Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will,

Transcription

1 Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, (or, How God is not responsible for evil) Introduction: Recall that Augustine and Evodius asked three questions: (1) How is it manifest that God exists? (2) Do all things, insofar as they are good, come from God? (3) Should free will be counted as one of those good things? Last time, they answered (1). Truth and Wisdom are the highest goods. We know now that we ought to give up our ephemeral, fleeting private goods and instead seek the perfect eternal goods Augustine even says that Wisdom CALLS to us (pg. 60). But, we are not there yet. We are not wise yet, but we are on our way. Furthermore, since we are not yet wise, we are fools. He writes, Wouldn t you agree that someone who is not just is unjust, and someone who is not prudent is imprudent, and someone who is not temperate is intemperate So, when someone is not wise, isn t he a fool? (2.15, pg. 59) Augustine is making reference here to the four cardinal virtues of early Christianity, which he had laid out earlier in Book I, section 13 (pgs ): Fortitude = Courage, strength. Confronting fear and hardship bravely. Temperance = Restraint. Controlling one s desires. Prudence = Wisdom. Conducting one s self with caution, reason, good judgment. Justice = Fairness. Living (morally) rightly, or righteously. [But, does it follow that if you are not just that you are UN-just? Or, if you are not wise, that you are UN-wise (i.e., foolish)? Consider: 1. You are not happy. 2. Therefore, you are UN-happy. That doesn t seem to follow. For, unhappy seems to mean something like sad. But, I can be non-happy without being un-happy. Similarly, unjust seems to mean something like unfair or even cruel. But, can t I be non-just without being un-just? Furthermore, can t I be non-wise without being a fool? In short, Augustine seems to confuse contraries (statements which cannot both be true, but CAN both be false) with contradictories here (cannot both be true OR both false).] 1

2 Participation in the Highest Goods: Time to tackle question (2). Augustine now argues that ALL things that exist are in some way good. Now, recall that the highest good was Truth, and this included eternal truths about Number. That being the case, it is evident that ALL things that exist participate in the highest good even if this is only insofar as all things that exist have number. Consider the heavens and the earth and the sea and everything in them that shines from on high or crawls here below, everything that flies or swims. They have forms because they have numbers; take away their form and number and they will be nothing. So they derive their being from the same source as number, for they have being only insofar as they have number. (2.16, pgs ) In some sense, ALL things that exist participate in the supremely good Truth, merely by existing. For, merely by existing, they have something of the eternal in them e.g., form, number, or beauty. If a thing did not have number, it would not exist at all. This explains why he says that even the depraved enjoy some goods: Woe to those who turn away from your light and gladly embrace a darkness of their own. They turn their backs on you and are bewitched by the works of the flesh, which are like their own shadows; [Sounds very Platonist doesn t it?] and yet even then, the things that delight them have something of the radiance of your light. (2.16, pg. 62) Consider also what he says of beauty: You could neither approve nor disapprove of anything you perceive through the bodily senses unless you had within yourself certain laws of beauty to which you refer every beautiful thing that you see outside yourself. (2.16, pg. 60) Here, he seems to be saying that, we could only judge something to be more or less beautiful if there were some fixed STANDARD of Beauty against which we could compare the things that we are judging. He seems to suggest also that we could not even take PLEASURE in worldly things if there were no such eternal standard. So, things are also good insofar as they participate in, or are like, Beauty. So, the answer to question (2) is Yes : Yes, all things are good. They can have more or less good, but AT MINIMUM, they participate in number merely by existing. 2

