Processen van radicalisering: waarom sommige Amsterdamse moslims radicaal worden Slootman, M.W.; Tillie, J.N.

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1 UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Processen van radicalisering: waarom sommige Amsterdamse moslims radicaal worden Slootman, M.W.; Tillie, J.N. Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Slootman, M. W., & Tillie, J. N. (2006). Processen van radicalisering: waarom sommige Amsterdamse moslims radicaal worden. Amsterdam: IMES. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam ( Download date: 18 Aug 2018

2 Processes of Radicalisation Why some Amsterdam Muslims become radicals Marieke Slootman, MS Jean Tillie, Ph.D Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies Universiteit van Amsterdam October 2006

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4 Acknowledgements This report could not have been brought to fruition in its current form without the contributions of a large number of people. The intensive co-operation with our colleagues at the IMES, Frank Buijs, Froukje Demant and Atef Hamdy, has led to a rapid increase of knowledge and initiated challenging discussions on this difficult subject. As committed partners in conversation, they have also made an enormous contribution to the oh-so important enjoyment of our work. We would like to give a special thanks to Frank Buijs for co-ordinating the field work. Meindert Fennema s notes provided constructive criticism, and Laurie Micon performed important work in the initial phase of the research. This research was conducted at the request of the City of Amsterdam. The steering committee for this research was made up of representatives from the municipal services that are connected with the We Amsterdammers action programme: the Council Governing Board, the Department for Social Development, and the Department for Research and Statistics (O+S). In addition, Prof. Dr. Peter Neijens, Ph.D from the Universiteit van Amsterdam and Rudie Neve, Ph.D from the Research and Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Justice (WODC) were members of the committee. Jeroen Slot of the Department for Research and Statistics was the steering committee chairman. We have enjoyed working with the steering committee, and would like to thank them for their constructive suggestions regarding our work in all phases of the research. Marian Visser deserves special recognition as member of the steering committee, as she proved irreplaceable as the contact person with the municipality. Finally we would like to thank all those who we cannot name because there are so many and because they were promised anonymity: all the people who took the time and effort to respond to our survey. Without their information this research would have been impossible. We would like to emphasise that those persons named above are not responsible for the content of this report. This responsibility lies completely in the hands of the undersigned. Amsterdam, 4 October 2006 Marieke Slootman Jean Tillie 2

5 Summary In this report we will present the results of our study of (potential) radicalisation processes among the Muslims of Amsterdam. This research was performed by the IMES (Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies) at the request of the City of Amsterdam. Purpose of and method for the research The central questions in this research are: (1) what is radicalisation? And (2) which factors determine whether someone is receptive to processes of radicalisation? The research is directed primarily at the phase before radicalisation; that is, the presence of opinions and ideas among Muslims who are not yet radicalised which could lead to radicalisation. This focus comes from the desire of the City of Amsterdam to strengthen the policy of prevention of radicalisation. The analysis of ideas that could initiate a process of radicalisation is central to the research. In Chapter 2, the ideas which could form possible reasons for radicalisation are described. In Chapter 3, the presence of these ideas in Amsterdam is investigated. For this research we used data from the Amsterdam Resident Monitor 2005 (a representative survey among the population of Amsterdam, including 321 Muslims). In Chapters 4 and 5 we analyse the factors which influence the possible presence of these possible reasons. After this analysis on the individual level, a number of city boroughs are investigated in Chapter 6 for possible context factors which influence the presence of possible reasons for radicalisation. We then expand the research to 12 Islamic youths from the periphery of the Hofstad group who did complete/have indeed completed this process of radicalisation. We have been able to have conversations with members of this group, some of whom are being monitored by the AIVD (General Intelligence and Security Service). From inside this group we study how the radicalisation process developed among them. The report of this field work can be found in Chapter 7. The report concludes in Chapter 8 with suggestions for a preventative policy regarding (potential) radicalisation processes among Amsterdam Muslims and with recommendations for policy to prevent extremist violence among radical Islamic youths. The figure below illustrates the groups targeted by the research: - The research was directed at a single group of 12 youths who had completed the radicalisation process. The research was decidedly not interested in violently extremist youths who had committed criminal acts. These are cases for investigative agencies and the police and not for preventative policy. (see the right side of the spectrum) - The research was also directed at the presence of ideas which precede the actual process of radicalisation and are possible reasons for radicalisation. The research is not directed at the presence of radicalism among Amsterdam Muslims. (See the left side of the spectrum). No statements can be made over the number of radical Muslims in Amsterdam based on this research 3

6 Not radicalised (overwhelming majority) Radicalisation process Approves of violence Violent intentions (Criminal persecution approach). Extremist, potential terrorists Focus Resident Monitor Focus 12 interviews Not radical, regards Dutch society as legitimate Spectrum Extremely radical, does not regard Dutch society as not legitimate Results and conclusions Radicalisation is not a characteristic of irrational madmen but a process which combines with certain emotions and attitudes and which can develop in a variety of individuals. From our analyses we see that there are two central possible reasons for radicalisation. One is a very orthodox religious stance (religious dimension) and the other is the idea that politics and the society deal with Muslims in an unjust manner threatening to Islam (political dimension). Amsterdam Muslims who combine these religious and political ideas have an increased probability of radicalisation. They often combine these ideas with a distrust of local politics, a dichotomous world view ( us versus them ) and a vision of a realisable ideal society ( utopian idealism ). The higher someone scores on the combination of religious and political dimensions, the greater the probability that they will radicalise. However, a high score on both dimensions is not sufficient in itself to actually initiate radicalisation. 2% of the Amsterdam Muslims score high on the religious and political dimension. They are not radicals, but are potentially the most receptive to radicalisation. The same viewpoints could lead one individual to apply himself for the betterment of society, while another might be influenced to withdraw from society. We see the prevention of radicalisation in discouraging emotions and attitudes which form a stimulus for radicalisation for some, although for the majority this is not the case. The most important conclusion from our research is that the religious and political dimensions are independent of each other. This means that orthodoxy does not lead automatically to political discontent (and from there to potential radicalisation), and vice versa. It is important to recognise this. Someone who is orthodox is not per se radical, nor will this person automatically become radical. The presence of both convictions (the religious and the political) is combined with: Age (16-18 years) Secondary school education Strong connection with the ethnic group Strong perception of discrimination Deep mistrust of politics Social isolation Besides these individual factors, we investigated whether there are specific context factors which make Amsterdam Muslims more receptive to radicalisation. This context-research had a preliminary, exploratory character. A number of Amsterdam city boroughs were studied for the potential influence of (a) quality of life; (b) atmosphere and tensions in neighbourhoods; 4

7 (c) the structure of social life (local organisations); and (d) the city borough council policy regarding immigrants. Among the factors studied, it seems that there are connections between the presence in a city borough of neighbourhoods that can be identified as potential areas of tension (see Chapter 6) and the structure of social life (the more networks that exist between social organisations, the fewer residents of the city borough who are receptive to radicalisation). From our field research among the twelve radical Muslim youths (the so-called salafi-jihadis, who theoretically defend the use of violence) it seems that the radicalisation process has different dimensions which have some ties to the factors listed above, particularly (1) a religious dimension, attached to a search for meaning ( who am I, why am I on earth, and how should I live my life ) and (2) a political dimension, based on the experience of injustice ( Muslims are discriminated against and judged by a double standard. ). In addition, there is also (3) a social dimension, which deals with the need for acceptance, appreciation and a sense of security. Although the three dimensions play a role in all of the radicals we studied, the accents and the course of radicalisation differed per person. What in one person gradually occurred through a process of years, developed within another within a few months or even weeks. At the individual level it is simply impossible to predict whether someone will radicalise and in what manner. Besides needs which tie into the three dimensions listed above (religious, political, and social), radicalisation is dependent on accidents and coincidences in the surroundings of the individual personality. It is certain that radicalisation does not play out in individual isolation. It is a social phenomenon: individuals learn from one another, on and off the Internet, and various radical movements compete vigorously with one another; arguments are exchanged, opponents are maligned, and every movement is convinced that it is in the right. There is a clear distinction between leaders and followers, where leaders dictate the correct interpretation of religious texts and the proper behaviour which is a consequence of the interpretation. To us it seems that within this group de-radicalisation processes are also possible, whereby a policy of intervention would be productive. During our field research one person appeared to de-radicalise and turned away from the group Recommendations On the basis of the results of our research, we have formulated eight policy suggestions directed at preventing radicalisation and three recommendations on how to deal with radical youths. The preventative policy recommendations can be organised in three categories: increasing trust and confidence in society, increasing trust and confidence in politics, and strengthening religious defences. Main theme 1: Increasing trust and confidence in society Combat dichotomous world views, such as believer versus infidel, immigrant versus native, et cetera. A dichotomous world view appears to play an important role in individuals who radicalise because radical ideas can easily attach to them. Negative treatment of Islam in a generalising manner leads to feelings of injustice which play an important role in individuals who radicalise. It is therefore important that people feel as though Islam is becoming less contentious as a political topic, and that Islam is seen in a less negative light Ensure that fewer people feel discriminated against, on the one hand by dealing with concrete forms of discrimination, and on the other by lessening the feelings of 5

