THE NATURE OF PURU$A IN MIMAMSA

Transcription

1 CHAPTER- 3 THE NATURE OF PURU$A IN MIMAMSA In this chapter we shall exclusively discuss Mimamsa philosophy with special reference to the nature of puru~a. In Indian tradition, it is this school which gives a detailed account of moral deeds and moral actions. It is said to be a sovereignty of ethical law. 1 "The Mimamsa is a philosophy of active life and teaches the indispensability and inescapability of ethical action, as ethical action is the supreme governing force of the universe. The basic concepts of such a philosophy are, first, the agent of ethical action must be real; second, action itself must be real; third, it must be the controlling and guiding force of the universe and fourd1, the universe as the field of action has to be real. The Mimamsa expounds and attempts to defend four of these. " 2 In the Mimamsa system, emphasis on duty and activism is justified for two reasons. "first, the sunyavada (nihilism) of the Buddhist philosophy and the extreme asceticism of the Jaina system endangered the social development of human life; second, the over emphasize on the speculative aspect of Vedic philosophy, which had resulted in giving preference to knowledge of the self (atma-vidya) or the unmanifested cause of the manifested universe, has led to the neglect of the scientific interpretation of the Vedic terms as enjoined in the 2 P.T. Raju, Structural Depths of Indian Thought, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1985, pp Ibid., p

2 braluna7ja-s.... This system tries to counter balance the extremist views of the heterodox schools of Buddhism and Jainism. It also tries to compensate for the negligence of the orthodox system towards the ritualistic and the activistic aspect of the Vedic thought. " 3 J aimini was the first composer of Mimarilsasutra and Sahara was the first commentator on his work. Later on, Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhakara popularized and developed this philosophy, albeit in their different styles and distinct views. After them, it was Murari Misra and many more who interpreted this work though they did not agree with each other on several issues. The four major questions which come under the perspective of the nature of puru$a and are dealt with by the Mimamsa, are as follows: (i) (ii) (iii) dharma; action and its relation to dlwrma; the subject matter of the Vedas with special reference to the idea of dharma; and (iv) the method of interpretation of the Vedas with illustrations by means.of which one can understand them, discussed at length by this school. This system is the longest of all with two thousand seven hundred sutra-s arranged in twelve chapters, each of which has eight parts consisting of four 3 I.C. Sharma, Ethical Philosophies of India, Johnsen Publishing Company, Britain, 1991, pp

3 parts each with the exception of three. 4 Each part of a chapter deals with different aspects of the four questions which constitute the subject matter of this system. The central theme of Mimari1sa is the adoption of dharma as enjoined in Vedas. It is dharma that controls the universe and produces for the agent of action what he desires and what his action deserves. It is the governing ethical force of the universe. The sutra begins with the enquiry into dharma, 5 i.e. What is the nature of dharnw?, what are the means to knowledge of dharma? To both these queries, the sutra says that dharma is indicated by means of the Vedas as conducive to the highest good It does not stand for merit only. It helps in achieving the goal and leads to success in this as well as life beyond. Dhanna in itself is self-sufficient and infallible. The only source of dharma is vidhi-s (Vedic injunctions). THE NATURE OF PURU$A All the inquiries related to dharma are concerned with puru$a, an empirical moral agent. So, it is important to know the nature of this agent. As stated in the earlier chapter, Mimamsa philosophy is quite similar to that of Nyaya- Vaise~ikas with regard to the nature of puru$a. Puru$a consists of sarlra 4 5 K.T. Pandurangi, Purvamimamsa from an Interdisciplinary Point of View, Vol. II, Part 6, Center for Studies in Civilizations, 2006, p. xxv. Atlulto dharmajijfiiisa. Mlmtililsastitra,

4 (physical body), indriya-s (sense-organs), manas (mind), jfitma (consciousness) and atma (soul). Each of these perform different functions and partake in performing action. Apart from these constituents, the role of apfirva, i.e. an unseen force generated by the past acts of dharma and adharma, (virtue ai1d vice) is very important. Sartra is the product of elements as prt!zvi etc. It is limited, unconscious, inactive and thus perishable. lndriya-s, like sartra are also perishable. They are the instruments for the cognition of external objects. They are unconscious instruments of the atman. Five indriya-s are derived from five elements. Manas is also considered as an indriya but it is an internal organ which perceives the apprehensions of the indriya-s about external objects and also the qualities of the atman like cognition and even pleasure and pain etc. It assists the cognition of the external objects through the external sense organs. Unlike Nyaya-Vaise$ika, Mimamsa holds that manas is not a!ju (atomic). It is also not quick in motion. Indeed, it is vibhu (all pervasive) and aspandan (motionless). It is neither a cause nor an effect. Though it is all pervading but limited by the sartra. Manas, according to Kumarila, is an unconscious instrument of atman and atman is controller of the manas. It is all pervasive because it can not be touched and produced by any.other object. It is pervasive like space and time but functions within the sartra only. Prabhakara does not agree with Kumarila regarding manas. He holds that manas is a!ju and quick in motion. According to him, manas is an internal 82

