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1 * PLEASE DO NOT CITE * The role of religion in Menachem Begin s foreign policy decision making vis-àvis the Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee ( ) 1.0 Introduction The foreign policy of Israel s sixth Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, was pinnacled by his signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978, and his authorisation of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in The former, signed alongside Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, paved the way for a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, conditioned on Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, and proposed a framework for addressing the Palestinian problem in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (the latter never fully implemented, however). The invasion of Lebanon, or Operation Peace for Galilee as Begin termed it, conversely marked the beginning of the First Lebanon War and with it, an already strenuous relationship between the two neighboring states intensified. Existing analyses surrounding the motives behind both events are plentiful. Telhami (1990), for example, explains the Camp David Accords in rationalist and systematic terms, referencing various geopolitical conditions which warranted a peaceful border with a militarily strong Egypt that, given its recent history of powerful leadership under pan-arabist Nasser, held more political leverage than any other Arab state. Such geopolitical conditions included unfolding unrest in Iran, Israel s sole regional ally, which would eventually culminate in the Islamic Revolution and subsequent severing of diplomatic relations with Israel. Others, such as Rowland (1985), have explained Begin s behaviour vis-à-vis the Accords, specifically the part addressing the Palestinian problem, with reference to ideological factors, arguing that it was Begin s ideological conviction that Jews inhabit all of Eretz Yisrael which fostered his refusal to relinquish Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza. With regards to Operation Peace for Galilee, analysts such as Shlaim (2007) and Maoz (2006) agree that the invasion, which officially sought to push PLO factions 40 kilometers north of the Israel- Lebanon border in order to protect Israeli civilians in the Galilee region, was motivated by Israeli aims to destroy PLO infrastructure; install a Christian Lebanese, pro-israel government; and expel the Syrian army from Lebanon. Ultimately, such measures were thought to foster conditions for a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon, which would increase Israel s security in the region. In addition to serving such strategic purposes, Operation Peace for Galilee was the culmination of years of tension and clashes between Israel and factions in Lebanon, one of the most prominent one being the Battle of Zahleh in April of 1981 between Israeli Defense Forces and Syrian Forces in the Christian Lebanese city of Zahleh. The purpose of this chapter is not to dispute any such analyses, as they surely capture important aspects of the motivations behind both the Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee. Rather, the aim is to explore the role(s) that religion played in those contexts. The chapter does so by referencing extensive primary material retrieved through archival and online sources, which gives insight to the private correspondence, meetings, Knesset speeches and public discourse surrounding each of the foreign policy outcomes. Looking at such a variety of sources makes it possible to identify in which contexts and when religion figured in the decision making process.

2 and, on that basis, derive its role(s) in the foreign policy outcomes in question. It is, of course, impossible to specify religion s roles with absolute precision, firstly because of lacking access to decision makers innermost thought processes, but also because religion presumably did not operate in complete isolation - variables rarely do. Nonetheless, religion features significantly in the decision making processes and public discourse surrounding both the Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee and its role in those contexts thus merits detailed study, however suboptimal its findings. The analysis is conducted with a focus on Menachem Begin, attributing significant influence to his personality and beliefs on the decision making processes and ultimately the Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee. As the chapter will demonstrate, that meant a stubborn and ardent insistence on Israeli sovereignty over Eretz Yisrael, and secure borders with Egypt and Lebanon to ensure Israel s security. Despite his influential leadership, Begin, as the leader of a democratic state and member of the international community, worked within a set of structures that would potentially constrain or support his preferred courses of action. Most notably, these structures included the Israeli parliament (Knesset), international opinion, domestic public opinion and external geopolitical environment. The chapter considers the influence of such structures in order to situate the main analysis, religion s role in foreign policy, within a comprehensive framework. Doing so mitigates the risk of attributing unwarranted importance to the main variable under study. The chapter proceeds in five main parts. First, Begin s worldview is outlined, as it was on this that he based his foreign policy doctrine. It shows that Begin s worldview was premised in large part on his religious convictions, and argues that a connection can be drawn between the two. Second, the chapter discusses religion s role in Begin s decision making during the Camp David Accords, particularly its Peace in the Middle East framework. It demonstrates how Begin s religious convictions led to a set of principled and causal beliefs that, taken together, served as a roadmap which guided his decision to oppose any concessions that would relinquish Israeli sovereignty over those territories. Third, the chapter looks at decision making processes and public discourse surrounding Operation Peace for Galilee. Given an overwhelming focus on security and absence of religion in those decision making processes, the latter are outlined with a view to highlight their contrast to Begin s public discourse surrounding the invasion, as well as their contrast to the decision making behind the Camp David Accords, in which religion was a driving force. This is done with a view to argue religion, by and large, played an instrumental role vis-a-vis Operation Peace for Galilee. Fourth, the chapter evaluates the potential constraints, imposed by domestic and international structures, that Begin worked under in the respective contexts, concluding however that none of them significantly constrained Begin s preferred course of action, either due to his disregard of them (international opinion) or overlapping interests (Knesset and domestic opinion). Fifth and finally, the chapter discusses religion s role in foreign policy by drawing on empirical findings from the Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee case studies. On this basis, it argues that religion takes on not one, essentialist and ahistorical role, but rather distinct roles depending on the context in which it operates; as such, the chapter concludes that the relationship between religion and foreign policy is a pragmatic one. 2.0 Liberation of Eretz Yisrael and making peace: discerning the religious premise of Begin s foreign policy doctrine.

