THE CONCEPTS OF ETHICS
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1 THE CONCEPTS OF ETHICS
2 THE CONCEPTS OF ETHICS BY SIDNEY ZINK Palgrave Macmillan 1962
3 ISBN ISBN (ebook) DOI / Copyright Sidney Zink 1962 Softcover reprint of the hardcover ist edition MACMILLAN AND COMPANY LIMITED London Bombay Calcutta Madras Melbourne THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA LIMITED Toronto ST MARTIN'S PRESS INC New York
4 CONTENTS INTRODuCflON. PAGB ix-xv CH AP. I. VALUE 1-60 I. Terminology 2. Occasions and Uses of Value judgment 2 3 Can Ethics be a Science? 6 4 Ar e Ethical Sentences Declarative? 10 5 Are Values Simple? Are Values Observable? 20 7 Is Value Relati ve? Are there Mistakes about Values? 26 9 Is there Contradiction in Ethical Judgments? Is there a T est for Values? Is Value Intrinsic? The Situational Relativity of Value A Universal Condition of Value DESIRE I. The Interest Theory The Concepts of Interest and Desire Desire and Action Does Value Exist in a Relation? What is the Relation of Interest' to its Obj ect? Knowledge of Value and Interest F inal Objections to the Interest Theory PLEASURE I. Pl easure and Feeling Pleasure and Desire 93 3 Good ' and Bad ' Pleasures 97 4 The Factors in the Value of Pleasure 99 5 Pleasure and Happiness Criticisms of Hedonism Pl easure and Virtue The Appeal of H edonism 122 v
5 vi CHAP. THE CONCEPTS OF ETHICS PAGE IV. OBLIGATION Terminology 125 2> Judgments of Responsibility and Moral Judgments of Praise and Blame Judgments of Obligation Subjective Obligation Subjective Obligation and Punishment Obligation and Good Can an Action be Both Right and Good? Is the Good Something that Ought to Be? Are Particular Obl igations, Obligations to Realize Good? 10. Obligations to Oneselfand Moral Decisions Rules of Obligation Rights 182 V. DECISION The Elements of Practical Reasoning The Best Reason Practical Decisions and Technical Decisions The General Objects of Choice cannot be Hierarchically Graded Rules of Prudence 2 5 VI. RESPONSIBILITY The Voluntary Are All Conditions of Responsibility 'Negative'? The Two Positive Conditions of Responsibility The Ability to Act The Determinist Thesis Can We Do Away with the Concept of Responsibility? The Determinist's Error The Source of the Determinist's Error 223 VII. WILL. 1. The Special Feature of 'Free Will' 2. 'Free', 'Able', and 'Free to Will' and 'Able to Will' 3. Willing and Trying 4. Willing and Desiring 5 The Capacity to Try as a Universal Condition of Responsibility
6 CHAP. VIII. CHOICE CONTENTS I. Acting and Choosing 2. Responsibility and the Ability to Choose vii PAGE IX. INTENTION I. We are Responsible only for Present Intentions 2. Acting Intentionally is Acting Knowingly 3. Objections to the Preceding Account 4. Intention and Prediction 5. The Evidence for Intentions 6. Intending and Trying 7. Is Intending a Personal Ability? 8. Varieties of Non-intentional Acts 9. Intention as a Condition of Responsibility INDEX 293
7 INTRODUCTION THE ethical theorist tries to understand the concepts we use in our everyday ethical decisions and judgments. Some of these concepts are perfectly fundamental: such are value, obligation and responsibility. It is the explicit or implicit presence of one of these concepts in a judgment which enables us to identify thejudgment as ethical. These concepts involve others. In understanding value we are driven to determine its relations to desire and to pleasure ; and in understanding responsibility we must analyze will, choice and intention. I propose, then, to investigate these concepts and their interrelations. In my view ethics concerns events or objects which can be known. But the problem of knowing these things is not, like the problem of knowing other events and objects of an empirical science such as chemistry or zoology, one of obtaining experience of new phenomena. We are weil acquainted with the phenomena; the problem is to understand their relations. Whether this understanding involves new ' observations' it is not now necessary to decide. What is involved is, at any rate, very different from what we usually think of as 'observation'. It is like what is done by the theoretical rather than the experimental physicist. The method is not to gather anything new but to re-examine what we have. What we have are thoughts about these things - value, obligation, responsibility. And the conspicuous and viable form in which we have these thoughts are as modes of verbal expression. In elucidating these concepts and their relations I shall continually refer to the way we talk about them. However, my objective is to elucidate not just the way we talk about these things, but the way we think about them. There is a distinction; still, to do one is to do the other. One cannot talk c1early on an extended scale while not thinking c1early. One can, in a confused state of mind, utter a c1earsentence, but, as Plato showed, one cannot write ix
8 x THE CONCEPTS OF ETHICS a clear paragraph or engage in a clear dialogue. Further, one eannot think at all without words or symbols. Thus the elueidation of thought is the elueidation of words, phrases and sentenees. The method of treating philosophieal problems by a eonjoint analysis of what we think and how we speak is, I think, the dominant philosophieal method today. The method, understood quite generally, is as old as Plato, but in reeent times it has been given a new self-eonseiousness and rigor by the work of G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein. (Moore's influenee is espeeially prominent in the pages that follow; he is responsible not only for the mode of philosophie method so widely praetieed, but also for the way in whieh many eurrent problems in ethies are posed.) To what degree their methods are alike is a tempting question whieh eannot be broaehed