5 organ of the titman. It supervises the functions of the external indriya-s. It is eternal and in contact with titman on account of merit and demerit. Mimarilsa accepts without reserve the doctrine of the existence of the self or atman. 6 Amza, according to them is puru~a which is distinct from sarlra, -indriya-s and manas. It is nitya (permanent reality) and atmajyoti~z (selfilluminated). The titman is distinct from sarlra because : 1. "Activities like breathing, winking etc. do not belong to the body. These are not found after the death even though the body is found. Therefore, these are the attributes of some other entity that is distinct from the body. 2. Joy, sorrow etc., are cognized by oneself not by others. The bodily attributes are perceived by others, but these are not perceived by others. Hence, these belong to atman. 3. By the desire also atman can be inferred. A person desires something that is already known to him. Therefore, the knower and desirer should be one and the same. This means there is a permanent titman. This argument is intended to refute the view that the vijfiiina, that is momentary, can serve the purpose of the cognizer. The cognizer has to be enduring. 4. By memory and recognition also a permanent titman can be inferred. These arise only in the case of the objects that are already known and to the same agent who knew. This proves an enduring agent. 6 Mimti.nisasti.tra, pp.18-24; Slokavartika, pp

6 5. The expenence as ahmn, i.e. 'I' establishes the atman. The atman Is capable of knowing itself, i.e. svasarizvedya. 6. The initiative to continue the work that was done half way is an earlier day on the next day also indicates an enduring self. " 7 The Purvamimarilsa concept of atman is broadly similar to that of Nyaya-Vaise$ ikas. However, Bhaga differs from them on the concept of at man. He discusses atman under Atmavada in Slokavartika. Atman is nitya (eternal), vibhu (all pervading), distinct from sarlra, indriya-s and manas. It takes different sarlra-s in different births and transmigrates from one sarlra to anqther and serves as the agent and enjoyer. 8 When it is said that he is an agent, it is not meant that he himself actually performs the actions. Whatever activities are performed by his sarlra and indriya-s, he initiates them. The sarlra and indriya-s can not perform any activities on their own. Atman has to initiate them. That is why, he is an agent. lfiiina, suklw-duf:zkha, iccha, prayatna, raga, dve~a, smhsktira, dharma and adharrna are the modifications of the atman but not eternal like atma. These modifications do not take place in the state of deep sleep. Prabhakara differs from Bhaga on two points. One, he does not admit of any change or modification of atman when cognition arises. Two, he holds that the 7 8 K.T. Pandurangi, 'Metaphysics and Ontology of Purvamimamsa' in Parvamlmiinl.sa from an Interdisciplinary Point of View, Vol.II, Part 6. (ed.) K.T. Pandurangi, Centre for Studies in Civilizations, 2006, p Slokavartika, Ratnabharti Series-3,

7 atman is not cognized as an object of cognition as 'aharh', or 'I'. The atman always reflects as an agent in the cognition and never as an object. One and the same cannot be both subject and the object. All cognitions consists of a knower, an object and knowledge. The cognition of these three together is called sanivit in the Prabhakara tradition. The sarhvit is self-revealing while atman and the object are not self-revealing. He argues that if atman is considered as selfrevealing, then, one will have to have the cognition of atman even during deep sleep. In all, the entire unit, i.e. sarlra, indriya-s, manas and atman is calledjlvdtman, who is an empirical moral agent. This agent has been given the important position in Mlmarilsa system. He is supposed to perform his actions according to Vedic injunctions. In case of any difficulty in understanding, authen~ic interpreters should be consulted. These authentic interpreters are neither gods nor God. They are those empirical moral agents who follow the rules of interpretation.* Thus, empirical puru$a is self-contained as far as the following of dharma is concerned. He carries out the details of the prescribed acts. Empirical puru$a is entitled to perform sacrifices also. He is responsible for his status and final goal. Quite often he is attracted towards complexities which (These rules of interpretation are laid down by Jaimini in his sutra-s which are to be adopted to find out the real meaning of the provisions, including the clauses or words incorporated therein, having due regard to the object and purpose of the provision, whenever it is necessary. But later on, Maxwell's principles of interpretation are used.) 85

8 bring to him sufferings. Vedic injunctions help him in resolving these complexities. Hence, puru~a should act according to Vedic injunctions. JAGAT AND PURU$A According to Mimihilsa, jagat is nitya. The system believes in the dynamic nature of it which is inherent in it's constituents. Puru~a is part of this jagat but his final aim is to liberate from the jagat. He may leave this jagat, but his own moral realm does not leave him. Puru$a lives in his world of action. He should adhere to his duties and not to go beyond dharma and adharma. One of the purposes of this adherence is to restore convictions in the conduct and to synthesize between empirical and transcendental aspects of life, so that he can lead a balanced life. Moreover, the welfare of society and status of peace and happiness is achieved, for puru~a and society are complimentary to each other. This jag at is a moral world where he discovers the basic moral principles which govern the world and him. These moral principles create a moral force which is fundamental, eternal and responsible for guiding puru$a 's actions. PURU$ARTHA-S The theory of puru~iirtha also helps in guiding puru~a 's actions. The early Mimarilsa, as available in Jaimini and Sahara, accepts dhanna, artha and kama only. It is only later that the fourth value, i.e. mok$a has been recognized in the.system of Mimarilsa. The artha and kama have social and material well-being as the ideal and lead to abhyudaya and mok$a is the highest end which aims at 86

