MARX, NATURAL REUGION, AND CAPITALISM

Transcription

1 Dialogos, 67 (1996) pp MARX, NATURAL REUGION, AND CAPITALISM MICHAEL A. PRINCIPE Lucio Colletti argues that, for Marx, capitalism operates in accord with a Christian religious metaphysic. 1 Colletti wants to reply to the objection often made against the labor theory of value that it is implicitly metaphysical and therefo re part of a pseudoscience. He does this by claiming that this objectio n misses Marx's point. According to Colletti, it is part of Marx's view that capitalism functions in certain essential ways like a religion. He says: ((Marx... accepts the argument that (value' is a metaphysical entity." It is, says Colletti, "the commodity itself o r value that is a scholastic entity, and not the concept which he, Marx, uses to describe how the commodity is made." Money, commodities and value all play roles in the capitalist religious metaphysic. However, like all religious phenomena, according to Colletti, they are human creatio ns w hich human beings can ultimately master. The metaphysical element is then not so much a part of Marx's view as it is a part of capitalism. In this paper I shall argue that there is some merit to Colletti's basic intuition of Marx. While parts of Colletti's view are problematic, I will show that, for Marx, capitalism does function in some respects like religion. I shall argue, however, that, rather than Christianity, natural religion provides Marx w ith his model for the way in which capitalism functio ns. In what follows, we will see that Marx arrives at this view in part by relying on his Young Hegelian heritage. Marx, at least from 1846 onwards, understands humanity's most primitive relationship to nature to be that re flected in natural relig ion. 2 1 Lucio Colletti, Marxism and Hegel, trans. Lawrence Garner (London: NLB, 1973), especially chapter Most notably in the 1844 Manuscripts Marx's view of humanity's relationship to nature is very differe nt. I will not argue now for my interpretatio n of his view there. I 155

2 In the German Ideology, Marx says that at the earliest stages of development, human consciousness is "purely animal consciousness of nature (natural religion) precisely because nature is yet hardly altered by history" (Marx's parenthesis). Nature originally "confronts men as a completely alien, all powerful and unassailable force, with which men's relations are purely animal and by which they are overawed like beasts" (MECW 5: 44).3 Human beings, because they have yet to begin shaping and altering nature to their needs, experience it as something fundamentally independe nt of themselves and their activity. In Capital, Marx refers in a similar way to humanity's primitive relationship to nature. He says there that primitive relationships of production and the corresponding limited relations amongst human beings and nature in the production process are "reflected in the ancient worship of nature and in other elements of tribal religions." According to Marx, these "religious reflections of the real world can... vanish only when the practical r-elations of everyday life between man and man, and man and nature, generally present themselves to him in a transparent and rational form" (C 1: 173). That is, the religious dimension is not overcome until rational control of nature is achieved in communist society. Here Marx hints at his mature view of humanity's relationship to nature. According to Marx, this relationship is a dynamic one which passes through three stages. Initially, humanity is dominated by nature. This is the period of natural religion. Then, with capitalism, human beings gain some control over nature, but this is not yet rational control. Finally, with communism, rational control over nature is to be achieved.4 will, however, briefly sketch it. In 1844 Marx presupposes an initial primitive unity of human beings with nature. That unity breaks down in large measure under feudalism where only the feudal lord has this kind of relationship to the land. Only with capitalism is humanity completely alienated from nature. 111is, for Marx, is finally overcome in communist society where there will be a reunification of human beings with nature. 3 Abbreviations are spelled out at the end. 4 Again, this contrasts with the 1844 view where communist society marks the reunification of human beings with nature. According to Marx, communist society "is the complete unity of man with nature (MECW 3: 296). Marx explicitly rejects this view in the German Ideology where he regards the idea of unity with nature as inconsequential. He says: "The important question of the relation of man to nature crumbles itself when we understand that the celebrated 'unity of man with nature' has always existed in industry" (MECW 5: 39-40). 156