3 In the words of Begin s longtime friend and advisor, Harry Hurwitz, Menachem was above all, [...] a man of immense and supreme faith 1, whose constant prayer was Be ezrat Haskem - With the help of the Almighty. 2 Another of his colleagues, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, has made a similar judgement of Begin s relationship with God in stating that Begin s deep and unswerving religious commitments [had] always been a guiding factor in his consciousness and in his pursuit of unswerving goals. 3 Scholars dedicated to studying the life and politics of Begin have reached similar conclusions. Amongst them, Dr. Arnon Lammfrom from the Israeli State Archives, who comments that although Begin was not religious in an explicit way [as] he was not a Rabbi; his soul was religious. 4 Most telling of all, perhaps, are Begin s personal reflections on his relationship with God, for example his many references to private moments of prayer in his autobiographical memoir White Nights: the Story of a Prisoner in Russia (1977). The fact that Begin held deep religious convictions is, as these excerpts suggest, not disputed; whether and how religion guided his foreign policy is a different matter and a natural relationship between the two should not be assumed without critical evaluation. Section 2.0 of the chapter outlines Begin s worldview, as it was on this that he based his foreign policy doctrine. Subsequently, the section evaluates the extent to which Begin s worldview was premised upon his religious convictions. Determining the connection between the two aids the analysis of religion s role in the Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee in sections 3.0 and 4.0, as both of those foreign policy outcomes developed from Begin s worldview. 2.1 Begin s worldview Begin s worldview consisted, in many ways, of the narrative adopted by all Zionists: that the Jewish people, expelled from its homeland in Eretz Yisrael by the Romans in the 6th century and forced to live in persecution and fear on foreign lands, was redeemed with the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948, which occurred as a result of the undeniable relationship between Jews and their homeland. Beyond this basic premise, Begin differed from, for example, his Labour Zionist predecessors in his dedication to territorial maximalist policies, which he insisted extend throughout Eretz Yisrael. 5 His ideological specificity was seen prior to Israel s establishment, too: in his activities as commander of the paramilitary group, Irgun, he was dedicated, by virtue of his staunch support of Revisionist Zionism, to liberating Mandatory Palestine and establishing a Jewish state on that territory. 6 Interlinked with his territorial maximalist policies, and arguably the reasoning behind them, was his vision that redemption of the Jewish people would necessarily come from its return to Eretz Yisrael. Staunch in his belief that Jews were a courageous, grand people, and that this grandeur had diminished through millennia in exile, Begin believed that Jews would regain their inherent strength through reconnecting with the Land of Israel. Rowland captures this overarching 1 Harry Hurwitz (1977) Menachem Begin, Johannesburg: The Jewish Herald Pty. Ltd., p Ibid. page 4 3 The American Presidency Project (2013) Visit of Prime Minister Menahem Begin of Israel Remarks of the President and the Prime Minister at the Welcoming Ceremony. Available from: Accessed: 1 December, Interview with Dr. Arnon Lammfrom at the Israeli State Archives, July 10, Other scholars with similar views on Begin include Robert C. Rowland (1985) and Frank Gervasi (1979). 5 His predecessors, contrastingly, subscribed to the view that (all of) Israeli-captured territory of the 1967 war, should be used for bargaining power during peace talks. 6 This approach diverged from that of the World Zionist Organisation, which sought to establish a Jewish homeland, through a less military forceful approach. Sofer, Sasson (1988) Begin: An Autonomy of Leadership, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p

4 worldview excellently by the very title of his book: The Myth of Redemption Through Return. Myth, in this context, serves specifically to highlight that the content of Begin s worldview was constructed by subjective interpretations of historical and contemporary events that, whether true or false, served as absolute truth for him. 7 This is not to say that there were not dimensions of Begin s worldview that were less than strictly ideological. Sofer notes that reality, for Begin, existed on two levels: one ideological as detailed above, and another resting on the rationality of political realism. 