9 spiritual well-being culminating in ni[1sreyasa. But mok$a is not nivrtti (cessation from activity). It is a realization of nityasukhabhivyakti (eternal happiness) with pravrtti. But the better course is the course of active participation which leads to eternal happiness and not mere cessation which leads to self-negation. DHARMA AND CEREMONIALISM The main aim of Mimamsa system is to discuss the true nature of dharma which is injunctive in nature. It says that all actions must be conducive to dharma. One accrues dharma or adharma from the proper accomplishment of actions. The system presupposes the following: (a) "All such actions which are enjoined in Vedas compnse of dharma. " 9 Interestingly, Kumarila m his Slokavartika, has posited various other notions of dharma and, after rejecting all those, he has concluded that they cannot be known through Veda as puru$artha. It is only sreya or happiness attainable by dravya, gu!ja and karma which is meant by dharma. (b) The one and the only source of knowing dharma is Veda as word or astra. The very definition of sastra implies those activities or refraining 9 sreyo hi pur~aprlti~z sa dravyagu~jakarmabhi/:l, Codntila~a!Ja~l sadhyat tasmiit tesvanadharmatti. Kumiirila, Slokavtirtika, Codntisiitra,

10 from them which are enjoined by the sastra through eternal or noneternal staments. 10 (c) The Veda is self-validated and reqmres no extraneous source for its authenticity. Here, a question naturally arises as to what is the basis for accepting self-validity of the Vedas and how to ensure the efficacy of Vedic statements. To this, the reply of Jaimini is stated in the famous SO.tra as follows: Autpattikastu sabdasyarthena sambandhastasya jfianamupadeso'- V~ fjtirekascarthe' nupalabdhe tatprama!jaliz Badaraya~zasyanapek~atvat. 11 From this it follows that dharma, an objective category, is essentially of the nature of an artlza which has been sanctioned by vidhivakya explained in terms of sukha and dul:zklza. Whatever does not produce dul:zkha in excess of sukha is artha and whatever produces du~zkha in excess of sukha is anartha. Hence, punt~a should avoid anartha and participate only in those actions which produce artha. Following and performing dharma may bring happiness to the agent visa-vis society. Dharma is essentially non-empirical in nature. It is also said that there is no dharma in non-empirical anartha-s even if it is prescribed by scriptures, for 10 Prav.rttirvti niv.rttirvti nityena krtakena vti purhstif!l, yenopatiryeta tacchtistramabhidhzyate. 11 Sabdaparicclzeda, 4. Btidaraya~wsyanapek~atvtit, Mimtirhstisutra, Quoted by S. Kumar, 'The concept of Veda-Apuru~eyatva' in Purvamimtuizstifrom an Interdisciplinary Pont of View, (ed.) K.T. Pandurangi, Vol. II, Part 6, p

11 anartha-s are evil and dharma is essentially artha. With regard to nonempirical artha and anartha, there is a controversy between Prabhakara and Kumarila whether artha and anartha are in the act or in the consequence. According to Prabhakara, dharma is objective, not a quality of the atlnan and is not identified with kriya or act enjoined by the scripture. It is a new category revealed by niyoga, i.e. the imperative or command or more precisely it is revealed by preraija - the authoritative advice to the will implied in such a command. The prerajja is a kind of impulsion in the atman which is the cause of certain physical processes or effects. According to Prabhakar, in certain ceremonial scriptural prescriptions there is an element of anartha. For example, syenena abhicaraij yajeta - one who wishes to kill his enemy should perform the sacrifice of syena. Such an act involves infliction of pain on the enemy. It is essentially adhanna and anartha. Hence, such acts should not be performed, as dharma consists of artha only, for the sastric prescriptions lead to artha and result m dharma. Sastric prescription includes only nityanaimittikakarma-s (unconditional duties) and kamyakarma-s (empirical duties). In either case there is dharma so far as there is no anartha involved. In nityanaimittikakarma-s, there is no sukha or dubkha. Such karma-s purify the mind and transcendental freedom can be attained. In kamyakarma-s there is artha but it gives material pleasure. However, in either case the dharma is not an act itself but apilrva which is revealed by preraijg in the atman produced by niyoga which is involved in siistric injunctions. Prabhakara holds that their 89

12 conduciveness is in their intrinsic validity as self-positing duty. It is this aparva which appertains necessarily to the prescribed acts of scriptures as duties that constitute their moral authority or validity. Though the duties consist in sastric prescription, their moral authority is independent of sastra being due to their ontological essence as duty which implies apilrva. Thus, aparva is the ground of their objective validity while prerat:tti IS the ground of the objective validity being subjectively known. Kumarila Bhana on the other hand, holds that dharma is not a non-empirical.category. It is the prescribed act in itself which is sreyaskara and conducive to good. There is no difference between kamyakarma-s (conditional duties) and nityanaimittikakarma-s (unconditional duties). Kumarila Bhaga, as opposed to Prabhakara says that codanalak~at:ta~z artha~1 dharmaf:z does not exclude codanalak~at:ta~1 anartha. All sastric prescriptions are artha and not anartha. The anartha enters within the scope of sastric prescriptions by way of nivrtti (prohibitions) and constitutes the subject matter of ni~edha codana-s or negative prescriptions. The prohibition of an anartha prescribed in itself is an artha. He defends ceremonialism on the ground of validity which is derived from Vedic authority. This applies both to nityanaimittikakanna-s or kamyakanna-s. These acts are obligatory as they are prescribed by sastric code of injunctions and prohibitions. The Bhaga school accepts ceremonialism in all its arbitrariness. Bhaga also assumes apilrva (an objective potency) but not as intrinsic essence of these acts as self validating. It is not known by any unique feeling of moral 90

13 impulsion but only by implication (artlulpatti) from their being scripturally prescribed as duties. According to Bhatta, there is apurva in these acts but this objective potency is not itself dharma. The acts themselves as scripturally prescribed are dharma and apurva is only an implication of their essence as dharma or moral duty. According to Kumarila, dharma as constituting the contents of sastric prescriptions is in two forms which is as follows: (i) (ii) the positive stistric prescriptions (the good involved in the act enjoined) the negative stistric prescriptions (the cessation of dharma from anartha-s). Punishment is entailed if one still performs ni$edha acts. Many more v1ews are available on ceremonial acts as producing artha or anartha. For example, the Sarilkhya school does not give any significance to those Vedic acts (ceremonial) which involve hilizsti. Such acts are not conducive to sreyas, the highest good which help the empirical puru$g from the taint of sanistira. In so far as these acts produce injury to the sentient beings, they are bound to bring sufferings. These acts are same as those empirical acts which are prompted by motive of gain. They may produce happiness which is perishable and ultimately lead to sufferings. Thus, Sarilkhya condemns ceremonial acts as these acts are in the form of avidya. They arise "from aviveka or from the absence of the proper discrimination of the true nature of reality." S.K. Maitra, The Ethics of The Hindus, University of Calcutta, 1963, p

14 The Nyaya- Vaise~ika differ with Sali1khya. According to them, ceremonial acts are not devoid of moral significance. They are conducive to dharma, if dtjly accomplished. They are essential and indispensable for moral culture and are conduce to the moral perfection of the agent. Dharma, according to them is the quality of the atman and thus subjective in significance. This subjective quality is acquired after discharging the objective code of duties. These duties are: (a) (b) the sadharaija dharma (duties of universal scope) vise$a-dhanna-s or var!jiisramadharma-s (the duties of one's tisrama and of one's varija or social class). They comprise of both ceremonial actions as well as duties of specific stage. Nyaya-Vaise~ikas' view differs from both Sarhkhya's (who condemn ceremonial acts) and Kumarila's (who accept ceremonial acts). They defend ceremonialism on ethical grounds and try to provide moral rationale. The Naiyayikas do accept apurva but only as subjective disposition or modification of the self. (For Prabhakara, it is neither known by implication as Kumarila holds nor by inference as Naiyayikas hold but it is immediately revealed to the self.). Kumarila does not accept any such disinterested morality in the strict sense. For him dharma necessarily implies good in the conditional as well as in the unconditional duties. In this way they are unable to get beyond ceremonialism and externalism as they regard the sastric prescriptions not only as the ground 92

15 of the moral authority of the duties but also as the only evidence of their conduciveness. A different version on ethical worth of ceremonialism is given by Sari1kara, a Vedantin. He holds that ceremonial activities do not constitute the highest good. They give only relative satisfaction but they do have moral significance since merit and consequent possibilities of karma generated from them. They help puru$a in preparing to move towards higher morality. Such activities are performed by those puru$a-s who adopt pravrtti-marga and not the nivrtti. The former path is for the one who participates in the empirical life, who is governed by the feeling of attraction and aversion. Duty here serves as a means to the satisfaction of desired ends. These ends may be empirical or nonempirical. These empirical duties are generally customary or general practices adopted in the society one belongs to. Even the empirical sciences such as science of medicine, the science of the rules of conduct etc. are said to be its sources. Some of the empirical duties are laid down in Vedic kannaktijjda. These empirical and non-empirical duties together constitute the moral code to fulfill the desire. Such duties in any case do not constitute the highest good. On _the other hand, the latter path that is pravrtti-marga is path of knowledge. It is the life of absolute cessation from desires and therefore from duties prompted by desires. It is the sphere of those virtues where there is no reference to any extraneous, empirical ends. This path takes one to practice sadhanacatu$_taya (the four-fold discipline) which leads to atmajfiana and jlvanmukti. This 93

16 realization implies that all limitations are shaken off and recovers its true essence as the unlimited and eternally accomplished being. Thus, according to Sarhkara the highest duty is that which conduces to this knowledge. The duties of the mundane affairs have moral significance only as a preparatory training for the discharge of higher duty which ultimately leads to highest knowledge where all ethical and worldly duties cease. Ramanuja, a viii${advaitin does not believe in Karmasmi1nyiisa. 13 Duties should be discharged disinterestedly without any desire for consequence. These duties are significant in the sense that they are conducive to the highest knowledge. In this context Ramanuja speaks of papakarma-s and pw;yakarma-s. Papakarma-s lead to suffering and pw;yakarma-s lead to happiness. All papakanna-s are obstacle to knowledge. Sometime even pw;yakarma-s become obstacles when they are performed with interested motives for some rewards. They become obstacles in accomplishing the highest end yet they qualify to achieve knowledge. Mere duty gives impermanent and insignificant results, for such results are relative and do not lead to knowledge. Bhagvadglta talks of one more path which is a synthesis of two paths enunciated by Sarilkara namely, pravrtti and nivrtti. It is called Nivrttikarmanulrga or the path of disinterested duties. According to BhagavadgWi, the highest duty is not the cessation of duties but is one which fills this void or cessation with concrete 13 Ibid., p

