Determinism and Free Will (4) Incompatibilism (1) Anti Free Will Arguments Incompatibilism is the view that a deterministic universe is completely at odds with the notion that persons have a free will. The hard determinists deny that any free will exists, and pessimistic incompatibilists (hard, hard indeterminists) deny both that the universe is determined and that free will exists. Among academic philosophers a minority (12%) hold this view: as against biologists/experimental psychologists/neuroscientists (14%) which proves nothing they may well be right in their view Hard Determinists Hume s arguments that Determinism can be reconciled with Free Will were controversial from the moment that they were written. Baron d Holbach (1770) Man, in running over, frequently without his own knowledge, often in despite of himself, the route which Nature has marked out for him, resembles a swimmer who is obliged to follow the current that carries him along; he believes himself a free agent, because he sometimes consents, sometimes does not consent, to glide with the stream; which, notwithstanding, always hurries him forward; he believes himself the master of his condition, because he is obliged to use his arms under the fear of sinking. It is still important to deal with the strong intuitive, psychological impression that we experience that we do have some control over the choices we make. For d Holbach we are a swimmers in a river (Determinism); we swim against the current for some time, until we tire; and then we will be carried downstream by the current. We are simply deluding ourselves. Other possible candidates for this false consciousness include Random behaviour Luck Bringing the question up to date, in 1998 a satirical film called The Truman Show was released. It was based on the idea that the cast were members of a long-running (13 years) reality TV show living in a gigantic film set. They believe that they are living quite normal lives but in fact the situations in which they find themselves are contrived and their lives are controlled, unknown to them, by the script writers of the show. Perhaps we are in that position. I am exaggerating the point but not attempting to trivialise it Hard Determinism is a wellestablished position to be taken seriously.
A Modern Hard Determinist Argument - The Consequence Argument - Peter van Inwagen 1983 If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of those things (including our present acts) are not up to us. Fatalism restated. Confirmation from Neuroscience? The Libet Experiments The field of neuroscience, studying - and most importantly measuring to gain hard facts mental activity within the brain is a rapidly developing field. It is at relatively early phase of development (the low foot hills of a mountain range) but its findings are extremely important and must be taken seriously The motor cortex is the region of the brain involved in the planning, control, and execution of voluntary movements, in particular, instructions for muscular movements. Since 1964 it has been known that, prior to any muscular activity there is a rise of electrical activity in the motor cortex of the brain which can be measured. This is known as Bereitschaftpotential (or Type II readiness potential) Benjamin Libet (1916 2007) was an American pioneering neuroscientist/experimental psychologist who in 1983 began a series of experiments to test neural activity of voluntary actions. Methods (from Internet) Researchers carrying out Libet s procedure would ask each participant to sit at a desk in front of the oscilloscope timer. They would affix the EEG electrodes to the participant s scalp, and would then instruct the subject to carry out some small, simple motor activity, such as pressing a button, or flexing a finger or wrist, within a certain time frame. No limits were placed on the number of times the subject could perform the action within this period. Libet's experiment: 0 repose 1 (-500 ms) EEG measures Readiness potential 2 (-200 ms) Person notes the position of the dot when decides 3 ( 0 ms) Act
During the experiment, the subject would be asked to note the position of the dot on the oscilloscope timer when "he/she was first aware of the wish or urge to act" (control tests with Libet's equipment demonstrated a comfortable margin of error of only -50 milliseconds). Pressing the button also recorded the position of the dot on the oscillator, this time electronically. By comparing the marked time of the button's pushing and the subject's conscious decision to act, researchers were able to calculate the total time of the trial from the subject's initial volition through to the resultant action. On average, approximately two hundred milliseconds elapsed between the first appearance of conscious will to press the button and the act of pressing it. Researchers also analyzed EEG recordings for each trial with respect to the timing of the action. It was noted that brain activity involved in the initiation of the action, primarily centered in the secondary motor cortex, and occurred, on average, approximately five hundred milliseconds before the trial ended with the pushing of the button. Libet found that although conscious awareness of the decision preceded the subject's finger motion by only 200 milliseconds, the rise in the Type II readiness potential was clearly visible at about 550 milliseconds before the flex of the wrist. The subject showed unconscious activity to flex about 350 milliseconds before reporting conscious awareness of the decision to flex. Indeed an earlier slow and very slight rise in the readiness potential can be seen as early as 1.5 seconds before the action. In the early 1980's the results from LIbet experiments were enthusiastically adopted by Hard Determinist incompatibilists to show that human free will does not exist. The fact which cannot be denied that there is a rise in RP caused by unconscious thought (where does this come from?) prior to the agent becoming conscious of the decision undoubtedly strengthens the case.
