heracles are 'discussing' tragic poets. Dionysus says: 'Searching, you will never find a creative poet, one who utters high-minded words' (96-97). When Heracles asks for clarification, Dionysus says that by 'creative' he means one 'who speaks such rash words as these' (98-99), and he proceeds to give three examples, parodying Euripides. The first concerns us: 'Aether, Zeus' chamber' (ai8 pa dto~ bmwxnov, 100), a parody on fro 487N.30 Aristophanes omits the 'holy', and replaces 'dwelling' (olk1lcrw) with the less lofty 'chamber' (bmllanov). We often find Aristophanes bemoaning (and criticizing) the harmful effects of natural philosophy on religion. Here, Zeus has been replaced with aether. (At Clouds , he complains that Zeus has been replaced by a vortex motion.)3l Such 'dangerous' words in the mouth of Melanippe may well be why, in the Thesmophoriazusae, Aristophanes has one of his female characters say that Euripides 'has done us much evil by purposely 26 See esp. Thrasymachus, OK S5B6a and BS, Antiphon, OK 87B44, and Critias, OK 8SB25. See also Xenophanes, OK 21B34, and Protagoras, OK SOB I and B4. For relevant passages from Euripides, see Heracles , , Trojan Women , and Bellerophon, fr Cropp (in Collard 1995, 270) believes it is probably connected with her claim of innocence; Webster 1967, 149, following van Looy, thinks she is here swearing that Poseidon was the father of the twins. 28 See Euripides, Helen , and Empedocles, OK 3IB7), B98, B 100, B 109, B115. See also Collard 1995,270 and Guthrie 1965, , , See Trojan Women 79 and Orestes This point was brought to my attention by Cropp (unpublished typescript). On aether in religion and philosophy, see Burkert 1985, 31S Frogs 311 employs the same parody as at line 100. At Thesmophoriazusae 272, Aristophanes writes: 0I1VUI11 'toivuv ai6ep' OtKT]CHV L'H6~. This is much closer to Euripides line, though Aristophanes still leaves out iepov (holy). 31 In another play, Euripides writes: 'The voii~ in each of us is god' (fr. IOI8N, quoted in Guthrie 1965, 18).

12 100 finding stories where a woman turns out to be wicked-by creating Melanippes and Phaidras' ( ). Whatever disputes or mysteries remain about Melanippe's famous speech, it should be clear that Euripides portrayed her as being (or as pretending or trying to be?) wise, as the title of the play suggests. Like her mother Hippo, she possessed a knowledge of higher things, and she used this knowledge in defense of her children. III. Behavior unbecoming a woman By order of her father, king Aeolus, Melanippe's children were to be destroyed as the unnatural offspring of oxen. To protect them, she defies her father by presenting a series of sophisticated, arguably philosophical, arguments that are at odds with traditional religion. Aristotle must regard Melanippe's ends-saving her children-as noble. Recall that her cleverness is not an improper kind of cleverness (in the sense of aiming at base ends); it is a proper kind found in an inappropriate degree in-or employed in an inappropriate way by-melanippe, because she is a woman. So, in what way could her speech be considered a portrayal of inappropriate or unbecoming cleverness? As we saw above in our discussion of our Poetics 15 passage, Aristotle must in some sense be saying that Melanippe's speech represents inappropriate cleverness because such cleverness in a woman is (or is thought to be?) morally and/or intellectually improper. Melanippe's speech is an example of an unbecoming and inappropriate level of cleverness, because it is in fact improper for a woman to speak and argue in the way Melanippe did. But how exactly is it improper? Is the speech improper because it shows that Melanippe is too outspoken? It might be that Aristotle regards her as too outspoken for a woman, but that cannot be why he thought her speech was an example of inappropriate cleverness. Even if we note that OEtv6~ can refer to forcefulness in speech, being too outspoken seems to fall under the virtue of moderation. In Politics i 13, discussing the differences between the virtues in men and in women, Aristotle writes: 'What the poet said about women one should consider true for all cases: "silence brings order to a woman" [Sophocles, Ajax 293], though this does not apply to a man' (1 260a29-3 1). Similarly, in Politics iii 4, he writes: 'Moderation and courage differ in a man and a woman. For a man would be thought cowardly if he were as courageous as a courageous woman; and a woman talkative if she were as orderly as a good man' (1277b20-23).32 So Aristotle is not maintaining that it is okay for women to be as wise as Melanippe so long as they are not vocal about it. 32 It seems somewhat odd that Atistotle refers to silence among women as an instance of their moderation. At least, this does not seem to fit entirely with the idea of moderation in NE iii 10-12, which refers to one's ability to control one's desire for bodily pleasures. (This virtue in speech might better fit one of the three social virtues Aristotle describes in NE iv 6-9.) But perhaps Aristotle in the Politics simply has in mind some general sense of self-control. The important point is that this is not an example of cleverness in women.