8 victimisation among Amsterdam Muslims. A feeling of exclusion can be especially discouraging for individuals who are strongly oriented towards Dutch society (integration paradox). Combat social isolation and stimulate more individuals to feel satisfied with their social relations. People who feel as though there is nobody on their side and who have little to lose will radicalise earlier than individuals with valued social contacts. Main theme 2: Increasing trust and confidence in politics It is important that confidence in politics and political self-confidence increases, giving individuals the feeling that one can make a difference and that politicians listen to their concerns. Radicalisation is a process of de-legitimisation, where trust in the system and society further decreases, prompting individuals to turn away from society. Reinforce social organisations. There are indications that a strong social life prevents radicalisation. Organisations, especially those with connections to other organisations, play an important role in spreading confidence in society and politics Main theme 3: Strengthening religious defences Ensure that the diversity within Islam becomes more visible. The orthodox doctrine is very accessible. It is available on countless websites on the Internet, and it is simple to explain in comparison to more liberal or pragmatic doctrines. It is clear and conveniently arranged, and its strict interpretations and rules fulfil a desire for certainty and stability. There are much fewer openings to more liberal interpretations of Islam, and these are often less accessible. Increasing the selection of religious ideas deserves consideration. Treat orthodox doctrines in a more relaxed manner. Research shows that the political and religious dimensions of radicalisation are almost completely independent. In other words, orthodoxy does not lead automatically to political dissatisfaction (and to radicalisation), and vice versa Recommendations: Dealing with radical youths Field research has shown that radicalisation is a social phenomenon. This means that it is vital to commit all resources to maintaining contact with young radicals. The isolation of the group can lead individuals to crossing the border between radicalism and extremism. Support mosques in their dealings with radicalising young people. Do not simply bar them from the mosque due to fear for a bad reputation or the attention of the AIVD. Teachers and mosque leaders should be equipped to recognise radicalisation and they should learn how to deal with it without alienating the young people. 6

9 Table of Contents 1 Introduction The Muslim population of Amsterdam The structure of the research The Report Religious and political orientations of Amsterdam s Muslims: what is radicalisation? Radicalisation as political process of de-legitimisation Islamic radicalism: salafism, fundamentalism and Islamism Variation in forms and accents in religious orientation Political orientations: from democratically active to radical Summary and conclusion Present convictions possible reasons for radicalism Religious orthodoxy Islam as a point of political conflict Combination of orthodoxy and Islam as a point of political conflict Mistrust of the established order Utopian and dichotomous world views The various convictions combined Summary and conclusion Factors which influence processes of radicalisation (literature and interviews) Injustice and politics: the need for justice Dislocation and low self image: need for acceptance and meaning Demographic characteristics Summary and conclusion Possible reasons for radicalisation empirically explained The structure of and reporting on the analysis of the Resident Monitor Orthodoxy explained Islam as a point of political conflict explained Combination of orthodoxy and Islam as a point of political conflict explained Mistrust of local government explained Dissatisfaction with religious elite Utopian and dichotomous world views explained Summary and conclusion Context factors which influence processes of radicalisation: preliminary exploratory analysis Analysis of five Amsterdam city boroughs Context 1: quality of life Context 2: structure of social organisations Context 3: city borough policy Summary and conclusion Among radicalising young Muslims in Amsterdam Structure of the field work Demographic characteristics of the group The individual religious development Religious forming

10 7.5 The social surroundings of the group The salafi-jihadi ideology Recommendations: what should we do? Recommendations for prevention of possible reasons for radicalisation in the city Recommendations for the specific approach of radical youths Works Cited Appendix 1 Terminology Appendix 2 Tables Appendix 3 Schematic verklaringsmodellen Appendix 4 City borough policy

11 1 Introduction The attacks of 11 September 2001 made it clear that terrorism in the name of Islam exists and that it is also a threat for our society. The attacks in Madrid and London confirmed this. The murder of Theo van Gogh and an increase in threats with an Islamic signature directed at public figures has brought this closer to home. In the Western world, and in the Netherlands in particular, it is unclear who the people behind these threats are and what motivates them. This lack of insight increases the sense of fear and insecurity and provokes some to project the threat onto an entire group of the population. To improve the insight into the problem of radicals and extremists, we look for answers to many complicated questions: what brings individuals to perform such acts and what makes them different from people who do not become radical and extremist? What is the process they go through and where does this differ from other religious and political orientations? What are their basic convictions regarding politics and religion and how broadly disseminated are these ideas among Muslims? How can behaviour which is detrimental to our society be discouraged and how can we stimulate positive action? At the request of the City of Amsterdam, the IMES has spent the last year and a half studying these questions. The answers to these questions are relevant for the City of Amsterdam and its policy. When we have more insight into the radical ideas and attitudes of Muslims, and their effects on their immediate surroundings and the rest of the city, and when we have more insight into the alternative religious and political orientations, the city will be more able to assess potential problems and decide on the right way to deal with them Of course we realise that among many different groups in the population radical and extremist behaviour can be found, such as extreme-right ideas among some native-born Dutch. However, this research is directed at Muslims with specific faith-based political convictions, which in some cases can form an inspiration for threats and terrorist attacks. This is primarily due to the relative lack of knowledge of Islam and Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands, and due to the lack of knowledge of the various forms of religious experience and political orientations among the Islamic population. Although this report deals with radicalisation among Muslims, the larger part of the report will not deal with the radicalisation process, but with the phase before radicalisation. Radicalisation processes are complex. There are several processes of radicalisation, just as there are several types of radicals and there are no factors which unequivocally lead to radicalisation (Buijs, Demant and Hamdy, 2006). Individual cases of radicalisation remain impossible to predict, which makes it difficult to prevent specific individuals from radicalising. It is impossible to determine which specific factors make an individual radicalise. There are some factors which make some individuals receptive to radicalisation. There are various convictions which could form possible reasons for radical ideals and cause individuals to be sensitive for radicalisation. The question is now under which circumstances these necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) conditions come to being, and in which parts of the population of Amsterdam can we find these conditions? These necessary conditions do not mean that someone with these characteristics will actually radicalise. These characteristics do however play an important part in a large number of the individuals who do radicalise and could form a key element in the prevention of radicalisation. Due to the many differences between radicalising Muslims, it seems that these are the only characteristics which the radicals share. 9

