Deleuze and Buddhism EDITED BY. Tony See AND Joff Bradley

Transcription

1 Deleuze and Buddhism EDITED BY Tony See AND Joff Bradley

2 Deleuze and Buddhism

3 Tony See Joff Bradley Editors Deleuze and Buddhism

4 Editors Tony See Singapore, Singapore Joff Bradley Chiba City, Japan ISBN DOI / ISBN (ebook) Library of Congress Control Number: The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 Th e author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Th e use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Th e publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. Cover illustration: Anthony Pleva / Alamy Stock Photo Printed on acid-free paper Th is Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature Th e registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd. Th e registered company address is: The Campus, 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW, United Kingdom

5 Contents 1 Introduction 1 Tony See 2 Deleuze and the Lotus Sūtra : Toward an Ethics of Immanence 11 Tony See 3 Deleuze, Spinoza and the Question of Reincarnation in the Mahāyāna Tradition 33 Simon Duffy 4 Kenji Miyazawa and Takaaki Yoshimoto: Schizophrenic Nature in Japanese Thought 51 Tatsuya Higaki 5 Ango the Schizo: Deleuze, Daraku, Downgoing 69 Joff Bradley v

6 vi Contents 6 On Not Mistaking Deleuze (With the Help of Some Buddhists) 99 Ian Cook 7 Deleuze and Guattari and Buddhism: Toward Spiritual Anarchism through Reading Toshihiko Izutsu 123 Toshiya Ueno Index 159

7 Notes on the Contributors Joff Bradley teaches in the faculty of foreign languages at Teikyo University, Tokyo. Although born and bred in northern England, he is a resident of Japan and applies his long-standing interest in schizoanalysis, European philosophy and critical thought to the social and political problems affecting his students. He has published articles in Asia, Australia, Europe, the UK, North America and the Middle East. His book with David R. Cole entitled A Pedagogy of Cinema will be published in Ian Cook teaches political philosophy and Australian politics at Murdoch University in Perth, Western Australia. He has published a series of articles on Deleuze and Guattari, and on Education Policy with Greg Thompson in Deleuze Studies (2015). He has authored and edited three textbooks on Australian politics: Contemporary Politics in Australia (2012), Government and Democracy in Australia (2009) and Keywords in Australian Politics (2006); articles on new technologies using Deleuzian theory (specifically MORPGs (multi- user online role-playing games), webporn and first-person shooters); and a traditional political theory book on Australian Liberalism, Liberalism in Australia ( 1999). He has also published his PhD thesis on J. S. Mill entitled Reading Mill: Studies in Political Theory (1998). Simon Duffy is a Senior Lecturer at Yale-NUS College, Singapore. His research interests include early modern philosophy, modern and contemporary European philosophy, the history and philosophy of science, ethics and Buddhist philosophy. He is the author of Deleuze and the History of Mathematics: in Defense of the New (2013), and The Logic of Expression: Quality, Quantity and Intensity in Spinoza, vii

8 viii Notes on the Contributors Hegel and Deleuze (2006). He is editor of Virtual Mathematics: the Logic of Difference (2006), and co-editor with Sean Bowden of Badiou and Philosophy (2012). He is the translator of Albert Lautman s Mathematics: Ideas and the Physical Real (2011). He has published in the journals International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities, Paragraph: A Journal of Modern Critical Theory, and the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. He has also translated a number of Gilles Deleuze s seminars on Spinoza. Tatsuya Higaki is Professor in the Faculty of Human Sciences at the University of Osaka, Japan. His specialty is French modern philosophy and Japanese philosophy. His Japanese books include Deleuze (2002), The Philosophy of Betting and Contingency (2008), Eternity and Instant: the Time Theory of Gilles Deleuze (2010) and Vita Technica: the Philosophy of Life and Technology (2011). Tony See is a Lecturer in the National University of Singapore (NUS) in Singapore. His research interest is on comparative philosophy. He has authored Community without Identity: the Ontology and Politics of Heidegger (2009), and his current research interest is on the intersections between Deleuze s philosophy and Buddhist philosophy. He has published a number of articles on Deleuze in international journals such as Tamkang Review (2014) and Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies (2015). Toshiya Ueno is Professor in the Department of Transcultural Studies in Wako University, Tokyo. His research field is critical theory, media theory and social thought. He has published numerous books in Japanese and essays in English. His most recent project is on Guattari and ecosophy. Underground techno party is also his field as both DJ and TJ (text jockey).

