FBI at Waco: Research Proposal. federal, state, and local, can better communicate with religiously motivated groups. More

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1 Higgins 1 FBI at Waco: Research Proposal Broadly, the question this paper tries to answer is how law enforcement agencies, both federal, state, and local, can better communicate with religiously motivated groups. More specifically, this paper will try to answer how the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) can communicate and interact better with new religious movements by examining the standoff at Waco, Texas in This paper will look at the interactions between federal agents of the FBI and David Koresh - along with Koresh s followers, the Branch Davidians. I plan to analyze the rhetoric utilized by both sides and examine the flaws, favoring neither side. I want to be able to explain how each side communicated with one another and draw conclusions about what went wrong. Furthermore, this paper will also try to clarify the role that religious scholars and the media played in the events of Waco and their impacts. I want to dissect how the media portrayed the situation and the key players at the scene. Finally, this paper will discuss the information presented by religious scholars and scrutinize why they were largely ignored. In all, this paper will try to answer what went wrong at Waco, what could have been done differently or better, and what role the media and religious scholars played in this catastrophe. The standoff at Waco has been intensely studied by religious scholars, such as Steven Weitzman, J. Phillip Arnold, James D. Taylor, and Catherine Wessinger. Wessinger, the leading religious scholar on Waco, states that the FBI s lack of understanding of the Branch Davidian s religion is the cause of the massive loss of life. Her conclusions are solidified by the fact that all the aforementioned scholars, including Arnold and Taylor who were at the scene of the standoff, agree with her position. It is impossible to deny that increased comprehension on the side of the FBI would have resulted in fewer lives being lost. My approach differs from Wessinger s in that I believe the conflict between the FBI tactical unit and the FBI negotiation unit plays an equally

2 Higgins 2 important role in the results of the standoff. Furthermore, my approach differs because it is clear that scholars, including Wessinger, are biased against the FBI. It is only natural that they are biased, though, because during the incident they were largely ignored when they offered advice to law enforcement. I believe that bias plays a role in the conclusions drawn by these scholars, so I intend to approach the situation evenhandedly, not favoring one side over the other. Prior to this incident, the FBI did not have a successful relationship with religion in general. For example, from the 1920 s and until the 1960 s the FBI repeatedly came into conflict with the Moorish Science Temple of America, a new religious movement that is focused on American nationalism and Moorish identity and it was targeted to black communities. Furthermore, It is necessary to point out that simultaneous to the Waco siege was the Lucasville Prison Riot, where 450 inmates rioted and took control of a prison, killing nine other inmates in the first two days. In this situation, proper negotiation protocol was followed, and the riot ended in 10 days with only nine causalities. In comparison, at Waco proper negotiation protocol was not followed and it took 51 days to resolve the standoff and resulted in 86 causalities. Therefore, this paper will have a focus on the negotiations protocols installed by the FBI and the negotiation strategies that utilized at Waco to prove that if proper negotiation protocols were followed at Waco, the end result would have been drastically different. Regardless, it is impossible to ignore that even after the disaster at Waco, the FBI continues to have a tumultuous relationship with religion. The exchange between Byron Sage, the lead negotiator for the FBI at Waco, and David Koresh, the leader of the Branch Davidians, demonstrates the consequences of the conflict and lack of communication between the FBI s tactical team and the FBI s negotiation team at Waco. The tactical team had believed that the FBI was wasting their time by trying to communicate

3 Higgins 3 with the Branch Davidians though negotiation, but the negotiation team believed they were making progress. Three weeks into the standoff, the tactical team begins to use demonstrations of force to coerce those inside the compound to surrender. These displays only pushed the Davidians to become more stubborn. The following close reading examines the interview between Sage and Koresh following the first show of force by the tactical team. It is clear early in the interview that Sage still wants to be able to assist the Davidians by using negotiation when he states, [W]e're tryin' to get this accomplished in your best interest and in ours, but we can only do that if we work together. Here, it is evident that Sage is trying to empathize with Koresh and make him believe that they are working towards the same goal with his use of diction in, we work together. These words suggest that both parties want the same thing. This belief is only solidified by his earlier statement, your best interest and in ours. By not stating what the interests are, it is up to Koresh to decide what they are, and it implies that the interests are shared. Therefore, by intentionally making the statement broad, Sage never has to say that the FBI and Koresh want the same thing, but Koresh can assume that the FBI and him do truly want the same thing. Sage utilizes this tactic of establishing a common ground by suggesting a common end objective between him, the FBI, and Koresh throughout this interview. He is attempting to do this in order to build and regain trust with Koresh after the tactical team of the FBI placed armored vehicles on the border of the Davidian s property as a clear sign of force. Prior to this occurrence the negotiation team had made headway with the Davidians. This excerpt from the interview shows the distrust bubbling within Koresh and Sage trying to guide him back: KORESH: And also, for you too. Hey, the other night your tanks came right up towards the house, is this not a violation of what you promised us yes or no?

4 Higgins 4 SAGE: No. What we... KORESH: (interrupts) It's not a violation. SAGE: let me finish. You asked the question, let me give you the response. You to, you asked that we not encroach on your property as long as you were going along with ah, arrangements that we were making in a very healthy and human fashion on the 28th and the first and the second. That did not happen, and you think about this for a second those tanks did not encroach, and they're not tanks by the way they're armored personnel carriers, in fact one's an ambulance and I pray we never have to use it. Through his yes or no question it is evident that Koresh is extremely troubled by the FBI s show of force and is unsure whether or not he should be trusting the agents he is currently communicating with. Furthermore, by his interjection, It s not a violation, it is evident that he is angered by this show of force. In Sage s consequent response, he points out technicalities in Koresh s argument in order to present him with reasonings to trust the FBI. He cannot deny that the FBI overstepped their bounds on the Davidian s property, as seen when Sage explains that they approached the camp because Koresh did not hold up his end of the bargain. More importantly though, in order to calm the fears of Koresh, Sage attempts to downplay what Koresh believes to be tanks on the Davidian property. Sage states, they're not tanks by the way they're armored personnel carriers, in fact one's an ambulance and I pray we never have to use it. He first is employing logos with Koresh by pointing out the fact that the vehicles creeping onto the property are not tanks but instead armored personnel carriers. He does this to decrease Koresh s fear and to rebuild his trust. Finally, Sage ends his sentence with an emotional plea, drawing on the common ground he had been building with Koresh in earlier conversations. Sage

5 Higgins 5 tells Koresh, one's [of the armored personnel carriers] an ambulance and I pray we never have to use it. First and foremost, it is important to point out that Sage clarifies that purposes of all the vehicles to demonstrate to Koresh the FBI s true intentions behind their show of force. More importantly though is the finally part of this statement, I pray we never have to use it. Sage s diction is crucial here; he chooses to employ the word pray rather than hope or beg. He knows that Koresh is a highly religious man who will respond best to religion before anything else therefore by praying, rather than hoping, Sage is trying to increase his chances of reasoning with Koresh. Furthermore, in this plea to Koresh, Sage uses a non-specific we, he never clarifies whether we constitutes the FBI, law enforcement in general, or all the parties involved in the standoff including the Davidians. By using this broad we, Sage is hoping that, due to previous statements, Koresh will include himself in that and will once more begin to trust and to listen to the FBI negotiation team. In all, this last statement is an emotional plea playing on Koresh s religion to make him believe the negotiation team and work with them towards a peaceful resolution to the standoff. These samples of interactions between Byron Sage and David Koresh are only a few of hundreds but they demonstrate Sage s want for a peaceful resolution and the uphill battle faced by the negotiation team when gaining the trust of Koresh and his followers. Furthermore, there are instances where Sage uses Koresh strong feelings towards religion to further the cause of the FBI but never asks what Koresh s religious motivating beliefs are.

Chapter 1 The Prelude

Chapter 1 The Prelude On the morning of February 28, 1993, seventy-six armed agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) attempted to serve a search warrant using a "dynamic entry" against