3 A brief digression into the Confessions and the Enchiridion. Evil is the Privation of Good: Still, doesn t it seem like lots of things are NOT good? The Problem of Evil: Disease, pain, sin All of these seem to be EVIL things. If God made everything, then it seems like, even if He made lots of good things, He made lots of terrible things too. But, God is supposed to be the supreme Good perfect in every way. So, the question arises: How could perfect Goodness create so much evil? Answer: Evil is not a thing at all. Consider: What we call 'evil' is just corruption. But, in order for something to be corrupted, it must have had some good in it because corruption harms (i.e., makes worse). But something cannot be made worse if it did not have some good in it to begin with. And a thing cannot be TOTALLY corrupted because then it would cease to exist! (since, to exist, it must at least participate in, e.g., number) In sum: Evil is the privation of good. It is not a thing. Rather, it is the ABSENCE of a thing. For instance, what is darkness? Darkness is not a thing. It is just the ABSENCE of light. If your sock gets a hole in it, what is the hole? It is nothing at all. It is the absence of fabric. It is a DEFECT in the (otherwise good) sock. Similarly, if you get sick, the sickness is not a thing at all. Rather, sickness is merely the privation of health. The wickedness of a man is not a thing either. It is just the absence of a good will. The man, insofar as he exists, is good. But, he is evil insofar as his will is defective, which causes his good to be diminished. The result is that all things are good. Nothing can be WHOLLY evil. For, if a thing is deprived of ALL good, it would just cease to exist at all. So, all evil things are still good. For, since they exist at all, there is still some good left in them. He writes, And it was made clear to me that all things are good even if they are corrupted. If they are deprived of all good, they will cease to exist. So long as they are, therefore, they are good. Therefore, whatsoever is, is good. Evil, then, has not substance at all. (Confessions, 7.12) And elsewhere, What, after all, is anything we call evil except the privation of good? (Enchridion, 3) How can something be both good AND evil? Good and evil seem to be contrary to one another they re opposites. But typically, nothing can have two properties that oppose one another. For instance, a room cannot be both dark and light. A shirt cannot be both black and white. And so on. So, how can something be both good AND evil at the same time? 3

4 Answer: Augustine admits that good and evil are contrary to one another. Something TOTALLY good cannot have any evil, and something TOTALLY evil cannot have anything good (or, rather, such a thing wouldn t exist at all!). But, keep in mind that evil isn t really a THING; evil is parasitic upon goodness. That is, there cannot be evil without good (though there CAN be good without evil). Consider: Perhaps a room cannot both be TOTALLY bright and TOTALLY dark but can t a room be LESS bright, or MORE bright? In a sense, we might say that a dimly lit room is both light AND dark even though these are contrary properties. But, darkness is PARASITIC on light. It isn t a THING at all. What we really mean is that the dimly lit room has LESS light in it than a well-lit room. Similarly for something with both good and evil in it. What we really mean is that it has LESS good in it (and evil isn t a thing at all). [Augustine says that this defies logic: The rule of the logicians fails to apply, (Enchiridion 4). Is he confused? Does this defy logic?] Solution to the Problem of Evil: Back to the problem: God created all things. Yet, He is not responsible for creating evil because there is no such thing as evil! Problem solved. Objection: It is still bad for God to allow privations of goodness to occur. Does this really solve the problem? Might we still ask, But, even if sickness isn t a THING, why would a good God allow the privation of health? It still seem bad to allow it. [Also, IS sickness just the privation of health? What do you think?] Augustine gives two answers: (a) Evil is instrumentally good because it makes good things seem even better in comparison: what is called evil commends the good more eminently, since good things yield greater pleasure and praise when compared to the bad things. (Enchiridion, 3) (b) God allows evil because it leads to much greater goods: the Omnipotent God would not allow any evil in his works, unless in his omnipotence and goodness, as the Supreme Good, he is able to bring forth good out of evil. (ibid.) [Are (a) and (b) true? Does Augustine s answer get God off the hook?] End digression. 4