13 101 It seems that on Aristotle's view, women should not be as talkative as men; but neither should they be as clever, which is something different. Given the high level of knowledge portrayed in the speech, the problem most likely goes beyond how forceful it is. Could the speech's impropriety involve its content~and specifically, its antireligious nature? I do not think so. Although Aristotle's complaint must in some way involve the unorthodox views Melanippe held and argued for, I do not think the problem is for Aristotle (as it was for Aristophanes) that she contradicted traditional religion. Aristotle would not regard contradicting traditional religion per se as inappropriate. Much of his own philosophy can be seen in that light (see, e.g., Meta. 1074a38-b14 and Poetics l460b al). But suppose Aristotle thought that regardless of his own views on religion, one ought not to present such positions on stage. If so, we would have to conclude that he thought Melanippe's speech contained ideas inappropriate to any character, regardless of gender. But this would not explain why her speech was inappropriate for a woman. As far as I can tell, the only remaining possibility is that it is the cleverness, the 'wisdom', the making of sophisticated arguments itself, that is improper for a woman. Regardless of the content of her speech and how outspoken she was, the speech was inappropriate because it presented a woman with a high degree of cleverness~a degree of cleverness appropriate only to a man. Melanippe claimed to have YOUr;, and was willing to use it (see fr. 483N). Now where we go from here depends entirely on how we read the claim, made in Poetics IS, that in tragedy, character must be good. Does Aristotle mean good according to his conception of ethics, or (also) good according to the moral outlook of a Greek audience? (I said this issue would come back to haunt us.) At first I shall proceed as if the former were true (as I think is likely); then I shall look briefly at what the other interpretation might suggest. Aristotle seems to think that it is, quite simply, improper for a woman to act and speak as Melanippe does. Now one may want to argue (perhaps as a consolation) that at least Aristotle admits that women can achieve a high level of knowledge, although he thinks it is improper for them to do so. After all, to say 'it is improper for x to do y' seems to imply that x can do y. To say that it is improper for Odysseus to weep like a woman implies that he can (but should not) weep like a woman. Therefore, the argument goes, to say Melanippe should not attempt to make such sophisticated, clever speeches implies that she can (but should not) make such speeches. I am afraid that such an implication cannot be defended in this case. Aristotle clearly thinks that a woman can act in a way that would be called courageous in a man; but then her action is not courageous, but rash. It is in fact impossible, on Aristotle's view, for her to be courageous in the way a man is courageous. A woman can act in a way that would be called moderate in a man; but then her action is not moderate, but immoderate. It is in fact impossible for her actually to be moderate in the way a man is moderate. (Similarly, if a normal person eats an amount of food which is moderate for Milo the Wrestler, his action will be