3 In both the German Ideology and Capital, Marx uses the notion o f natural religion in describing humanity's initial relationship to nature. Nature is a force over which human beings have little control and which actually dominates over them. Given the Young Hegelian tradition with which Marx was once involved, we should not take lightly the fact that Marx chooses to refer to natural religion. This was a subject discussed by Hegel and the criticism of religion was a major concern of the Young Hegelians who in general thought that through such criticism, philosophy could be brought to the world. Marx, of course, rejects this program, and is not himself overly concerned with religion. However, I shall argue that Marx's view of humanity's relationship to nature represents the transformation of one variety of Young Hegelian religious criticism in such a way as to reflect what Marx takes to be the real relationship o f human beings to nature. Marx's view can be seen as the result of employing certain aspects of Young Hegelianism in a wholly new context. Natural religion is the key. In order to understand the significance of Marx's reference to natural religion, I will need to note briefly two important Young Hegelian criticisms of religion, those of Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer. I will first briefly touch upon Feuerbach's view which he developed prior to the specific ideas of Bauer which we will consider. Most importantly, Feuerbach claimed that God was nothing but the projection by human beings of the human essence. The idea of God arose, said Feuerbach, only because the human essence had not been perfected. God is actually the ideal consciousness humanity has of itself. The characteristics of omniscience, omnipotence, immortality and perfect goodness are actually characteristics that can be had by the species (Gattung) as a whole. Obviously, individuals cannot exemplify these characteristics on their own. Only in community can they achieve human perfection and realize the human essence. In a certain sense, for Feuerbach, God has to be brought to earth. The human species is then to take God's place. The attributes of God thereby become the attributes of humanity. The God to which Feuerbach refers in his discussion is the God o f Christianity. As a rough and preliminary attempt to determine the significance of Marx's reference to natural religion, we can ask what Feuerbach's analysis would look like if we radically changed the concept o f God employed. What if we were, in our analysis, to use the the naturegod of natural religion? The characteristics of this God are far from identical to the Christian God. This God is powerful, capricious and even irra- 157

4 tional. Human beings for this God occupy no special place but are simply part of the natural world. Floods, droughts and all variety of natural disaster are the actions of the God of nature. It is this God in front of which Marx claims human beings bowed down in the primitive stages of civilization. The forces of nature are the powers of the God of nature. To bring this God to earth would be to give these p owers to hum ln beings. Feuerbach's view, if we change the conception of God employed, resembles in some ways the three-stage developmental model which I mentioned earlier. Through history, human beings gradually make the powers of nature their own. The characteristics of the nature-god b e come the characteristics of humanity. These powers of nature, rationally harnessed by human beings, can then be used for the benefit of all individual human beings. Can we then say that Marx's use of the notion of natural religion and the rest of the three-stage model represent a rehabilitated Feuerbachianism? Actually, no. Specifically, it would seem that by bringing the awesome, irrational powers of the nature-god to earth and giving the m to human beings, one is simply making human beings the wielders of awesome, irrational power. This is hardly the rational control of nature w hich Marx envisions for communist society. By looking at some of Bruno Bauer's criticism of Feuerbach we will be able to see very clearly why Marx's view cannot be construed as any sort of rehabilitated Feuerbachianism. We will see that Marx's view is instead closer to a rehabilitated Bauerianism. Bauer did not believe it sufficient to bring God to earth in the manner of Feuerbach. Far from rep resenting the perfection of humanity, Bauer believed such an attempt to embody a myriad of contradictions. According to Bauer, the Christian God is the result of a distorted consciousness and is itself distorted and contradictory, this being the reason it can be the subject of so many arcane theological disputes and even why the Gospels are inconsistent. To give humanity the characteristics of this distorted and contradictory God is to make of humanity a distorted and contradictory thing. According to Bauer, to bring God to earth and transform him into the species is to spare both God and the species from the ruthless criticism which was Bauer's own replacement for the motive force of Hegelian Spirit. The contradictions go uncriticized. According to Bauer, therefore, Feuerbach has not succeeded in the project of criticism: "Feuerbach has let stand in essence the very relation which he wanted to criticize... For although he has converted it into the relation of the human essence, he yet 158

5 has only made it more difficult for man. "5 Bauer's vision is of a kind o f spiritual development which goes beyond Feuerbach's account. In Bauer's view, Feuerbach settles for a situation in which human beings have developed really not at all, having uncritically accepted as perfections those perfections earlier attributed to God. Because Feuerbach has not carried criticism to its completion, the community and harmony which he envisions is, according to Bauer, bound to break down into what Bauer calls the "indiscriminate crowd." The otherness of God has not been transformed by criticism and is still to be found within the community as the otherness of a despotism which ~~a bolishes freedom in the smallest things" (Bauer, ref. 6, p. 204). The crowd becomes tyrannical. Bauer believes, though, that criticism must propel consciousness forward. Bringing the Christian God to earth is insufficient. The tyranny of the crowd is for Bauer the result of the incomplete criticism of religion. According to Bauer, more is required than the account given by Feuerbach. Again we can ask what this analysis would look like if rather than Christianity we were to speak instead of the sort of natural religion described by Marx. The God of nature is, as we have said, a vast, completely alien and even capricious force. What if the vast powers of nature as represented by the nature-god were to become the powers of humanity? Without a doubt, humanity would itself become a mighty force. However, it is hard to escape the thought that this would be something of an ugly force. The irrational power of nature simply becomes the irrational power of humanity. Just as Bauer claimed that bringing the Christian God to earth was insufficient, so it seems here that bringing the God of nature to earth is insufficient. In addition to transferring the powers of the nature-god to humanity, these powers need to be rationally controlled. We want more than for it to be humanity rather than the God o f nature at whose w him there is creation or destruction. It is clearly no t enough here to place humanity in God's place. To do this would be to take the exclusively Feuerbachian approach to the natural religion described by Marx. In fact, to make this move, to bring the God of nature to earth in this way, yields the relationship of humanity to nature characteristic of capitalism in Marx's mature view. That is, human beings have developed in- 5Bruno Bauer, "The Genus and the Crowd," in The Young Hegelians, ed. Lawrence S. Stepelevich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp

6 dustry and technology such that they can take control of nature, but it is a capricious and irrational control. Since in Marx's mature view, human beings are a part of nature and have always been in unity with it (see note 4), the God of nature, insofar as it is violent and capricious, is a God divided against itself. Some natural forces wreak havoc on other parts of nature including human beings. Just as Bauer saw the Christian God as a God of contradiction, so the God of nature is in its essence contradictory. Just as for Bauer, this contradiction does not vanish when God is brought to earth, so in our case, the contradiction within the God of nature is still evident with capitalism. The control of nature exercised under capitalism results, according to Marx, in the ruining of the land and the suffering of human beings.6 Little has been done to change the irrationality of the power exercised. Human beings rather than the God of nature have simply become the agents of this power. Under capitalism human beings take control of the metabolism with nature, though it is not yet rational control. Marx does state, however, that capitahsm is an advance over the state of affairs characterized by natural religion. Capitalism produces a stage of society "in comparison to which all earlier ones appear... as nature idolatry. For the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility, ceases to be recognized as a power for itself. "7 Humanity gets beyond natural religion. In regard to humanity's relation to nature, Marx views capitalism as both a great step forward and as a calamity. A kind of control is attained, but it is a contradictory and self-destructive control. Human beings have taken the place of an irrational, contradictory God of nature. To regard this God as contradictory in this way of course points to Marx's rehabilitation of a Bauerian rather than a Feuerbachian approach. Bauer is explicit about the contradictions in the Christian God, but also sees such a concept as a necessary part of human development. Bauer despised Christianity but also saw it as an advance. This too is Marx's view of capitalism. In Bauer's view Christianity is contradictory, reflecting humanity's own self-contradiction; so to be satisfied with bringing the Christian God to earth only confirms this self-contradiction. 6fxamples of Marx decrying the ruination of the land are numerous, but see espedauy: C 1: 348, 376, , and C 3: 195, 354, J<arl Marx, Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Random House, 1973), p

7 With Marx's presentation, we see the contradictions of the God of nature found in a different form under capitalism: while gaining a kind o f control over nature, human interaction with nature is often self-destructive. Here again more needs to be done, i.e., a social revolution is needed. Capitalism itself is not the sought for end. In a certain sense, capitalism is natural religion, but with human beings having taken on the attributes of the nature-god. This is the kind of transformation Feuerbach claimed needed to occur in regard to the Christian God. However, just as Bauer claimed that because the Christian God was contradictory humanity would in Feuerbach's procedure become a contradictory thing, so this is the case for the nature-god in Marx's analysis. The irrational and contradictory power of the nature-god becomes the irrational and contradictory power of humanity under capitalism. Here we see an important similarity of Marx's view to that of Bruno Bauer, his former friend and ally. As support for my claim that there is such a similarity, we can note that Marx frequently compares capitalism in certain respects to paganism and nature worship. This is, of course, the crucial evidence needed in order to justify the comparison between capitalism and natural religion as in fact something intended by Marx. We see in the following passage that Marx explicitly compares the progress made by capitalism to the actions of a pagan God: "When a great social revolution shall have mastered the results of the bourgeois epoch, the market of the world and the modern powers of production, and subjected them to the common control of the most advanced peoples, then only will human progress cease to resemble that hideous, pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain" (MECW 12, 222; my emphasis). Marx is very clear in his comparison of the progress made under capitalism to the violent and irrational actions of a pagan God. According to Marx, only under communism, where rational contro l over the forces of nature is attained, will there cease to be any such resemblance. Another, though less explicit, allusion to the idea that capitalism in certain respects resembles natural religion is in Marx's claim that commodities "rise up on their hind legs and face the worker as 'Capitaf." Here Marx again compares capitalism to the pagan God of nature. At one point, Marx dismisses with contempt eastern religions in which there is "a brutalizing worship of nature, exhibiting its degradation in the fact that man...fell down on his knees in adoration of Kanuman, the monkey, 161