8 This complexity in his worldview is perhaps nowhere better illustrated, than in Begin s personal letter of August 4, 1980 to Sadat in which he writes, Jerusalem, in its entirety, is the indivisible capital of Israel, a city reunited and indivisible for all generations [ ] To the Jewish people Jerusalem is not only holy; it is their history for three millennia, their heart, their dream, the visible symbol of their national redemption. You assure me, Mr. President, that you are for the unity of Jerusalem, but in your speech at the National Press Club in Washington, a few months ago, you demanded that Eastern Jerusalem can be put under Arab sovereignty. This is a contradiction in terms. Two sovereignties over one city mean its re-partition. Impossible. [ ] The same applies to our settlements in Judea, Samaria, the Gaza District, and the Golan Heights. They are legal and they are an integral part of our national security. None of them will ever be removed. 9 In this excerpt, Begin speaks about Israel s claim to Jerusalem with reference to the city s religious meaning for the Jewish people ( Jerusalem is not only holy ); its historical importance ( it is [the Jews ] history for three millennia); its legal status ([the settlements] are legal ); and finally, its implications for Israel s security ( [the settlements] are an integral part of our national security ). The tension between ideology and political realism, pointed to above, is clear from this passage. The contrasting dimensions of Begin s worldview - ideology and political realism - reflected in his foreign policy which was characterised by two main tenets: liberation of the historic Jewish homeland, Eretz Yisrael; and peace with Israel s neighbouring states to ensure Israel s security. The best way of achieving these aims, according to Begin, was through diplomacy and use of force, as is summed up in the excerpt from Begin s discourse below: This ought to be the rule for us: every nation should try to achieve its national goal by diplomatic means, as far as is possible. The use of force, if right is on your side, is not forbidden. At times it is even obligatory Rowland, Robert C. (1985) The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin: The Myth of Redemption Through Return, Maryland: University Press of America 8 Sofer, Sasson (1988) Begin: An Autonomy of Leadership, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p Letters following Begin s Hospitalization, August 2-27, 1980 in Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p Begin cited in Sofer, Sasson (1988) Begin: An Autonomy of Leadership, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 139

5 Despite the many instances where political realism can be discerned in Begin s discourse, analysts such as Sofer (1988) argue that it is evident from reviewing his discourse and actions, that in Begin s [ ] profound inner contradiction, the romantic element has frequently undermined the realistic political assumptions [ ] Begin s general outlook, the basic principles of the policies for which he strove throughout his life, rested upon principles of natural right or historical right, which are totally beyond proof. 11 The triumph, if you will, of Begin s ideology can be seen in his unequivocal reference to the West Bank 12 by its Biblical names of Judea and Samaria, even when that territory was discussed in a strictly non-ideological context. This is clear from looking at a personal correspondence between Begin and Sadat, in which Sadat wrote, voicing specific points of disagreement between him and Begin, that It goes without saying, also, that these actions contradict the provision of the Fourth Geneva Convention which prohibits the annexation of occupied territories. 13 Begin, specifically addressing Sadat s point above, replied that The Egyptian delegate votes for a resolution demanding that by November 15, Israel withdraw from Judea, Samaria (my language), the Gaza District, the Golan Height and Jerusalem. 14 Begin s insistence to refer to the West Bank by its Biblical name, despite the non-ideological context in which the area is discussed, implies, if nothing else, a constant presence (and thus importance) of Begin s ideology. 2.2 The religious constituent of Begin s worldview From this overview it is possible to discern a spiritual worldview premised on Begin s idea of Jewish redemption through return to Eretz Yisrael. The worldview has a spiritual character not necessarily because is tied to religion (Judaism); but rather by being a worldview that saw Israel and the Jewish people pre-determined to fulfill a specific destiny. This comes, very possibly, as a result of Begin s time in jail in the early 1940s 15 during which he was confronted with immeasurable human suffering 16, which led him to the conclusion that faith is the sole spiritual 11 Sofer, Sasson (1988) Begin: An Autonomy of Leadership, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p As is the territory between Israel s internationally recognised borders and Jordan officially labelled. 13 Letters following Begin s Hospitalization, August 2-27, 1980 in Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p Ibid. p Begin was jailed by Russian soldiers on the charge of being the chairman of Betar, a Revisionist paramilitary youth movement, in Poland. 16 Letters following Begin s Hospitalization, August 2-27, 1980 in Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p. 191.