here. Briefly, however, Moore typically referred to 'eommon sense', to what the ordinary person must think, while Wittgenstein typieally referred to ordinary language, to the way the ordinary person talks. But both have in eommon a stress upon the partieular ease - upon elueidating and testing a philosophie proposition by eonsidering what this proposition eomes to when its terms are taken in the way that we ordinarily take them, and applied to the sorts of partieular eases to whieh we would ordinarily apply them. Some reeent writers O. K. Bouwsma eomes first to mind - have eoneentrated their efforts almost exclusive1y on the detailed analysis of partieular eases. Others, sueh as Nowell-Smith, have direeted their attention mainly to the verbal expressions we use in dealing with a subjeet. Both, I think, are proper and useful. I think that a referenee to verbal expressions is most to the point when there is reason to believe that a philosophie puzzle has been generated through the looseness and ambiguity of language, as on the question of responsibility and 'free will'. Whereas a referenee to eonerete eases is most to the point when one wants to eonfirm or eritieize a general doetrine, as the 'teleologieal' or 'deontologieal' theories of obligation. However, both methods are appropriate in both sorts of treatment. In treating responsibility one will want to eonsider partieular
9 INTRODUCTION cases in which we do hold persons responsible; as in treating obligation one will want to ask how we use the word 'obligation'. And finahy, one will want to ask how this word interacts with other words when we are speaking of obligation generally, as weh as when we are speaking of some particular case of obligation. One thing which the method would exclude as profitless, and which I hope I have excluded, is the formulation of general principles which are not supported either by the way we talk or by their capacity to explain what we think about concrete cases. Sometimes, then, I shall refer to what people do or would 'say', and sometimes to what people do or would 'think'. I use the latter when there seems either no particular problem about the form of verbal expression, or any light to be gained from analyzing it - when most light is to be got from directing attention chiefly to the actual phenomena themselves in the form of either an unusual or a decisive case. A principle of thought and language which I presuppose is that members of a language community understand the basic concepts in the same general way, but that no one understands them fully. The philosopher has the opportunity and the inclination to reflect more about them and to advance their general understanding a little or a lot. The absence and the need of more understanding of the basic ethical concepts is seen in the paradoxes and contradictions about them which sometimes come to the surface. On any given occasion the ordinary person feels no strain in his handling of these concepts. He can express what he thinks with fair readiness and point. But if he comes to compare what he says on different occasions, he can feel puzzled, for he seems to contradict hirnself. And it may happen that the puzzlement breaks out in a single very perplexing moral problem, which has elements that bring in both of his contradictory views. Telling examples of these discrepancies are on the questions of 'Relativism' versus ' Objectivism', 'Hedonism' versus ' Stoicism" 'Subjective' versus 'Objective' Obligation, 'Free Will' versus, Determinism'. In an easy-going mood the ordinary man xi
10 xii THE CONCEPTS OF ETHICS may say: 'Good is relative' or 'Value judgments are merely a matter of opinion'; but then when speaking of a particular question, say HitIer's persecution of Jews, he will denounce this in the strongest language, as 'HitIer was an evil man'. Similarly, at one time he will be inclined to say that of course 'Pleasure is good', and in another context that of course 'If a thing is good we ought to pursue it' ; but then if one asks, 'Do you mean that one ought to pursue pleasure, and his own pleasure?' he will not know what to say. Another case. He says that ' A person ought to do what he thinks right'. But he also thinks persons sometimes mistake right for wrong. The two notions thus commit hirn to saying, 'A person ought sometimes to do what is in fact wrong'. One final case. He may say at one time that 'Nothing happens without a cause' and at another that 'A person is free to choose'. Further, the difficulty takes on practical poignance when he considers what ought to be done about persons convicted of crime. He may not know what is right - whether we ought to punish the person because he was 'free to choose' or whether we ought to try to help hirn because 'he couldn't avoid doing what he did'. I shall attempt to show that these paradoxes arise from overlooking distinctions of meaning in our concepts, and that an analysis of their meanings enables us to resolve the puzzles. The first and last examples above, and especially the last, show that the questions, though 'merely theoretical' in mode of treatment, are not so in final result. However, it is a common view among present analytic philosophers (whose general method I pursue) that philosophie analysis can be done without any practical commitments; that the ethical theorist can do meta-ethics without doing ethics; that he can explain how such concepts as value and obligation are related without saying what is good or obligatory. There is a truth here. And there is a healthy desire to specialize the theoretical work so as to do it better. But there is also an error, and perhaps an unhealthy desire to avoid taking astand. The ethical theorist can avoid a stand on the more particular questions for ethical decision,