12 To begin with, we observe the normal non-radical Muslim population and the convictions which could become possible reasons for radicalisation. This is relevant for the prevention of radicalisation. In a later chapter we will look at the other end of the spectrum: young Muslims in an advanced stage of radicalisation. 1.1 The Muslim population of Amsterdam In this study we have limited our attention to the Muslim population of Amsterdam. This paragraph contains a short overview of the composition of this group. Islam is, after Christianity, the second largest religion in Amsterdam. (See Table 23 and Table 24 in the Appendix). According to the survey, 35 percent of the residents of Amsterdam claim a religious affiliation. Half of these are Christians and almost a third are Muslims. The rest of the religiously active population is splintered and no single religion has a share of the population of more than ten percent. According to the Resident Monitor survey, the Moroccan and Turkish Amsterdammers are relatively active religiously: 77 percent of the Moroccan Amsterdammers and 66 percent of the Turkish Amsterdammers claim affiliation with a religion. Approximately half of the other non-western ethnic groups are religiously active. Native-born Dutch residents of Amsterdam are by far the least religious group. Less than a quarter claim any religious affiliation. Among those with a religious affiliation, there is a clear ethnically determined preference for the various religions. Moroccan and Turkish Amsterdammers are the most unanimous in their religious identification: 98 percent of the religiously active Moroccans and 93 percent of the religiously active Turks feel affiliated with Islam (eight percent of the Turks are Christian). In comparison, 77 percent of the religiously active native-born Dutch residents claim affiliation with Christianity 1. It therefore follows that the majority of the Muslims in Amsterdam are of Moroccan or Turkish origin (76 percent) (See Table 25, Appendix). Half of the surveyed Muslims are of Moroccan origin, and a quarter is Turkish. The remaining quarter is made up primarily of people from non-industrialised countries (fifteen percent) or the former Dutch colony Surinam (five percent). This study is directed almost exclusively at Amsterdammers of Turkish or Moroccan origin. The focus of the analysis of the Amsterdam Resident Monitor is also directed at Turkish and Moroccan Muslims. Muslims with other ethnic backgrounds were not subjects of this study, due to their relatively small numbers. The facts that ethnic and religious identities are strongly related, and that Turks and Moroccans are strongly religious means that a majority of the Turks and Moroccans identify themselves as Muslims (See Table 23, Appendix). These groups are, based on their numbers, not to be ignored: fourteen percent of the residents of Amsterdam are of Turkish (five percent) or Moroccan (nine percent) origin (See Table 1). In the city boroughs Zeeburg, De Baarsjes, Slotervaart and Osdorp, approximately a quarter of the residents are of Moroccan or Turkish origin, and in the city boroughs Bos en Lommer and Geuzenveld-Slotermeer these groups make up almost forty percent. (For population statistics at the city borough level, see Table 26 in the Appendix.) 1 The twenty different religious movements listed in the survey were grouped in five categories: Christianity (including Roman Catholic, Dutch Reformed, other Calvinist, Lutheran, Greek Orthodox, Jehovah s Witnesses, New Age, Christian-Other, Protestant, Anglican, and Mennonite), Islam, Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism. All other answers, such as Humanism, Anthroposophy and answers such as none of your business fell under Other. 10

