CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION. This thesis seeks to examine fatwā in the post-new Order (Orde Baru)

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1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION A. Background This thesis seeks to examine fatwā in the post-new Order (Orde Baru) Indonesia issued by three major fatwā-making agencies (dār al-iftāʼ) in the country namely Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), Lajnah Baḥth al-masāil Nahdlatul Ulama (LBM-NU), and Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah. It elucidates the key features of these agencies and the distinctive methods they utilize in crafting their fatwā. Major factors conditioning the genesis of fatwā selected are also examined, although it should also be made clear from the outset that this thesis does not aim at in-depth socio-historical analysis conditioning the making of fatwā. Another central issue analysed is how competing modes of thought condition as well as reflect the production of fatwā within the respective agencies. Furthermore, how fatwā serves as a site for competing mode of thought of dominant agencies within the Muslim community of Indonesia will be explored. The overriding interest is in understanding the implications of fatwā on Indonesia s plural society and the extent to which it facilitates adaptation to the demands of rapid social change confronting the community. While there have been a vast number of fatwā pronounced by these organisations within the period selected, this thesis will focus on fatwā that have strong implications on the lives of Muslims within Indonesian society as they attempt to adapt and adjust to the demands of change and challenges of the plural society in which they live. Fatwā on 1

2 sectarianism and inter-religious relations, major aspects of rituals and religious practices as well as those dealing with issues of modernity will be examined. In Indonesia, fatwā-making agencies are generally integral to Islamic groups or movements. For example, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) are equipped with fatwā-making bodies called Majelis Tarjih and Lajnah Baḥth al-masāil respectively. Other organizations such as Persatuan Islam (Persis) also founded the Dewan Hisbah which is responsible for the production of fatwā within the organization. 1 In some organisations such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) where no specific fatwā-making institution exists, the organisation nonetheless frequently functions as fatwā-making body for its members. The three organisations selected for this thesis are highly influential in society. Of these, the most prominent is perhaps Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) which is active in producing fatwā relating to various issues for contemporary Muslim society in Indonesia as a whole. MUI is a stateaffiliated religious body that represents both the state and the majority of Muslim groups in Indonesia. As MUI is an organization representing almost all Muslim groups in the country, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama constitute part of this umbrella organisation. MUI provides a forum for discussion for Muslim scholars and leaders and is seen as the most competent 1 For study on Persatuan Islam and the Dewan Hisbah, please refer to Howard M. Federspiel, Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century Indonesia (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2009); Syamsul Falah, Pandangan Keagamaan Persatuan Islam: Studi atas Fatwa-Fatwa Dewan Hisbah Tahun : Laporan Penelitian (Bandung: Pusat Penelitian: IAIN Sunan Gunung Djati, 1998); and Uyun Kamiluddin, Menyorot Ijtihad Persis: Fungsi dan Peranannya dalam Pembinaan Hukum Islam di Indonesia (Bandung: Tafakur, 2006). 2

3 council in giving guidance and rules on religious problems and questions (iftā ). 2 In general, MUI proclaims itself as a successor of the Prophet (warathatu al-anbiyāʼ) which functions to fulfil his legacy. Hence, it assumes the roles as fatwā-giver (mufti), guide and servant for the umma (riʽāya wa khādim al-umma), movement for reform and improvement (al-iṣlāḥ wa tajdīd) devoted to amr bi al-maʽrūf wa nahy ʽan al-munkar (inviting to do good and forbidding evil). 3 In its specific function as fatwā agency, MUI established a special agency responsible for dealing with fatwā called Komisi Fatwa (Fatwā Commission). Historically, MUI is founded in May 1975 as the representative-body for Muslims nationwide. As the creation of MUI was strongly supported by former President Suharto, many believe that MUI is a politically created religious institution aimed by the regime at gaining legitimacy from the ulamā in justifying strategic and potentially controversial policies it introduced. 4 Suharto s support for its founding was formulated in terms of concern for the unity of Indonesian Muslims in meeting and resolving challenges they face with the support and participation of the ulamā. 5 Through this political will, MUI was finally established with branches spreading across all Indonesian provinces and regencies which have expanded to more than thirty. As a country with a majority Muslim 2 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwa MUI Sejak 1975 (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2011), See MUI s website, 4 The current chairman of NU, Said Agil Siradj, is among those who believe in this conviction. See Iip D Yahya, Ajengan Cipasung: Biografi K.H. Moh Ilyas Ruhiat (Yogyakarta: LKIS Pelangi Aksara, 2006), Atho Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama : a study of Islamic legal thought in Indonesia, , Ph.D Thesis, University of California, Los Angeless, 1990, 92 3

4 population, matters relating to Islam occupy a central place in politics. Although the administration of religious affairs in Indonesia has been formally assigned to the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kementrian Agama), at the practical level, this ministry does not deal with specific issues confronting Muslims. Since such a role is assumed by MUI, it can be said that MUI represents the state and its fatwā stands as the formal legal position of the state on issues relating to Islam. The other organization which this study focuses on is Muhammadiyah. This group has been widely associated with a puritan-reformist strand of Islam, and for such a reason it is also often associated with Wahhabism and Salafism. However, this description might fail to describe the whole range of Muhammadiyah movement. In some extent, especially in terms of faith, the association of Muhammadiyah with Wahhabism is not really misleading. Similarly, the terms Salafism might also be applied to Muhammadiyah, when it refers to group which adhere to the principle of returning to the Qur ān and Sunna. 6 It has also been rendered as the representative of reformist Islamic movement in Indonesia. Some scholars studied on this movement have also pointed to its current conservative inclinations. Founded in 1912, Muhammadiyah was set up as an Islamic movement aimed at purifying Islam as practiced by Javanese society in the beginning of 20 th century, featured by syncretic amalgamation of Javanese traditions with Islamic teachings. 6 More detail and comprehensive discussion on the multiplicity of Muhammadiyah s orientations will be presented in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 4

5 Although currently labelled as puritan, studies reveal that in its initial phase, Muhammadiyah was often described as accommodative towards local tradition. Its rigidity in dealing with local cultures and traditions only occurred about a decade after its foundation. This paradigmatic shift is believed to have been conditioned by the establishment of Majelis Tarjih. Consequently, in addition to being a think tank of this organization, Majelis Tarjih is also frequently identified as the agent of puritanism within this group. This ambiguous nature of Majelis Tarjih is relevant to understanding its mode(s) of thought and how it is reflected in fatwā issued. Majelis Tarjih is founded in 1927 with the basic function of issuing fatwā or legal determination for certain problems. Nevertheless, it should also be emphasized here that Majelis Tarjih does not deal only with religious problems in a narrow sense. Rather, it also claims to deal with all contemporary problems by referring back to the principles of the Qurʼān and Sunna, 7 and urges for ijtihād in resolving contemporary issues confronting Muslim societies. The other movement, Nahdlatul Ulama, has been long known as the representative of traditionalist Muslim groups in Indonesia. It is for this reason that it is selected for this study. Interestingly, its characterisation as traditionalist is currently questioned in view of competing mode of thought that have merged within the movement. The extent to which this development within NU impacts upon fatwā will be examined. Within NU, the Baḥth al-masāil has played a very significant role in constructing 7 See official website of Majelis Tarjih, accessed on 3 April

6 religious strand of NU since its foundation in Literature on the history of this body indicates that in its initial phase, Baḥth al-masāil was essentially a kind of discussion that took place in pesantren as part of a mechanism in solving problems within society. As a kind of activity, its inception is concurrent with the founding of NU. 8 Subsequently, it was formalized as an autonomous structure within NU called Lembaga Baḥth al-masāil or Lajnah Baḥth al-masāil. 9 Historically, NU is founded partly in response to the ascendance of the new political power in Saudi Arabia which marked a shift from the Shafi ite oriented to a Wahhabi-inclined political leadership. This shift of power was seen as a potential threat to traditionalistic Islam and its practices as Wahhabism served as ideological basis for the new regime which harboured hostility to traditions maintained by traditionalist groups. At about the same time, the call for religious reforms in Indonesia had begun to take place spearheaded by several groups. It has inevitably created anxiety among traditional Muslim leaders which culminated in the foundation of NU. NU s formal institutionalization rendered it both as jamīʽa (community) adhering to traditional practice of Islam as well as jamʽiyya (organization), meaning those who formally joined NU as its members. For both, NU developed specific understanding of religion conditioned by as well as reflecting its predominant mode of thought. 8 See Martin van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat: Tradisi-tradisi Islam di Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan, 1996), Ahmad Zahro, Tradisi Intelektual NU: Lajnah Bahtsul Masa il (Yogyakarta: LKIS), 69. 6

7 Apart from their significance in the life of Indonesian society, these three fatwā-making agencies also reflect the interplay of competing mode of thought in the formation of their legal thought as reflected in the fatwāmaking processes as well as substance of fatwā issued. The selection also provides a view of their impact on fatwā-making. Fatwā relating to religious beliefs and practices posed by challenges in the advancement of scientific knowledge is a case in point. It can be illustrated by the fatwā on the determination of the beginning of Islamic calendar (hijriya), especially with reference to the holy Ramadan and Idul Fitri. For decades Idul Fitri has not been celebrated concurrently by different groups of Muslims, Islamic organizations and government. It should be borne in mind that in the Indonesian context, managing religious matters is part of the government s responsibility. 10 Not surprisingly, Eid celebration is always preceded by an official meeting held by the Ministry of Religious Affairs that involves representatives from all Islamic organizations in Indonesia including MUI. The meeting popularly known as Sidang Isbat is designed to determine the exact date of Eid. Once an agreement is achieved, it will be followed by an official announcement by the Minister of Religious Affairs. It is usually the case that the government s decision differs from some Islamic organizations in Indonesia. This dispute is due to different methods adopted by Islamic organizations and the government in determining the new 10 According to classical Islamic jurisprudence, a product of ijtihad is not binding. However, in order to prevent any dispute, state or government s intervention is often required. Ibrahim Hosein, a respected Indonesian scholar argued that government should only be allowed to intervene in social matters and not in matters of worship. See Ibrahim Hosen, Fiqih Perbandingan Masalah Nikah (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 2003),

8 date of the Islamic calendar that is based on the lunar system. 11 The most notable disputants are Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. 12 As widely known, the former adopts the method of calculation (ḥisāb) 13 based on astronomical and mathematical principles, while the later believes in the ru ya method which involves direct vision of the crescent (hilāl). NU rejects ḥisāb based on a conviction that this method was never practiced during the Prophet Mohammad s lifetime. 14 The 2011 Eid was not an exception. But unlike previous years, the controversy in that year was much more intense. Muhammadiyah, which celebrated Eid on August 30, 2011, a day earlier than government s decision, was blamed as the source of tension and confusion among Indonesian Muslims since it firmly insisted on the results of its own ijtihād. The controversy intensified as the Sidang Isbat was broadcasted live by a number of Indonesian national television stations. Comments were obtained from Thomas Jamaluddin, a scientist interviewed in the programme who maintained that Muhammadiyah s method is outdated. 11 For an example of how the dispute is examined by Indonesian scientists, please refer to Farid Ruskanda, Seratus Masalah Hisab dan Rukyat (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996). See also, Farid Ismail, Selayang Pandang Hisab Rukyat (Jakarta: Direktorat Pembinaan Peradilan Agama, Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia, 2004); Syamsul Anwar, Hari Raya dan Problematika Hisab-Rukyat (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2008); Heri Ruslan, Penetapan Awal Bulan, Seperti Apa Aturannya?, Dialog Jumat Republika, 5 November 2010; and Farid Ruskanda (et. al), Rukyat dengan Teknologi: Upaya Mencari Kesamaan Pandangan tentang Penentuan Awal Ramadhan dan Syawal (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1994). 12 Other smaller Islamic organizations such as Persatuan Islam have their own method of determining the new Islamic calendar determination. However, in general they follow the government s decision in determining the day of Eid celebration. Although generally Nahdlatul Ulama members follow government s decision, some NU-affiliated pesantrens celebrate Eid and performed Eid prayer on the same day with Muhammadiyah s decisions. This is based on my personal observation. 13 Etimologically, hisab (Arabic) means calculation. It is a derivative form of h-s-b means to calculate. For explanation on hisab, see Susiknan Azhari, Ensiklopedi Hisab Rukyat, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2005). 14 Detailed explanation on Nahdlatul Ulama s position regarding ru ya can be found in A. Aziz Masyhuri, Masalah Keagamaan: Hasil Muktamar dan Munas Ulama Nahdlatul Ulama Kesatu/1926 s/d Ketigapuluh/2000 (Depok: Qultum Media, 2004),

9 Muhammadiyah s insistence in adopting the method it employed was also blamed as the factor for the irreconcilable dispute. 15 The scientist further asserted that by using a more advanced technology the dispute can actually be avoided. In other words, according to him, it is the reluctance of Muhammadiyah to adopt a more modern technology that had worsened the situation. As a result, unlike other Muslim countries such as Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar, Indonesia had two versions of the Eid in that year: Muhammadiyah s Eid coincided with the majority of Muslim countries while NU and the government s version was a day later. 16 While the Eid celebration ran peacefully despite differences and controversies on the grass-root level, the dispute resumed at another level. Having been accused of employing outdated method, Syamsul Anwar of Muhammadiyah s Majelis Tarjih maintained in defence that the method employed by NU which the government endorsed is much more outdated. 17 Moreover, some commentators even confidently argued that if the moon s appearance is considered, Muhammadiyah s version of Eid day is much closer to the truth. 18 However, none of government officials and others who endorsed the opposite position responded to Muhammadiyah see also Accessed on September 10, Based on Decree of Minister of Religious Affair of the Republic of Indonesia, Number 148 Year The copy of the document can be accessed through: al1432h.pdf. Accessed on September 10, Accessed on September 10, nama-dan-awal-bulan-qomariyah.html. Access was done on September 10,

10 This description is a factual example of how modes of thought influence fatwā. It has long been acknowledged that the ḥisāb method is regarded as modern since it is based on astronomical and mathematical calculations while ru ya only accepts direct vision of the crescent, although the vision also involves the use of advanced technology. The debate, therefore, has wider implications on the issue of compatibility of Islamic law and modern science. The method adopted also mirrors and conditions divergent modes of thought of groups concerned. In the study of fatwā issued by these selected fatwā-agencies, this thesis confines itself to the period of post-new Order Indonesia for several reasons. The foremost is the collapse of New Order reign in This collapse has ushered considerable changes in political and religious life in Indonesia. Two most significant and particularly relevant of these are political openness or political liberalization and freedom of religious expression. Suharto s Orde Baru was featured by authoritarianism and strict political surveillance. When the regime collapsed, political openness was clearly manifested in the mushrooming of political parties. In the first election in the post-suharto Indonesia (1999), forty eight parties participated with a significant number of them being Islamic political parties. Although the number of participating political parties fluctuated from one election to another, they nonetheless indicate the climate of political liberalization in the country. Moreover, political liberalization is also featured in the emergence of democracy in Indonesian political life. Relatively transparent elections and freedom of 10