9 1 Introduction Tony See This book represents a concerted attempt to think of the various resonances between the philosophy of Deleuze and concepts in the Buddhist philosophical traditions. Although much scholarship has been devoted to an investigation of Deleuze s philosophy in recent years, the question as to how his philosophy might be connected with other forms of thought such as Buddhism remains largely under-researched or peripheral. Deleuze himself has reminded us that it is usually something on the outside that forces us to think. It is my contention that Buddhist philosophy can be such an outside and that a dialogue between the two can be productive. It is also at once necessary and desirable to engage in this dialogue because Buddhism may not simply be an outside but a distant inside that pulsates with the desire for life against death, for affirmation rather than revenge, for joyful passions rather than sad passions. T. See ( ) National University of Singapore (NUS), Singapore, Singapore The Author(s) 2016 T. See, J. Bradley (eds.), Deleuze and Buddhism, DOI / _1 1

10 2 T. See The attempt to engage Buddhism as a philosophical outside immediately raises a number of methodological problems, chief of which lies in Buddhism s incredible diversity. Although Buddhism is in popular imaginations represented by the three traditions of Theravāda, Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna, in reality it is much more diverse than that. Without a centralized authority, Buddhist traditions are free to follow different teachings and practice a variety of different meditative practices, loosely linked together by no more than a few core principles such as the four noble truths, eightfold paths and wisdom and compassion for all living beings. Its diversity is such that it has become fashionable among some scholars in the last few decades to say that Buddhism is an intellectual abstraction, and that it would be better and more accurate to say that there were many Buddhisms. Paul Williams, for instance, noted that This diversity prevents, or strongly hinders, generalizations about Buddhism as a whole what unifying element there is in Buddhism, Mahāyāna and non-mahāyāna, is provided by the monks and their adherence to the monastic rule (Williams 2009, pp. 1 3). On the other hand, while this diversity is a reality in the Buddhist traditions, it can be a formidable challenge for scholars who are interested in studying it or in comparing it with other philosophical systems. Its sheer diversity, due to a lack of central authority like some other religious traditions, can result in a huge catalogue of diverse local practices, doctrines and histories without knowing what Buddhism is. Thus, Rupert Gethin states that it is not unreasonable to focus on broad patterns within the Buddhist tradition, those that are generally assumed and shared by most Buddhist traditions, and to commit to an essentialist that remains open (Gethin 1998, p. 3). One possible route we might take in response to this debate is in accepting that the answer may lie somewhere in the middle Buddhism is neither one nor many, but a becoming that aims at wisdom and compassion. Thus, in this book we will examine some of the resonances between Deleuze s philosophy and Buddhist philosophy. Our attempt at a Deleuzian-Buddhist engagement could be seen as the latest addition of what is generally called comparative studies. This interest has been reiterated recently in a book by Jay Garfield called Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy ( 2015 ). In this book, Garfield calls for further dialogue between the two traditions because the

11 1 Introduction 3 outcome promises to be productive (Garfield 2015, p. 15). Garfield s work can be seen as a latest addition to a trajectory of thought which has gained a degree of recognition in some academic institutions. Some of the more notable ones include Freny Mistry s Nietzsche and Buddhism ( 1981 ) which explores the relationship between Nietzsche s philosophy and various Buddhist philosophical concepts. In addition to this, we also have Graham Parkes Heidegger and Asian Thought ( 1987 ) which provides a number of notable essays on the relationship between Heidegger s thought and Buddhist concepts, Park s more recent Buddhisms and Deconstructions (2006 ) and also the intersections between continental philosophy and Buddhist ideas and practices. While these comparative studies have generated some interest they seem to remain peripheral in relation to mainstream academic studies of philosophies and religions, which generally tend towards textual, historiographical and philological studies. It is with the hope of reversing this trend, offering an alternative and promoting a more productive dialogue, that this book project is undertaken. There are currently a number of studies which examine the relationship between Deleuze s philosophy and Buddhist thought. We are not alone. Indeed, these by no means constitute a trend, a movement or even a becoming; we have no way of knowing in advance what these amount to. But their molecular beginnings should not prevent us from appreciating the virtuality which they harbour. One such work is Robert Glass s The Tibetan Book of the Dead: Deleuze and the positivity of the Second Light which can be found in the late Mary Bryden s edited volume Deleuze and Religion (2001). The paper offers us insights into the Buddhist understanding of life and death as it is found in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition. Philip Goodchild s Speech and Silence in the Mumonkan : An Examination of Use of Language in Light of the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze ( 1993 ) also explores the relationship between Deleuze and Zen in term of their use of language and silence. Simon Sullivan s paper A Life between the Finite and Infinite: Remarks on Deleuze, Badiou and Western Buddhism ( 2014 ) also offers us interesting insights into the development of western Buddhism. More recently, the publication of Deleuze and Asia (2014), an edited volume by Ronald Bogue, Hanping Chiu and Yu-lin Lee in the wake of the First Deleuze in Asia Conference

