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2 Syria and its Neighbours Emile Hokayem Syria s neighbours have grown used to the resilience and surprising longevity of the Bashar al-assad regime. Bashar owes much to the attainment by his father Hafez al-assad of three strategic goals: consolidating internal authority, turning Syria s difficult geography (bordered by powerful or volatile states) into a source of regional relevance and turning its limited qualities of power into an appearance of strength. Today, with internal unrest and incipient civil war, this strategic stability is in jeopardy; the country is exposed to external predatory ambitions, sectarian-fuelled intervention and attempts to change its strategic orientation. The reactions of Syria s neighbours, to be sure, vary considerably. Iran, Syria s brother-in-arms, is already mobilising resources to prevent Assad s fall. Shia-dominated Iraq, too, has thrown its lot with Assad, for fear he could be replaced by an antagonistic Sunni regime. A deeply divided Lebanon attempts to sidestep difficult decisions, but in this case events may overwhelm its fragile politics. Jordan, dependent on its Gulf patrons but vulnerable to Syrian mischief, is treading a difficult line. For the Gulf states and Turkey, who have explicitly called for Assad s departure, his gradual weakening offers a long-term opportunity, but one fraught with dangers to their own stability and interests. Surprised by the growing strength of the popular and armed challenge to the Damascus regime, aware of their own limitations and of the difficulties of navigating Syria s new dynamics, and wary of the costs of an uncertain proxy war, Emile Hokayem is Senior Fellow for Regional Security, IISS Middle East. Survival vol. 54 no. 2 April May 2012 pp DOI /

3 8 Emile Hokayem they had, as of early March 2012, proved reluctant to take decisive action. Indeed, despite official Syrian allegations of a vast conspiracy, there was no evidence of massive state resources dedicated to Assad s downfall. Yet, as international diplomatic efforts stall, Assad s few but committed allies come to his rescue and pressure from Syrian and foreign Arab public opinion increases, many of Syria s neighbours will feel driven to intervene to advance their own interests and pre-empt others. Whether such intervention is overt or covert, and alone or in concert with others will matter greatly for Syria s future. Brothers in arms Iran, more than any other country, stands to lose from regime change in Syria. The two governments are locked in a strategic, force-multiplying alliance that has resisted differences in outlook and the repeated courting of Western and Arab states. But Burhan Ghalioun, head of the main Syrian opposition group, has said that the current relationship between Syria and Iran is abnormal. There will be no special relationship with Iran. Breaking the exceptional relationship means breaking the strategic military alliance. 1 The prospect of a strategically and politically hostile government in Damascus alarms Iranian leaders, who moreover see the uprising against Assad as part of a broad, sustained campaign to weaken both. Tehran has thus extended political and material support for the Assad regime, including helping Syria organise repression, circumvent sanctions, monitor Internet traffic, shore up its currency and economy, acquire weaponry and mobilise their common allies. Tehran has, to be sure, called for limited reform and extended clumsy outreach to the Syrian opposition, especially its Islamist faction, to broker a compromise with the Assad regime. But these hypocritical calls failed, as many Syrians now perceive Iran as an active enabler of the repression rather than a champion of the weak and oppressed. Iran s pro-assad stance has eroded its image and appeal across the Middle East and spawned accusations of sectarian behaviour. Nevertheless, Iran is not threatened in the short term. A weakened but combative Assad embroiled in a civil war would still accommodate

4 Syria and its Neighbours 9 Tehran s interests. Iran has much experience and expertise in thriving in difficult environments. In Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan, it has successfully cultivated allies and unlikely proxies to remain relevant and maximise its leverage. Chaos in Syria would permit supply of Hizbullah. But there would be costs in standing and treasure. Iran would garner no sympathy from Sunni Arabs by standing by the Assad regime. Syria is a vital enabler of Iran s ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean and a precious (and lone) Arab ally. Without it, Hizbullah, Iran s ultimate instrument of deterrence and coercion against Israel, would lose precious strategic depth, and find itself stuck in Lebanon s muddy politics and unable to perform its primary function. Iran would also lose its Arab entry point into Palestinian politics. Such a strategic and ideological setback could force Tehran to engage in soul-searching. A debate would likely arise among Iranian strategists about the wisdom of propping up costly and unstable proxies. This could lead to greater investment in indigenous defence and deterrence (including Iran s nuclear programme), or reorienting attention and resources to Iran s immediate neighbourhood, fortifying its presence in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Gulf. Some officials could even make the case for genuine talks with the United States and neighbouring Arab states over a regional security arrangement, as happened on the heels of the 2003 US invasion of Iran, which initially alarmed the Iranian leadership. High expectations, significant constraints No country has extended greater assistance to Assad during his years of international isolation, or can project as much power into Syria, than Turkey. Any external strategy to accelerate Assad s departure requires Turkish acquiescence, support and participation. Yet when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan tried to nudge Assad toward reform he was snubbed and rejected. Ankara has allowed Syrian civilians and defectors to take refuge and the nominal leadership of the rebel army and the opposition to base itself on Turkish soil. Ankara has also imposed sanctions on Syria and taken an active part in the international diplomacy to isolate and pressure Assad.