17 content, which asks for the accomplishment of duties of life, i.e. duty for the sake of duty. It is the stage of karma without material motive. The famous saying in this regard is, "to action alone hast thou a right and never at all the fruits of actions be thy motive, neither let there be in thee any attachment. to inaction." 14 GWi strongly urges to act without attachment or desire for phala, because phala is beyond our power. On the whole, one may say that actions play a vital role in Mima1i1sa system, but the actions which imply the scriptural duties are given greater importance whether they are rationally justified or accepted on their own authority. These scriptural duties which are called Vedic prescription or vidhivakya-s are distinguished from empirical duties. These Vedic prescriptions are given greater importance because of their "evidential value and validity with regard not only to the present but also the past, the future and the super sensuous, the remote and the mediate. Hence, it transcends all the limitations of space and time and produces knowledge of what is artha, tattva and reality. It is thus superior as a source of knowledge to sense experience (indriya-s) as well as the other source of knowledge... Codana thus bridges the gulf between the empirical and the non-empirical, the phenomenal and the transcendental." 15 The system holds that "man has to live a life of constant activity. Without action, he cam10t have any 14 Kanna!Jyevtidhikaraste mti phale~u kadacana, Ma karmaphalaheturbhurmti te sa!j1go 'stvakarma!ji. Bhagvadgltti, S.K. Maitra, The Ethics ofthe Hindus, p

18 conditions of life, And any life, good or evil. He cannot, therefore, have either pleasure or pain. Every man desires pleasures and a happy life here and hereafter. He has therefore to know what actions to perform and what to avoid. " 16 Hence, there is a provision for certain rules in the form of vidhl-s and ni$edha-s (obligatory) and arthvada-s and namadheya-s (non-obligatory). MEANING AND CLASSIFICATION OF VIDHI-S Vidhi has not been separately defined by Jaimini. It's meaning is indicated in one of the sutra-s which defines dharma. 17 It has a trait of a command. 18 Jaimini classifies vidhi-s on the basis of binding nature of the provision as follows: 1) Obligatory or mandatory rules: (a) (b) Vidhi-s - positive cmmnands (a direction to do a particular act.) Ni$edha-s - negative commands (a direction not to do a particular act) 2) Non-Obligatory: (a) (b) Arthavada-s- non-obligatory rules connected with vidhi-s. Namadheya-s - non-obligatory rules not connected with vidhi-s. 16 p. T. Raju, The Philosophical Traditions of India, Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, l971,p Codanti l~a!j-o 'rtlw dharmaf:t. Jaiminisutra, M. Rama Jois, 'Mirnarilsa Rules of Interpretation', m Purvamlnuin1sti from an Interdisciplinary Point of View, Vol. II, part 6, p

19 Vidhi-s necessarily contain a direction/compulsion which should be followed. When an act is performed even without it, it IS no vidhi. For example, the commands like 'shut the door,' 'eat fruits', etc. are no vidhi-s. There is no compulsion involved in performing them. If someone wishes to do, he would do it without any rule. But when a rule contains a direction which conunands to a particular act, which a person may not wish to act but has to act under the force of a command, it is vidhi. For example, 'follow traffic rules', 'pay tax' etc. are vidhi-s. There is compulsion involved in doing such acts. No one would like to do such acts voluntarily. The meaning of ni~edha presupposes a conunand which is similar to vidhi but negative in form. It is a command to a person not to do an act for example, there is no ni~edha involved when someone conunands 'do not eat fruits' but there is a compelling factor involved when some one says 'do not break traffic rules'. In the latter case a person is likely to break the rules unless there ts a force to stop him. Arthawida is a statement connected with a vidhi, without adding to it or detracting from it. It is a subsidiary provision which may explain the reason of a vidhi or may illustrate it. In itself it is neither a rule by itself nor a modification of the main rule. In other words, arthavada consists of words or expressions used along with a vidhi to make the rule more understandable even though without these words vidhi would be complete in itself. However, there is an 97

20 exception when arthavada becomes a vidhi. 19 This exception means that though a sentence is part of a vidhi but appears like arthavada. If in reality it incorporates any injunctive rule by way of addition to the vidhi, it should be regarded as vidhi and not as arthavada. 20 It is a statement containing reason by virtue of the independent significance and explanation. 21 Namadheya is a word or expression which forms part of a law text but not a.part of a vidhi. It indicates the meaning of the word, i.e. What it means or what it excludes. 22 PROCEDURE TO APPLY VEDIC INJUNCTION Not only puru~a has to follow certain rules and regulations, there is a provision for procedures to be followed in applying Vedic injunctions. According to Mimarhsa, this procedure may be explained as follows:. "The objective of sabdlbhavana, i.e. Prompting or generating interest, 1s to enable the sacrificer to undertake the initiative. Undertaking initiative 1s arthlbhavana. Therefore, generating the arthlbhavana is the objective of sabdlbhavana. The sabdlbhavana is the import of the optative termination lin. Therefore, knowledge of this lin serves as the instrument. Mere cognition of lin 19 Jaiminisiitra, Ibid.,l Ibid., Ibid.,

