Security Trends. Analysis. 1 st May to 31 st May

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1 Trends NCCI s Security Trends provides internal advice for NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside your organization. If forwarded internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed on to any third parties. Security Trends 1 st May to 31 st May [Type text]

2 The NCCI Security Trends is provided to member NGOs once a month as an informational and advisory report on possible trends, threats and incidents based on information received from NGOs, the media, NCCI focal points, international organizations and official sources. Every reasonable effort is made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this analysis. NCCI collates information from reliable sources. Where a source is in doubt, NCCI seeks to corroborate that information. There may be an occasion when some information is included and its accuracy cannot be guaranteed. This typically occurs with an emerging or developing situation when it is considered in the best interests of NCCI s member organisations to be made aware of any available information. We thank you in advance for NOT disseminating this document and ensuring that it is ONLY circulated between members within your organisation General information is available to members at the NCCI website Please do not hesitate to contact us at communication@ncciraq.org 2 NCCI We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization

3 Table of Contents New Displacement due to Floods and Related Security Impact..5 Initial Election Results Impacting Security Environment Battle for Fallujah Continues while Government Slowly Regains Control of Ramadi Continued Violence in the Northern Governorates... 8 Increase in Intra-Shia Tensions in the Southern Governorates First Crude Oil Sale by KRG Increases Tensions with Baghdad NCCI We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization

4 Map of Iraq and Governorates 4 NCCI We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization

5 New Displacement due to Floods and Related Security Impact In April, militants belonging to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-sham (ISIS) took control of the Nuaimiyah Dam, 5km south of the city of Fallujah. After closing the dam, floods destroyed villages and farms across a 200sqkm area west of Baghdad, leaving tens of thousands homeless and at high risk of waterborne diseases like cholera 1. The latest wave of IDPs was already standing at 72,325 families, according to the Ministry of Migration and Displacement (MoMD), and although it is not clear how many more people are displaced, the UN estimates that at the height of the floods between 12,000 and 20,000 families were forced to leave their homes 2. The Abu Ghraib Mayor stated that a total of 49 villages were flooded and 40,000 families were affected 3. The water is now slowly receding from Abu Ghraib and some families started to return home. Photo by Mohammed Al-Bahbahani/WFP According to the Mayor of Abu Ghraib, as a result of the flooding a total of 10,406 houses are damaged. 49 schools are closed and 2 schools are totally destroyed 4. There is also a severe shortage of potable water and there will be a long-term negative impact on the community as a lot of crops have been lost. Floodwaters remain widespread and are still over one meter high in some locations. Anbar IDPs who were residing in temporary shelter were very exposed to the water and are now displaced again. IDP families are in urgent need of shelter, non-food items, food items, water tanks, hygiene kits and health care. Several cases of people suffering from waterborne diseases, particularly those who were displaced from Anbar, have been reported but none have been confirmed so far. The ISF Special Forces announced on May 10 th that they regained control of the dam so in the near future the danger of having more floods should be averted. The Anbar IDPs affected by the floods have no money to approach health services which makes their situation even more precarious. This might lead to increasing frustration towards the government for their inability to halt the militants violence. ISIS primary intention was to slow/ halt ISF movements in some districts around Fallujah. It is thus likely that militants will continue to target the ISF inside the Anbar governorate or in the capital to distract ISF efforts and release some of the military pressure on the Fallujah area IOM DTM April Report recorded 74,010 families 3 NCCI Field Situation Report May 28 th NCCI We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization

6 Initial Election Results Impacting Security Environment On May 19 th 2014, initial election results were released. The results indicate that PM Nouri al-maliki s party, the State of Law Coalition, won the largest share of parliamentary seats. The voter turnout for the elections was 60% 5 and because of the ongoing situation in Anbar, the majority of Sunni voters were not able to cast their ballots due to the lack of security in the area. Following the election results and the general stagnation in the political sphere in Iraq, levels of violence in the week following the results substantially increased across the country. On May 20 th, eight soldiers were killed by militants in Kirkuk 6. During the same week, 24 Shia pilgrims were killed in a series of bombings in Baghdad 7. Photo by Karim Kadim/AP The release of the elections results was followed by multiple allegations of fraud. Former PM and leader of the Iraqiyya coalition, Iyad Allawi, publicly questioned the fairness of the elections 8. Accusations emerged from the Shia community, meaning that a Shia coalition is unlikely to happen. The strained relations of Maliki s party with Sunni and Kurdish parties will further complicate forming a government. Sunni militants continue their violent campaign against Shiites like they did on the 22 nd when suicide bombs killed tens of Shia Muslim pilgrims in Baghdad. Consequently, the election results have led to an increase in violence against the Shia population specifically and to an increased number of violent deaths in general. According to the Iraq Body Count website, there has been a definite increase in deaths, especially in Baghdad, within the weeks following the announcement of the election results. The security might deteriorate throughout Iraq in the next weeks. The preliminary election results and the inability of many Sunnis to vote, could lead to increased frustration of the Sunni population and more support for ISIS and other militant groups. As violence continues to increase throughout the country, forming a coalition government will be hard to achieve in the near future, which also makes any shift in the security dynamics unlikely. The next few weeks are expected to witness negotiations on sensitive issues such as oil and budget disagreements between Erbil and Baghdad NCCI We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization

7 Battle for Fallujah Continues while Government Slowly Regains Control of Ramadi On May 8 th, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) launched a large scale military operation to re-take control of Fallujah. The military crackdown in areas surrounding the city is ongoing, with artillery and air strikes continuing to target different city neighborhoods. However the ISF seem unable to gain traction against the different militant groups. Several media sources reported that there were multiple civilian fatalities and that health facilities in the city are overwhelmed and may be forced to close down. Fallujah s main hospital said 366 people had been killed in the months-long conflict 9. Insecurity levels in Ramadi have also heightened because of new military operations. On May 16 th, wide-scale operations were initiated in eastern Ramadi and the ISF have started implementing curfews. Photo by A. al-mashhadani/reuters According to official figures released by the MoMD, the number of Anbar IDPs is 72,325 families (IOM DTM April Report recorded 74,010 families). The recent military operations have displaced even more people, in the past few days alone more than 35,000 people have been reportedly displaced 10. The mayor of Habanya district, east of Ramadi, stated that the district has become densely populated and there are no remaining places to accommodate displaced families. For civilians still remaining in conflict areas it is increasingly difficult to escape and aid organizations continue to encounter difficulties to operate in these areas. Moreover on May 18 th, the head of Fallujah General Hospital said that the hospital will be closed soon due to the lack of medical staff and the constant bombardments near or on the hospital. As the intensity of clashes continues between ISF and militants and neither side is making any major gains, a resolution in the near future is not likely. Most government resources remain absorbed by the coalition-building process, which makes any shift in the security dynamics unlikely in the next weeks. In order to relieve military pressure from Fallujah, insurgents might try to carry out attacks in other parts of Anbar and in other governorates such as Ninewa, Salah ad-din, and Diyala. ISIS could also conduct revenge bomb attacks on government and Shia civilian targets, especially in the capital. Such attacks would give greater momentum to government military operations and to the legitimacy of its actions ICRC Report 7 NCCI We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization

8 Continued Violence in the Northern Governorates Levels of violence in the northern governorates increased substantially in the second half of May, with several mass-casualty incidents targeting civilian populations in all provinces. In line with previous forecasts, there was an increased number of IED and VBIED attacks and a continued targeting of security forces and civilians. Between May 10 th and May 12 th, a total of 25 police officers, 22 ISF elements, and 7 civilians were killed in Nineveh and Salahuddin 11. In Diyala, four Iranian workers were also killed when a bomb struck a vehicle belonging to an Iranian company building a gas pipeline. Nineveh continued to attract the majority of attacks, with several VBIEDs detonating in Mosul, causing scores of casualties. On May 25 th, a Turkish consulate convoy carrying Consul General Ozturk Yilmaz, heading to Erbil was also attacked in Mosul 12. Photo from World Bulletin ISIS militants continue to increase their presence in their old strongholds in the northern governorates. They continue to carry out deadly campaigns to cripple the security of these governorates and to further ignite the longstanding frustration of Sunni populations. The attack on the worker of the gas pipeline in Diyala and the attempted murder of a Turkish consul just days before the KRG sold its share of crude oil to Turkey, signifies a continued attempt to harm Iraq s energy sector and further destabilize the central Iraqi government. As the oil sector is the backbone of the Iraqi economy, this will influence the entire country and will most likely provoke more sectarian tension and violence. The continuous provocations by militant groups, predominantly by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-sham (ISIS), are leading to deterioration in the security situation in the northern governorates with no sign of stabilization in the near future. The targeting of security forces and the energy sector makes it clear that the main goal for the militants is to harm Baghdad and the Iraqi government as much as possible. They are thus likely to continue to target the energy sector to put Maliki s political party in Baghdad under increased pressure, while they are trying to form a coalition government NCCI We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization

9 Increase in Intra-Shia Tensions in the Southern Governorates In the last two months it became clear that there is a growing disagreement between the three biggest Shiite Muslim parties: the Sadrist bloc, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the State of Law Coalition. These three former allies decided to compete separately in the April 30 th parliamentary elections, and tensions between each of the parties increased after the amount of votes for the latter exceeded expectations, with more than 94 parliamentary seats being won. The Sadrist bloc and ISCI do not want to form a coalition government with PM Al-Maliki and do not want to grant him a third term. These continuing divisions between the main Shia parties, is being reflected by an increase in intra-shia violence in the southern governorates of Iraq. Photo by AP Despite an absence of car bombs over the past two weeks in the southern governorates, which is a sign that Sunni militants have maintained their focus upon the central and northern areas of the country, drive-by shootings targeting individuals in the provinces of Basra, Maysan and Qadisiya were reported 13. However in line with previous forecasts most incidents remained concentrated in the Babil governorate, with IEDs targeting ISF checkpoints and an increase in tribal fighting between the groups in Babil and Dhi-Qar. The parliamentary elections and the associated political maneuvering of individuals and blocs appear to have provoked and further inflamed existing rivalries and disputes on the ground in Shiamajority areas in the South. This in turn is impacting to some extent the wider security situation. As political divisions are expected to continue over the coming months, with Al-Maliki s State of Law Coalition looking to draw individuals out of existing blocs to enable them to collect enough seats to form a stable government, there is a danger is that this will manifest itself in increased violence and tension between Shia populations. It is highly likely that Maliki will not be able to form an alliance with any of the other main Shia political parties and if this is the case then formation of a new government could take months to facilitate. The longer this void exists, the more room will remain for those wishing to force their own influence upon proceedings, whether this be through peaceful protest or violent means NCCI We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization

10 First Crude Oil Sale by KRG increases tensions with Baghdad The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad have been at odds with each other about budget allocations and the centralized control of oil revenues during the past year. The dispute evolved to Kurdish oil contracts being deemed illegal by Baghdad, and to who should have authority over oil sales from the KRG. Unable to solve the dispute, Baghdad has cut off the Kurdish region s budget for the past four months, thereby halting salary payments of Kurdish civil servants. The continuing tensions between the KRG and the Government of Iraq (GoI) in Baghdad have reached a critical point since the KRG made its first sale of crude oil on May 27 th despite strong opposition from Baghdad. Photo by Rudaw More than a fifth of Kurdistan s people are on a government payroll that has swollen to 840 billion dinars ($722 million) a month. As the KRG is currently unable to pay these wages, Kurdish businesses are giving loans to the KRG 14. This however is not sustainable so the KRG started to export oil via Turkey in order to compensate for the loss. "We are open to dialog and negotiations with Baghdad but we want 17 percent from the Iraqi budget" Barzani told the regional parliament. Iraq's central government however says it has filed legal action against Turkey and the pipeline operator because Turkey had violated the terms of an agreement between the two countries 15. As oil underpins Iraq's economy, making up more than 95% of its budget revenues, the Kurdish oil sales create increasing tensions while PM Al-Maliki looks to form a new coalition government. The disputes between Baghdad and Erbil are dividing the country even more along ethnic and sectarian lines. The latest development could further strain relations between Baghdad and the KRG, as well as between Iraq and Turkey. The Kurds could use the current negotiations to form a new coalition government to secure concessions about the oil sales and national budget allocations. If the GoI however is not willing to negotiate, this might lead to more frustration among the Kurdish people and push them even further away from Baghdad, The Kurdish Region of Iraq (IKR) is becoming increasingly autonomous and direct oil sales such as this could be used as a bargaining tool by the KRG when negotiating to secure concessions from the GoI NCCI We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization