University of Groningen The subjective conditions of human morality Vujosevic, Marijana IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below. Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Publication date: 2017 Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database Citation for published version (APA): Vujosevic, M. (2017). The subjective conditions of human morality: The relevance of Kant s moral psychology. [Groningen]: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. Copyright Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Take-down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum. Download date: 19-03-2019
The Subjective Conditions of Human Morality The Relevance of Kant s Moral Psychology
THE SUBJECTIVE CONDITIONS OF HUMAN MORALITY: The Relevance of Kant s Moral Psychology Copyright 2017 by Marijana Vujošević ISBN printed version: 978-90-367-9850-1 ISBN digital version: 978-90-367-9849-5 Research for this book was funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). Cover image by Ivana Brnada Typesetting by *studio Michal Slawiński, thesisprint.eu Printed by Proefschriftenprinten.nl
The Subjective Conditions of Human Morality The Relevance of Kant s Moral Psychology PhD thesis to obtain the degree of PhD at the University of Groningen on the authority of the Rector Magnificus Prof. E. Sterken and in accordance with the decision by the College of Deans. This thesis will be defended in public on Thursday 22 June 2017 at 9:00 hours by Marijana Vujošević born on 17 March 1979 in Novi Sad, Serbia
Supervisor Prof. P. Kleingeld Assessment Committee Prof. C. Bagnoli Prof. K. Bauer Prof. M. Lenz
For my parents
Table of Contents References to Kant s Writings 9 Acknowledgements 10 1. Introduction 13 1.1 The Relevance of Moral Psychology in Kant s Moral Theory 15 1.2 The Relevance of Kant s Conception of Conscience to Contemporary Moral Psychology 24 2. The Kantian Capacity for Moral Self Control: Abstraction at Two Levels 27 2.1 Introduction 29 2.2 Self-Control as Autocracy 31 2.3 Self-Control as Abstraction 39 2.3.1 Voluntary Distraction: The Rudimentary Level of Self Control 41 2.3.2 Abstraction in the Narrow Sense and its Multiple Functions 42 2.4 Conclusion 53 3. Kant s Conception of Moral Strength 55 3.1 Introduction 57 3.2 Kantian Moral Strength Thus Far 58 3.3 A Twofold Account of Moral Strength 62 3.3.1 Strength in Acting Acquired via Cultivation 62 3.3.2 Virtue as the Strength of Intention 67 3.4 Conclusion 76 4. Kant s Account of Moral Weakness as Lack of Moral Strength 77 4.1 Introduction 79 4.2 A Critical Look at Paradigmatic Solutions 81 4.3 An Attempt at a Novel Solution 84 4.3.1 Preliminary Clarifications 84 4.3.2 Is Weakness a Mere Lack of Moral Strength at the Level of Maxim Following? 86 4.3.3 Moral Weakness at the Level of Maxim Adoption 88 4.4 Conclusion 98
5. The Judge in the Mirror: Kant on Conscience 99 5.1 Introduction 101 5.2 Why is Kant s Account of Conscience a Puzzle? 102 5.3 Kantian Conscience, Special Moral Sense, Guilt and Relief 105 5.3.1 Conscience: Felt Clue or Special Moral Sense? 105 5.3.2 Conscience and the Self-Evaluative Sentiments 107 5.4 Conscience as One of the Conditions of Moral Receptivity 110 5.5 Conscience as Practical Reason and its Multiple Functions 115 5.6 Conclusion 121 6. Conscience as the Rational Deficit of Psychopaths 123 6.1 Introduction 125 6.2 A Kantian Conception of Conscience: Conscience as Moral Self-Appraisal 127 6.3 Psychopaths and Moral Self-Assessment 131 6.3.1 Unrealistic Self-Assessment and Self Evaluative Feelings 131 6.3.2 Incompetence in Judging Moral Issues 135 6.3.3 Insensitivity to Moral Considerations 140 6.3.4 Failure to Accept Responsibility 141 6.4 The Specific Rational Deficit of Psychopaths and its Implications for the Rationalism Sentimentalism Debate 143 Concluding Considerations 147 Summary 153 Samenvatting 161 About the author 169 References 171
References to Kant s Writings References are to: Kants gesammelte Schriften. Ausgabe der Preussischen (later Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Georg Reimer, subsequently Walter de Gruyter, 1900 ). Except where indicated otherwise, translations are based on the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, eds. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992 ). References to Kant s works are given using the following abbreviation scheme: A C C1 C2 C3 G ID LA LE LM MM MPTT NF NMM P R Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View Conflict of the Faculties Critique of Pure Reason Critique of Practical Reason Critique of the Power of Judgment Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Inaugural Dissertation Lectures on Anthropology Lectures on Ethics Lectures on Metaphysics The Metaphysics of Morals On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy Notes and Fragments Kant s Notes to the Metaphysics of Morals What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff? Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 9
Acknowledgements Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of this dissertation are slightly modified versions of the following articles: Vujošević, Marijana (2014) The Judge in the Mirror: Kant on Conscience. Kantian Review, 19, 449 474. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415414000181 Vujošević, Marijana (2015) Conscience as the Rational Deficit of Psychopaths. Philosophical Psychology 28, 1219 1241. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.983221 I would first like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Pauline Kleingeld. Thank you, Pauline, for giving me the opportunity to do what I always wanted to do. Thank you also for your helpful and thoughtful comments on numerous drafts of my papers. Finally, thank you for teaching me how to prepare work for publication and for encouraging me to improve my public speaking skills. Additionally, I would like to thank the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) for funding Pauline s project, Kant on Morality and Empirical Knowledge of Human Agency, to which my own research contributed. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to attend interesting conferences and to present my work in different countries; conferences in Toronto, Leuven and Oslo were particularly productive and enjoyable. The same holds for my research visit at Macquarie University (Sydney); Professor Jeannette Kennett, whose work inspired me to write on conscience dysfunction in individuals with psychopathy, has greatly helped me to develop my own view. Working in Groningen has been a pleasure, and I have been lucky to have wonderful officemates. Thank you Franziska for your warm hospitality and for making my days in Groningen special. Thank you Marc for your caring advice and for making me feel so welcome in our office. And thank you Paolo for your continual concern about my falling downstairs (again) when I was pregnant. Not only were my officemates great, but my other colleagues were wonderful as well. Thank you Paulien (Snellen) for your sincerity, for your comments on my papers, and for making me see how Kant looks when viewed from an Aristotelian perspective. Thank you Frank, Jochen and Markus for your valuable help with my papers. There are so many others I would like to acknowledge, including (but not limited to): Anita Willems-Veenstra, Daan Evers, Karolina Krzyżanowska, Leon Geerdink, Matthé Scholten, Nikki Hausen, Nynke Kathelyne Boef, Peter Timmerman, Sander Verhaegh, Stefan Sleeuw, Titus Stahl and Tom Bates. 10
I would also like to thank Sanne Stuur for her great friendship and wise advice, Carolyn Benson for invaluable help with my dissertation, and Ljiljana Bogičević for endless corrections to my Dutch. To Branka, Ivana, Sandra, Svetlana and Timea: it is a privilege to have you as friends (even though we are often far apart). I would like to thank my perfect mother for always being there for me and my father for encouraging me to study philosophy. I am also grateful to my sister and thrilled to have her here in the Netherlands. Special thanks go to Đura, who has always understood my passion for philosophy and is always ready to readjust his busy schedule. Special thanks also to Filip, who has completely changed my perspective on life. You amaze me every day, and, incredibly, you ve even cured me of my extreme fear of public speaking. Although I ve not slept for over three years, I wouldn t have it any other way. 11