5 Back to On Free Choice of the Will Is Free Will a Good? Now it s time to tackle question (3). Recall that Augustine does not think that the THINGS that sinners turn toward (e.g., material things) are evil. Rather, it is the TURNING TOWARD them that is evil. He writes, Hence, the goods that are pursued by sinners are in no way evil things What is evil is the turning of the will away from the unchangeable good toward changeable goods [T]his turning is not coerced, but voluntary (2.19, pg. 68) THAT is what sin is (using our free will to turn away from the eternal Truth). So, it seems like free will is not so great. For, it s by the abuse of free will that we sin. And sin is bad. On the other hand, our will is used rightly when it cleaves to the unchangeable good that is common, not private namely, the truth. That is, when you regulate yourself by those unchangeable rules and lights of the virtues that dwell incorruptibly in the common truth and wisdom. This is how to achieve happiness, which is the proper and principal good for a human being. (2.19, pgs ) Problem: So, (a) isn t sin ultimately God s fault, since He gave us free will? And (b) isn t free will an evil, since this is what makes sin possible? It seems like God should not have given us free will at all! Reply to (b): Sure, free will can be abused to do evil. But, the mere fact that a thing can be abused does not entail that it is not good to have it. LOTS of good things can be abused in this way. Hands, feet, eyes: All of these things seem to be GOOD things to have and yet, we can abuse them to do evil (e.g., we can strangle, or kick people, or be peeping Toms). This doesn t make the THING evil. Free will is a good gift from God. We shouldn t blame the giver of the good gift rather, blame the person who MISUSES that gift for evil. But WHY is free will good? Sure, free will makes it possible to sin. But, it also makes it possible to live RIGHTLY. Only by making a FREE choice to turn ourselves toward Truth and live in accordance with its principles are we able to live rightly, or virtuously. We are morally responsible for our actions if we have free will. [Consider a robot who is PROGRAMMED to do good deeds. This robot is not a moral being. It is not making a choice to do good things. It is not morally responsible, or praiseworthy for what it does, because it is not in control of itself.] 5

6 We ve admitted that having hands and eyes is good. But, THOSE things are not needed in order to live rightly. Free will IS required in order to live rightly, however. So, which is better? (a) A thing that can be abused that is NOT needed to live rightly, or (b) A thing that can be abused that IS needed in order to live rightly? Clearly (b). Hierarchy of Human Goods: Free will is really an intermediate good in a hierarchy: Goods Examples Required to live rightly? Unable to be abused? Virtues (great good) Powers of the Soul (intermediate goods) e.g., justice, prudence, fortitude, temperance e.g., free will X Goodness of Objects (lowest goods) e.g., beauty, pleasure X X No one can misuse justice (for then what one was doing would not really be just). But, we CAN misuse our will, as we have seen. We misuse it (i.e., sin), when we turn away from the highest, unchangeable goods of Truth and Virtue. In short, sin occurs when we FREELY turn our will from things higher in the hierarchy to things lower in the hierarchy (e.g., often, sin involves turning toward the lower goods, like physical pleasure). Is Sin Voluntary? But, is sin really voluntary? What is the CAUSE of the turning away? Nothing? Is there NO cause at all? After all, every defect comes from nothing, and that movement of turning away, which we admit is sin, is a defective movement. (2.20, p. 69) Nature? Is this movement is a part of our very nature? Augustine and Evodius reject this proposal, for it is incompatible with the fact that we are BLAMEWORTHY for our actions (an assumption which they take to be uncontroversial). He writes, if the will was given to us in such a way that it had this movement naturally, then it turned to changeable goods by necessity, and there is no blame involved when nature and necessity determine an action. [The] movement, by which the stone seeks the lowest place is a natural movement. If that s the sort of movement the soul has, then the soul s movement is also natural. And if it is moved naturally, it cannot justly be blamed; even if it is moved toward something evil, it is compelled by its own nature. But since we don t doubt that this movement is blameworthy, we must absolutely deny that it is natural, and so it is not similar to the natural movement of a stone. (3.1, pgs ) 6