21 and the comprehension of its import, i.e. Prerm:u'i is not sufficient to produce initiative. It needs to be supported by the information that the activity enjoined for undertaking is a worthy one. This is generally provided by the arthavada-s mentioned by the side of the injunctive statement. These arthavadasa-s euology convey prasastya, i.e. worthiness of the recommended activity. This is itikartavyata, an aid to make the preraija, 1.e. Sabdlblzavana effective.... Sabdlbhavana ya~1 arthlbhavana sadhyatvenanveti linadijiianam kara~wtvema anveti, prasastyajiianam itikartavyatatvena anveti. Thus, arthibhavana accords with sabdlbhavana in respect of the purpose, knowledge of lin etc., accords in respect of the cause, while worthiness of the recommended action accords in respect of what is undertaken. " 23 Prabhakara does not accept this application procedure of Vedic injunctions. He rejects the concept of sabdlbhavana on the ground that there is no evidence. to say that the injunctive suffix has a vyapara designated as prera~uj, i.e. prompting to cause the initiative. The initiative does not necessarily follow on hearing an injunctive statement. Consequently, the idea of arthlbhiivana (initiative) being the result of the sabdibhavana cannot be accepted. He holds that scriptural prescriptions are of the nature of niyoga. It is revealing itself as self-established, self authoritative law to the agent. There is a unique relation between a. command and the 23 K.T. Pandurangi, 'Exposition of Dharma as the Central Theme of POrvamimarhsa' in Purvamlmii.rh.sti from an Interdisciplinary Point of View, Vol. II, part 6, pp

22 conu11anded which differs radically from the relation of karta and kriya. The relation between karta and kriya is causal while the relation between command and commanded is of revelation. Niyoga only reveals the law, it does not compel. There is moral prompting in it which is entirely different from physical or psychological promptings. According to Prabhakara, the arthlblzavana is subordinate to the vidhi. The vidhivakya-s are obligatory by its very nature and necessarily reveal itself as.authoritative or binding in the consciousness of the agent. It is cognized through a unique mode of consciousness, atmakufavise$a, i.e. an excitement or i.tllpulse in the self which is svaprakasa. These vakya-s induce the feeling of impulsion in the self. On hearing vidhi one becomes conscious of this impulsion in oneself. It is a self-validating experience which validates the moral imperative in consciousness. This atnw.kuta is not peculiar to moral impulsion or prera!jti but exists in laukika prerm:ul or non-moral impulsion also. It is present in requests, invitations and other non-moral experiences. This is such a unique experience which cannot be further analyzed. Other than the experiencer, no one else can understand it. Imperatives thus, impel only in the sense of revealing the law as duty, i.e. by inducing the knowledge of its authority. It is this sense of the authority of the imperative in the form of cognition that is binding on puru$a as duty that constitutes pravartakatva, the power of the motivation of the vidhi. But, atnw.kuta is not a subtle force. It's function is to move the moral agent by 100

23 making the vidhi known which is radically different from bhtivanti. As compared to atmakuta, bhavanti is causal determination or compulsion. These two kinds of relations, i.e. causal relation and that of revelation, are not accepted by Kumarila. According to Kumarila, the concept of bhavana is sufficient to explain the authority of scriptural imperatives. As soon as one hears a scriptural injuncti<?n, he is conscious of two bhavana-s (operative processes) which account fo~ the obligatoriness or the moral authority of injunctions and together constitute the mode of operation of the vidhi. They are: (i) The sabdibhavana (the optative agency of the categorical imperative which calls for puru~apravrtti in the moral agent). (ii) The arthibhavana (conveyed by the general verbal termination of the agent's will which brings about the act). The former is a process outside the puru~a and the latter is a process within him. Further, Kumarila holds that the relation between the two bhavana-s is of ekapratyayabhidheyatva, i.e. being expressed in one and the same affix. As soon as puru~a hears a statement containing a verb that is in optative, he understands that he is directed to undertake the activity mentioned by the verb. Ordinarily, such a direction is given by a puru~a. However, in the case of Vedic statement, there is no puru~a behind it. Therefore, the optative suffix itself is taken as giving the direction. This aspect of bhavana is designated as 101

24 sabdfblu'ivana and direction generates initiative on the part of the listener. to undertake the activity in the statement "yajeta svargakama~1". This initiative is designated as arthfbhavana. The word artha means the objective, the purpose. Since this initiative intended to achieve the objective, i.e. svarga, it is called arthfbhavana. There is no priority or posteriority between them. Indeed, the sabdibhavna necessarily involves arthibhavana. To implement a direction and an initiative there are three requirements: (i).(ii) (iii) sadhya or bhavya (an objective something to be realized) sadhana orktiraij.a (the means to achieve it) itikarttavyata (manner in which the activity is to be carried out) Thus, sadhyarhsa i.e. the object to be realized by the operation of the imperative is the inducement of puru~apravrtti. This inducement of the agent's will lead necessarily to the realization of the empirical action which is arthfbhavana. Hence, arthibhavana is a necessary implicate of sabdfbhavana. Some followers of Bhana school differ from Kumarila with regard to two bhavana-s being coordinated. They hold that as the sabdibhavana leads to arthibhavana; the former is primary (pradhana) and the latter is auxiliary (gauij.a). There are some who believe that arthibhavanii is a principal operation and the sabdtbhavana is secondary. The Naiyayikas, however do not accept Kumarila's as well as Prabhakara's view of the moral imperative. According to them, there is neither sabdfbhavana 102