Sam Harris Free Will (2012) Sam Harris is a leading neuroscientist, the most prominent hard determinist and critic of the concept of free will. He has a first degree in Philosophy from Stanford followed by a PhD in Neuroscience from UCLA. He makes considerable use of evidence from neuroscience, in particular Libet s work. The main argument in this book an Amazon best seller and available for 5.50 in e-book format - is as follows: He gives prominence to genetic factors in human behaviour. He gives prominence to the high level of neural activity at the unconscious level as shown by the Libet experiments and other later studies He comments on the unstructured, random nature of most of our conscious thought He uses the standard Hard Determinist argument of the fact that we are in a trail of causation of which we may not be aware at the conscious level Our psychological impression that we do have an element of control he puts down to Luck The misfortunes of life such as disorder, crime or being a murder victim be puts down to Bad Luck Harris says the idea of free will "cannot be mapped on to any conceivable reality" and is incoherent. Science "reveals you to be a biochemical puppet." People's thoughts and intentions "emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control." Every choice we make is made as a result of preceding causes. These choices we make are determined by those causes, and are therefore not really choices at all. Critical Response on Interpretation of the Libet Experiments Neuroscience is a rapidly developing area of study but it is at an early stage of development. Libet s study concerned the linkage between the motor cortex and external muscles. It is focused on an action a willed decision and a simple muscular action. The results surprised Libet back in 1983 (results published in 1985) but the experiments focused on an act of will; they did not zero in on idea formation but clearly demonstrated that this probably took place at an unconscious level. Many further studies are ongoing in this field they confirm that much neural activity concerned with idea formation which takes place in many areas of the brain operates at the unconscious level this in itself is neither surprising nor controversial. But as of now (2018), they do NOT amount to an agreed theory of the brain. Libet himself did not agree with the way his work was interpreted. His views are available on the website. See Extract from Benjamin Libet Mind Time, Harvard University Press 2004
Hard Hard Determinism The Impossibilists This school of thought can be thought of as a Radical Fringe Galen Strawson was born in 1952 and so is 66, the son of P. F. Strawson, who we came across in the outline of Compatibilism, and is presently the Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas, Austin He takes a diametrically opposed view to his father and takes the position that Free Will is not possible on logical grounds. His position is based on what he terms the Basic Argument which he first proposed in 1984, which is outlined below 1. You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are 2. To be ultimately responsible for what you do, you have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are at least in certain crucial mental respects. 3. But you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all. 4. So you cannot be ultimately responsible for what you do. What links these statements is the term Causa Sui which means caused by itself. In formal logic causa sui is invalid because it sets up a circular argument or a regress. On the other hand all selfinduced thoughts are causa sui by definition - they appear (note not caused?) by themselves I have put up an article written by Galen Strawson in 1993 on the website where he expands his view. You can judge it yourself. His view is a minority position. Derk Pereboom is Dutch, born in 1957and so 61. He was educated in the US. He is Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University in upper NY State He maintains that due to general facts about the nature of the universe which he derives from a Dutch philosopher of the 17 th Century, Baruch Spinoza, we lack the free will required for the aspect of moral responsibility at issue in the traditional debate. That is, whether our actions are deterministically or indeterministically caused, we will not have the control in action required for our deserving to be blamed or punished for immoral decisions, and to be praised or rewarded for those that are morally exemplary. Guess who judges? Again this is a minority position Saul Slimansky is much younger; he was Galen Strawson s research student at Oxford while reading for a D.Phil. He is currently Professor of Philosophy at the University of Haifa in Israel Illusionism is the position that illusion often has a large and positive role to play in the issue of free will. In arguing for the importance of illusion, I claim that we can see why it is useful, that it is a reality, and why by and large it ought to continue to be so. Illusory beliefs are in place concerning free will and moral responsibility, and the role they play is largely positive. Humanity is fortunately deceived on the free will issue, and this seems to be a condition of civilized morality and personal value Free Will and Illusion (2002) OUP Cop out time minority position