WHY PLANTINGA FAILS TO RECONCILE DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND LIBERTARIAN FREE WILL Andrew Rogers KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Abstract In this paper I argue that Plantinga fails to reconcile libertarian free will with divine foreknowledge in his 1986 essay On Ockham s Way Out. Plantinga focuses on responding to an argument that they cannot be reconciled made by Jonathan Edwards in his 1754 book Freedom of the Will. I argue that Plantinga s objections to Edwards can be interpreted as either an appeal to backwards causation or as misreading Edwards metaphysical argument as an epistemic argument. Either way Plantinga s objections to Edwards can be met by combining Edwards argument with Peter VanInwagen s Consequence Argument. This combination makes it clearer why Plantinga s response does not refute Edwards argument. I conclude that Edwards argument still stands and that Plantinga has failed to reconcile libertarian free will with divine foreknowledge. Introduction In On Ockham s Way Out (1986), Plantinga attempts to refute an argument made by American theologian Jonathan Edwards in his 1754 book Freedom of the Will 1 that if past events are unchangeable and God s foreknowledge is a past event, 2 then God s foreknowledge is unchangeable and, therefore, we are not free to do other than what God has foreknown. I will combine Peter Van Inwagen s Consequence Argument against the compatibility of free will and determinism with Jonathan Edwards argument. I will argue that if Van Inwagen s Consequence Arguments proves the incompatibility of determinism and free will, 3 then it also proves the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and free will. I will also argue that this new formulation of Edwards original argument more clearly shows the failure of Plantinga s attempt to reconcile divine foreknowledge and libertarian free will in On Ockham s Way Out. First I will present Van Inwagen s Consequence Argument against the compatibility of determinism and free will. Then I will explain how this argument can be combined with Jonathan Edwards argument against the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and free will. I will conclude by showing how this new formulation of the argument deals with objections which Plantinga has made to Edwards original formulation of the argument. Peter Van Inwagen s Consequence Argument One of the better known arguments against the compatibility of free will and determinism is Peter Van Inwagen s Consequence Argument. I am primarily concerned with showing one thing about this argument: that if it can be used to prove the incompatibility of determinism and free will, then it can also be used to show the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and free will. 4 Van Inwagen has defined free will as, 1 Pg 113, Part 1: Section 12. Edwards (1754) 2 At least partly. 3 I will remain agnostic on whether Van Inwagen s original argument is successful in proving incompatibilism. I am not arguing for either compatibilism or incompatibilism, but only that if free will and determinism are incompatible, then free will and divine foreknowledge must also be incompatible. 4 I am not taking the position that Van Inwagen s Consequence Argument does in fact prove the incompatibility of determinism and free will. I am only arguing for the conditional that, if Van Inwagen s Consequence Arguments proves the incompatibility of determinism and free will, then it also proves the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and free will. Polymath: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Arts & Sciences, Vol. 4, No. 3, Summer 2014
Why Plantiga Fails to Reconcile the power or ability of agents to act otherwise than they in fact do. To deny that men have free will is to assert that what a man does do and what he can do coincide. And almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition for holding an agent responsible for an act is believing that that agent could have refrained from performing that act. 5 In one formulation of his Consequence Argument, 6 Peter Van Inwagen uses the example of a judge who could choose to raise his hand in a courtroom in order to revoke a harsh sentence that has been handed down on a certain criminal. He argues that if the future (P) is that the Judge (J) did not raise his hand and if this future has already been determined by the conjunction of the past (P₀) and the laws of nature (L), then the judge cannot choose to raise his hand because he would be rendering false either the past or the laws of nature. P₀ stands for some point in the past, L stands for the laws of nature, and P stands for some point in the future. J stands for a judge who could revoke a harsh sentence by raising his hand at time T which is the time at P. Van Inwagen says that the P entailed by P₀ and L included the judge not raising his hand. 7 (1) If Determinism is true, then the conjunction of P₀ and L entails P. (2) If J had raised his hand at T, then P would be false. (3) If (2) is true, then if J could have raised his hand at T, J could have rendered P false. (4) If J could have rendered P false, and if the conjunction of P₀ and L entails P, then J could have rendered the conjunction of P₀ and L false. (5) If J could have rendered the conjunction of P₀ and L false, then J could have rendered L false. (6) J could not have rendered L false. (7) If Determinism is true, J could not have raised his hand at T. 8 The fact that (5) doesn t really follow from (4) has already been mentioned by others 9, but the argument can easily be salvaged by changing (5) to, If J could have rendered the conjunction of P₀ and L false, then J could have rendered either P₀ or L