Chapter 1 The Prelude

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1 Chapter 1 The Prelude On the morning of February 28, 1993, seventy-six armed agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) attempted to serve a search warrant using a "dynamic entry" against Vernon Wayne Howell (who legally changed his name to David Koresh in 1990) for suspected weapons violations. The agents arrived under the cover of cattle trailers, and bailed out in force in front of the Mount Carmel Center, the residence and worship facilities of the group that has come to be known as the Branch Davidians. Although accounts of who fired first are conflicting, a gun battle ensued which left four BATF agents dead and twenty wounded, six Branch Davidians dead and four wounded. David Koresh was shot in the arm and stomach. As a result of the gunfight, the BATF was unable to conduct its search, and a protracted siege ensued. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrived on February 29 with its Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and took over the operation, treating it as a "Complex Hostage/Barricade Rescue" situation. The "rescue" lasted for fifty-one days, when at six a.m., on April 19, 1993, FBI agents began inserting CS tear gas into Mt. Carmel through booms protruding from M-60 tanks and with Bradley Fighting Vehicles firing "ferret rounds" through windows. At around twelve noon, smoke was observed coming from windows in the Mt. Carmel center, and by twelve-forty, the structure was completely engulfed in flames. Seventy-four Branch Davidians lost their lives in the fire, including twenty-one children. When the initial February 28 raid occurred, Branch Davidian Wayne Martin, a Harvard educated attorney, called the local sheriff's department using "911." The discussions began with Lieutenant Larry Lynch of the sheriff's department and were continued by Jim Cavanaugh of the BATF. These conversations were recorded on audiotapes and later were transcribed into typed form. When the FBI took control, they set up a negotiation center at the McLennan County Airport, and conversed by telephone with the inhabitants of Mt. Carmel over the next fifty-one days. The FBI also recorded these negotiations and subsequently transcribed them in typed form. According to the FBI in the Justice Department Report on Waco, negotiators spoke by telephone with over fifty individuals in Mt. Carmel, for over 200 hours. The transcripts of these conversations were withheld from the public until August of 1995, when the trial of the surviving Davidians was over and the House of Representatives concluded its second set of hearings on "Operation Trojan Horse" as the siege was called. The transcripts of the

2 negotiations conducted over the fifty-one days of the siege are the primary focus of this study. Importance of the Study There are two primary reasons for pursuing this course of study, one of them of practical and the other of theoretical importance. The basic practical rational is best summarized in the old adage, "Those who forget the mistakes of the past are bound to repeat them." No one has systematically explicated the negotiations that occurred over the fifty-one days. The government reports on the incident and the Congressional Hearings provide no detailed analysis of the negotiations or the negotiation process itself. Moreover, no academic exposition of the material has occurred either. However, as the year 2000 or "The Millennium" approaches, the potential for confrontations between alternative religious groups and Federal law enforcement will increase. Many groups are focused on eschatological religious writings, as were the Branch Davidians, and the year 2000 is prophetically important to their belief systems as ushering in a new era and possibly the "end of the world." There is also a rise in more secular antigovernment sentiment, leading to the formation of numerous groups built around a variety of value based issues (taxes, guns, property rights, and so forth) that may lead to more confrontations, as the siege with the "Freemen" in Montana illustrated. Additionally, seventy-four people died in a fire while being ostensibly in government custody, and in constant contact with "government negotiators" throughout the 51 days. A thorough explication of the negotiations might provide an answer to the question, "What went wrong?" The more U.S. policy makers and law enforcement officials can understand what worked and what did not work in dealing with the people in Waco, the better able they will be to prevent fiery endings in the future. But the Waco incident also provides useful material of theoretical importance for communication scholars. The negotiations with the Branch Davidians created a unique rhetorical problem for the negotiators that at least initially they were ill-equipped to deal with. David Koresh told the negotiators that he was the Lamb spoken of in Revelation who was given the knowledge by God to unlock the "mysteries" of the Seven Seals that marked the end of time and ushered in God s final judgment on the world. Koresh had agreed to leave Mt. Carmel with his followers if the FBI would play his one hour declamation of the Seven Seals on the radio. The message was played and 2