11 INTRODUCTION but he cannot avoid a stand on general questions. To continue with the above examples: ifhe holds the deterministic view that no human actions are avoidable, and if he thinks that persons are not responsible for things they cannot avoid, then he is practically committed to refusing ever to judge any person responsible. This result is a highly general one, but it is no less practical for being general, and the more important for being so. Again, if the theorist maintains that pleasure is something which is good, and that people are obligated to pursue pleasure, then he is committed to recommending that they sometimes pursue their own pleasure. Finally, if he argues that value judgments are not expressions of knowledge but expressions of feeling (or attempts to arouse feeling), then he is committed not to presenting value judgments as if they were claims to knowledge. If value judgments are not claims to knowledge, then the theorist who knows this is committed, when he utters sentences about value, to making sure that the persons to whom he makes these utterances understand them for what they are. And this would require some pains, for ordinary persons are under the impression that value judgments are true or false. Now, of course, in saying that the ethical theorist is practically committed to all these things, I am committing myself to a judgment both about the nature and the value of ethical theory. To say the theorist is committed in these ways is to say what the theorist ought to do. A theorist ought not to advance a theory which he doesn't believe; and he ought to try to get people to understand and believe his theory; and he ought not to act contrary to what he believes. These, obviously, are propositions not about what is a good theory and not even about what is a good theorist, but about what is right action. To assert that a good theory is a true one, and that a good theorist is a theorist who holds a good theory, is to assert technical propositions about the nature of theory and not ethical propositions carrying an implication as to what any human being ought to do (as it would be if we said that it is good to construct theories). But it is an ethical proposition to say that if the theory is true, and if it is the sort of theory, as X111
12 XlV THE CONCEPTS OF ETHICS ethics is, on which one can act, then one ought to act on it. Thus a theorist who would agree that he has the practical commitments I say he has, could agree to this only if he agreed with this general ethical principle. And he might disagree with it. The theorist will have to reflect and see whether he does. My way of urging that he does not is to cite what people in general think about this matter, and what he as a member of this group thinks about it as shown by the way he and others generally talk. People generally, and the theorist too, think that a person ought to practice what he preaches - that if he believes a theory to be true, then on the appropriate occasions he ought to act on it. Thus if we mean by a meta-ethics one that remains quite pure of practical commitments, there is no such field. Nor is there any need for this esoteric word-form 'meta'. It may be that there can be a pure logic or mathematics, but there cannot be a pure ethics. We can say what we need to say with the word 'theoretical'. Ethics is, like logic and aesthetics, more or less theoretical and philosophical. It is the more theoretical, and the less practical, as it has less to say about general sorts of ethical problems, such as the rightness of capital punishment, divorce, advertising, etc., and as it has less to say about completely particular ethical problems, as what a person ought to do in a particular case. The present essay has nothing direct1y to say about such things, except by way of illustration. It is a work in theoretical ethics. But, even on such specific topics as the above, it does carry some implications, even if only as to the sort of reasons which are relevant to their solution. A word now - and a very inadequate one - about debts. I believe that a great debt which without this mention would probably go unnoticed is to John Dewey. I was so early saturated with his work that it is impossible for me to say how much I owe to hirn. Although I found - and find - much to resist in Dewey, my stress upon the flexibility of ethical rules and upon a plurality of values sterns from hirn. My explicit concern in the following pages is almost
13 INTRODUCTION entirely with writers influenced, as I am, by G. E. Moore. I am indebted to the authors of many books and artides who are mentioned here scantily or not at all. To keep the lines of my analyses dear I have considered in detail only those works which I feel to be directly relevant to the points I want to make. This means that no explicit mention is made of writers who do not share fundamental assumptions of this essay or who do not pose problems in a way useful for my purposes. I have learned from them nevertheless. And those whom I do discuss I often charge with mistakes in so positive a manner that my references to them often conceal the real benefit I have gained from them. Another matter. I have broached a number of large topics which I have touched very lightly - for example, desire, punishment, rights. My excuse is that I have had here to treat these in the course of another topic. I am as painfully aware as the reader will be of the much fuller consideration which these topics call for. Finally, I want to give thanks to Rudolph Weingartner for reading the book in manuscript and suggesting many improvements in darification. I am also grateful to Robert Connolly for his cheerful labor in preparing the Index. Above all, I want to express indebtedness to my wife for steady encouragement and help. xv
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