false. And changing (6) to J could not have rendered either P₀ or L false. Clearly, J could not change either the past or the laws of nature, so the argument still appears to be sound. Jonathan Edwards Divine Foreknowledge Argument Jonathan Edwards made a similar argument in Freedom of the Will (1754), where he pointed out that if God had ever had any belief about the future actions of any person at any time in the past then it would be impossible for that person to do other than what God believed he would do without rendering God s belief false. Jonathan Edwards argues that it follows from divine foreknowledge that all future actions are necessary and, therefore, that determinism follows from divine foreknowledge. He uses this to argue that if free will is incompatible with determinism, then free will is also incompatible with divine foreknowledge. Here is Edwards original argument: 1. I observed before, in explaining the nature of necessity, that in things which are past, their past existence is now necessary: having already made sure of existence, 'tis now impossible, that it should be otherwise than true, that that thing has existed. 5 Pg 188. Van Inwagen (1974). 6 Van Inwagen has put forward at least four different formulations of this argument. I am using what I consider both the strongest and the least technical version. 7 This is actually closer to the version in Gallois (1977). I am using Gallois version because I believe it is stronger. 8 Pg 191 Van Inwagen (1975). 9 Gallois (1977). 28
Polymath: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Arts & Sciences 2. If there be any such thing as a divine foreknowledge of the volitions of free agents, that foreknowledge, by the supposition, is a thing which already has, and long ago had existence; and so, now its existence is necessary; it is now utterly impossible to be otherwise, than that this foreknowledge should be, or should have been. 3. 'Tis also very manifest, that those things which are indissolubly connected with other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary. As that proposition whose truth is necessarily connected with another proposition, which is necessarily true, is itself necessarily true. To say otherwise, would be a contradiction; it would be in effect to say, that the connection was indissoluble, and yet was not so, but might be broken. If that, whose existence is indissolubly connected with something whose existence is now necessary, is itself not necessary, then it may possibly not exist, notwithstanding that indissoluble connection of its existence.-whether the absurdity ben 't glaring, let the reader judge. 4. 'Tis no less evident, that if there be a full, certain and infallible foreknowledge of the future existence of the volitions of moral agents, then there is a certain infallible and indissoluble connection between those events and that foreknowledge; and that therefore, by the preceding observations, those events are necessary events; being infallibly and indissolubly connected with that whose existence already is, and so is now necessary, and can't but have been. 10 I feel that rewording Edwards argument would be helpful because some of the language used in these discussions has changed and also because combining it with Van Inwagen s formalized Consequence Argument would make Edwards argument clearer. Jonathan Edwards Consequence Argument Version 1 Omniscience = The doctrine that there is a god who has complete foreknowledge and that this god s beliefs cannot be false. B = God s belief at time T₁ that P would occur at time T₂. P = J not raising his hand at time T₂. (1) If Omniscience is true, then B P. (2) If J had raised his hand at T₂, then P would be false. (3) If (2) is true, then if J could have raised his hand at T₂, J could have rendered P false. (4) If J could have rendered P false, and if B P, then J could have rendered B false. (5) J could not have rendered B false. (Doctrine of Omniscience). (6) If Omniscience is true, J could not have raised his hand at T₂. Plantinga gave a response to Edwards argument in his 1986 paper On Ockham s Way Out. He attempts to avoid Edwards conclusion by distinguishing between hard facts and soft facts and arguing that God s past belief about a future event is a soft fact and therefore not necessary. However, it seems that Plantinga s response misses the point of Edward s argument; whether we call God s beliefs at time T₁ soft facts or hard facts does nothing to change the conclusion that no person can have the power to render God s T₁ beliefs false when he acts at T₂ without contradicting divine omniscience. Plantinga says that, Edwards argument fails because, essentially, God s having known a certain proposition is not, in general, a hard fact about the past; but only hard facts about the past are plausibly thought to be accidentally necessary. 11 Edwards argument appeals to God having a certain mental state at a certain moment in the past. Calling the mental state a soft fact does nothing to get Plantinga out of Edwards snare. In fact 10 Pg 113, Part 1: Section 12. Edwards (1754) 11 Pg 261, Plantinga (1986) 29