3 preparations were made on both sides for the Davidians to leave. As the Davidians, with coats on, were about to begin exiting the building, Koresh broke down with a "religious experience" in which he claimed to have received an audible message from God who told him to wait. Koresh and the other Davidians told the negotiators that they feared the wrath of God for disobedience of his "wait" edict more than they feared firepower of the FBI HRT. So the wait began. For the majority of the standoff, the negotiators had to try and talk a prophet of God and his followers out of their divinely sanctioned stronghold. On April 14, Koresh claimed to have received another message from God, when he was instructed to write down the interpretation of the Seven Seals and then surrender. However, decisions were made by the FBI to continually increase the pressure on those inside Mt. Carmel (cutting electricity and water, playing loud sounds and shining spot lights all night, having tanks "bump" the buildings, etc.) with the intention of causing the group to fracture and for Koresh to lose control over his followers. Arguably these pressure tactics not only failed, but had the opposite result of increasing both group cohesion and loyalty to Koresh. The pressure culminated in the tear gas attack, which resulted in the fiery deaths of the inhabitants. Several important theoretical questions are raised by this incident. Were some negotiation strategies more effective than others as measured in concessions on the part of the Davidians? How do those strategies comport with the behavioral science literature and recommendations on crisis negotiations? Which tactics employed stiffened the resolve of those inside to remain for a protracted period of time? Was there a potential solution to the standoff absent a final confrontation? Did ambiguities exist in the narrative scripts adopted by either side that would allow for a peaceful resolution? Is there any evidence that Koresh was serious in his promise to write his interpretation and then surrender, or was this simply a "stalling" tactic as the FBI claimed? Were the Davidians simply a group of "brainwashed" individuals who intended to commit suicide from the beginning? What happens in the "real world" when two worldviews collide into a showdown of faith versus force? What really occurred in negotiations between federal law enforcement and the Branch Davidians? These are some of the questions that this study hopes to provide more documented answers to based upon actual conversations between participants. 3

4 Review of Literature The relevant literature for this study falls into four categories, which are subdivided by type in the included bibliographies. 1). News stories of the siege that provide contextual material of the rhetorical situation, 2). both academic and popular works that provide information on the history and beliefs of the Mount Carmel Branch Davidians, 3). academic works concerning law enforcement hostage negotiations theory and practice in general, 4). academic works on the rhetoric and beliefs of apocalyptic groups in general. Academic works on the Waco negotiations also would be useful, but they do not exist at present. There was major press coverage of the Waco siege, both in print and on television. Much of the coverage originated with almost daily press briefings by the FBI at the Waco Convention center, and consequently there was extensive duplication in material in most of the newspaper accounts. In order to simplify the research burden, this study draws newspaper material from the New York Times, the paper of record for the United States. In addition, the Waco Tribune Herald also did extensive coverage of the group and the siege, and it is included where appropriate. Interestingly, its initial "Sinful Messiah" series has been charged with warning the Davidians that the BATF raid was imminent. Other press material, such as magazine, television, and popular book coverage, is incorporated where relevant and available. This material is relevant for contextual understanding, but is largely irrelevant for the actual analysis of the negotiation texts. Prior to the raid, there was a general lack of material about the history of the Branch Davidians. Few people even in Central Texas knew of the group s existence, and only a handful of scholars had written about the group. Since the fire, several works have been written that provide useful material about the historical roots of the group and their doctrinal beliefs. One work of note is Why Waco?, by James Tabor, a professor of New Testament studies at the University of North Carolina, Charlotte. He, along with Philip Arnold, played a personal role in Waco by discussing Koresh's interpretation of Revelation, which was recorded on a tape and sent into Mt. Carmel by the FBI. Koresh referred to Tabor during the negotiations and mentioned him by name in his letter of April 14, when he indicated his intention to write his interpretations and surrender. 4

5 Tabor's book provides the clearest explication of the major doctrines and hermeneutic method Koresh used to develop those doctrines. This material is useful for interpreting the historical and theological materials that were discussed during the negotiations. Virtually nothing has been written on the Waco negotiations. Only one author has written a book in which the transcripts are considered. The Ashes of Waco, by journalist Dick Reavis, is primarily a narrative account of the entire situation, and only draws from the transcripts to support socio-political themes developed in the larger project. The book is primarily a critique of the press for not having effectively covered the incident. Several other books concerning the siege were written, but most were "thrown together" even before the fire to capitalize on the media publicity. None of those authors had access to the negotiation transcripts, but some provide material that is useful in developing the perspectives of disaffected ex-davidians. Concerning the more general scholarly negotiation literature, several articles and dissertations have discussed hostage negotiations and "hostage/barricade" incidents in general. However, the transcripts they examined were of incidents of much shorter duration (hours, not days) and had none of the religious complications inherent in the Waco situation. These dissertations also examined incidents with true hostages" (people held against their will), usually where criminals seized innocent bystanders during the commission of a crime. In the case of the Davidians, the people inside Mt. Carmel willingly stayed with Koresh, and many expressed their reasons for remaining inside in discussions with the negotiators and on a videotape that the Davidians produced during the siege. As for scholarly works within the discipline of Communication Studies, I have been unable to locate a single book or journal article dealing with negotiations with the Branch Davidians. There have been numerous articles written about corporate and small group negotiations, but these do not seem to be relevant to the study at hand. The few articles dealing with law enforcement crisis negotiations, primarily by Donohue, Rogan, and Miller, have approached the subject from a quantitative perspective. Additionally their studies are exploratory and their test cases again had none of the religious complications that were inherent in Waco. There are several articles written within the disciplines of Sociology and Psychiatry that address interactions of their theories and services with law enforcement operations, and which provide useful background material. But of course this material does not cover the subject of this paper. They primarily support the position that the FBI mis-analyzed 5

6 the situation in treating it as a "Hostage/Barricade" incident, and were ill served by the psychiatrists who were consulted during the negotiations. The final area of material is that of apocalyptic rhetoric and beliefs. There have been two books written within the Communication Studies discipline on the subject, and several journal articles as well. Stephen O'Leary's Arguing the Apocalypse: A Theory of Millennial Rhetoric, and Barry Brummett's Contemporary Apocalyptic Rhetoric are useful for explaining the belief structure of the Davidians and their apocalyptic worldview. However, the extant material does not clarify how the Davidian's apocalyptic belief structure interacted with the very different one of the FBI and BATF. In summary, there has been nothing of academic substance written concerning the negotiations between Federal law enforcement and the Branch Davidians. This project hopes to fill that gap with an exploratory rhetorical analysis of those negotiations. Method of Analysis Given the lack of study on the negotiations between Federal law enforcement and the Branch Davidians, this study has two foci. First, I performed an open-ended analysis of the negotiations in order to describe and document the strategies of negotiation and the themes of conversation over the fifty-one days with the purpose of revealing what occurred. Second, I examined how symbols created two different "rhetorical trajectories" that met in the fiery end of the crisis. In his study of Lee Harvey Oswald's rhetoric, "When Dreams Collide: Rhetorical Trajectories in the Assassination of President Kennedy," Leland Griffin defines a rhetorical trajectory as follows: I mean by "rhetorical trajectory" something close to the phenomenon that Burke discusses under the heading "qualitative progression." It is the salience and/or sequency of god and devil terms in a body of discourse suggestive of the qualities, motivations, or state of mind of a speaker or writer, "a state of mind which another state of mind can appropriately follow."... It is the assumption of my essay that rhetoric, indeed, "maketh a ready man"; that we are moved by our rhetoric as our rhetoric is designed to move others, and that by the tracing of the terminological trajectories in the rhetoric of an individual or a collectively we 6