11 speech are among a few consequences that have accompanied the new climate of political change. Post-Suharto Indonesia also manifests in the emergence of more open space for diverse religious expressions, especially from Muslim groups, including more formalistic and bold expressions of demands for Islamic law and legal principles in government and administration. 19 Accordingly, Islamic organizations in Indonesia found spacious room to freely elaborate and express their positions, principles and attitudes regarding significant issues affecting Indonesian society. Martin van Bruinessen, for instance, noted that the face of Islam in post-suharto Indonesian society diametrically differ from the previous era. 20 The space has also witnessed a conservative turn evident in religious violence and inter-religious conflicts as well as the emergence of transnational Islamic movements attempting to influence mainstream Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU. 21 This changing condition has also impacted on religious discourse and practice of Islamic law in Indonesia. Inevitably, Islamic law has been witnessing a considerable shift from earlier decades. During the era of political authoritarianism and oppression under Suharto s New Order (Orde Baru) in which political restriction was an integrated feature of the regime, 19 For more discussion on Islamic law dynamic within the context of contemporary Indonesian setting, please refer to Jan Michiel Otto (ed), Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010), especially Chapter 10. Comparative perspective on the subject can also be found in Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra (eds), Shari a and Politics in Modern Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003). 20 Martin van Bruinessen, Introduction: Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam and the Conservative Turn of the Early Twenty-First Century, in Martin van Bruinessen (ed), Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the Conservative Turn (Singapore: ISEAS, 2013), Ibid. 11

12 open expressions of Islam in public space was perceived as a threat to the stability of the state. Moreover, in the early days of Suharto s ascension to power, relationship between Islam and the state was characterized by hatred and suspicion. When massive student demonstration in 1998 forced Suharto to step down from presidency and many restrictions were lifted, a new phase of Indonesian politics was revealed. It was accompanied by unprecedented challenge to Muslims who continue to seek religious guidance and rulings from religious elite in resolving uncertainties and complexities of life encompassing many domains. While this has been ongoing long before the fall of Suharto, the changing context created less restriction on the expression of religious opinions including the domain of law and legal thought. This signifies the basis for selection of post-new Order Indonesia as point of departure for this study. B. Mode of Thought One of the major issues examined in this thesis is the function of mode of thought in conditioning fatwā. In its relation to religion, mode of thought is reflected in groups perspective of religion including what aspects of religion are deemed significant and what are marginalised or overlooked. It is also manifested in how religious teachings are conceived and applied. While mode of thought of groups may shift over time and may not be monolithic at any point in time, it is nonetheless possible to discern dominant modes of thought as manifested in ideas, views, opinions, and judgment held by the groups as they respond to their milieu as opposed to those that are marginal. 12

13 Three major mode of thought are relevant to this study, namely traditionalism, revivalism and reformism. The meanings attributed to these terms must be clarified at the outset to avoid confusion as they have been used by various scholars in diverse ways. Against the backdrop of Indonesian Islam s complex diversity, these typologies of mode of thought in understanding religious experience might be viewed as an oversimplification. However, such categorizations are ideal types which do not ignore the dynamic interaction within and between a particular social group s religious outlook while facilitating analyses of interplay and contestation among variety of modes of thought. As ideal types, these constructions are also meant to capture the main tendencies of mode of thought in the context of Indonesian Muslim society without over-generalising. In general, Nahdlatul Ulama is widely associated with traditionalistic Islam as opposed to Muhammadiyah which is predominantly classified as a reformist Islamic movement. MUI, on the other hand, being the amalgamation of all Indonesian Muslim groups and supported by the state, is often highlighted for its traditionalistic and conservative bent in Indonesian Islam. The meaning of these modes of thought as defined in this thesis and their usage in analysing fatwā will elucidate the extent to which such dominant perceptions of their mode of thought hold sway, although this in itself is not the major aim of the thesis. 13