Why Plantiga Fails to Reconcile Edwards argument still works even if Plantinga means to imply that there could be backward causation in these soft fact cases. Of course, Plantinga doesn t explicitly argue for backwards causation so perhaps his point was that we were just wrong about what God had believed earlier. Plantinga could have meant that if an agent chooses x instead of y, then God must have believed ahead of time that the agent was going to choose x even if we had already stipulated that God had believed that the agent would choose y. But if he is arguing that we were wrong about God s initial belief state, then I think he is again missing Edward s point; Edwards wasn t claiming that he, Jonathan Edwards, had personal knowledge of God s past beliefs. Edwards was merely saying that God had some past belief about the future choice of an agent (which Plantinga would have to affirm if he believes in divine foreknowledge) and that whatever that belief was in the past, it would need to come true in the future or else the agent would be rendering God s past belief false. Either way Plantinga s response fails to address Edward s argument. If Plantinga intended to argue for backwards causation we can restate Edwards argument in a way that precludes this response: Jonathan Edwards Consequence Argument Version 2 Omniscience = The doctrine that there is a god who has complete foreknowledge and that this god s beliefs cannot be false. B₁ = God s belief at time T₁ that at time T₂ subject S will choose x B₂ = God s belief at T₂ that at T₁ God believed B₁ (1) At time T₂ God has the belief B₂ that at time T₁ God had the belief B₁ that at time T₂ subject S will choose x. (2) If subject S does not choose x at time T₂, then God s belief at T₂ (B₂) is false. (3) If subject S has the power at T₂ to not choose x, then S has the power to render God s belief (B₂) false. (4) S cannot render B₂ false. (Doctrine of Omniscience). (6) If Omniscience is true, then S cannot have the power at T₂ to not choose x. Jonathan Edwards Consequence Argument Version 3 We can also formulate this argument as a conditional proof for B x (If God has belief B, then it must be the case that subject S choose action x at T₂). The purpose of this would be to show that God believing something will happen makes it necessary that that thing happen. O = God is omniscient B₁ = God s belief at T₁ that at T₂ S will choose x B₂ = God s belief at T₂, that at T₁ God had the belief that at T₂ S will choose x B = B₂ is true x = S chooses x at T₂ (1) B (Assume for Conditional Proof that it is the case that God s belief B₂ that at time T₁ God had the belief that at time T₂ S will choose x is true.) (2)~x (assume for Indirect Proof that it is not the case that S choose x at T₂) (3) O B (if it is true that God is omniscient, then it must be the case that God s belief B₂ is true via definition of omniscient ) (4) ~x ~B (if S does not choose x at T₂, then it must be the case that God s belief B₂ is false via definition of x and B ) (5) ~B ~O (If God s belief B₂ is false, then it must be the case that God is not omniscient via transposition on (3)) (6) ~x ~O (If S does not choose x at T₂, then it must be the case that God is not omniscient via Hypothetical Syllogism on (4) and (5)) (7) O (via Doctrine of Omniscience). 30
Polymath: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Arts & Sciences (8) ~O (It is not the case that God is omniscient via Modus Ponens on (2) and (6)) (9) O&~O (It is the case that God is omniscient and it is not the case that God is omniscient via Conjunction of (7) and (8)). (10) ~~x (since (9) is a contradiction we can conclude that it is not the case that it is not the case that S chose action x at T₂ via Indirect Proof on (2) through (9)) (11) x (It is the case that S choose action x at T₂ via Double Negation on (10)). (12) B x (via Conditional Proof on (1) through (11)). If God is omniscient, then he must know all things at time T₂, including all of his past beliefs. This means that even if we allow for backward causation, we will still end up with a contradiction between God s omniscience and his current belief state in the case that the agent picks the opposite of that which God remembers having had foreknowledge of. The person arguing for the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and libertarian free will could perhaps object to this conclusion by arguing that the future is entailed by the past in a very different way in the deterministic worldview alluded to by Van Inwagen in his original Consequence Argument than in their worldview. However, I think they have failed to show how there is any real difference. They may say that P follows logically from P₀&L in the deterministic worldview mentioned by Van Inwagen. Of course, it needs to be proven that it does not follow logically in their own divine foreknowledge worldview and I maintain that Edwards has shown that it does follow logically in their worldview as well. They both follow logically because in both cases if the antecedent is true, then the consequent must be true: Under determinism If P₀&L, then it must be the case that P and under divine foreknowledge If B (God s belief), then it must be the case that x (future action that God believed would occur). As Jonathan Edwards says at the end of his original formulation of the argument, From what has been observed it is evident, that the absolute decrees of God are no more inconsistent with human liberty, on account of any Necessity of the event, which follows from such decrees, than the absolute Foreknowledge of God. Because the connexion between the event and certain Foreknowledge, is as infallible and indissoluble, as between the event and an absolute decree. That is, it is no more impossible, that the event and decree should not agree together, than that the event and absolute Knowledge should disagree. 12 REFERENCES Edwards, Jonathan. Freedom of the Will. Vancouver: Eremitical Press (2009). Copyright (1754). Gallois, Andre. Van Inwagen on Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Studies Vol. 32, No. 1. July. pp. 99-105. (1977). Plantinga, Alvin. On Ockham s Way Out. Faith and Philosophy. Vol. 3 No. 3 July. (1986). Van Inwagen, Peter. The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Studies 27 pp. 185-199 (1975). 12 Pg 116, Part 1: Section 12. Edwards (1754) 31