6 mode of withstanding [human suffering]. 17 He was very much of the persuasion that time and destiny would ultimately resolve any national and personal predicament; a belief that was, in part, confirmed to him by the establishment of Israel in 1948, following millennia of Jewish persecution in the Diaspora, and not least the atrocities of the Holocaust. The spiritual character of Begin s worldview, interesting as it may be in the study of ideas and foreign policy, does not lend itself directly to the very specific study of religion s impact on foreign policy. A similarly general and spiritual view could be held by an irreligious individual, and the two must thus not be conflated. Therefore, when considering religion as a worldview and its impact as such on foreign policy, it is necessary to identify strands within that view that are explicitly religious. In other words: discern the extent to which Begin s worldview derives from his religious conviction. It is, of course, impossible to determine this with precision, due to lacking access to Begin s thought processes. Nonetheless, it is possible to detect, through various discourse excerpts, that Begin reasoned his aspiration to return to Eretz Yisrael, in large part, on the grounds of religion. In a public prayer at the Wailing Wall following Israel s (re)capture of Jerusalem in 1967, Begin spoke the following words: We shall yet come to Hebron, the city of the Four Couples, and there we shall prostrate ourselves at the graves of the Patriarchs of our people. We shall yet be on the way to Euphrath as thou comest to Bethlehem of Judah. We shall pray at the Tomb of Rachel and we shall bring to mind the prayer of the prophet: A voice is heard in Raman, weiling and bitter lamentation, Rachel weeping for her children, she refuseth to be comforted for her children, for they are not. Refrain thy voice from weeping and thine eyes from tears for there is a reward for thy labour, saith the Lord, and they shall return from the land of the enemy. And there is hope for thy latter end and thy children shall return to their borders. 18 In this passage, Begin expresses his vision that Jews will go to (presumably inhabit) Hebron and Bethlehem of Judah, both which cities are part of Eretz Yisrael. More interestingly, Begin does more than just pray for Jewish inhabitation of those cities; he refers to the city of the Four Couples and the Tomb of Rachel - holy places of the ancient Israeli state - to highlight an ancient religious bond to the land. The part of Begin s worldview which aspires to a return to Eretz Yisrael, then, seems to be rationalised through religious Jewish ties to this land, as opposed to, say, strictly historical ones. The same logic is found in less religiously charged settings too: in his response to Sadat s speech delivered to the Knesset on November 20, 1977, in which Sadat referred to the West Bank and Gaza as the Occupied Territories 19, and called for Israel s presumed understanding of the need to create 17 Ibid. p Begin addresses Jewish Leaders in New York, September 20, 1978 Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p The Camp David Accords and Related Documents (1998) Beer-Sheva: The Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East Studies and Diplomacy, p. 39

7 a Palestinian state, given the Jews moral and legal justification to set up a national home on a land that did not all belong to [them] 20, Begin said: [ ] it is my duty to tell our guest and the peoples watching us and listening to our words about the link between our people and this land. [ ] No sir, we did not take over any strange land. We returned to our homeland. The link between our people and this land is eternal. It was created at the dawn of human history. It was never severed. In this land we established our civilization. Here our prophets spoke those holy words you cited this very day; there the Kings of Judah and Israel prostrated themselves; here we became a nation; here we established our Kingdom and, when we were exiled from our country by the force that was exercised against us, even when we were far away we did not forget this Land, not even for a single day; we prayed for it; we longer for it; we have believed in our return to it 21 Here, Begin speaks of the Jews eternal link to the Land, a choice of word which has a religious rather than historically factual connotation. Similarly, he speaks of prophets who spoke holy words on the Land of Israel, a land that Jews for millennia subsequently, prayed that they would return to. Begin expressed a similar view in his address to the Egyptian people on November 1977, demonstrates: It is in the Holy Koran, in Surah 5, that our right to this land was stated and sanctified. May I read to you this eternal surah. Recall when Moses said to his people, O my people, remember the goodness of Allah towards you when He appointed prophets among you. O my people, enter the Holy Land which Allah hath written down as yours. 22 Taken together with the previous examples, this excerpt indicates that Begin s worldview which stipulated a return to Eretz Yisrael is upheld by the Jews religious ties to that land. The fact that his expression of it held constant across very different settings (public religious audience, the Knesset, and the Egyptian public) makes his dedication to it all the more tenable. What is more, Begin was an unusually outspoken, stubborn and assiduous diplomatic figure, which reflects in his private and public statements alike. Various accounts from Begin s negotiation colleagues confirm this; for example, Egypt s Foreign Minister, Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, who in his first-hand account of the negotiations at Camp David notes, Every hour brought reports of further concessions. Begin insisted on deletion of all reference to the non-admissibility of acquiring territory by force, telling Carter that if he had to sign or cut off his two hands he still would not sign it. This resulted in the deletion of the reference to this 20 Ibid., p Ibid., p Begin broadcasts directly to the Egyptian People, November Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p. 8.