12 4 T. See in Tamkang University in Taipei also suggest that this desire for a more productive dialogue is gaining momentum. If we have now entered the age of terrorism and ecological collapse, due to humanity s unrestrained desires in an age of neoliberal dogmatic images of thought, then the necessity for such dialogues becomes all the more apparent and urgent. This volume of essays aims to make a contribution toward such dialogues. Deleuzian Remarks on Buddhism Deleuze wrote exceedingly little about religions, and on Buddhism he wrote even less. Nevertheless, Deleuze made three critical remarks on Buddhism which are indicative of how his understanding of Buddhism underwent development throughout his philosophical career. One of Deleuze s first references to Buddhism can be found in Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962). Here, Buddhism is contrasted with Christianity while Buddhism is a form of passive nihilism, Christianity is a form of reactive nihilism. As a form of passive nihilism, Buddhism is seen as being far superior to Christianity because it knows how to deal with nothingness while Christianity has an interest in producing sad passions and feeding the spirit of revenge (Deleuze 2006, pp ). Although Deleuze was critical of Christianity, he was not critical of the idea of Christ, for Deleuze follows Nietzsche in making a conceptual distinction between the two (Deleuze 2006 ). While Christianity was about the spirit of revenge, war and sad passions, the figure of Christ was none of this, he represented the coming of glad tidings, the absence of sin and all ressentiment. What Christ wanted to reveal was a kingdom of God on earth that is based on the heart. As proof of his doctrine, Christ accepted death and gave up his life for us (Deleuze 2006, p. 155). This Nietzschean Christ has more affinity with the Buddhism than with Christianity as an organized religion, because it reminds us of the Bodhisattva ideal in Mahāyāna Buddhism, a great being who is possessed of wisdom and who is willing to sacrifice him/herself out of compassion for all sentient beings, rather than a God who is filled with a vengeful spirit. This is why Deleuze would come to say that Christ was neither Jew nor Christian but Buddhist; nearer the Dalai Lama than the Pope (Deleuze 2006, p. 155).

13 1 Introduction 5 Deleuze also made references to Buddhism in his later collaborative work with Guattari. In A Thousand Plateaus (1980), Deleuze, together with Guattari, brought up the topic of Buddhism while discussing the differences between western and oriental bureaucracies western bureaucracies operate by way of pre-established classes, while oriental bureaucracies work by channeling classes. Deleuze holds that this calls for a rethinking of the image of the tree in oriental societies. The Buddha s tree is no longer a tree, it is not a signifier for the system of state hierarchy that has come to dominate western societies, but in reality a rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 20). It is not clear what Deleuze meant when he says that the Buddha s tree is a rhizome as he did not elaborate on it. However, what is at least clear in this passage is that there is a significant development in Deleuze s thinking with regard to Buddhism it is no longer merely a passive nihilism that is only meaningful by way of its contrast with Christianity. Buddhism has become, at least by the time of A Thousand Plateaus, a rhizome that is capable of life without dogmatic images of thought. Deleuze also made references to Buddhism in his final published work with Guattari, What is Philosophy? (1991). Here, Deleuze and Guattari began to draw our attention to the subterranean resonances between western philosophy and Buddhist thought. What is truly fascinating about western logic, they say, is that despite its apparently demonstrative structure, it works in dependence on the virtual which is ultimately that which cannot be demonstrated by propositional statements themselves. Western logic cannot, in the end, demonstrate how it works, it can only show. In this sense, the basis of western logic is not a proposition but a form of silence which makes it much closer to the teachings of Zen Buddhism. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari tell us that logic is silent, and it is only interesting when it is silent. Paradigm for paradigm, it is then in agreement with a kind of Zen Buddhism (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p. 140). This brief statement by Deleuze and Guattari in their final collaborative work suggests that they were beginning to have an interest in having a more productive dialogue with Buddhist thinkers, although this was clearly spelled out or systematically elaborated. Deleuze s three remarks on Buddhism represent a significant development in his thought. By the end of his last collaborative work with

14 6 T. See Guattari, Buddhism is no longer seen as a passive nihilism but an ally that western philosophy shares a secret affinity with. If anything, this calls for a rethinking of the divide between religion and philosophy that we have come to accept without questioning. In his famous study of Bergson s philosophy, Deleuze noted that it is the mystic who plays the whole of the universe as its mystical soul while philosophers can only consider such a soul from the outside (Deleuze 1988, p. 112). It is not clear what Deleuze was getting at, since the reigning impression among some scholars is that he was opposed to religious and mystical reflections, but it is not improbable to think that Deleuze is here lamenting the limitations of philosophical reflections that proceed with the pretensions of openness when they exclude a priori the contributions that religious and theological systems of thought may make, and have made, toward immanence and resistance. Deleuze s brief remarks on Buddhism calls for a rethinking of his thought in relation to religious and theological reflections. This book also aims to contribute to Deleuze scholarship by extending what remains unthought in his work. Organization of the Book This book is organized around seven chapters. In Chap. 2, Deleuze and the Lotus Sūtra : Toward an Ethics of Immanence, I will be examining the resonances between Deleuze s philosophy of immanence and the doctrine of Buddha-nature in the Lotus Sūtra. Deleuze was known for hunting down transcendence throughout his philosophical career, and for his construction of a philosophy of immanence. The ethical implication of this philosophy is that it does not accept the idea of other-worldly transcendence, but only a positive affirmation of this-worldly immanence. In this regard, there is a strong resonance between Deleuze s philosophical project with the idea of Buddha-nature in the Lotus Sūtra. This idea rejects the commonly held belief that the aim of Buddhist practice lies in other-worldly transcendence, and affirms the idea that Buddhahood is a state of life that is accessible in the here and now, because all sentient beings already possess a Buddha-nature.