25 (any impersonal operation of the imperative) nor niyoga (any unique feeling of impulsion). It is only a phalecclui, presenting itself in the form of moral obligation or duty. There is nothing unique in the consciousness of authority. It is not sabdaikagocara[l, induced by only sabda or verbal command. Being a compound of smrti (past experiences) and abhila$a (desire), it may arise with or without verbal conunand. The validation of imperatives in consciousness is a process in the moral agent consisting in the impulsion of desire which arises from the expectation of the consequence. Scriptural imperatives being the prescriptions of the lord are personal commands to imperfect finite beings. There is compulsion implied in such commands. This is because the lord creates good and evil through injunctions and prohibitions. The desire for the good and aversion towards the evil is involved in the injunctions and prohibitions. This desire for good and aversion for evil in the agent are the real operative forces and moral authority is the operation of the good and evil through the agent's subjective desires and aversions. Thus, one thing is clear from the above elaboration that it is vidhi as imperative -that inspires the consciousness of duty which involves sense of obligation in the puru$a, a moral agent. Vidhi is the highest authority which constitutes obligatoriness on the moral agent as duty or dharma. OBLIGATORINESS OF VIDHILIES IN THE ACT OR IN THE END According to Mimarilsa, this obligatoriness of moral actions of puru$a do not arise from the consequence. There is prompting of the imperatives in the 103

26 consciousness. Prabhakara holds that "there is no extraneous end in the vidlzi as imperative, morally, psychologically or metaphysically. The imperative is irs own end and constitute the sanction, the motive as well as the moral authority of the vidhi. It is the independent, intrinsic authority of the command which determines motive and choice. " 24 The motive is not i$!asddhanatajfiiina as Naiyayikas believe but simply the cognition of something to be done as produced by the representation of it as specifying the self. There is a difference in the motives, so there is a difference in the conception of duties too. For instance, if the motive is good as subjectively determined, moral obligation will be only the authority of the agent's freely chosen end and if the motive is simply the act as self-referred, moral obligation will be the imperative presenting itself as the law of the agent. Even in secular injunctions, the impulsion itself is a unique feeling and not a form of desire for the consequence. Motives also are not necessarily the consciousness of some ista or good. Indeed, it is this erroneous view which impairs the conception of moral authority or obligation. The motive of the will is simply the consciousness of something to be done as produced by the representation of the act as a self qualification. The self itself is "identified with the act to be done which acts as motive and not the consequence of any good. Thus, in moral promptings there is no external factor involved rather there is prompting of the imperative in the consciousness. This prompting (prerm:z_d) of obligation as produced by the revelation of the law in 24 S.K. Maitra, The Ethics ofthe Hindus, p

27 consciousness is all that is required to move to act and not any consciousness of extraneous end. Naiyayikas are wrong in conceiving an end or phala as a necessary accompaniment of the vidhi. A vidhi does not imply more than two anubandha-s (i) (ii) adhikaranubandha or niyoga (an agent's command) vi$ayanubandha (the act commanded) The consequence is not one of the accompaniment of the imperative. It is relative to the understanding of the puru$a and not the intended meanmg of vidhi. The command impels simply by revealing the act as obligatory. When the agent is impelled by the desire for the consequence as in kamyakarma-s, the imperatives are udaslna, indifferent or morally neutral. The imperative in kamyakarma-s declares the act being merely a means to the desired end. Its operation consisting only in the establishment of this sadhyasadhanatabhava (means end relation). Vidhi does not derive its force from any extraneous end either in kamya or nityanaimittikakarma-s. The difference between the two karma-s is that in the former it is without any imperative character while in the latter, the imperative is its own end, it is self authoritative or self validating. According to Prabhakara, what is true of vidhi is true of ni$edha also. According to Kumarila, "the end, the consequence determines only the motive or the choice, but not the obligatoriness of the imperative... The phala or consequence is only pravarttaka, i.e. a psychological motive but is not vidheya, 105

28 1.e. the objective of moral imperative. It is a psychological implication of the moral action, an end as motive being necessary for moral as for all action, but it is not a moral implicate of the imperative which is obligatory independently. of the end. " 25 Kumarila points out that the phala determines only the pravarttaka (motive) and the choice and not the vidheya (obligatoriness) of the imperative. The moral authority of the imperative is thus independent of an end. There are two main points of difference between Kurriarila and Naiyayikas. One, Kumarila holds that the phala has to be conceived because of its logical and metaphysical necessity rather than its moral implication; Naiyayikas, on the other hand believe that phala must be conceived so that the impelling character of the imperatives retain and clear distinction between right and wrong is maintained. Two, according to Kumarila, phala enters only into the motivation of the act and does not determine its authority on the agent whereas according to Nyaya, the consequence as good determines the objective authority of the imperative though not subjective obligatoriness which implies something more, i.e. agent's subjective reference. Regarding the source of this obligation or the impelling character of vidhi, the Naiyayikas believe that it lies in the motive of the agent. If the motive is good, the moral imperative must also appeal through the consciousness of good which does not necessarily imply pleasure. If the motive implies no such consciousness, the imperative would be independent of all the considerations of 25 Ibid., pp

29 utility. It is either pleasure or the avoidance of pam m the case of kamyakarma-s, i.e. ordinary empirical actions done with material motives. In the case of mumuk~u, the personal seeking of the transcendental freedom, i~.ta is duflkhena atyantikatz viyoga~z freedom which a mumuk~u (total and absolute freedom from suffering). The seeks, arises from virakti (dispassion). There is neither attraction nor aversion. This differs essentially from the avoidance of pain which is prompted by aversion, for freedom from pain is never absolute in the case of aversion. There can be two different motives with two different agents. For some, there may be material motive which is important, for the others, it may be the transcendental freedom. Hence, motives are not given as matters of fact which act mechanically on the agent. They are themselves the effects of subjective valuations or subjective self-determination. What is pleasure and motive to one is not necessarily pleasure and motive to the other. Thus, Naiyayikas hold that motive is conceived as a subjectively determined value. Contrary to Prabhakara, the Naiyayikas hold that the motive being the consciousness of the i~.ta or good, the imperative derives its force from i~_tasadhanata viz., conduciveness to good. The obligatoriness of the imperative.is thus the worth of its end appealing to the consciousness of the agent. As this worth itself depends on the agent's kamana (desire) for the good and therefore on subjective valuation or subjective preference, obligatoriness also depends on the subjective desire/force of the agent's desire for the end. This kamana in the 107