8 and Sabbala, the cow" (MECW 12, 132} One difference between this kind of natural religion and capitalism is that the four legged commodity which rears up on its hind legs has replaced the four legged animal, and it is this new quadruped to which human beings now pay homage. Commodities, which are the creations of human beings, according to Marx, take on some of the characteristics of the gods of nature. Whether man "fell down on his knees" in worship or the objects of adoration "rise up on their hind legs," the result is the same; human beings are subservient, not themselves being in a position to exercise rational control. The difference is that in one case they are subservient to the beings of nature and in the other to their own creations. Under capitalism, Marx says, human beings are subject to the "magic and necromancy" of commodities (C 1: 169). This again suggests paganism as does the very idea of the fetishism of commodities where magical powers are ascribed to human creations. Also note that Marx, in order to explain the nature of commodities, offers a "religious" analogy. Given the discussion to this point, Marx's reference seems to be to natural religion. He says: "To fmd an analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each other and the human race" (C 1: 165} These figures are most plausibly understood as the ancient gods to which we have already seen Marx refer. The analogy is certainly not to a single monotheistic deity. Marx describes a religion where several divine figures interact. Under capitalism, human beings and the products of their activity take the place of these figures. Insofar as human beings are still unable to rationally control the natural world, Marx describes this as a world of magic and mystery. In this same regard, recall also the important reference to natural religion which occurs in Marx's discussion of the fetishism of commodities. Marx says that with ancient modes of production, there are limited relations between human beings and nature and that "these real limitations are reflected in the ancient worship of nature." Such religious reflections, says Marx, can vanish "only when the practical relations of everyday life between man and man, and man and nature, generally present themselves...in transparent and rational form" (C 1: 173). Because Marx mentions no other religion here other than natural religion, it would seem that he means that essential elements of natural religion linger on until rational control of natural forces is achieved. This was the claim 162

9 Marx made in the earlier passage comparing human progress prior to communism to a "hideous pagan idol." Marx here makes the same p oint. Capitalism itself embodies a religious dimension which is not eliminated until the arrival of communism. The lack of human power and contro l characteristic of natural religion is not overcome until capitalism is overcome. Capitalism is, for Marx, natural religion brought to earth. Capitalism, like natural religion, seems mysterious and impenetrable. Finally, let me briefly note how Colletti errs in his inte rpretation. Colletti correctly emphasizes those places where Marx compares the functioning of capitalism to religion. He notes, for example, Marx's claim that a commodity is "a very queer sort of thing, full of metaphysical subtleties and theological whimsies" (C 1: 163; Colletti, p. 270). However, when Marx makes such remarks, he makes no mention of Christianity. Of course, Colletti, while offering his list of citations from Marx, does mention some which make reference to Christianity. These, however, have to do for the most part with Christianity being a fit religion fo r capitalism. Obviously, though, the fact that Christianity is the best religion for capitalist society need have nothing to do with its serving as a model for this society. Colletti's mistake is that he does not distinguish between the two different kinds of claims which Marx makes. That is, he conflates some claims Marx makes about Christianity with other claims he makes about capitalism functioning in accord with a religious metaphysic and arrives at the notion that capitalism functions in accord with a Christian religious metaphysic. To summarize, from Marx's comments about natural religion we have drawn a backdrop against which to understand his view of humanity's relationship to nature under capitalism. This analysis is much in the spirit of Bruno Bauer. There is a sense in which the God of natural religion is brought to earth, losing its divinity, with capitalism. We saw on nume r ous occasions Marx uses the language of pagan religion to describe capitalism and the system of commodity production and exchange which characterizes it. However, as with Bauer's analysis of Christianity, it is n ot enough to bring this pagan God to earth. To substitute humanity for the God of nature only makes humanity the agent of violent and irrational power as in capitalism. More needs to be done. According to Marx, the irrationality of the system needs to be combatted and rational contro l seized. The irrationality and implicit metaphysic of commodity production and circulation described by Colletti is precisely what needs to be controlled. I have argued, though, that Colletti errs in unde rstanding 163

10 Marx to be comparing capitalism to Christianity. In fact, the irrationality of the system is more easily compared to the gods of natural religion. I have argued that this is indeed the comparison that Marx had in mit:td. Capitalism for Marx is the midpoint between humanity's primitive situation in which nature is wholly other and communism where human beings rationally control natural processes. The irrationality of capitali.sm finds its analogue in the irrationality of the God of nature. Middle Tennessee State University ABBREVIATIONS C MECW Karl Marx, Capttal, trans. Ben Fowkes (vol. 1) and David Femback (vols. 2 & 3). New York: Random House, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works. New York: International Publishers, 1975ff. 164