7 may gain understanding as to how a particular state of readiness is achieved. (Griffin, n2, ) Just as Kennedy and Oswald followed their rhetorical trajectories to disaster in Dallas, Federal law enforcement and the Davidians followed rhetorical trajectories to the entelechial end in Waco. The first rhetorical trajectory to be considered will be that of the Davidians, based upon their conversations and symbolic actions during the siege. The Davidians believed in a literal translation of the Bible (including a literal God and Devil) and more specifically in the book of Revelation and the Judgments of the Seven Seals. They viewed their world through the "glasses of scripture," using the text to justify Koresh's claims to be the "Lamb" and to have procreation rights with essentially all Davidian women. When the raid occurred on February 28, they were convinced that the prophecies in the Old Testament and Revelation were coming to pass. They interpreted the negotiators claims and the tactics employed by the FBI through the "terministic screen" of apocalyptic scripture. This created a rhetorical trajectory that could lead either to an immediate apocalyptic confrontation, or a potentially peaceful settlement if the ultimate "Day of Judgment" was delayed for a time. The second rhetorical trajectory to be considered will be that of the FBI, as represented by the conversations of the negotiators and the symbolic actions employed by the tactical officers during the siege. The FBI initially perceived David Koresh as a mentally disturbed individual who needed to be humored and talked out of his "compound." They saw his followers as brainwashed victims. Ultimately, they concluded that Koresh was nothing more than a religious "con-man," using his doctrines and charisma to sleep with married women and young girls. The male Davidians were ultimately viewed as a private army who had killed Federal agents and needed to be humbled and brought to justice. These two rhetorical trajectories intersected with terrible results on April 19, when tanks engaged in a final assault and Mt. Carmel subsequently burned to the ground. The surviving Davidians still claim they did not start the fire. However, the preponderance of forensic evidence indicates it was intentionally started from within (DOJ, ), suggesting a 1990's Masada type incident. The negotiation transcripts provide a chronological blueprint to these convergent rhetorical trajectories and their corresponding "worldviews in collision" that should be explicated. 7

8 The primary materials considered in the analysis are the complete negotiation transcripts, beginning with the "911" call on February 28, and ending with the destruction of Mt. Carmel on April 19, Also included were Koresh's discussions with the press the day of the raid, his radio message played on March 1, 1993, the four letters he sent out during the siege, and the videotape the Davidians produced and sent out on March 17, This material will be used to develop the Davidian trajectory. The FBI trajectory will be developed from the negotiation transcripts, negotiator event logs, as well as from the reports of both the Justice Department and the Treasury Department about Waco. Those reports discuss the progress of the siege and the tactical decisions employed, as well as the final conclusions of both Departments on their respective handling of "Operation Trojan Horse." Plan Of Study Chapter two, "In The Beginning," develops the history and doctrines of the Branch Davidians, and the historical context of the siege itself, including discussing events that precipitated the initial raid. The negotiation plan of the FBI and the "doctrines" of FBI crisis negotiators are elaborated. Chapter three, "The Sixth Seal - Terror," covers the "911" tapes on the day of the February 28 raid to March 3, when Koresh received his message from God to "Wait," which altered the course of the negotiations. Chapter four, "The Interlude," covers the discussions during the "waiting period" from March 3 until April 14, when Koresh claimed he was told by God to write his interpretation of the Seven Seals and then surrender to the FBI. Chapter five, "The Seventh Seal - The Trumpets," covers the period from April 14 to April 19, when the tear gas assault occurred and Mt. Carmel burned to the ground. Chapter six, "The Judgments," contains conclusions regarding the rhetorical trajectories of the Davidians and the FBI, as well as theoretical and practical implications from the study. 8

FBI at Waco: Research Proposal. federal, state, and local, can better communicate with religiously motivated groups. More

Higgins 1 FBI at Waco: Research Proposal Broadly, the question this paper tries to answer is how law enforcement agencies, both federal, state, and local, can better communicate with religiously motivated