13 Table 1 Percentage of Turks, Moroccans en other immigrants in the city boroughs, 1 January 2005 In absolute numbers and percentages of the total population in that borough Borough Turks Moroccans Combined Native Dutch Total Bos en Lommer 4,933 16% 7,179 23% 12,112 39% 10,300 33% 30, % Geuzenveld-Slotermeer 6,315 15% 9,040 22% 15,355 38% 14,904 36% 40, % Osdorp 4,069 9% 6,830 15% 10,899 24% 21,748 49% 44, % Slotervaart 3,609 8% 6,892 15% 10,501 24% 21,071 47% 44, % Zeeburg 3,234 8% 5,658 13% 8,892 21% 18,673 44% 42, % De Baarsjes 3,151 9% 3,976 12% 7,127 21% 16,584 48% 34, % Oost/Watergraafsmeer 2,960 5% 5,780 10% 8,740 15% 31,746 54% 58, % Amsterdam-North 4,434 5% 7,215 8% 11,649 13% 50,079 57% 88, % Westerpark 960 3% 3,054 9% 4,014 12% 17,968 54% 33, % Oud-West 755 2% 1,579 5% 2,334 7% 19,134 60% 31, % Amsterdam Oud-Zuid 1,690 2% 3,460 4% 5,150 6% 50,795 61% 83, % Zuideramstel 556 1% 1,147 2% 1,703 4% 30,601 65% 47, % Westpoort 10 3% 2 1% 12 4% % % Zuidoost 800 1% 1,564 2% 2,364 3% 23,465 29% 80, % Amsterdam-Centre 733 1% 1,418 2% 2,151 3% 49,980 62% 81, % Amsterdam Total 38,209 5% 64,794 9% 103,003 14% 377,278 51% 742, % Source: O+S 2005b: Table 5: Population by ethnic group, 1 January 2005 (Grey: above average) The Muslims of Amsterdam are relatively young. According to statistics from O+S, approximately two-thirds of the Turks and Moroccans are younger than 35 (66 percent and 69 percent respectively), compared with only 39 percent of the native-born Dutch residents (Table 2 and Table 27, Appendix). The percentage of children under ten among Turks and Moroccans is almost three times that of the native-born Dutch residents (Turkish eighteen percent, Moroccan 22 percent and native-born Dutch eight percent). The numbers of elderly residents, however, are comparatively low. While almost a third of the native-born Dutch population is over 55, only eight percent of the Turkish and Moroccan Amsterdammers fall in this age group. Table 2 Age composition of the population of Amsterdam by ethnic group Turks Moroccans Native Dutch Total 0-4 9% 12% 5% 6% 5-9 9% 10% 3% 5% % 12% 4% 6% % 6% 2% 3% % 30% 25% 28% Subtotal 66% 69% 39% 47% % 22% 32% 32% % 8% 29% 21% Total 100% 100% 100% 100% Source: O+S 2005a: Table : Population by age and ethnic group, 1 January 2005 The Muslims in Amsterdam have relatively little education (see Table 28, Appendix). There are four education categories: unschooled, low, intermediate and high 2. In contrast to 2 Unschooled: no education or only primary school. Low education level: special education, secondary education to the age of 16 (VBO, MAVO, MULO or VMBO). Intermediate education level: secondary education or trade school (HAVO, VWO, HBS, MMS or MBO). High education level: higher professional education (HBO) or university. 11

14 the native-born Dutch population, where only five percent are unschooled, (almost entirely in the 55+ age group), is among the Muslims almost a quarter of the population unschooled (22 percent). In total more than half of the Muslim population fall in the categories unschooled or low education level (51 percent), compared with the native-born Dutch population in which less than a quarter falls in these categories (21 percent). The percentage of highly educated native-born Dutch is relatively high (56 percent) compared with the Muslim population where this percentage is eighteen percent. This may partially be explained by the large percentage of young people among the Muslim population, as youths under eighteen are usually still attending secondary school, and so cannot yet begin higher professional education (HBO) or university. 1.2 The structure of the research This research is directed at the variety of religious and political orientations among Muslims in Amsterdam, with special attention to processes of radicalisation. We study which factors play a role in creating receptiveness to radicalisation, as well as what effect radicalisation has on social networks and on the city as a whole. The results serve as a basis for recommendations for prevention of radicalisation in Amsterdam. The focus of this research is on Muslims who portray certain necessary conditions which could lead to radicalisation. The subjects are Muslims who are not radical, or who are radical but have not committed any criminal acts. Religious extremists, who are violent and have committed criminal acts, are difficult to contact for research and do not form a subject for policy initiatives aimed at prevention of radicalisation. They are subjects for the police and the courts. It is not our intention to deal with criminal investigations. The Muslims we deal with are relatively easy to contact and communicate with. Aside from studying the literature on this subject, we have also applied various qualitative and quantitative research methods. During the orientation phase, we interviewed dozens of people, mainly public functionaries in Amsterdam. We also performed a quantitative analysis of the Amsterdam Resident Monitor. Next, we spoke with many pious young Muslims on the verge of radicalising. In the last phase of the research we explored the situation in different city boroughs by speaking with people who live and work in the neighbourhoods concerned. We co-operated closely with three IMES-researchers who have, at the request of the Ministry of Justice, been conducting a nation-wide study of the political orientations among Muslims: Frank Buijs, Froukje Demant and Atef Hamdy. The interviews with radicalising youths were conducted together with these researchers. While their research was focused on the radical ideals and various paths of radicalisation, we concentrated our study on the underlying causes of radicalisation and the local situation in Amsterdam. Orientation interviews with public functionaries In the initial phase, we spoke with more than forty government workers in Amsterdam, and we held a group discussion with a number of students at a secondary school (VMBO). We made a diverse selection of interview subjects in order to obtain a broad overview of what is happening in the city. The focus lay in the parts of the city where comparatively large numbers of Muslims live. The individuals interviewed came from many city boroughs, including Geuzenveld, Oost/Watergraafsmeer, Bos en Lommer, De Baarsjes and Zeeburg. We spoke with men as well as women, who work in different functions which give them different connections with the Muslims in Amsterdam: neighbourhood organisers, youth workers, teachers, education supervisors, individuals from mosques and city employees. Some of these individuals we interviewed have a Turkish or Moroccan background, and therefore also have a view of a portion of the Muslim community via their private lives. We obtained the names of the interview subjects via the Internet and connections. We selected them based on their 12

15 geographic location and their professions. The results of these interviews provided a vision of what those connected with the Muslim community consider to be radicalism, how they observe radicalism, and how big the problem of Islamic radicalism seems in their perspective. They also indicated who they observed to be radicalising, and which circumstances seem to them to influence the radicalisation process. During the group discussion with the students, they talked about how they deal with their faith. Our goal was to gain an impression of how they observe radicalism in their surroundings and to what extent radical ideas are present among them. The group was made up of six students between 14 and 16 with diverse ethnic backgrounds, and including two young women. This initial phase provided a preliminary insight into the problem of radicalisation in the perception of Amsterdammers, and of possible factors which influence radicalisation. The results of these interviews have been processed in Chapter 4, where they are compared with existing theories regarding processes of radicalisation. Analysis of the Amsterdam Resident Monitor Alongside these interviews, we have also performed a comprehensive analysis of the data from the Amsterdam Resident Monitor 2005 (ABM 2005, survey conducted by O+S, the Department of Research and Statistics of the City of Amsterdam). This survey is conducted annually among roughly three thousand Amsterdammers. In 2005, questions were added to determine whether opinions which could form possible reasons for radicalisation were present among the Muslims interviewed. In this way, we could ascertain connections between these opinions and demographic characteristics, socio-economic situations and diverse attitudes. In the spring and summer of 2005, 2,977 Amsterdammers were surveyed using various methods. The majority (65 percent) were conducted via telephone interviews. 25 percent completed written questionnaires. Face-to-face interviews were only conducted with individuals with a Turkish or Moroccan background. Among those surveyed with a Turkish or Moroccan background, half (48 percent) were in the form of face-to-face interviews. One percent completed the questionnaire on-line. The data was then adjusted by O+S to correct the composition of the surveyed group in relation to the composition of the population of Amsterdam. The adjustment corrects the response based on a combination of age, ethnicity, type of household, and city borough and on a combination of gender and ethnicity. Since this adjustment does not correct the data for the separate ethnic groups, especially relating to age group divisions, we have used an adjustment factor which was prepared by O+S especially for our research. This adjustment factor corrects the age divisions for individuals of Turkish and Moroccan origin. For the division of the surveyed individuals by ethnicity, we refer to Table 29 in the Appendix. Conversations with young people on the verge of radicalising We also conducted interviews with 24 youths on the verge of radicalising, as well as twelve young radicals called jihadi. We approached these young people in schools and mosques, or via common acquaintances. Although it was a very diverse group, we cannot make any statements about its representative qualities. Among the 24 young people in the process of radicalising, there were five young women. 21 were of Moroccan origin, and three were converts. All were between 17 and 42 years old. The majority were between 20 and 26. Sixteen of them could be classified as highly educated, studying at the VWO, higher professional education (HBO) or universities. The rest were low educated (VMBO, LTS or MBO). Most of their parents had come to the Netherlands as guest workers and are low educated. The results of these interviews are processed in this report, but an extended description is printed in the book Strijders van eigen bodem, by Buijs, Demant and Hamdy (2006). We do describe our conversations with the jihadi youths in depth in this report. The 13