15 1 Introduction 7 In Chap. 3 Deleuze, Spinoza and the Question of Reincarnation in the Mahāyāna Tradition, Simon Duffy aims to develop a secular foundation for the Buddhist concept of reincarnation, one that is consistent with the different ways in which this concept is understood across a number of Buddhist traditions such as the Mahāyāna or Madhyamaka tradition as presented in the works of Śāntideva and Nāgārjuna. In this regard, he is inspired by the Deleuzian-Spinozist account of what it means to be an individual, which provides an alternative metaphysical explanation of reincarnation. He claims that while the former makes a real distinction between saṃsāra and nirvāna, the latter makes a nominal distinction between the two. Duffy argues that this has a correlate in Deleuze s philosophy, specifically in his reworking of the fifth part of Spinoza s Ethics, which provides an alternative metaphysical explanation for reincarnation in terms of what remains of an individual in losing existence, in dying or even in suffering. Chapter 4, Tatsuya Higaki s Kenji Miyazawa and Takaaki Yoshimoto: Schizophrenic Nature in Japanese Thought considers the literary and philosophical ideas of Takaaki Yoshimoto, a famous critic after the Second World War in Japan. As an influential left-wing thinker, Takaaki Yoshimoto did not merely serve as a critic of literature but also examined the thought of a famous Pure Land Buddhist monk called Shinran ( ). He grasped the concept of Ou-Chyou ( ), or to go over to the horizontal direction and it played an important role in the development of his thought. Tatsuya Higaki also considers how Yoshimoto tried to reintroduce these Buddhist concepts to bear with Leftist theories including Deleuze and Guattari s philosophy in their work on the Anti-oedipal. Chapter 5, Joff Bradley s Ango the Schizo: Deleuze, Daraku, Downgoing, considers the literary references to the ocean and waves in Japanese writer Ango Sakaguchi s post-war works, his Mahāyāna Buddhism-inspired conception of the body and decadence ( daraku, ) and his slogan to live is to fall. Here, he suggests that it is the Artauld s-inspired BwO (Body without Organs) that we need to turn to, as it wards off fascism and raises questions about the possibility of a return to furusato ( ). In Chap. 6 On Not Mistaking Deleuze (With the Help of Some Buddhists) Ian Cook presents us with an interesting perspective on how

16 8 T. See we might read Deleuze more accurately with the help of Buddhist philosophy. In this chapter, he reads Deleuze and Guattari as critical theorists seeking to elaborate the process of self-transformation. He gives a presentation of Deleuze and Guattari s and Buddhists ideas as diametrically enfolded, both engaged in the question of transformation through the rejection of representation. Both Deleuze and Guattari and Buddhists promote a concept of Difference, which they distinguish from that of difference. Both Deleuze and Guattari and Buddhists reject notions of absolute interiority (as in absolute zero and not The Absolute ) in favor of absolute exteriority and relative interiority in favor of relative exteriority. While Deleuze and Guttari argue for transformations through a myriad of non-local assemblages that combine and fragment in the articulation of new practices (as innovations and improvements ), Buddhism offers meditation as praxis. In Chap. 7, Toshiya Ueno s Deleuze and Guattari and Buddhism: Toward Spiritual Anarchism through Reading Toshihiko Izutsu, there is a thoughtful reading of the relationship between Deleuze and Buddhism by way of examining the thought of the Japanese thinker Izutsu. Izutsu was a famous Japanese intellectual well known for his ability to straddle both eastern and western thought. This is especially clear in his famous studies of Islamic philosophy. Toshiya Ueno s chapter highlights the contributions that Izutsu has made in East West studies, as well as in his original reading of the intersections between Buddhist and western thought. Bibliography Deleuze, G Bergsonism (trans: Tomlinson, H.). London: Athlone Nietzsche and Philosophy (trans: Hugh Tomlinson, Foreword. Michael Hardt). New York: Columbia University Press. Deleuze, G., and Felix Guattari A Thousand Plateaus (trans: Brian Massumi). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press What is Philosophy? (trans: Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell). New York: Columbia University Press.

17 1 Introduction 9 Garfi eld, J Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gethin, R The Foundations of Buddhism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.. Goodchild, P Speech and Silence in the Mumonkan : An Examination of Use of Language in Light of the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. Philosophy East and West 43: Mistry, F Nietzsche and Buddhism. Berlin: De Gruyter. Park, Jin Y., ed Buddhisms and Deconstructions. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Parkes, G., ed Heidegger and Asian Thought. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Sullivan, S.O A Life between the Finite and Infinite: Remarks on Deleuze, Badiou and Western Buddhism. Deleuze Studies 8(2): Williams, P Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, 2nd edn. London/New York: Routledge/Kegan Paul.