14 Traditionalism According to Robert Towler, traditionalism is a style of religiousness which clings on the old ways. 22 Its main tendency is maintaining tradition it has received unquestioningly from generations of the past. Similarly, Karl Mannheim formulated traditionalism as a tendency to cling to vegetative patterns, to old ways of life. Given its dogmatism in according the ways of the past at the core of its religious belief, traditionalism can be seen as a potential as well as a manifest reaction against deliberate reforming tendencies and is characterised by fear of innovation. 23 Similarly, traditionalism in William Graham s understanding refers to an emphasis upon the historical authority of, and the continuity with or recovery of, norms and institutions basic to a particular cumulative tradition. 24 All these concepts of traditionalism indicate an attitude of reluctance in dealing with contemporary situation which shares the attitude of conservatism. However, Karl Mannheim viewed traditionalism and conservatism as two distinct concepts. For him, traditionalism is not necessarily bound up with political or other sorts of conservatism. 25 It is also obvious that traditionalism is closely related to tradition although the two can be clearly distinguished. Edward Shils describes tradition as anything which is transmitted or handed down from the past to 22 Robert Towler, The Need for Certainty: A Sociological Study of Conventional Religion (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1984), Karl Mannheim, Conservative Thought in Kurt H Wolff, From Karl Mannheim (London: Transaction Publishers, 1993), See William A Graham, Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 23, 3 (1993), Karl Mannheim, Conservative Thought in Kurt H Wolff, From Karl Mannheim (London: Transaction Publishers, 1993),

15 the present. 26 This formulation underlines the continuity or linkage with the past as an important element of tradition. Similarly, Bauman asserts another possible understanding of tradition as the element of historical continuity or social inheritance in culture, or the social process by which such continuity is achieved. More fundamentally, tradition can also be interpreted as the collective social inheritance of particular people, culture, society, group or collectivity and as such stands as the referent of its collective identity. 27 Similar in a way is a definition of the term offered by Harry B Acton who defines tradition as belief or practice transmitted from one generation to another and accepted as authoritative, or deferred to, without argument. 28 In its derivative form, William A Graham refers traditional to those societal norms and institutions that a culture perceives as congruent with or continuing older precedents and values while Phillips and Schochet argue that in most cases tradition is identified with enduring social practices and tacitness is often regarded as its signature. 29 Shaharuddin Maaruf s formulation of tradition is also instructive. He maintains that it is the cultural or value system which have been influential in moulding or shaping the world-view of a given people for a significant period in their cultural history. The cultural or 26 Edward Shils, Tradition (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1981), R. Bauman, Anthropology of Tradition, in Neil J Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (eds), International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (New York: Elsevier, 2001), See William A Graham, Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 23, 3 (1993), Mark Salber Phillips and Gordon Schocet, Preface in Mark Salber Phillips and Gordon Schocet (eds), Questions of Traditions (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2004), ix. 15

16 value system represents the stable core, which provides the basis for the society s responses to contemporary and future challenges. 30 It cannot be denied that above-mentioned understanding portrays tradition in neutral and positive rather than negative ways. The basic understanding of tradition connotes neutral and even positive meanings but an analogous meaning cannot be applied to traditionalism, since traditionalism is often understood in a pejorative sense. 31 Jeroslav Pelikan, for instance, makes a very sharp distinction between the two. For him, tradition is the living faith of the dead, while traditionalism is the dead faith of the living. 32 However, as tradition is intrinsically related to the past, 33 it is also sometimes pejoratively perceived. For example, it is sometimes used in comparison with Enlightenment and Renaissance movements that promote discontinuation with the past, since the past is perceived as a symbol of 30 Saharuddin Maaruf, One God, Many Paths: Essay on the Social Relevance of Religion in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Aliran Publication, 1980), In an Islamic context, both positive and negative connotations of traditionalism could also be found. Scholars such as Seyyed Hossein Nasr and his disciple Malaysian philosopher Osman Bakar, for example, are often categorized as the defenders of traditional Islam that engaged in promoting positive meanings of tradition. For Nasr, tradition is the principal milestone for spiritual authenticity and an infinite source of grace. Tradition in Nasr s thought is understood as spirituality and perennial philosophy of Islam that should be renewed and revived in facing the challenge of modernity. Furthermore, Nasr writes: at once al-din in the vastest sense of the word, which embraces all aspects of religion and its ramifications, al-sunnah, or that which, based upon sacred models, has become tradition as this word is usually understood, and silsilah, or the chain which relate each period, episode or stage of life and thought in the traditional world to the Origin, as one sees so clearly in Sufism. Tradition, therefore, is like a tree, the root of which are sunk through revelation in the Divine Nature and from which the trunk and branches have grown over the ages. See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World (London and New York: KPI Limited), Jersolav Pelikan, The Vindication of Tradition: The 1983 Jefferson Lecture in the Humanities (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984), Edward Shils, Tradition (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1981),

17 backwardness and primitiveness. 34 Tradition is also at times perceived negatively due to confusion in mistaking it with traditionalism 35 as the traditionalists have also irresponsibly hijacked traditions for their interests. Robert Towler describes traditionalism in terms of several salient features such as: a) firmly holding on to the past and shutting the gate of critical inquiry; b) cherishing the certainty of the stable and secure order lodged in the past; c) resistant to any kind of innovation; d) affirms and reinforces the established order; d) hostile to any change and alert in pressing innovative endeavours back into the established mould; e) strong tendency to avoid or dismiss all questions by directing all questions to an exclusive custodial authority. 36 In the context of Islam in Indonesia, apart from the above traits, traditionalism is also used to refer to the practice of religion that blends with adat, local practice or the way of the ancestors. 37 Concomitantly, the late Abdurrahman Wahid, the former leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, described traditionalist Muslims as follows: [they] are widely supposed to be rather backward in orientation and ossified in their understanding of Islamic society and thought. It is held that their persistence in upholding orthodox Islamic law leads them to reject modernity and a rational approach of life. Similarly, in matters of theology, their determined adherence to the scholasticism of al-asy ari and al-maturidi is said to have resulted in a fatalistic understanding of submission to God s will and disregard for the exercise of free-will and independent 34 William A Graham, Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 23, 3 (1993). 35 Jeroslav Pelikan, The Vindication of Tradition: The 1983 Jefferson Lecture in the Humanities (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984). 36 Robert Towler, The Need for Certainty: A Sociological Study of Conventional Religion (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), Martin van Bruinessen, Traditions for the Future: The Reconstruction of Traditionalist Discourse within NU, in Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1996),

18 thinking. Traditionalists are furthermore accused of being too other-worldly in their practice of ritual Islamic mysticism (tasawuf) Thus the commonly held view of traditionalists is that they are wholly passive community unable to cope with the dynamic challenges of modernisation, the sort of community that scholars regarded as belonging to a dying tradition. 38 In the Indonesian context, Islamic religious traditionalism is manifested in the reverence for tradition or adat and its incorporation into religious teachings and practice. Moreover, it is also associated with adherence to mystical orientation of Islam and its influence on the attitude towards worldly life. Despite the influence of modernism, traditionalism as a religious orientation in Islam continues to be a major type of religious orientation among Muslims. In general, Muslim traditionalists are characterised by certain common traits: Firstly, they adhere dogmatically to selective interpretations of the Qurʼān and Sunna without engaging with competing views. 39 As Binyamin Abrahamov noted, traditionalism is built on several foundations of which strict adherence to selective teachings of the Qurʼān and Sunna of the Prophet is a major one. Consequently, any kinds of interpretations not in accord with its selected meaning are disregarded although traditionalists do not object to the diversity in the understanding of Islamic teachings. In understanding the Qurʼān, the use of reason is very limited. Hence, 38 Abdurrahman Wahid, Foreword, in in Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), xv. 39 Karim Douglas Crow, Roots of Radical Sunni Traditionalism Fear of Reason and the Hashwiyah (Singapore: Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2008), 19; George Makdisi, Remarks on Traditionalism in Islamic Religious History, in Carl Leiden (ed), The Conflict of Traditionalism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East (Austin: The Humanities Research Center the University of Texas, 1966); and Binyamin Abrahamov, Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998). 18

19 traditionalist can only accept certain types of interpretations of the Qurʼān and do not evaluate competing views on ground of principles. As Seyyed Hossein Nasr explicates, traditional Islam accepts the Noble Quran as the Word of God in both content and form: as the earthly embodiment of God s Eternal Words, uncreated and without temporal origin. It also accepts the traditional commentaries upon the Quran, ranging from the linguistic and historical to the sapiental and metaphysical. 40 This strict adherence to selective readings of the Qurʼān and Sunna is termed as isnad 41 paradigm of traditional Islam. This paradigm is based on derivation of authority primarily or even solely from linkage to a sacred tradition through a chain of personal transmission linking intervening authorities to an original source. 42 For traditionalists, the meaning of the Qurʼān is self-fulfilling prophecy in nature, and for this reason it does not need any complicated interpretation. In technical terms, traditionalists believe that the Qurʼān is both qath iy alwurūd (transmitted in very fixed and unquestionable method) and qath iy aldalāla, which means that the meaning of the Qurʼān is also fixed and undisputable. 43 Secondly, Islamic traditionalism stands on the perception that pious forebears of Islam are unchallenged. Azhar Ibrahim calls this tendency as 40 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World (London and New York: KPI Limited), Isnad is a technical term in the study of hadith that basically means chain. This term refers to the chain of scholars or ulama in transmitting hadith. 42 William A Graham, Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 23, 3 (1993), Manbaul Ngadhimah, Potret Keberagamaan Islam di Indonesia (Studi Pemetaan Pemikiran dan Gerakan Islam), Innovatio, Vol. VII, 14, (2008),

20 romanticism of the medieval past. 44 Conditioned by this attitude, Islamic traditionalism has a tendency to give overriding importance to religious knowledge of the past which it deems as perfect and complete. Moreover, traditionalists believe that ideas, knowledge and values propagated by forebears are at the same time relevant and constitute truth which cannot be ignored. The same attitude is also applied to the formulation and product of thinking of ulamā of the past deemed as complete, final and absolute. As a result, any attempts to contextually understand Islam or interpret its teachings contextually is forbidden on the basis that such interpretations were never practiced by pious forebearers (salaf al-salīh). Hence, traditionalists are also often trapped in a symbolic type of Islam. For example, in certain circles of traditionalist Muslims, emphasis is given to genealogical origin in the belief that only descendants of the Prophet are authorised to teach Islam. In Indonesian history, the debate over privilege accorded of sayyids and habaib (the descendants of the Prophet) instanced by Jami at Khair and al-irsyad is illustrative. While the latter give importance to Muslims based on quality of their devotion to God (taqwa), genealogy signifies a significant factor in the mode of thinking of the former. 45 Thirdly, Islamic traditionalism is ambivalent to reason and generally perceives it as limited. Amidst the significance of rationality in the contemporary context of modernity traditionalism is becoming much more assertive in limiting the role of reason in interpreting religious text. Its 44 Azhar Ibrahim, Contemporary Islamic Discourse in the Malay-Indonesian World: Critical Perspective (Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2014), See Deliar Noer, Introduction in Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas- Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), xv. 20

21 attitude towards reason is based on the conviction of intrinsic limitations of reason which prevents it from determining truth. 46 Azhar Ibrahim argues that this trait of traditionalism resembles medieval mysticism which sees reason as the enemy of human beings in achieving spirituality. 47 He also maintains that the reluctance and also suspicion of traditionalists in employing reason is influenced by Sufi theosophical speculation which draws sharp distinction between reason and revelation, in which the former is seen as absolutely fallible. 48 As the result of this limited employment of reason, traditionalists are characterised by uncritical and dogmatic reliance on religious traditions. 49 The fourth characteristic of traditionalism featured in Muslims mode of thought is the fear of innovation. 50 It should be made clear that innovation in this context refers to innovation in thought and social practices and not in terms of religious rituals. This distinction is important, since traditionalist, despite their fear of innovation, often create rituals that are deemed as bid a (heresy) by revivalist and reformist. 51 This fear of innovation is further strengthened by the tendency of glorifying the past and of perceiving the past as the only ideal that Muslims must refer to. Consequently, this mode of thought defines their reluctant attitude toward social change. As Hisham 46 Wan Muhammad Ali and Muhammad Uthman Ali, Islam dan Modernisma (Kuala Lumpur: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, 1977), Azhar Ibrahim, Contemporary Discourse, Ibid, Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, Changing Roles, Unchanging Perceptions and Institutions: Traditionalism and Its Impact on Women and Globalization in Muslim Societies in Asia, The Muslim World, 97 (July 2007), Benyamin Abrahamov, Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), chapter 2, In the section on reformism, I will discuss types of orthodoxies that among other things pertaining ritual innovation. 21

22 Sharabi argues, traditionalists are usually bound with historicism as they see the past as the locus and not the future. Therefore, as Azhar asserts, traditionalists views are generally the opposite of the ideas of the reformists who advocate progressive change in society. 52 Fifthly, traditionalists are usually closely linked to traditional Islamic institutions and use those institutions as medium in the spread of their ideas transmitted from the past. They tend to dominate religious institutions such as mosques, religious learning centres, madrasa and pesantrens. In Indonesia, traditionalists also often dominated state-affiliated Islamic institution. Fatwā institution in Indonesia represented by Majelis Ulama Indonesia is an example of state-affiliated religious institution dominated by traditionalminded religious scholars. This mode of thinking impact on religious thought including fatwā. The dominance of traditionalism bears implications on the attitude towards social change. They are reluctant to accept social change since from their point of view surrendering to present needs implies compromising Islamic belief. Although they resist change, traditionalists often gradually accommodate and adjust to changing conditions. However, they do this on the ground of exigency rather than principles. They continue to uphold selected religious formulations they deem authentic as they pragmatically adapt to the demands of their milieu. 52 Azhar Ibrahim, Contemporary Discourse, 5. 22

23 Revivalism Revivalism refers to a type of mode of thought which is politically assertive and reflects a more conscious intellectual and political formulation compared to religious traditionalism. Some revivalists are engaged in political activism and use politics as a means to achieve their ideals. They include, but not limited to, personalities such as Abul A la al-mawdudi, 53 Hasan al-banna, 54 Sayyid Qutb 55 and Taqiyuddin an-nabhani who are identified with the agenda of institutionalising an Islamic order or Islamising society through political means. The founding of Islamist political parties and organizations with such a mode of thought has intensified their immense influence in the global spread of Islamic revivalism in the contemporary Muslim world, including Southeast Asia. 56 Basically, Islamic revivalism is another response of Muslims to the challenges of modernity which is featured by its strong hostility towards the West. The seeds of religious revivalism have taken place more than a century ago in the context of colonialism in the 19 th century. It is from this point that puritanical stance of revivalist mode of 53 On Mawdudi s thought and role in the making of Islamic revivalism, see Seyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Seyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawlana Mawdudi s Biography The Muslim World Journal, 85, 1-2 (1995), For further account on Hasan al-banna see Gudrun Krämer, Hasan al-banna (London: Oneworld Publications, 2009). 55 On Sayyid Qutb s political thought see Sayyid Qutb and William E Shepard, Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam (Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill, 1996); Muhammad Hafiz Diyab, Sayyid Qutb: al-khitāb wa al- Iduyulujiyya (Cairo: Dar al-thaqafa al-jadida, 1989); Sayed Khatab, The Power of Sovereignty: The Political and Ideological Philosophy of Sayyid Qutb (London and New York: Routledge, 2006); Adnan A Musallam, From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundation of Radical Islamism (Westport: Praeger Publisher, 2005); John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origin of Radicalism Islamism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Ibrahim M Abu Rabi, Discourse, Power and Ideology in Modern Islamic Revivalist Thought: Sayyid Qutb The Muslim World Journal, 81, 3-4 (1991), Ira M Lapidus, Islamic Revival and Modernity: The Contemporary Movements and the Historical Paradigms, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 40, 4 (1997),