16 jihadi form a loose-knit group of about fifteen young people aged between 15 and 25. There are three young women connected with this group, but none of them were available for interviews. Their education level varies from MBO (low) and HAVO (intermediate) to university (high). Three of them have recently stopped their studies. The conversations gave a nuanced image of many possible forms of religious experience and political orientation and a deeper understanding of the influence of the different factors in the radicalisation process. City borough analysis We then explored the influence of contextual factors which were not measured in the Resident Monitor survey, but which may be relevant for policy making. We observed, among other things, the city borough policy regarding integration, the structure of social organisations, and potential inter-ethnic tensions. For this we used data from O+S research, and held a second round of interviews with approximately twenty functionaries from five selected city boroughs 1.3 The Report This paper is the report of our research. In it, we will answer the following questions: What do we understand under the terms radicalism and radicalisation? What are the characteristics of Islamic radicalism, and where does it differ from other Islamic religious and political movements (Chapter 2)? How can we measure the concept of radicalisation, and what is the relation with the presence in Amsterdam of possible reasons which could lead to radicalisation (Chapter 3)? Which factors influence the presence of these possible reasons among the population of Amsterdam? Here we look at what has been written on this subject and what we have observed in the qualitative portion of the study (Chapter 4). We then compare this with the data we have collected from the Amsterdam Resident Monitor (Chapter 5). Which contextual factors could influence processes of radicalisation? This is a preliminary exploratory study. To this end we observe more closely the situation in five Amsterdam city boroughs (Chapter 6). What is the (group-) dynamic among the radical jihadi youths (Chapter 7)? We describe what drives radical youths to adopt extremist ideas and under which circumstances these processes of radicalisation develop. We conclude our report in Chapter 8 with conclusions and recommendations. 14

17 2 Religious and political orientations of Amsterdam s Muslims: what is radicalisation? Sometimes in the contemporary social debate it seems as though people assume that radicalism and Islam are inextricably linked. This is not the case. Buijs explains that all existing ideologies can be used as vehicles for extremism and radicalism (2002, p. 53). Radicals turn the original ideology and practices inside out. They see this as a consequential extension of concepts and values which form the core of that ideology, and which broad sections of the population value, but which are betrayed by the leaders of the mainstream (p. 54). It is therefore not the case that Islam in general can be seen as the cause of Islamic radicalism, nor is it so that Islam and radicalism are inextricably linked. There are many forms of radicalism outside Islam and there are many forms of Islamic religious experience and (Islamic-) political orientations aside from the radical movements. In this chapter we will focus on the different religious and political orientations among Muslims. We will describe the characteristics of a general radical political orientation (2.1) and the characteristics of specifically Islamic radical ideals (2.2). We then describe which schools of thought can be discerned in the religious orientations of Muslims in the Netherlands (2.3) and which political movements can be seen on a spectrum running from a democratically active attitude to a radical or even extremist position (2.4). The chapter concludes with a short summary and conclusive remarks (2.5). This chapter is based on literature research and on the interviews with radicalising young people in the form used in Buijs, Demant and Hamdy (2006). 2.1 Radicalisation as political process of de-legitimisation Radicalism is an oft-used term which can have widely varied meanings and nuances. The term has another connotation in the combination radical feminist than in the combination radical Muslim. To clarify this, we will explain what we understand as radicalism and what its characteristics are. Although the term radical is used in a variety of contexts, the general definition of radical is going to the root, fundamentally or drastically deep 3. This also emerges in the concept as defined by the AIVD: The (actively) pursuing and/or supporting deeply fundamental changes in society, which could become a danger for (the continuation of) democratic rule of law (goal), possibly through use of undemocratic methods (means), which could impair the functioning of the democratic rule of law (effect). By extension, radicalisation can be defined as the (increasing) willingness to pursue or support such changes (possibly in an undemocratic manner), or to persuade others to do so. (AIVD, 2004: p. 15). Extremism is the strongest form of radicalism and is characterised by a violent application of principles. We also see radicalism as the pursuit of fundamental changes in society, but we describe this in terms of legitimacy. The process of radicalisation is seen as an increasing loss of legitimacy for the democratic society, where the final form of radicalism (extremism) is seen as the antithesis of democracy. Democracy is based on ideas such as national sovereignty and equality for all citizens, as well as freedom of religion and freedom of expression. Extremism, in contrast, refuses to accept democratic values and principles, and presents its 3 Source: dictionary 15