18 2 Deleuze and the Lotus Sūtra : Toward an Ethics of Immanence Tony See Introduction This chapter examines the resonances between Deleuze s idea of immanence and the doctrine of Buddha-nature that is found in the Lotus Sūtra. Although much has been devoted to a study of Deleuze s idea of immanence and the doctrine of Buddha-nature, relatively little has been focused on how these two ideas resonate with one another. Deleuze was known for his attempt to construct a philosophy of immanence in order to resist the dominance of transcendence in the western philosophical tradition. In order to achieve this, he relied on a series of philosophers which placed an exclusive emphasis on immanence, the most important of which were Duns Scotus, Baruch Spinoza and Friedrich Nietzsche. Based on their philosophies, Deleuze constructed a philosophy of immanence which has ethical and political implications. This resonates with the idea of Buddha-nature in the Lotus Sūtra. The Lotus Sūtra is an important T. See ( ) National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore The Author(s) 2016 T. See, J. Bradley (eds.), Deleuze and Buddhism, DOI / _2 11

19 12 T. See text in the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition which teaches that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature. The significance of this is that it locates the aim of religious practice, together with the inherent cause for doing so, squarely in this world rather than in some transcendent world. It is my contention that these two ideas resonate with one another in the sense that both philosophies reject transcendence and affirm the power of immanence. Immanence and Transcendence French philosophy has recently been characterized in terms of two distinct trajectories, namely, immanence and transcendence (Smith 2003, p. 46). These two trajectories serve as useful heuristics for our understanding the aims of each French philosopher and who and what their conceptual opponents are. In general, the term transcendence refers to a trajectory of thought that moves toward a transcendent One that is opposed to the Many. In metaphysics, one common example for this One is none other than Plato s Idea ( eidos ) which provides a philosophical ground for the possibility of the Many. One consequence of accepting such a notion is that it immediately sets up a hierarchy in which the One stands over and above the Many. The Many are now situated along a chain of being with their value measured in terms of their proximity to or distance from this One they are approximations of the One but they can never be this One. This dualistic view of existence, hence, privileges the One over and above the Many. The acceptance of such a metaphysics of transcendence renders the individual passive in relation to this One, separating them from their power to act, and ultimately renders them ethically impotent. This is one reason why Deleuze saw his own philosophical project in terms of a reversal of Platonism (Beistegui 2012, p. 55). There is an affinity between Deleuze s and Derrida s philosophical enterprise in the sense that both engage with the shortcomings of traditional metaphysics. Derrida s deconstructive readings of works in the philosophical and literary traditions, and eventually in the legal and political traditions, aims to foster a sense of not knowing where to go ( aporia ), so that one remains open to the futural

20 2 Deleuze and the Lotus Sūtra: Toward an Ethics and a sense of ethical responsibility emerges. However, this is not to say that Deleuze s project is identical with that of Derrida s. What makes Deleuze s philosophical project distinct is that instead of merely deconstructing metaphysics, Deleuze also sought to construct a metaphysics of difference. Deleuze saw himself as a pure metaphysician because, if there are issues in traditional metaphysics, the point is not to abandon them but also to replace them with something better (Beaulieu et al ). Thus, the challenge for Deleuzian philosophy is not merely to question the dominant discourse but in constructing a different metaphysical system that is capable of accounting for becoming and difference (Smith 2003, p. 50). In order to construct such a metaphysics, Deleuze relied on a number of philosophers, literary writers and artists that together formed a series. For our purposes, we will confine our discussion to three main philosophers whose ideas provided the conceptual nodes that helped Deleuze to make his connections and to create a new image of thought. This will be followed by a section on the doctrine of Buddhanature and an examination of the resonances that exist between them. Finally, a discussion of how these two concepts may serve toward building an ethics of immanence will follow. On Deleuze s Philosophy of Immanence In terms of methodology, Deleuze adopted the idea of intercession. This could be a playful way of referring to his Catholic background, but it could also be due to his pragmatic approach to philosophy. In Negotiations, he states that: Whether real or imaginary, animate or inanimate, you have to form your intercessors. It s a series. If you re not in some series, you re lost. I need my intercessors to express myself, and they d never express themselves without me: you re always working in a group, even when you seem to be on your own (Toscano 2009, p. 382). The idea is that you need to find your allies, people who resonate with your philosophical ideas in some ways, and link up with them so that a series results.the idea is a practical one; you do not face your philosophical opponents alone, but in a strategic formation, as a war machine. In doing so, Deleuze relied on a multiplicity of allies throughout his

21 14 T. See philosophical career, ranging from philosophers to literary writers and film-makers. In this section, we will consider three key intercessors that helped Deleuze to develop his idea of immanence. These are namely, Scotus, Spinoza and Nietzsche. In the next section, we will consider how his idea of immanence resonates with the idea of Buddha-nature in the Lotus Sūtra. One of Deleuze s first intercessors was the scholastic thinker Duns Scotus who was famous for his idea of univocity. Scotus seems to be an unlikely choice for the idea of immanence because, like other theologians of the time, he was interested in the nature of God and was engaged in a debate concerning the knowability of God himself. His framework was, therefore, based on dualism or what we might call transcendence. Nevertheless, as we shall see, his role was important as he was one of the first who saw the issue with transcendence and sought to reconceptualize God in the direction of immanence. If God exists and if God is utterly transcendent, an idea that was accepted during medieval ages, then there could be an issue with knowing this God because he cannot be reduced to the things that we can know of in the world. What are the epistemic conditions which provide for our knowledge of God, since our faculties are not perfect but faulty? Surely, if there is a wide chasm between God and man, the former being perfect and the latter imperfect, then we cannot really understand his existence in the same way that ordinary objects say, a cup, exist? The scholastic answer to this question is that we can know God s existence in an analogical manner, that is, we can know God s existence by way of an analogy of how a cup exists. This answer raises another problem if God exists analogically in relation to human existence, then we cannot really be sure what it means to say that God exists. Scotus saw that the analogical theory of being is inadequate, as it would ultimately suggest that God s existence is unknowable. Scotus argued that the relationship between God and man cannot be an analogical or equivocal one because it would ultimately render God unknowable. Scotus maintained that God and man must exist in one and the same sense (Smith 2012, p. 169). This doctrine of univocity suggest that there is a radical continuity between God and his creatures. Scotus developed the idea of univocity in order to preserve God s knowability, but in the process, he also provided a philosophical basis for Deleuze s idea of

22 2 Deleuze and the Lotus Sūtra: Toward an Ethics immanence. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze states that With univocity, however, it is not the differences which are and must be: it is being which is Difference, in the sense that it is said of difference. Moreover, it is not we who are univocal in a Being which is not; it is we and our individuality which remains equivocal in and for a univocal Being (Deleuze 1994, p. 39). The univocity of Being then, suggests that if God exists, he does not differ from us in substance but merely in degrees. We do not have a condition in which God is one thing and man another, rather, the relationship between God and man is a far more intimate one than we could imagine. Deleuze also relied on Spinoza and his idea of substance in order to develop his idea of immanence. Although Scotus idea of univocity suggests of a radical continuity between God and man, this continuity remains incomplete. Given Scotus religious and theological contexts, it was perhaps not the wisest thing to assert the identity of God and his creations. Thus, in Scotus philosophy an underlying conceptual distinction persists between the two. In this regard, Spinoza s philosophy went much further than Scotus. In Expressionism in Philosophy (Deleuze 1990 ), Spinoza developed the idea that God is a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence (Deleuze 1988, p. 13). In this view, God is an infinite substance and his creations and creatures are reconceptualized as his modes and expressions (Deleuze 1988, p. 63). This means that God as infinite substance cannot be separated from his expressions, the two are only conceptually distinct but not substantially distinct there cannot be a God that is lacking in expressions. The significance of this becomes clear once we examine the theory of causation, as the univocity between God and his creations is also implies the univocity of causes. In terms of the univocity of cause, there are three types of causes: a transitive, emanative and immanent cause. A transitive cause is a cause with effects that leave itself, these effects are outside of itself and become lesser than itself. An emanative cause is a cause that does not leave but emanate from the cause they are nearer but remain beyond the cause. While these two ideas of God and causation seems to conform to our ordinary of what God is and what he does, the issue is that they set up a hierarchical relationship between cause and effect. One implication of this is

23 16 T. See that God s creatures have less causative power, they have less power to act and are ultimately passive. Instead of accepting these two models of reality, Spinoza developed the idea of immanent causation, this is where the effects do not leave or emanate from the cause, but remain within the cause (Smith 2012, pp ). In such a theory of causation, the effects do not go outside or emanate away from the cause but remain immanate within the cause. These effects are modes which remain in its cause no less than the cause remains in itself as substance. These modes in their activities as expressions both explicate and implicate God (Smith 2012, p. 174). If we see the world as an expression of God, then there is nothing in the world which is not a sign of God. This is why Deleuze states in Difference and Repetition that The rock, the lily, the beast, the human equally sing the glory of God in a kind of crowned anarchy (Deleuze 1994, p. 278). In this pure ontology there is nothing beyond or outside or superior to Being, there is no hierarchical difference between God and his creatures, but a radical equality or even anarchy, between the multitude of beings. This forms the conceptual basis for Deleuze s idea of immanence. Deleuze also relied on Nietzsche s idea of eternal recurrence in constructing his idea of immanence. Even though Spinoza s reconceptualization of God as an infinite substance that is totally infused in every aspect of the world moves in the direction of immanence, this idea may nevertheless create a new dependency on the idea of substance itself. The danger of falling into a new form of transcendence remains. This is why Deleuze also turned to the ideas of Nietzsche to help him construct his idea of immanence. Nietzsche s idea of eternal recurrence is especially important in this regard because it is able to affirm immanence without the corresponding dangers of transcendence. In Difference and Repetition (Deleuze 1994 ), Deleuze explains Nietzsche s idea of the eternal return not in terms of the return of the same identical things in the world in other words, not in its usual cosmological sense. Instead, Nietzsche s eternal recurrence is about affi rming the return itself. In this interpretation of eternal return, there is only a series of returning differences without the need for a first term. This idea enabled Deleuze to build a pure ontology which is free of any substance or foundational term, as it does not have any first term as a ground for the multiplicity of phenom-

24 2 Deleuze and the Lotus Sūtra: Toward an Ethics ena, and the very basis for transcendence is dismantled, leaving behind only a pure Nietzschean affirmation of immanence. This is evidenced in the following two passages from Deleuze s Difference and Repetition : Eternal return cannot mean the return of the Identical because it presupposes a world (that of the will to power) in which all previous identities have been abolished and dissolved. Returning is being, but only the being of becoming. The eternal return does not bring back the same, but returning constitutes the only Same of that which becomes. Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming itself. Returning is thus the only identity, but identity as a secondary power; the identity of difference, the identical which belongs to the different, or turns around the different. Such an identity, produced by difference, is determined as repetition. Repetition in the eternal return, therefore, consists in conceiving the same on the basis of the different. (Deleuze 1994, p. 41) For eternal return, affirmed in all its power, allows no installation of a foundation-ground. On the contrary, it swallows up or destroys every ground which would function as an instance responsible for the difference between the original and the derived, between things and simulacra. It makes us party to a universal ungrounding. By ungrounding we should understand the freedom of the unmediated ground, the discovery of a ground behind every other ground, the relation between the groundless and the ungrounded, the immediate reflection of the formless and the superior form which constitutes eternal return. Every thing, animal or being assumes the status of simulacrum; so that the thinker of eternal return who indeed refuses to be drawn out of the cave, finding instead another cave beyond, always another in which to hide can rightly say that he is himself burdened with the superior form of everything that is, like the poet burdened with humanity, even that of the animals. (Deleuze 1994, p. 67) The idea of immanence has ethical and political implications. Immanence suggests that there is no room for the negative in this life, that everything is to be affirmed and nothing is to be rejected. It calls for an affirmation of all of life s sufferings and afflictions, without the necessity for any ground or identity. This eternal return can be explained in terms of Nietzsche s idea of the will to power. Deleuze explains that the eternal return is the

25 18 T. See instrument and the expression of the will to power. This will to power is not to be confused with the usual interpretation of a power over others. Instead, this will to power is better understood in terms of the power of affirmation. This will to power is a power that raises each thing to its superior form, that is, its nth power (Deleuze 2004, p. 125). Thus, Deleuzian immanence refers to a power that has no negativity but which affirms life in its entirety, in spite of all of its misfortunes and sicknesses. It is this affirmation of life which restores one s power to act. He states: Th e eternal return is indeed the category of the ordeal, and we must understand, as such, of events, of everything that happens. Misfortune, sickness, madness, even the approach of death have two aspects: in one sense, they separate me from my power; in another sense they endow me with a strange power, as though I possessed a dangerous means of exploration, which is also a terrifying realm to explore. (Deleuze 2004, p. 125) Deleuze s intercessors Scotus, Spinoza and Nietzsche afforded him with the necessary conceptual resources which enabled him to construct the idea of immanence in opposition to the metaphysics of transcendence. Although there are obvious differences between these three philosophers and the concepts that they expounded, namely univocity, substance and eternal recurrence, nevertheless, there is a clear trajectory toward immanence. In the next section, we will examine how this idea, the idea of not rejecting and escaping from this life, bur affirming and even transforming it through one s wisdom and compassion, can also be found in Buddhist teachings. On the Doctrine of Buddha-Nature in the Lotus Sūtra The doctrine of Buddha-nature ( buddhadhātu ) is an important doctrine in Mahāyāna Buddhism which teaches all sentient beings have the Buddhanature. The significance of this teaching is that it suggests that the cause of enlightenment does not lie in some external sources but within oneself, and that the aim of religious life is not in some transcendent plane

26 2 Deleuze and the Lotus Sūtra: Toward an Ethics but immanent in this world. The ethos of this teaching is not escape from this world, but affirmation. This Buddha-nature exists in sentient beings in a perfect condition. What makes ordinary sentient beings different from a Buddha is merely that their Buddha-natures are obscured by karmic mental, emotional and dogmatic defilements. Hence, the difference between a Buddha and ordinary sentient beings is not one of substance, but merely in terms of intensity. The doctrine of Buddha-nature thus calls for a reinterpretation of the meaning of religious practice itself, where the aim of religious practice is not to escape from this world but the realization of one s inherent nature itself. Th e idea of Buddha-nature reaches its logical conclusion in the Lotus Sūtra ( ). The Lotus Sūtra is an important text in East Asian Buddhism that has influenced Japanese culture, literature and aesthetics (Tanabe and Tanabe 1989 ). One reason for its popularity is its teaching that all of the Buddha s previous teachings were skilful means and not the ultimate truth. The ultimate truth is, rather, that there are not many paths but only one path, namely, that of Buddhahood. This doctrine probably came about in response to tendencies within the Buddhist community which began to teach three distinct and separate spiritual goals. The Lotus Sūtra rejects this view and maintains that there is only one goal in Buddhist practice, namely, the attainment of Buddhahood. In the Lotus Sūtra, the idea that all sentient beings have the Buddhanature also suggests that it is not impossible realize this Buddha-nature, and become a Buddha, in one single lifetime. The reason that everyone can attain Buddhahood is that all sentient beings already come possessed with a Buddha-nature. It is not something far away in some transcendent plane, but that which is inherent in one s nature. The Lotus Sūtra teaches how we can do this by way of a number of parables. The central idea behind these parables seem to be that we can attain Buddhahood in this lifetime if we have enough faith (Groner 1989, p. 59). The question of faith has been discussed in a number of studies on the Lotus Sūtra, suffice it here to say that this doctrine reverses the tendency among some Buddhist and religious traditions that place an exclusive focus on other-worldliness. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the doctrine of Buddha-nature is in terms of the meaning of religious practice. From the perspective of the Lotus Sūtra, the aim of Buddhist practice is not to

27 20 T. See become something other than what one authentically is, but to become what one already is. This is because there is no transcendence to speak of, from the perspective of the Lotus Sūtra, except as a skilful means that is meant to lead one back to oneself. True enlightenment consists in the wisdom that one is not merely a passive object in the world, but an active subject with the power to make a difference in the world. Hence, the doctrine of Buddha-nature resonates with Deleuze s idea of immanence and being an active subject in the world, rather than being a passive object that hankers after transcendence at every step of the way. Historically, the doctrine of Buddha-nature in the Lotus Sūtra was highly influential in the development of Chinese Buddhism in the sixth century CE. Specifically, it has influenced the Tiantai, Tendai and Zen schools of Buddhism. In medieval China. Zhiyi ( ) (538 97), the founder of the Tiantai school of Buddhism, developed the idea of Attaining Buddhahood in this Body ( Chi-shen ch eng-fo ) on the basis of the doctrine of Buddha-nature expressed in the Lotus Sūtra. If the Lotus Sūtra itself did not present us with a systematic philosophy on how we may become a Buddha, Zhiyi composed an important commentary called Verses on the Lotus Sutra (Fa-hua wen-chü ) in order to explain how this can be done (Groner 1989, p. 58). The Lotus Sūtra was also highly influential in the development of Japanese Buddhism. In Japan, the Lotus Sūtra otherwise known as Hokkekyō ( ), influenced Saichō ( ) ( ), the Japanese reformer who founded the Tendai school of Buddhism in Japan. He also placed an emphasis on the idea of attaining Buddhahood in this present body ( sokushin jōbutsu ) on the basis of the doctrine of Buddha-nature in the Lotus Sūtra. Although some scholars have argued that this doctrine was developed in the esoteric Buddhist tradition called Mikkyo (or Shingon), textual evidence suggests that Saichō already thought about a direct path ( jikidō ) to Buddhahood that is based on the Lotus Sūtra as early as 802 (Groner 1989, p. 54). His mature view of sokushin jōbutsu can be traced to his last written work, the Hokke shūku, which has come to form an important text in the Tendai Buddhist tradition (Groner 1989, pp. 61 2). The doctrine of Buddha-nature in the Lotus Sūtra also influenced the development of Zen Buddhism in the thirteenth century, through the Zen master Dōgen ( ) ( ). Influenced by the Lotus Sūtra, he

28 2 Deleuze and the Lotus Sūtra: Toward an Ethics composed a ninety-two chapter text entitled the Shōbōgenzō ( ) in which he teaches that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature, and that this is not merely a potential that needs to undergo growth and development before it can manifest itself. Instead, the Buddha-nature already exists in all sentient beings in a pristine condition ( Shobogenzo, Bussho, p. 16). This is based on his interpretation of a Chinese translation of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra ( ) or the Nirvāna Sutra ( ) in short, which says that sentient beings do not merely have a Buddha-nature, but are ( ) the Buddha-nature ( ) itself (Kodera 1977, p. 273). Dōgen s interpretation of the Buddhanature brings about a radical reversal in the way we usually conceive of religious practice as a means to attain some transcendent end. Instead, religious practice is conceived in that it does not postulate Buddhahood to be a transcendent state to be longed for by the practitioner, but an immanent reality that is hidden from common view. The doctrine of Buddha-nature in the Lotus Sūtra also influenced Nichiren, ( ) ( ) an important Japanese Buddhist reformer in Kamakura Japan. Nichiren teaches the idea in the Lotus Sūtra that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature, but there is a slight difference in terms of methodology between his teaching and Dōgen s teaching. While Dōgen s emphasis is on just sitting as an expression of one s innate Buddha-nature, Nichiren teaches the more active practice of reciting the title of the Lotus Sūtra, or Nam-Myōhō-Renge-Kyō, while facing the mandala called the Gohonzon. The Gohonzon is supposedly, a visual depiction of the Buddha s enlightened state as expressed in the Lotus Sūtra. If this may seem like a focus on something that is external and transcendent to oneself, Nichiren clarifies in his treatise The Real Aspect of the Gohonzon that this Gohonzon is not in reality external but internal to their nature. Thus, in one of Nichiren s most famous passages he writes: Never seek this Gohonzon outside yourself. The Gohonzon exists only within the mortal flesh of us ordinary people who embrace the Lotus Sūtra and chant Nam-Myōhō-Renge-Kyō. The body is the palace of the ninth consciousness, the unchanging reality which reigns over all life s functions (Nichiren 1996, p. 328). Although the doctrine of Buddha-nature is very important in Mahāyāna Buddhism, it is not without its share of controversies. The