8 cardinal principle of Resolution 242. [ ] In return for the word full that Carter had added to the phrase autonomy, Begin insisted on inserting the phrase administrative council between brackets before the phrase the self-governing authority so as to minimize its jurisdiction to administrative questions to the exclusion of the legislative and judicial. 23 Whilst it may have made negotiations taxing for his colleagues, Begin s outspoken and assiduous personality enables the development of good analysis in that his discourse can be viewed as a largely accurate representation of his views and reasoning processes. Section 2.0 has showed that Begin s worldview, premised on Begin s idea that Jewish redemption would occur through a return to Eretz Yisrael, reflected in a foreign policy doctrine that was characterised by two main tenets: liberation of the historic Jewish homeland, Eretz Yisrael; and peace with Israel s neighbouring states to ensure Israel s security. With reference to discursive excerpts and Begin s personality, the section has also shown that Begin s religious conviction served as the basis for his worldview. By implication, it is possible to discern a connection, however indirect, between Begin s religious conviction and his foreign policy for which it served as premised. How religion s role played out is the subject matter of sections 3.0 and 4.0, which explore that question in relation to the Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee. One important disclaimer before proceeding with the analysis: however apparent the relationship between Begin s religious conviction, worldview and foreign policy; religion is unlikely to have operated as an independent variable, if for no other reason than the complexities of the human mind. Existing studies dealing with similarly unquantifiable concepts such as identity and culture have affirmed this conundrum: in their book Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (2002), which comprises of six country-specific case studies and their respective authors take on how national and state identities affect foreign policy, Telhami and Barnett make the informed assertion that identity cannot be identified as operating like a master variable which exerts direct causal effect(s) on a foreign policy decision. 24 Religion, a variable that is arguably less compound than that of identity, should not be expected to exert a strictly causal relationship either. 3.0 Religion and the Camp David Accords: providing a road map for the decision making process This is, Ladies and Gentlemen, the third greatest day in my life. The first was May 14, 1948, when our flag was hoisted [ ] The second day was when Jerusalem became one city and our [ ] soldiers [ ] kissed the ancient stones of the remnants of the Western Wall, destined to protect the chosen place of God s glory. [ ] This is the third [greatest] day in my life. I have signed a treaty of peace with our neighbor, with Egypt. The heart is full and overflowing Kamel, Mohamed Ibrahim (1986) The Camp David Accords: A Testimony, London: KPI Ltd., p Telhami, Shibley & Barnett, Michael N. (2002) Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, New York: Cornell University Press, p Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt. Protocols, Annexes, Letters, Memorandum of Agreement between Israel and the United States, Addresses of Presidents Carter and Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin, 26 March 1979, Volumes 4-5:

9 These words were spoken by Begin, following his signing of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, on the lawn of the White House in Washington on March 26, 1979, alongside signatory Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat and, witness, US President Jimmy Carter. The peace treaty was a result of negotiations preceding and following the Camp David Accords, signed and witnessed by the same three parties some six months prior. A two-framework agreement, the accords comprised of plans for Peace in the Middle East and the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. The former agreement addressed the need to solve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects 26 by allowing for full autonomy to Palestinian Arabs living in the West Bank and Gaza, while providing for Israeli forces to remain in specified locations during a transitional period of five years. The final status of the West Bank and Gaza was to be determined through future negotiations. The latter agreement called for full withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Sinai Peninsula, granting full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty over that territory, and leading to the establishment of a binding peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, including diplomatic relations. 27 Throughout Begin s political career, 28 first as leader of the opposition and, from May of 1977, as Prime Minister, he expressed an unequivocal commitment to territorial maximalist policies vis-à-vis Eretz Yisrael, or Land of Israel, 29 which he interpreted to comprise of the territory of British Mandate in Palestine (that is, roughly, present day Israel, Jordan, Gaza and the West Bank). 30 He was a staunch believer in Jews right to inhabit Eretz Yisrael based on their historical and religious ties to that land; an opinion which he raised publicly and privately on countless occasions. His agreement, then, to sign the Camp David Accords, which not only demonstrated friendly relations with Sadat, a man whose country had been at war with Israel five times during the preceding thirty years and was a staunch critic of Israel s mere existence; but also required territorial sacrifice on Israel s part, came as a shock to many, particularly Israeli religious movements. To the neutral observer, too, Begin s decision to sign the Camp David Accords would seem intuitively at odds with the territorial maximalist policies, which he had hitherto so vehemently promoted. A meticulous appraisal of the Camp David Accords suggests that this was not the case. With regards to the Framework II which called for an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty conditional on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Sinai, Begin s compliance did not contradict his ideological stance, as the Sinai Peninsula, unlike Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, did (does) not constitute the Biblical promised land. While it is true that Begin, as leader of the opposition, disapproved of ruling Labour s interim talks with Egypt and the United States which concerned the potential 26 Text of the Camp David Accords The Camp David Accords and Related Documents (1998) Beer-Sheva: The Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East Studies and Diplomacy, p Ibid. p Begin s involvement in politics predated the Israeli state s establishment, but it was only after this that his concern with specific territory was made explicit. He first became politically active at the age of 15, upon joining the Revisionist paramilitary youth movement Betar ; a movement whose leader, Ze ev Jabotinsky, was to become his mentor. Upon Jabotinsky s death in 1940, Begin inherited leadership of the Revisionist movement, and sought to implement its vision of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine, through his activities as commander of the Zionist paramilitary group Irgun, and subsequently through that group s successive political party Herut. 29 Eretz Yisrael and Land of Israel is used interchangeably henceforth. 30 See Appendix 1 for map of British Mandate in Palestine.

10 withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai Peninsula; 31 he did so because these did not request a final peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, and not because they challenged his ideological agenda. 32 In other words, Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, as it was agreed to in the Camp David Accords, did not constitute a departure from religious reasoning. This too, was the case for Framework I, which called for full autonomy to Palestinian Arabs living in the West Bank and Gaza. Whilst the notion of relinquishing control of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, which were (are) considered Biblical territories of the highest stature, would understandably prompt hostile and startled reactions by religious movements in particular, Begin entered into and signed the Camp David Accords with the intention of maintaining Israeli sovereignty over those areas. This becomes evident when appraising the agreement in light of the negotiations that preceded it, the (lack of) actions that followed it and indeed the minute details which comprised it: through Begin s meticulous and tenacious approach to the negotiations, detailed by various first-hand accounts, he ensured that the final agreement to which he gave his signature at Camp David, was phrased in such a way that he could be neither expected nor forced to make any compromise that would require Israeli settlement or military withdrawal from Judea, Samaria and Gaza, much less one that would relinquish Israeli sovereignty over the territories. An example of the type of assiduousness and concessional requests exposed by Begin is detailed by former Security Council member, William B. Quandt, who was actively involved in the Camp David Accords. He describes Begin as intransigent 33 and having a feel for the strategic use of time, taking the negotiations to the brink of collapse over secondary issues to avoid being pressed on key problems. 34 By key problems Quandt refers specifically to the Palestinian issue, where Begin demonstrated an unwillingness to accept that the principle of withdrawal from occupied territory, as called for in Resolution 242, should apply to the West Bank and Gaza at the end of a transitional period, 35 and that any agreement [ ] concerning Egyptian-Israeli relations should in no way be dependent on resolving the Palestinian question. 36 To suggest, based on this analysis, that Begin s behaviour vis-à-vis the question of Judea, Samaria and Gaza was premised on and driven by his religious conviction is of course a supposition, as other factors may well have motivated this behaviour. However, it is however not a supposition that is entirely farfetched, given Begin s extensive reference to the Jewish people s righteous claim to Eretz Israel by virtue of its religious (as opposed to only historical) ties to that land, which he invoked repeatedly in public as well as private communications and thoughts. 31 Following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egypt s Anwar Al-Sadat, wanting to regain control over Sinai and having realised after Egyptian partial defeat during the 1973 war that this would be achieved better through negotiations than on the battle field, entered into interim negotiations with the US and Israel. These negotiations were not explicit in necessitating a final Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement however, and it was with this point that Begin took issue. 32 Sofer, Sasson (1988) Begin: An Autonomy of Leadership, Oxford: Basil, p Quandt, William B. (2005) Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, 3rd edition, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, p Ibid, p Ibid, p Ibid, p. 198

11 By drawing on Goldstein & Keohane s (1993) framework for the study of ideas and foreign policy, the following section demonstrates that religion s influence in this context, played out by providing Begin with two types of beliefs (principled and causal) which, together, constituted a road-map that rendered it impermissible to relinquish Israeli sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza, as those territories comprised Eretz Yisrael.! 3.1 Principled beliefs Principled beliefs, as Goldstein and Keohane term them, are usually defined in terms of larger worldviews, and serve to specify criteria for distinguishing between right and wrong. 37 Such beliefs are discernible in Begin s discourse in that he expresses his belief in the Jewish right to inhabit Eretz Yisrael. To apply Goldstein & Keohane s terminology: Begin s conviction that an inherent right was given to the Jewish people by God, serves as a principled belief which allows him to interpret Israeli sovereignty over Eretz Yisrael as right. Lack of or opposition to Israeli sovereignty over this territory is, in turn, wrong. An emblematic example of how religion allowed for the facilitation of such a principled belief is found in Begin s clandestine letter of March 5, 1978 to Sadat. Addressing a particular press conference in which an Egyptian journalist confirmed the acceptance by Sadat and Egypt of Israel s right to exist, Begin said: [ ] we have never asked for such recognition. Every nation [ ] has the same right to exist, be it large or small, strong or weak, near or far. Indeed, we were given our right to exist by the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. We have paid a price for that right, higher perhaps than any other nation. It is inherent; it required no recognition. 38 A similar example, expressed in a public setting, is found in Begin s address to the Knesset and Sadat, during the Egyptian president s visit to Jerusalem on November 20, In reference to the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, Begin said: With the help of God Almighty, we overcame the forces of aggression, and we have guaranteed existence for our nation not only for this generation, but for the coming generations, too. We do not believe in might. We believe in right, only right 39 These examples refer to Israel in terms of its very existence; that is, regardless of its borders spanning beyond armistice lines 40 or not. Begin also used the same discourse in specific reference to the Palestinian question, as it was discussed in the context of the Camp David Agreement, however. In a letter to Sadat on May 1980, upon pressure from the latter to alter his position vis-à- 37 Goldstein, Judith & Keohane, Robert O., ed. (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p An exchange of letters in Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El- Sadat Personal Correspondence Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p Prime Minister Menachem Begin s Speech to the Knesset, November 20, 1977 The Camp David Accords and Related Documents (1998) Beer-Sheva: The Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East Studies and Diplomacy, p Armistice lines refer to internationally recognised borders which exclude the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and the Gaza District.