18 own ideology as the universally valid one which must be forced upon the population, if necessary with violence. It places uniformity against diversity, intolerance against tolerance, and orders against dialogue. Legitimacy of the system is a requirement for democracy. Democracy exists only by the confidence that citizens have in the political system, which depends largely on the citizens perception of the manner in which basic functions are performed and problems are dealt with. It is not necessary for all citizens to display all democratic values such as diversity, tolerance, dialogue and willingness to make compromises, but at least a large part of the population must at least passively support the majority of these values. Radicalisation can be seen as a process of denying this support to the system. This process has three general development phases, which are characterised by the measure of confidence in the system and the related retreat into one s own group. Despite the many differences between the various types of radicals (leftist, right-wing, religious) they all pass through this journey of alienation. The first stadium is the crisis of confidence. Here the existing confidence is broken down and there may be conflict between a group and specific power figures regarding specific policy measures. Criticism is formulated in ideological terms and aspects of a counter-culture are developed (language, behaviour, opinions). The second stadium is that of the legitimacy conflict. The legitimacy of the system itself is brought up for discussion. The opposition develops an alternative ideological and cultural system and converts frustration and anger about the functioning of the system into de-legitimising ideologies. The last stadium is the legitimacy crisis. Criticism of the system is then expanded to the people who populate the society. They are dehumanised and the activists develop a new morality, in which they portray themselves as combatants entrusted with the task of fighting evil. The (violent) movement is isolated from the world at large and lives in its own reality (compare Sprinzak, 1991). This description clarifies the risks of processes of radicalisation for society. Now that we know the characteristics of radicalism in general, we can narrow our attention to a specific form of radicalism: Islamic radicalism. 2.2 Islamic radicalism: salafism, fundamentalism and Islamism Islamic radicalism is a religiously inspired form of radicalism. Although there are many differences between various Islamic radicals, they all share a communal background. There are general concepts which we must handle to be able to formulate the differences in the next paragraph. We will describe the concepts of salafism (orthodox religious ideals), fundamentalism (a specific combination of religious attitudes) and Islamism (political aspirations) in order to come to a description of Islamic radicalism. Salafism Many contemporary orthodox Muslims consider themselves to be salafis. In doing so they identify themselves as Muslims who attempt to live as piously as the Muslims in the time of the Prophet (salaf means early generation, predecessor ), who are considered to be the perfect Muslims. Salafis advocate a return to the pure Islam of the Prophet and his followers and see the Koran and the hadith (Islamic traditions) as the sole sources of religion; modernisation and interpretations are taboo. A central article of faith is tawhid, often translated as monotheism, but the connotation is the unity of God who is omnipresent and permeates everything. Contemporary Salafism is strongly connected with the Wahabi movement in Saudi Arabia. There, mainstream Wahabi ism is formed by established religious scholars who cooperate with the political elites. These religious scholars are powerful, and due to their wellpaid position they stand loyally and without criticism behind the political order. Outside the 16

19 religious establishment, there are younger scholars with less authority, who express strong criticism of the Saudi political elite, due in part to the widespread corruption and its dependence on the United States. Fundamentalism Like radicalism, fundamentalism is a vague concept with many different connotations. The basis for fundamentalism is the concept that the religious community is threatened by enemies. People fear that the religion will be pressed into the margins of society, where it will slowly die off, poisoned by the secular, degenerate Western view of the world (paraphrasing Appelby, 2000). To prevent this, the religious community must be reinforced and alternatives must be developed for secular structures and processes. Fundamentalism is therefore innovative traditionalism ; the threat to the religion creates a new situation which demands a new policy, legitimised by the holy texts and tradition. Fundamentalist ideology has various characteristics. The first is a tendency to absolutism: one s own faith and sources form the only truth, which is above criticism. It is also characterised by belief in one s own infallibility. This legitimises use of modern technologies. Fundamentalists also tend to dualism, an absolute division in good/evil or faithful/infidel, and towards apocalyptic thinking. This apocalyptic thinking includes the expectation of a resurrection of Good, coupled with a destruction of the world. This inspires the thought that participation in the struggle and spreading chaos can serve to bring the Apocalypse closer. Islamism The term Islamism describes a politically oriented ideology which forms a schism with the a- political traditions of Islam. Islamists combine the pursuit of the fundamentals of the faith with a struggle against colonialism, imperialism and modernism. Islamism is rooted in Salafism, but goes further in its political content. To begin they demand the right for individual interpretation. Secondly, they see Islam as the basis for society and all its institutions, which demands a fundamental change in which all forms of injustice and corruption are suppressed. They stride for an Islamic state, where the rule of law is based on the shari a. Islamic radicalism The concepts listed above merge together in Islamic radicalism. Islamic radicalism is inspired in large part by the thinkers Sayyid Qutb ( ) and Sayyid Abul A la Maududi ( ). Qutb was an Egyptian intellectual with close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. He studied in the United States and radicalised after his return to Egypt. Maududi was the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami, a political party which argued for an Islamic agenda in India. After the founding of Pakistan, he continued to struggle for the foundation of an Islamic state and a complete political order based on Islam. He fiercely criticised the Pakistani political elite for their secular goals for the Pakistani state. The ideals of Qutb and Maududi are based on salafist religious doctrine, but they expand the unity of God, tawhid, towards the constitution and politics. Their doctrine is extremely fundamentalist and Islamist. The West s denial of the existence of God s omnipresence has led according to them to moral degeneracy. An Islamic society, ordered according to God s plan, is morally superior. They emphasise the sovereignty of God, including on a political level. They therefore see man s attempts to make his own laws as sinful arrogance, whether it occurs in Western democracies or in Muslim countries led by political or religious elites. In doing so, and by no longer showing compassion for the lot of ordinary people, the (Muslim-) establishment has pushed Islam into the margins of society. 17