5 10 Emile Hokayem Turkey is, moreover, uniquely positioned to deploy military power to secure no-fly zones and safe zones, facilitate defections and help organise Syrian rebels, and orchestrate the unification of the Syrian opposition. Should the Gulf states decide to fund and arm Syrian opposition factions, a mission for which they are ill prepared, Turkish assistance and intelligence support will be essential. To lead and operate effectively in Syria, however, Turkey would require credible multilateral cover and robust and sustained Arab and Western commitment. A swift regime change in Damascus and the assumption of power by pro- Turkish Syrian factions (most importantly, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which enjoys close relations with Ankara) would position Turkey as the dominant player in the Levant. Turkish-led regional economic integration could serve as a stabilising factor in a post-assad Syria and would enhance Turkey s already strong popularity among Lebanese, Jordanians, Palestinians and other Arabs. Yet Ankara remains cautious. Understandably, Erdogan shows no enthusiasm at the prospect of orchestrating a covert or overt operation in neighbouring Syria. A relative newcomer to Arab politics, Turkey finds itself on the front line, pressed by the Sunni Arab street to demonstrate leadership on issues that could antagonise its immediate neighbours. The Arab consensus on Syria (driven mostly by the Gulf states) may prove transient, as Iraq, Sudan, Algeria and other states seek to block serious action. And Turkey s strategy and political vision for Syria may not entirely align with that of the Gulf states, who are themselves divided. Moreover, alienating Syria, Iraq and Iran as well as its powerful northern neighbour Russia carries significant geopolitical and security risks for Ankara. The Iranian Turkish competition for regional leadership, long dormant, has been revived by the Syrian crisis, Turkish championship of Palestinian rights, tensions between Turkish-backed factions and the Shiadominated government in Baghdad, and the decision to allow the basing of NATO radars on Turkish soil. Turkish concerns also extend to the divided Syrian Kurdish community, whose small Assad-allied PKK contingent could mount terrorist attacks inside Turkey. There is also a powerful Ankara remains cautious

6 Syria and its Neighbours 11 faction among the Turkish political and military elite that views Arab politics as too capricious and treacherous to warrant Turkish involvement. This compounds political divisions, with many secular leaders distrustful of Erdogan s suspected pan-islamist intentions. Containing overspill Repercussions of the unrest in Syria have already been felt in Lebanon, long the target of Syrian predation and strategic focus. Thousands of Syrian civilians, hundreds of regime defectors and many wounded rebels have found refuge among sympathetic kin in the tribal regions of northern Lebanon. Elsewhere in the country, Syrian dissidents are less safe: their activities are monitored by pro-damascus factions, including Hizbullah, and several have been kidnapped and handed over to Syria by pro-syrian Lebanese security personnel. Allegations (sometimes well founded) that aid, weapons and fighters are smuggled into Syria have served as pretext for deadly Syrian incursions into Lebanese territory. Sunni and Alawite fighters have already fought deadly gun battles in Tripoli that the Lebanese army struggled to end. The Lebanese economy, from the banking sector to regional trade, has also been hit. The resilience of the Lebanese system against the ripple effects of the Syrian unrest is already being tested. Lebanon s own confessional and political divide has been amplified by the growing sectarian nature of the conflict in its neighbour. A pro-syrian cabinet over which Hizbullah wields significant influence sits in Beirut, but the fragmented nature of Lebanon s politics and security forces requires a delicate balancing act, lest sectarian passions surge. Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati, a Sunni from Tripoli worried about his base and the Gulf states, has adopted a policy of neutrality and dissociation from Syrian developments. In practice, this led to Lebanon voting against or abstaining on several resolutions condemning Syria at the Arab League and the United Nations, and a refusal to implement Arab League sanctions. This provoked outrage among anti-assad Lebanese factions that suspect Syria and its Lebanese ally Hizbullah of being behind a series of assassinations of their leadership since 2004.