12 vis the Palestinian question, Begin answered that Our position on settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District is certainly well-known to you, as is that on Jerusalem: it is the exercise of our inherent right [ ] 41. Perhaps no more explicitly is the same view expressed than in his address at the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organisations, in which he asserted: The Bible is a living document eternally living document. We live on this Book, with this Book forever. And my predecessor of blessed memory, the late Mr. Ben-Gurion, aptly expressed himself when he said, Some people say that the British Mandate is our Bible. It is untrue he said. The Bible is our mandate! Yes, Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip are integral parts of Eretz Yisrael the land of our forefathers, which we have never forgotten during exile, when we were a persecuted minority, humiliated, killed, our blood shed, burned alive. We always remembered Zion, and Zion means Eretz Yisrael. It is our land as of right. 42 In short, Begin s religious conviction allowed for the facilitation of his view that Jews, as a matter of principle granted by God, have a right to inhabit Judea, Samaria and Gaza, as well as Eretz Yisrael as a whole. 3.2 Causal beliefs Causal beliefs, as characterized by Goldstein & Keohane, are distinguishable from principled beliefs by virtue of their function to provide a guide for the individual on how to obtain a specific objective 43 an objective that is itself valued because of principled beliefs, and understandable only within the context of broader world views. Begin s religious conviction constituted causal beliefs in that he anticipated Jewish redemption through the return to Eretz Yisrael. This rationale formed, as we have seen, the overarching framework of his world view, and led as well to his principled belief in the justness of Israeli sovereignty over Eretz Yisrael. Rowland notes how Begin believed that, by returning to biblical Israel, the living center of Judaism, Jews would regain the strength that had diminished through millennia in the Diaspora. 44 This causal belief can be discerned is his letter to Sadat, in which he wrote that We, the descendants of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob [ ], returned through the course of history, time and again, having never severed our ties with this land of our ancestors. [ ] None of us mortals can know the will of god Almighty, but surely as the history of the 41 Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p Begin addresses Jewish Leaders in New York, September 20, 1978 Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p Goldstein, Judith & Keohane, Robert O., ed. (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p Rowland, Robert C. (1985) The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin: The Myth of Redemption Through Return, Maryland: University Press of America, 164.

13 Egyptian people will find its completion in Egypt, so the history of the Jewish people will find both its expression and consummation in their own land, the Land of Israel. 45 Begin s references to the expression and consummation of Jews in their own land, the Land of Israel make palpable the causal link pointed to above between Jews return to Eretz Yisrael on the one hand, and their redemption on the other. To understand fully how this causal belief operated, drawing on Begin s personality is useful: he had what some refer to as an arguably unmatched skill of taking an idea and building it into a pattern for the purpose of granting legitimacy to an existing idea, as well as a large capacity for self-persuasion. Such pragmatism renders Begin s conviction in the causal belief that return equals redemption all the more plausible. To the extent that such a causal belief is formulated within the context of his broader worldview, and to the extent that the worldview (as we have seen above) is formulated in large part due to religious conviction, Begin s causal belief emanates, as well, from religion. Judaism, as it has been demonstrated thus far, influenced Begin policy vis-à-vis the Palestinian problem by providing the source of his worldview as well as specific principled beliefs and causal beliefs which, taken together, saw it just and desirable for Jews to inhabit Eretz Yisrael. In doing so, religion assumed the very influential role of prescribing Israeli presence on Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. This role is, arguably, specific to the given context due to the unique relationship the between territories in question and Jewish scripture. 3.3 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty In other contexts religion assumes a less prescriptive role. Such is the case in Begin s policy vis-àvis the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. Here, Begin would recurrently employ a religious framing suggesting that the peace between Egypt and Israel was an act that was commended by God. This is evident in his speech at the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, where he spoke the following words: [ ] The ancient Jewish people gave the world the vision of eternal peace, of universal disarmament, of abolishing the teaching and learning of war. Two prophets, Yeshayahu ben Amotz and Micha Hamorashti, having foreseen the spiritual unity of man under God with His word coming forth from Jerusalem gave the nations of the world the following vision expressed in identical terms: And they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation shall not lift up sword against nation; neither shall they learn war anymore. Despite the tragedies and disappointments of the past, we must never forsake that vision, that human dream, that unshakable faith. Peace is the beauty of life. It is sunshine. It is the 45 Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p. 207.