7 Clearly, a stone is not worthy of moral blame or punishment if it falls even if it falls on someone s head and hurts them. For, it has no control of itself. It is simply following the laws that govern its motions by necessity. If WE are like that, then we are no more blameworthy for our sins than the stone. (A similar reply would apply to the Nothing proposal). So since we ARE clearly blameworthy it must be the case that WE are the source of our own sin. In Conclusion: We have free will, sin is voluntary, and God is not to blame for our sins. On Grace and Free Choice: Near the end of his life, about 40 years after On Free Choice of the Will (~388 AD), Augustine clarifies his position on free will in his Reconsiderations (~427 AD). To understand his clarifications, it will help to give some historical context: Manicheanism: Recall that Augustine had converted to Christianity from Manicheanism (in 387 AD). That religion claimed that there are actually TWO eternal, unchangeable beings a good one and an evil one. On Free Choice of the Will (388 AD) was partially aimed at refuting the Manicheans. There, Augustine s aim was not only to show that God isn t responsible for evil, but also that free creatures rather than the eternal evil being from Manicheanism ARE responsible for evil. Pelagianism: 20 years later or so saw the rise of Pelagianism. This was the view that humans are SO free and in control of themselves that they don t need God s help to be free from sin. Rather, we can achieve moral perfection entirely on our own. (Thus they clearly denied the doctrine of Original Sin see below.) The Pelagians tried to claim that Augustine agreed with them by citing his earlier works. The Doctrine of Original Sin: Augustine held a common Christian view about Original Sin. This is the idea that, though man was created pure, after the first sin of Adam and Eve (eating the forbidden fruit from the Tree of Knowledge in the Garden of Eden), man has ever since been tainted. At that moment, human beings were corrupted, so that, externally, we experience death and decay, and, internally, a sinful will. Even for newborn babies, BEFORE they ve ever personally sinned, there is still some corruption in them inherited from Adam and Eve. This inherited corruption is called Original Sin. As a result of Original Sin, it turns out that, we are automatically born corrupted. Furthermore, we have zero ability to uncorrupt ourselves. As Augustine puts it, we cannot pick ourselves up voluntarily as we fell voluntarily. (2.20, pg. 69) Every single person requires God s help, in which He gives them the desire and power to turn away from evil and toward the highest goods. This divine help is called God s grace. 7

8 [Babies in Hell? Note that Original Sin solves the problem of how a good God could send a newborn baby to hell (Augustine believed that, because ALL humans deserve punishment even if they are personally innocent, they re still tainted with the corruption of Original Sin), and also explains why he favored the practice of infant baptism (because it invites God s grace and makes the child safe from hell, just in case it dies).] But, wait. Now, the doctrine of grace makes it seem as if we are NOT free. This doctrine says that the only way that we can have either the desire or the power to turn toward the good (i.e., the only way that our will can be good) is with God s help (i.e., grace). We cannot do it on our own. But, then, how do we turn to God FREELY? For one who accepts the doctrine of grace, there seem to be two possibilities: (a) We have nothing to do with our grace. God just chooses to grant grace to some people and not others (some people then go to heaven and some go to hell). Problem: Then it really does seem unjust for God to send people to hell, since there s no way that they could have turned toward God on their own. (b) Maybe we still have the freedom to ASK for the power to turn toward the good, and God just grants grace to whoever (freely) asks for it. Problem: Grace is generally described as a gift that God gives. It s not something he HAS to give. He just does it because he s super nice. But, then, does God give grace to EVERYONE who asks for it? Does he HAVE to do so? Anyway, the point is not to get bogged down in theological controversies (save that for a theology course). Rather, simply note that Augustine s view gets a bit more complicated later in his life, and the Medieval philosophical views about free will are sometimes complicated by further theological issues (e.g., divine grace). Divine Foreknowledge: After establishing that free will is a good, and that God has good reasons for giving us free will, even though we will inevitably misuse it, Evodius then asks: But, if God knows everything that will happen in the future, how can we still be free? To answer that question, we will first take some time to ask, What is the nature of time, and what is God s relation to it? 8