7 12 Emile Hokayem As Syria unravels, the main danger resides in the psychological game between Lebanon s competing factions. A militarily powerful but insecure Hizbullah fears that its emboldened, albeit weaker, Sunni rivals may challenge its dominance if they see an opening. Hizbullah and smaller pro-syrian factions remain the most powerful militias in Lebanon, able to seize control over the capital and force the Lebanese army into submission, as happened in May But unable to control hostile territory for long and unwilling to replicate Hamas s takeover of Gaza for fear of being exposed to Israeli attacks and international and Arab isolation, Hizbullah also realises that such a move would hardly ensure lasting political supremacy. Sectarian dynamics may nevertheless force the various factions into an unwanted communal conflict in which the Sunni Shia divide would be the dominant feature, as opposed to the Christian Muslim character of the civil war that ended in Regime change in Syria would force Hizbullah to face a difficult choice. It could decide to gradually fold its controversial armed wing into the Lebanese army and focus, albeit reluctantly, on Lebanese politics. The hard-line leaders who set the organisation s course would certainly resist this, out of concern that the Shia militia would become irrelevant for its Iranian patron and lose both its raison d être and its funding. But continuing to pursue resistance against Israel would become immensely more complicated logistically, politically and strategically. Opportunities For Saudi Arabia, Syria has long been more than a nuisance but less than a strategic threat. Damascus s deepening ties with Tehran over the last decade, coupled with its influence on Lebanese and Palestinian affairs, have worried Riyadh. But the Saudis lacked leverage, determination and opportunity, as well as the sympathy of a wider Arab public supportive of Syria s anti-israeli posture and suspicious of the kingdom s ties with the United States. With a popular revolution raging in Syria, this has now changed, presenting Saudi Arabia with a considerable opportunity. The fall of Assad would mean the end of a hostile regime; allow Riyadh to assert itself as the leader of the Sunni and Arab worlds; reverse the loss of Iraq; and check Iran s advance into the Levant.

8 Syria and its Neighbours 13 Along with Qatar, the other prime Arab mover, Saudi Arabia has called publicly for a transition of power in Damascus. It plays an essential role in rallying Arab and international support against Assad, and provides crucial media and political support to the Syrian opposition. Pressure on Saudi Arabia to adopt a more aggressive policy toward Assad has increased with the rising death toll in Syria and the stalling of international diplomacy. Whether Riyadh heeds those calls, and how it might intervene in Syria, remain uncertain. Much attention has been focused on Saudi Arabia s links with major Syrian tribes, religious organisations and Syrian businessmen, and its ability to provide significant assistance to Syrian rebels in the form of funding and weaponry. The Saudi ability to project power into Syria nevertheless remains limited. As a result of its fraught relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, the wariness of the secular opposition in Syria about its sectarian outlook and its ties with former regime figures, the kingdom has an incomplete and narrow understanding of Syria s complex society and diverse opposition. Moreover, it lacks the experience and expertise to manage and navigate a civil conflict that doubles as a proxy war, as its failure in Iraq suggests. Operating in Syria would represent a massive challenge that only cooperation with Turkey or Jordan would ease. The risk that Islamist groups backed by Gulf states or individuals would adopt radical tactics and agendas, replicating the tragic experience of Afghanistan and Iraq, is a major concern. Should such groups play a leading role in a Syrian civil war, minorities would likely maintain their loyalty to Assad and the Syrian opposition could fragment. Adapting to change The Israeli military values the rules that had come to govern Israeli Syrian relations. Comparatively weak and easy to deter, Syria kept an awkward calm on the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and confronted Israel only indirectly, through Hizbullah and Palestinian factions, and in coordination with Iran. Israeli strategists now believe that, with return to the old status quo in Syria unlikely, any scenario that sees Assad survive would be detrimental to Israeli interests. A weak Assad, who lost territorial control, would still be

9 14 Emile Hokayem easy to deter, but a civil war would create too much ambiguity about who operates along the Israeli border, who controls key military capabilities and how Iran is adapting to the new environment. The passing of the strategic certainty that existed before 2011 would force Israeli planners to rethink their military posture toward a troubled Syria. In the short-term, Israel also has to worry that Assad or Hizbullah may try to divert attention from their troubles by provoking the Jewish state, that advanced Syrian weaponry will be transferred to Hizbullah and that jihadi groups will operate closer to its territory. A related concern is about the potential loss of control of stocks of chemical weapons and other sophisticated weapons systems as the Syrian military disintegrates. In the medium term, Israeli policymakers calculate that a new government in Syria would be indebted to either Turkey or the Gulf states, and would therefore likely adopt a less confrontational stance towards the Jewish state. More importantly, they too are heartened by the stated desire of the Syrian opposition to break ties with Iran and Hizbullah. Still, a new government in Damascus will be no less nationalistic or intent on recovering the Golan Heights. One of the opposition s accusations against Assad, in fact, is that his military is used to secure his survival rather than liberate occupied Syrian territory. * * * Despite pronouncements by Western analysts, leaders and commentators, there is nothing inevitable about the fate of the Assad regime. Although its legitimacy, authority and resources are eroding, as of the beginning of March 2012 the internal balance of power remained in its favour. It could survive the current unrest, though in a much weakened shape. Much will depend on whether and how its neighbours intervene. Notes 1 Syria Would Cut Iran Military Tie, Opposition Head Says, Wall Street Journal, 2 December 2011, online.wsj.com/article/sb html.