14 102 immoderate: see NE 1106a29-b5 and 110b19-26.) These examples illustrate what it means for Aristotle when he says that the virtues are different in men and women. And although cleverness is not a mean between two extremes, it can be possessed in degrees or at different levels, so the same point applies. Therefore, Euripides may be able to make the character Melanippe sound as wise as a wise man, but she could not actually be so, or else she would be as wise as a wise man. In reality, a woman can at best appear to speak like a wise man, but without being so. In general, a woman can try to be as virtuous as a man, on Aristotle's view, but she cannot actually be as virtuous. And it is improper for her to try, because she cannot succeed. The result is always vicious. If it seems odd to speak of something being both improper and impossible, consider the following example: it would be improper for a ten year old child to attempt to drive an automobile (and his parents might very well punish him for the attempt); and, it is impossible for him to drive an automobile. In the same way, if Melanippe actually existed, it would be improper, according to Aristotle, for her to attempt to argue in a sophisticated, clever way; and moreover, it would be impossible for her to argue in such a way. So Melanippe's speech is an instance of cleverness unbecoming a woman because it is improper for a woman to speak and argue in such a way, and because it is in fact impossible (or highly unlikely?) for a woman to speak and argue in such a way.33 Women can be clever-but they cannot be clever in the way men are. But can women be wise in any way, according to Aristotle? We know that women, on his view, cannot be prudent (see Politics 1277b24-29). Perhaps he also thought women cannot in any sense be wise. This might explain why Aristotle uses 'clever' (8Etv6~) rather than 'wise' «Jo!p6~) to describe Melanippe's speech I leave unanswered (because I do not know the answer to) the question of whether Aristotle thought Melanippe's speech was utterly absurd coming from a woman. This depends at least in part on what Aristotle thought about the possibility of exceptions here. Unfortunately, it is unclear what exactly he thought about this possibility. He does not comment on Socrates' story about Diotima in the Symposium; nor does he mention the existence of female students in the Academy, on which consider Lefkowitz 1986, 144: Diogenes Laertius lists [as Plato's female pupils] 'Lastheneia of Mantinea and Axiothea of Philius, who is reported by Dicaearchus to have worn men's clothes' (3.46). According to POxy 3656, one of them, probably Lastheneia. studied philosophy first with Plato, then with Speusippus (Diogenes Laertius 4.2), and then with Mendemus; according to Aristophanes the Peripatetic 'she was pretty and full of unaffected charm.' In Politics i 12, Aristotle mentions the following exception to men being superior to women with respect to ruling: 'B Y nature a male is more of a leader than a female, unless he is in some respect constituted contrary to nature' (l259bl-3). If this is the kind of exception we could generally expect to find in Aristotle concerning women, then it does not bode well for the possibility of female philosophers, since he is saying some men are as bad as or worse than some women, not that some women are as good as 'normal' men (cf. Swanson 1992, 67). But this is all I can say here on this interesting (and possibly fruitful) topic of exceptions. 34 If so, then this certainly counts against Swanson's idea that women are especially well-

15 103 As I see it, Aristotle's remarks on Melanippe's speech in Poetics 15 imply that women cannot, on his view, speak or argue in such a wise and sophisticated way. But why can they not? Aristotle's answer (from Poetics 15) is, quite simply, that woman are inferior (xeipov, 1454a21). But why does he think they are inferior? Answering this question takes us beyond the Poetics to Aristotle's biological, moral and political writings, which go beyond the scope of this article. All this having been said, an escape for the revisionist reading of Aristotle's remarks on women is still possible-if Aristotle's own conception of what constitutes good character does not match (or match closely) the conception found among an average Greek audience (which he had in mind in Poetics 15). If that were the case, then Aristotle might be saying that Melanippe's speech makes her an inappropriate character in a tragedy because such a speech would be held to be improper or impossible to a Greek audience. But that says nothing about Aristotle's own views about a woman's capacity to make such a sophisticated speech. This is not to say that Poetics 15 actually helps the revisionist case, but that it does not hurt their case. Nevertheless, I think the burden of proof is with the revisionists. Since Aristotle does not tell us that by 'good' he means good according to the views of a Greek audience, we should assume he means good, period-what really is good character. So let me end by making the following friendly challenge: Anyone who claims that Aristotle believes women are capable of a high level of intellectual ability must come up with a better explanation for Aristotle's comments on Euripides' Melanippe the Wise in Poetics Department of Philosophy Seton Hall University South Orange NJ BIBLIOGRAPHY Burkert, W Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical. Trans. by John Raffan. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Collard, c., M.J. Cropp, and K.H. Lee edd Euripides: Selected Fragmentary Plays. vol. l. Warminster, UK: Aris & Phillips Ltd. Cropp. M.J. Unpublished typescript. 'Melanippe's Mother'. Davis, Michael The Politics oj Philosophy: A Commentary Oil Aristotle's Politics. Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Else, Gerald F Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Fortenbaugh, W.W Aristotle Oil Emotion. London: Duckworth. Guthrie, W.K.C A Hisrory oj Greek Philosophy. vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. adapted for receiving voil~ from outside. (Of course, the explanation may be that in general Greek usage, the terms are practically synonyms.) 35 I should like to thank Ronald Polansky and the anonymous referees for Ancient Philosophy for their helpful comments and criticisms. Any remaining errors are my own. Thanks are also due to the Seton Hall University Research Council for a Summer Stipend (1997) which gave me the time to begin work on this article.

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