Libertarian Free Will and Chance 1. The Luck Principle: We have repeatedly seen philosophers claim that indeterminism does not get us free will, since something like the following is true: The Luck Principle (LP): If an action is undetermined, then it is not a free action, or one that the agent is responsible for. If the hard determinists convince us that free will is impossible if determinism is true, the worry still arises: But, perhaps we could still have free will if determinism is false. If the compatibilists convince us that we can in some sense still be free and morally responsible for our actions EVEN IF determinism is true, the worry still arises: But, perhaps we also possess some more satisfying, more ultimate kind of freedom if determinism is false. This is where LP comes in. It is designed to get rid of these worries, hammering the final nail in the coffin of libertarian free will. But, Robert Kane rejects LP. 2. The Case for LP: Reasons commonly given in favor of LP are these: An undetermined event is merely a matter of chance or luck. But, something that results from chance is something that nothing is in control of. But, a free action is one that the agent is in control of. Any action that resulted from indeterminacy would merely result in an involuntary spasm, or seizure. Such events would DIMINISH our freedom, not enhance it. It might cause our hand to jerk as we were trying to write something down or worse, cause our legs to carry us somewhere against our will! If some actions were undetermined, then, we could rewind time to a moment when you were about to make an important decision. The deliberation process would be EXACTLY the same your thoughts, reasons, beliefs, desires, and every characteristic about you and the entire universe and yet, you might choose differently the second time around. This seems to make nonsense of libertarian freedom, since such a decision would be irrational, inexplicable, capricious, and arbitrary. Moral Luck: Consider the last point. Many think that it would make nonsense of praise and blame because everything we do would be a matter of luck. For instance, imagine two worlds, or two possible ways that your life could have gone (as if we rewound time to some moment twice in a row). In both worlds, the entire history of the universe 1
is EXACTLY the same up until time t. Before time t, a brief flicker of temptation to steal Smith s car crosses your mind. You spend a while deliberating about it. Here are the pros and cons that you have come up with after deliberating: Don t Steal Smith s Car Tonight You like Smith, and have no desire to harm him You don t like Smith s car (it s old and junky) You already have a car, and don t need another one You have no desire to steal anything You believe stealing is wrong Your disposition is to avoid doing wrong things You would probably get caught and go to jail There is a party tonight that you really want to go to Steal Smith s Car Tonight You might be able to sell it and earn $1000 Now we push play. The first time around, you don t steal the car. The second time around, given EXACTLY these same reasons, you DO! Undetermined, libertarian freedom would seem to deliver the result that, at the end of a deliberative process, ultimately the decision is made by spinning a roulette wheel of chance. In the end, your final decision might be entirely unsupported by your reasons, desires, beliefs, etc. But, why should you deserve any blame for stealing the car in the second scenario if your decision was ultimately just a matter of chance. You were just unlucky enough for the roulette wheel to land on steal rather than don t steal. The argument proposed by opponents of libertarian free will is something like this: The Luck Argument 1. In the actual world, Jones kills Smith at time t. 2. Assumption of the libertarian: There is a possible scenario where the universe is EXACTLY the same as the actual world up until the moment of Jones s action (t), but where Jones does NOT kill Smith. 3. But, if the two scenarios (in the actual world and the possible scenario) are EXACTLY the same until the moment of the action, then the difference is not at all explained in terms of Jones s powers, capacities, states of mind, characteristics, dispositions, motives, etc., at time t, or any earlier time. 4. If whether or not someone does X has nothing to do with a person s powers, capacities, etc., then that person is not responsible for doing X. 5. Therefore, Jones is not responsible for killing Smith. 2
3. Against LP: Kane begins by pointing out two errors that defenders of LP make: Undetermined Uncaused: First, it does not follow from the fact that an event is undetermined that it has NO cause. Rather, it can be caused. It just does not have a DETERMINISTIC cause. For instance, imagine a pair of dice. Dice are not indeterministic, but imagine that they are (i.e., that the outcome after I throw them is truly a matter of chance). If the dice come up snake eyes (1 and 1), this outcome was not determined (they might have come up something else; e.g., 6 and 6). But, it WAS caused (namely, the cause was my throwing of the dice). Self-Forming Actions (SFA s): Kane points out that it doesn t need to be the case that ALL free actions are undetermined. Perhaps in the Stealing Smith s Car scenario, your decision IS determined by your deliberation. BUT, that doesn t rule out the possibility that many of the reasons that went into that decision WERE undetermined in the past (for instance, you could have had many undetermined free choices in the past that shaped how you would respond to reasons, or formed your desire to avoid doing wrong, etc.). In that case, your decision would still be one that you are ultimately responsible for, even if it was determined. So, Kane argues, there can be some actions that are undetermined (namely, SFA s), and these actions DO have causes (namely, US). But, how do we make undetermined choices? Kane points out that, in certain situations, there is a conflict in the will. For instance Interview: Johnson is a businesswoman on her way to an important interview. On the way, she sees someone in need, crying out for help on the side of the street. Two competing neural networks activate in Johnson s brain. She has competing wills, tugging at in two opposite directions: (a) She wants to go to her interview, because it is important. (b) She wants to stop to help the stranger, because she feels a moral obligation to do so. Kane says that, in such moments, quantum indeterminacy is stirred up at the neural level such that it is undetermined which of these two neural networks will win (or cross some activation threshold which leads to action), and which one does win is up to YOU. Objection: But, which way one decides in these SFA moments still seems to be a matter of luck or chance. For instance, if nothing determines whether you go to the interview or help the stranger in the example above, then you are not responsible for the outcome! 3
