Simplicity, personhood, and divinity

Transcription

1 International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 41: , Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. Simplicity, personhood, and divinity MARKWYNN Australian Catholic University, Brisbane, Australia 1. Introduction In contemporary philosophy of religion, it is customary to think of God as an individual person, who exists in time, and is related to things in the world not only as their cause but also in various respects as their effect.1 On the whole, this model has displaced the so-called 'classical' account, according to which God is pure being and therefore 'simple'. Two kinds of consideration lie behind this development. First of all, there is a philosophical concern regarding the internal consistency of the classical view. For instance, some commentators have urged that it makes no sense to suppose both that the world makes no difference to God and that God has knowledge of the world.2 A second kind of concern is more religious than philosophical in flavour. Here it is said that the classical view fails to provide for the inter-personal dimension of the believer's relation to God. Above all, this is because inter-personal relations, so it is said, require reciprocity: they demand that each party should be able to affect the other.3 In this paper, I shall consider the possibility of charting a sort of middle ground between these two approaches. I shall argue that certain features of the individualistic approach point us in the direction of the classical view, though they may not require the recapitulation of that view in full. More exactly, I shall argue that establishing the religious relevance of a God conceived individualistically will require some use of notions which are more commonly associated with the rival view. 2. The religious adequacy of the individualistic model I shall take Richard Swinburne's works The coherence of theism and The existence of God as a benchmark for my discussion of 'the' individualistic approach, although of course a great diversity of views may be brought under this general heading.4 The God depicted in these works endures through time, and changes over time, as he learns of new developments in the world. This reflects the fact that, in some cases, creaturely choices logi-

2 92 MARKWYNN cally precede God's knowledge of those choices.5 Moreover, this God acts in the world for reasons which are broadly (though not in all their detail) intelligible to human beings.6 Lastly, the God Swinburne portrays does not contain the reason for his own existence. In so far as his powers and knowledge are unbounded, such a God is more likely to exist than relatively complex things like you and me.7 In this sense, there is a connection between the divine nature and the divine existence. But this connection is probabilistic: while God's existence is more likely than that of other things, considered abstractly there is no necessity that God should exist.8 Writers in the classical tradition are likely to take exception to this picture on metaphysical grounds, arguing that an agent of this kind must be causally dependent. But I wish to examine the idea from another point of view, by considering its religious adequacy. The question I shall consider is this: why suppose that the God Swinburne describes is a fitting object of religious concern? I shall begin by offering, very briefly, a thought experiment which may appear to call into question the entitlement of a Swinburnean God to such regard. On Swinburne's account, God's existence is improbable.9 Granted this fact, we ought to attribute to such a God some of the following attitudes. First of all, such a God will surely feel gratitude for his existence, recognising the improbability of his existing, and that he has done nothing to earn it. In turn, if God views his own existence in these terms, then he will surely understand his creative activity as a matter of sharing with others the 'gift' of life which he has himself received. Such a God, we may think, will create in a spirit of wonder before the fact that anything at all exists, and in a spirit of gratitude for his own existence. Of course, this way of talking about God is strikingly anthropomorphic. However, the picture Swinburne presents seems to invite this sort of extrapolation. And in other contexts, Swinburne himself is willing to attribute to God forms of understanding which offer a close parallel with the mental lives of human beings.10 For some, the possibility of this sort of imaginative reconstruction of the mental life of a Swinburnean kind of God will constitute a reductio ad absurdum of his approach. In what follows I wish to consider how far this response is justified. Should anthropomorphism of this kind call into question the entitlement of Swinburne's God to be called divine? In particular, we might ask: if some such self-understanding can intelligibly and plausibly be attributed to the God Swinburne describes, does that in any way detract from his entitlement to receive worship? Our first recourse in addressing this question must be Swinburne's own account of the rationale for worship. He writes that to worship is:

3 SIMPLICITY, PERSONHOOD, AND DIVINITY 93 to show respect towards a person acknowledged as de facto and de jure lord of all. Such a person deserves a peculiar kind of respect for two reasons. Firstly, whatever our dependence on other beings, they depend on him. He is our ultimate benefactor, and has the right to be such. Secondly, he has incomparable greatness; if greatness deserves respect, he deserves a peculiar respect.11 Here the entitlement of God to receive worship is grounded in a similarity between human beings and God. More exactly, worship is said to be a limiting case of the sort of respect that we owe to other human beings, in so far as we depend upon them, and in so far as they have achieved greatness. This may suggest that the 'discovery' that Swinburne's God will view his existence in rather the way that we view ours need not after all undermine his entitlement to worship, since that entitlement rests from the start on the thought that there are certain similarities between human beings and God. However, some emphases in this passage do seem rather strained if we start from the thought that Swinburne's God will feel wonder before his own existence, and consider his activity as an expression of gratitude. In particular, we might suppose, such a God would not conceive his own relationship to other beings primarily, if at all, in terms of lordship, where lordship implies that others are beholden to you, on account of their dependence upon you. I shall try to substantiate this claim by exploring first of all the way in which a human being's gratitude before their own existence should condition their attitudes towards other people. Suppose we draw a distinction between basic and derived abilities. My ability to ride a bike is, clearly, a derivative ability: it is one I have acquired by the exercise of various other abilities, such as the ability to move various parts of my body. But, evidently, not all of my abilities can be of this derivative kind. In particular, since I am not self-caused, the most fundamental of my abilities, those which are bound up with my very existence, cannot derive from my own activity. Even if we suppose that all the abilities I possess at present are derivative, my existence in the first place as an agent with the capacity to generate derivative abilities will need to be presupposed. This capacity must be basic. Granted that some of our abilities are basic, our capacity for activity is ultimately a 'given'. This suggests that whatever benefits we may have conferred upon others, our relation to them is never properly one of 'lordship'. While others may depend upon us, in engendering that dependence, we are ourselves dependent upon our initial endowment of basic abilities. In such a case, we may say, we are merely sharing with others the possibilities which

4 94 MARKWYNN were inherent in our initial endowment. And since this endowment was not of our own making, it seems inappropriate to make this sharing the basis of a relationship of subservience. This suggests that there is indeed a connection between recognising one's own dependence in gratitude and adopting a certain attitude towards other people. Of course, not all human beings have acknowledged the force of considerations of this kind. But the validity of such an association of ideas seems to recognised in, for instance, the traditional Christian teaching that human beings should relate to one another in humility. At least in part, this teaching seems to rest on the idea that since we are indebted ourselves, to a beneficent God, it would be a mark of ingratitude to consider our relations to people who in turn depend upon us in terms of power and domination.12 This teaching retains its relevance, I suggest, even if a person does not believe in God. For whether or not there is a God, it is clear that I cannot be the ground of my own existence. And so long as I am not the ground of my own existence, then I will have reason to consider my existence as a 'gift', to be received in gratitude and humility. Now by parity of argument, it is clear that Swinburne's God must also have certain powers which are basic. But if his existence, like ours, is ultimately a 'given', then surely his existence, like ours, is to be received in humility and gratitude. In turn, this suggests, to revert to the issue with which we began, that just as power and subordination are inappropriate ways of understanding inter-personal relations in the human case, so 'lordship' is not the most helpful category for understanding the relationship of Swinburne's God to other things. A further distinction is useful here. Clearly, the most basic powers of Swinburne's God are indeed a part of him. But he is not merely to be identified with these powers. For instance, on Swinburne's account, God's decision to create is free in the libertarian sense.13 It follows that God's knowledge of the world does not follow directly from his initial stock of basic powers. Hence we must distinguish between the basic reality which is ultimately presupposed in the activities of such a God and the particular pattern of world-dependent thoughts and world-sustaining activities which make up his reality more 'concretely'.14 So we might express the point that Swinburne's God will not conceive of his relation to other beings in terms of 'lordship' more precisely by saying that qua a mind with world-dependent thoughts, this God has reason not to understand his relationship to others in terms of subordination, in so far as his relation to his basic abilities is one of dependence. Granted all of this, is Swinburne's God properly considered as divine, or as worthy of worship? I shall suggest a fuller answer to this question shortly, but on the basis of this discussion, we might at least offer this

5 SIMPLICITY, PERSONHOOD, AND DIVINITY 95 response: not perhaps for the reasons that Swinburne gives. In particular, the relationship of lordship, in the sense we have considered, seems problematic, given the related facts that Swinburne's God should feel gratitude for his existence, that certain of his powers are basic, and that qua a mind who has knowledge of the world he is a dependent being. Significantly, these considerations do not seem to apply to the God of 'classical' theism. For instance, on the classical view, there is no question of God feeling wonder and gratitude before his own existence. For his essence and his existence will be conjoined necessarily (and not merely probabilistically).15 Moreover, on this account, the world makes no difference to God, and there is therefore no possibility of drawing a distinction between a core reality of basic powers and the actualisation of that reality in particular choices and activities. So there is no question on this approach of God qua individual mind with knowledge of the world exhibiting dependence upon God qua core reality. It is true that such a God will have certain powers which are basic. But given that the existence of these powers is guaranteed in the same way as the divine nature, and that they are indeed identical with that nature, then, again, the notions of gratitude and dependence will not have the same application here. So an attempt to spell out the sense in which the God of classical theism is entitled to respect and even to worship seems not to be vulnerable to the issues we have been considering. If these issues do indeed cast doubt on Swinburne's account of the rationale for worship, and if no persuasive account can be provided in its place, then the discussion so far could be taken as an argument, from the nature of worship, for something like the classical view. But before drawing such a conclusion, we need to think further about whether we can supply some other rationale for the worthiness of worship of Swinburne's God. 3. Developing the individualistic model We might begin by returning to the basic power which is presupposed in the activities of Swinburne's God. The question I want to consider is this: is this basic power a proper focus of worship? One reason for thinking it might be is that the basic power shares certain properties with the God of classical theism. Thus it is immaterial, and contains within itself all other possibilities, in so far as all other facts concerning reality ultimately depend upon it. Moreover, the power can be termed necessary in so far as Swinburne's God cannot lose his most fundamental powers (those which belong to him essentially).16 And by extension, if these fundamental powers are unchanging, and if they cannot be altered by other things, then the basic power may be considered immutable and impassible.

6 96 MARKWYNN In all of these respects, the character of the basic power clearly recalls the God of classical theism - immutability, impassibility and necessary existence are all, of course, characteristics of the 'simple' God of classical theism. By contrast, Swinburne's God qua individual mind thinking worlddependent thoughts is changing, passible, and contingent. This suggests that the God of classical theism and Swinburne's kind of God could in principle co-exist, assuming that the basic power which is presupposed in the activities of Swinburne's God can be given the further properties of the classical God (such as knowledge of the world). However, this possibility is unlikely to represent a happy compromise. Swinburne could hardly accept that the activities of his God depend upon the will of another, more fundamental reality. And proponents of the classical view will hardly agree that their God acts through a time-bound intermediary such as Swinburne's God. So despite the theoretical possibility that both kinds of agent might exist, we seem in practice to be driven to a choice between them. For the purposes of this paper, I shall simply assume that the classical account is not available at this point. Of course, on the classical view, the perfectly simple source of all other realities has knowledge of the world and will. Moreover, as the source of all other existents, this reality possesses the fullness of existence within itself - it is subsistent existence.17 By contrast, contemporary philosophers of religion tend to suppose that simplicity is not compatible with divine knowledge of the world. Such knowledge, they will say, implies that the world makes a difference to God, and that some distinction must therefore be drawn between God qua a mind with knowledge of a contingent world and God qua basic power (to put the point in my terms).18 They are likely moreover to suppose that the notion of subsistent existence, far from suggesting a rich concentration of possibilities for existence, is merely vacuous.19 If we may suppose that this critique is well-founded, then the basic power which is presupposed in the activities of Swinburne's God is unlikely to commend itself as a fitting object of religious reverence. For instance, on this supposition, the power will lack any knowledge of the world, even if knowledge of other kinds can be attributed to it. Understood in these terms, the power is more reminiscent of Aristotle's God than of the God specified in Christian theology, and seems no more likely to elicit a response of worship. So despite certain similarities between the basic power of Swinburne's God and the God of classical theism, it seems unlikely that this power can provide a satisfactory object of religious regard when deprived of the further assumptions which are characteristic of the classical scheme. So our question remains: if we adopt a basically Swinburnean ontology, is there any way of finding a proper focus for religious attitudes?