24 thought emerged. In the attempt to alleviate the socio-economic plight of the Muslims ravaged by the impact of colonial policies, these groups maintained the conviction that religion can facilitate the progress of the community. However, their revivalist orientation conditioned their view that the way forward was to return to the pristine past of Islam which was constructed based on their image of Muslim history and Islamic culture. In this mode of thinking, Islam as practiced by Muslims has been corrupted by the influence of local and popular cultures. This syncretic type of Islam to their mind had contributed to the stagnation of Muslims and had to be reformed in order for Muslims to progress. 57 In the contemporary period, this mode of thought is rooted in internal and external factors impacting on newly independent Muslim states and societies in meeting the demands and challenges of social change. Since the 1970s in Indonesia, revivalist ideas had begun circulating among student circles and some groups. However, restrictions that the New Order regime imposed upon dissenting voices had suppressed their demands. In the subsequent period, the fall of Suharto s regime has facilitated the space for their manifestations in the religious landscape of Islamic thought in contemporary Indonesia. While this mode of thought dominates radical movements and political groups such as Hizbut Tahrir and Front Pembela Islam, its salient traits are not confined to such groups. A central motive in this mode of thinking is the notion that the advancement of Western modernism has induced secularism of state and 57 Fauzan Saleh, Fauzan Saleh, Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in 20th Century Indonesia: A Critical Survey (Leiden: Brill, 2001),

25 society which revivalists associate pejoratively with relativity of human values, objectification of the world or nature and the overthrow of religion. 58 Therefore, revivalist discourse is strongly bent on reviving and returning to the fundamental teachings and precepts of the Islamic faith. 59 However, in this mode of thought, what is deemed fundamental in religious teachings is exclusively defined by the group at the expense of others. This exclusive trait in revivalist mode of thought is manifested in its credo that Islam is not a mere religion but al-dīn, a comprehensive religion, a total way of life and the only path to salvation and that the Islamic system is the most legitimate and authentic. While generally Muslim do not object to these formulations, the meaning that revivalists accord to these, however, are markedly different and which they alone have the prerogative of defining to the exclusion of all others. The claim of absoluteness in its formulation of Islam is also manifested in its strong tendency to regard other Muslims who adhere to other interpretations and practice of Islam as un-islamic or even worse, outside the fold of Islam. 60 In this mode of thought, Islam and state are not separable. This doctrine is best described in terms of Islam as dīn wa dawla, or that Islam embodies not only religious matters but also defines how a state is run. The separation of dīn (religion) and dawla (state) is inconceivable as religion is perceived as both a polity and a method of government. Their denouncement of the 58 Shaharudin Maaruf, 2001, p 3 59 Hussin Mutalib, Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic State (Singapore: University of Singapore Press, NUS, 1993), Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the Jama at-i Islami: The Origins, Thoery and Practice of Islamic Revivalism, in Ali Rahnema (ed), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (Kuala Lumpur and Beirut: SIRD and World Book Publishing, 2005),

26 present social order and insistence on what they define as the Islamic alternative reflect elements of utopian mode of thinking. 61 Revivalists do not see the relevance of classical Islamic tradition as a legacy that should be preserved or revaluated so that it can contribute to the development of the community. At the same time they adopt the popular credo of returning to the Qurʼān and Sunna. In fact, this relegates the entire vista of classical learning to the margins with the exception of few scholars like Ibn Taymiyya and al-mawardi. 62 Unlike the traditionalists who cherish and adhere strictly to the opinions of savants of the classical period, revivalists reject this as taqlīd and attempt to reconstruct the past based on ijtihād which they consider pristine and authentic. However, their lack adequate grounding in both religious sciences and modern knowledge impairs their capacity for genuine reform. Revivalism is not anti-modernity. Zainah Anwar, for instance, maintains that in contrast to stereotypes that most Islamic revivalists are not educated, anti-modern, and society misfits, they are in fact well-educated, upwardly mobile and motivated individuals. 63 It is hence unsurprising that while harbouring strong hostility to the West and the existing order it deems secular, western concepts including those of state and government are heavily 61 Hussin Mutalib, Islamic Revivalism in ASEAN States, Asian Survey, 30, 9 (1990), R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islamic Revival: Catalysts, Categories, and Consequences, in Shireen T Hunter (ed), The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), Zainah Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the Students (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publication, 1987), 2. 26