30 agent may or may not be pure. In kamyakarma-s this impulse is not pure, for the actions are performed with material motive. In the case where the actions are performed purely for transcendental freedom this impulse is pure. However, in both the cases, desire is a necessary factor. It determines the subjective worth of the value of the end that constitutes the motive and also determines obligatoriness of the imperative. The fact that the good acquires subjective value or worth through subjective preference does not imply that it is objectively neutral. Without an objective value there is no significance of subjective value. Indeed, moral value has authority in two senses: the objective authority that is the intrinsic authority independent of agent's choice or preference; the other is subjective authority which depends mi agent's desire for the particular end. This constitutes that obligatoriness of the moral value is thus a compound of the objective authority of the end and the force of the subjective desire. Obligatoriness is different from the objective authority of the imperative. Though in both the cases the authority is due to the imperative. The objective authority arises from the intrinsic worth or value of the end, while obligatoriness is due to the objective value being subjectively appropriated through a particular desire. In other words, there is an intrinsic worth in certain ends which ought to determine choice and this is their objective authority which.is independent of choice. When they are chosen, they acquire subjectivity in addition to their objective authority and this is their obligatoriness. Thus moral 108

31 obligation would be inexplicable without the conception of an end. It is only through phala, the wrongness or rightness of an action becomes intelligible. Naiyayikas do not accept Prabhakara's view of explaining moral obligation. They call explanation as superfluous which leads to an indefinite series of ends which has no end. This anavastha (instability) can be avoided only by bringi"ng the external consequences with intrinsic independent authority. While answering to their charge, Prabhakara rather calls their assumption of an extraneous end as superfluous. He says that the fallacy of the Naiyayikas consists in conceiving moral or sastric imperative on the analogy of secular injunctions. Since the secular injunctions appeal through an external sanction, there must also be a sanction for the scriptural imperatives. Naiyayikas forget that scriptural imperative are ultimate, irreducible and absolute while secular imperative are relative and acquired. Thus, the difference between the scriptural and secular injunctions imply a corresponding difference between their respective authority. Moral injunction is svatantra or autonomous. To sum up the above discussion regarding the obligatoriness of the moral actions, Naiyayikas hold that it is only it's i$_fasadhanata, or conduciveness to an end appealing through the agent's desire. On the contrary, for Bhaga and Prabhakara, it is independent of extraneous end; an end being only necessary to.constitute the psychological motive and not the moral authority of the duty 109

32 according to Bhatta; and being only implied and never consciously present to the agent, according to Prabhakara. OPERATING PROCESS OF VIDHIIN AGENTS' CONSCIOUSNESS As Prabhakara, Kumarila and Naiyayikas have different vtews regarding the nature of moral authority, they also differ on the issue as to how moral imperative influences agent's consciousness, so as to lead to the accomplishment of duty? Prabhakara holds that bhtivaflii causes krti (the will) in the agent. It is not same. as the niyoga because niyoga does not cause or determine. It is only a prerm:u.l or authoritative suggestion to the will. This suggestion is the revelation of the law as imperative which is distinct from physical or psychological compulsions. Prera!Jii implies prai$)1aprai$asambandha (the relation of the cmmnand to the agent commanded). It is revealed to the agent. Thus, it is different from blulvana. It is prior to bhavana in consciousness of duty. Prabhakara clearly indicates that prera(lii is not a form of action. It's fundamental character is that of jfiapaka, knowledge inducing, and not karaka, action making. Jfiana is not kriya. According to Prabhakara, there are different forms of prermja as in request, promises etc. They are expressed by the different moods of verbs viz., lot, lin etc. There are different modes of prera(la which are due to different upadhi-s. These upadhi-s are the circumstances of their application for prayoga. It may be of samavi$ayaprayoga (equal to an equal) or of hlnavi$ayaprayoga 110

33 (superior to an inferior) etc. In each case there is an impulsion in a particular mode. In every case impulsion is not of the nature of causation or compulsion though each case is particular according to the circumstances of its application. Prerm:u'i is an atmadharma. Like the atlnan or the self, it is svasarhvedya, known only through itself. It is not pramd1jdntaravedya (known through any other process of knowledge). It is an ultimate irreducible fact of consciousness just as the self is. It is itself the ground or the reason of the bhautikavyapara, the empirical, psychological process which constitutes the willing of the act commanded. It can only be felt where there is an imperative present to consciousness. It follows the dharma, the code of duties that are morally obligatory known only through sabdapramaija. Such duties imply preraija and revealed through preraija only. Thus, according to Prabhakara, prera~1a, through conunand, is essentially of the nature of enlightemnent which does not interfere with agent's freedom but influences agent's consciousness. It is not a simple fognition but the cognition of an act to be accomplished which implies a unique feeling of excitement that is unanalysable. Kumarila holds that the operation of the imperative is independent of any extraneous end. A vidhivakya is charged with a peculiar prompting force, sabdlbhavand which is of the nature of causation. This calls forth puru~aprav.rtti (the agent's will) which leads to the accomplishment of the act, arthlbhavana. 111