14 smile of a child, the love of a mother, the joy of a father, the togetherness of a family. 46 In this excerpt, Begin draws a connection between Jewish prophetical teachings praising the practice of peace, and the peace between Egypt and Israel, with the clear intention of suggesting that an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is in accordance with religious teaching, and is therefore a benevolent one. A similar reference is found in Begin and Sadat s joint press conference following Sadat s visit to Jerusalem in 1977 in which Begin remarked: [ ] as we both believe, the President and I, in Divine Providence, before the departure of the President and his party, we pray to the Almighty that he give all of us the wisdom to continue in our efforts to bring peace to our nations real peace [ ] 47 Although perhaps less explicitly than in the quote above, Begin frames the immanent Egyptian- Israeli peace as something, which is somehow in line with God s will. This is distinct from the references he made to narratives relating to the Palestinian question which, as we have seen, employed a framing which suggested that it was Israeli presence on Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District (not peace as in the Egyptian case), which was commanded by God. In turn, this demonstrates that religion takes on a distinct role in this separate context. Section 3.0 has showed that in spite of giving the immediate impression that they constitute a departure from religious reasoning, the Camp David Accords were in fact largely driven by Begin s religious conviction. This is particularly the case in the context of Framework I Peace Plan for the Middle East, where religion formed a set of principled and causal beliefs which in turn served as a roadmap for Begin s decision making. In the context of Framework II the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, religion assumed a distinct and less assertive role by condoning peace and territorial withdrawal (as opposed to territorial presence). Section 4.0 below will explore religion s role(s) in Begin s decision making vis-à-vis Operation Peace for Galilee. 4.0 Religion and Operation Peace for Galilee: a means to mobilise support of a failing foreign policy. On 6 June, 1982 Israel launched a military invasion, Operation Peace for Galilee, into Southern Lebanon, which officially sought to push PLO factions 40 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border in order to protect civilians in the Galilee region in Northern Israel. Analysts such as Shlaim (2007), Maoz (2006) and Freilich (2012) largely agree, and archival sources cited throughout this chapter confirm this, that the objectives of the operation also included destroying PLO infrastructure in Lebanon; installing a Christian Lebanese, pro-israel government; and expelling the Syrian army from Lebanon. Ultimately, such measures were thought to foster conditions for a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon, which would increase Israel s security in the region. In contrast to especially Framework I of the Camp David Accords which was driven by Begin s religious 46 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt. Protocols, Annexes, Letters, Memorandum of Agreement between Israel and the United States, Addresses of Presidents Carter and Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin, 26 March 1979, Volumes 4-5: Begin Addresses Jewish Leaders in New York, September in Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p. 88.

15 ideals, Operation Peace for Galilee was above all driven by security concerns and occasionally also justified with reference to humanitarianism and international law. Religion did not figure in private talks between Begin and his Israeli and international negotiation partners, apart from a few cases in which players in the conflict were characterised along religious lines (for example, pro-israeli forces in Lebanon were referred to as the Christians ). Only in his public discourse following Israel s seizure of West Beirut, after which public support of Operation Peace for Galilee diminished, did Begin make extensive reference to Judaism. The timing of that discourse is significant, as it suggests that Judaism was used instrumentally and thus assumed a much different role than in the context of the Camp David Accords. This section will demonstrate the abovementioned themes of the decision-making behind Operation Peace for Galilee with reference to empirics retrieved from the Israeli State Archives, with a view to substantiate the claim that religion served as a means of justification, as opposed to a driving force which was the case vis-à-vis the Camp David Accords. This contrast is drawn in order to highlight the different roles of religion in foreign policy decision making - a theme which will be elaborated upon in the conclusion. 4.1 Security threats in Lebanon The decision to launch Operation Peace for Galilee was made following an assassination attempt by the Abu Nidal Organisation 48 against the Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom, but as Begin s then Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, has since related in his memoirs, the assassination attempt was merely the spark that lit the fuse 49. The operation was, above all, a response to various developments in an increasingly hostile Lebanon, which were thought to pose direct threats to Israel s security. Most threatening amongst these developments was PLO s firing of artillery shells into Israel s Galilee region, and Syrian deployment of missiles in Lebanon along with an increased anti-israel Syrian military presence in that country. The security-driven rationale behind the operation is expressed in Begin s private letter of 30 May, 1982 to U.S. Secretary Alexander Haig, in which he repeatedly clarified that Israel was acting with force in order to protect Israeli citizens and the Jewish state. In the same letter, Haig expressed concern about future Israeli military actions in Lebanon and encouraged Israel to exercise military restraint. Begin found Haig s suggestion inappropriate as he thought that there [was] in Lebanon a neo-nazi terrorist organization which constantly proclaim[ed] its design to kill [Israeli] people in Israel and abroad - men, women and children [...] 50, and he took Haig s suggestion to mean that Israel should let [the PLO] kill [Israeli] citizens and brethren - and do nothing 51. Begin ensured Haig that Israel s reconnaissance flights would continue to fly over Lebanon, as he would never expose the Jews to such danger, because of what had happened to [them] in the Past. 52 As the letter reveals, Begin s policy vis-àvis Lebanon was driven by security concerns, which were in turn reinforced by Jewish suffering during the Holocaust. 48 The Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO) was a militant Palestinian splinter group. 49 Malaspina, Ann (2009) Creation of the Modern Middle East, New York: Infobase Publishing, p Album 5, p Album 5, p Album 5, p. 84