Reply: Kane believes that the objector is making the mistake of thinking that agents cannot be responsible for undetermined actions. But, that is clearly false. Imagine that the Luck Argument above is about the following scenario: Luck Gun: Jones is trying to assassinate Smith. Unfortunately, the only gun that Jones has is a luck gun. It is designed such that, when you pull the trigger, it is undetermined whether it will fire or not (e.g., when you pull the trigger, an electron detector detects the position of an electron, and will only fire if the electron is in a particular position). Jones aims the gun at Smith and pulls the trigger. Smith dies. Is Jones responsible for Smith s death in this case? Yes! BUT: Whether or not Jones killed Smith was NOT determined. Therefore, you CAN be responsible for undetermined actions. So, LP is false. Alternatively: Whether or not Jones succeeds is not at all determined by his powers, beliefs, dispositions, etc. Rather, it is a function of the Luck Gun. So, premise 4 of the Luck Argument is false. When we say Jones got lucky, we mean that he succeeded despite the probability or chance of failure (233). But, this does not entail that Jones is not responsible for Smith s death if he succeeds. Rebuttal: But, if THAT were how freedom worked, then indeterminism would merely be like some interference or background noise that sometimes prevented us from doing the things that we were trying to do. But, THAT S not what we mean by freedom. In the Luck Gun case, Jones is already SET on killing Smith. The only role of the indeterminacy is that it might thwart his will. In the Interview case, Johnson in NOT already set on a decision. The role of the indeterminacy is that her WILL ITSELF is undetermined. If Johnson tries to go to her interview, but ends up helping the stranger because of some indeterministic interference, THIS is not what we mean by freedom. True libertarian freedom (at least, in SFA scenarios) requires the ability to intentionally and voluntarily do A at time t, and the ability to intentionally and voluntary NOT do A at time t. (Kane calls this requirement LP*.) Kane s Refutation of LP*: It gets a bit complicated here, but let s go back to the Interview case. This is an instance of a self-forming action (SFA). Johnson has two competing wills. She wills to go to the interview, and she wills to help the stranger. She cannot do both. This stirs up some indeterminacy in her brain. 4
But, note that the indeterministic interference goes in both directions, and BOTH stem from HERSELF. Her will to go to the interview interferes with (and ultimately may thwart) her will to save the stranger. Similarly, her will to save the stranger interferes with (and ultimately may thwart) her will to go to the interview. Luck Gun+: Jones is trying to assassinate either Smith or Black. He has two luck guns. They are connected to one another, such that whether each gun fires is dependent on some feature of the other gun. Jones aims the guns, one at Smith and the other at Black, and pulls the triggers. Smith dies. Is Jones responsible for Smith s death in this case? Yes! But unlike in the original Luck Gun case where failing to kill Smith would NOT have been a product of Jones s will in Luck Gun+, if Jones does NOT kill Smith (and instead kills Black), this alternative will ALSO have flowed from his will. In short, Luck Gun+ is an example where EITHER action will be intentional and voluntary, and yet, which is chosen is undetermined. And Jones would be responsible for either outcome. Going back to Interview, WHICHEVER decision Johnson makes, EITHER WAY her action will have flowed forth from her will (since she has two COMPETING wills). So, she will be responsible either way. It is important that, in SFA scenarios, the indeterministic interference flows from one s self. Objection: But, it still seems like, ultimately, whatever she does is a product of chance. Whichever of her two competing wills wins is just randomly decided. Reply: Kane admits that there IS some element of randomness that generates the outcome here. But, it is confused to think that this makes the outcome NOT Johnson s. the whole process is her effort of will and it persists right up to the moment when the choice is made. There is no point at which the effort stops and chance takes over. She chooses as a result of the effort, even though she might have failed because of the indeterminism. (232-233) But, either way, she will endorse the outcome. She willed BOTH things. (This is importantly different from the Stealing Smith s Car example, where you would have been like wtf is happening to me!? if you found yourself stealing Smith s car contrary to all of your beliefs and desires. That decision was not an SFA). 5
[My own brainstorm on some further criticism: It almost sounds like compatibilism at the end, where you do something of your own free will so long as you identify with the action or approve of it (have a reflective second-order volition toward it, etc.). Is Kane s view just an indeterminism version of compatibilism? Even if Kane s view were possible, it seems like it would only happen in cases where one was 50-50% split between two choices (e.g., Buridan s Ass). Johnson has two competing wills during her SFA choice. But where did these competitors come from? Previous SFA choices? But, where did the competitors come from in those scenarios? At some point, it seems like we are driven back to genetics and upbringing (i.e., Strawson s worry, that we ultimately never get that initial foothold that is required for responsibility, is still a worry).] 6