7 SIMPLICITY, PERSONHOOD, AND DIVINITY 97 Swinburne's God qua an individual with world-dependent knowledge is to be distinguished, I have suggested, from the basic power which is presupposed in his activities. Having considered the possible religious significance of Swinburne's God qua basic power, we might consider next whether any religious significance attaches to this God considered as an individual mind with knowledge of the world. I suggest that we can make some progress with this question by returning to the understanding of divinity which is evident in the writings of Aquinas. In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas remarks that God created a great diversity of creatures so that the deficiencies of one kind of thing would be remedied by the characteristics of another. In this way, the divine nature could be bodied forth, in a fragmentary way, by the created order as a whole: God planned to create many distinct things, in order to share with them and reproduce in them his goodness. Because no one creature could do this, he produced many diverse creatures, so that what was lacking in one expression of his goodness could be made up by another; for the goodness which God has whole and together, creatures share in many different ways. And the whole universe shares and expresses that goodness better than any individual creature.20 This remark might suggest that if Thomas had been convinced that his doctrine of subsistent being was untenable, then he would have chosen the cosmos as a whole as the proper object of religious devotion, in preference to a Swinburnean kind of God. For the thought expressed here is that no individual thing (not even an individual of the kind described by Swinburne, we might suppose) can capture the nature of 'being' as fully as the totality of individuals. However, rather than pursuing this thought, I propose to keep to the main theme of our discussion by examining a further approach, one which will find a securer place for Swinburne's God. The passage from Thomas I have quoted implies that anything which is divine should body forth, in a unitary way, the nature of beings in general. (Of course, more generally, this is the implication of Thomas's teaching that God is pure being.) By this criterion, there is, it seems, some reason to consider Swinburne's God qua individual mind a proper recipient of religious regard. For if you want to know what 'being' is like in general, it is not enough to direct your attention to the basic power. More precisely, you need to look to the individual mind whose contingent intentions have fixed the general character and purpose of the world. Thus Swinburne's God contains the nature of being within himself in so far as his intentions and activities provide the primary 'channel' for the basic power, and thereby determine the fundamental tendencies of things in the world in general.21

8 98 MARKWYNN So there is a sense in which in relating ourselves to Swinburne's God, considered as an individual mind, we relate ourselves to being in general and, we might say, to the basic drive towards goodness and community which is evident in things in general. On this basis, we may say that to be related to the personal God Swinburne describes is indeed to be related to what is divine. But again this God is not so much the 'lord' of all; his role is rather one of 'focussing' or 'channelling' the basic power, the core reality which is presupposed in his own activity and thereby in the activity of all other things. And in turn, his goodness is not simply intrinsic (by contrast with Thomas's God, who is subsistent existence), but is determined by reference to the quality of his effects - for it is these effects which fix the character of 'being' in general. In so far as the tendencies of things are indeed value-promoting, to that degree we have good reason to think of the channel of the basic power as divine. This understanding of the basis for ascriptions of divinity lends itself easily to the thought that individual things within the world may also have a claim to divinity, not by virtue of focussing the basic tendencies of existence, but by providing in themselves a paradigmatic expression of those basic tendencies.22 More exactly, if we suppose, following the Christian tradition, that the basic purpose and tendency of the world has to do with the creation of community or love, then we might infer that only a consciously relational being could play such a role in full. If such a being were to express unreservedly (and proleptically) the communitarian character of the world, then we would have reason to consider it divine. Notice that this reason would be of the same general character as our reason for thinking Swinburne's God divine, for it would have to do with the capacity of an individual thing to represent the nature and goodness of being in general. But in this case, the individual's significance would relate to its role as an expression of this goodness, rather than as a channel for it.23 Clearly, these thoughts could be developed in an incarnational direction. But this would take us away from the basic issue before us - whether a Swinburnean kind of ontology is rich enough to sustain religious attitudes. In brief, the answer which is beginning to emerge is 'yes', but not perhaps for the reason which Swinburne gives. Swinburne's God has reason to be considered divine not as lord of the world, but rather as the channel which establishes the basic patterns of the world's development, and in this sense discloses the nature of being. In concluding this section, it may be helpful to note how the proposal I have developed is affected if we abandon Swinburne's libertarianism, while keeping the remainder of his system. If we forgo the idea that God and creatures have libertarian freedom, and suppose that the divine activity follows directly from the divine essence, and that the activity of creatures follows

9 SIMPLICITY, PERSONHOOD, AND DIVINITY 99 directly from the divine activity, then on the account I have given, there is no obstacle to the thought that the basic power is divine without qualification. For in such a case, the basic power will fix the nature of being in all its detail. Notice also that in such a case we can consistently attribute to the basic power a knowledge of the world, since there will be a precise correspondence between the world and the power from which it deterministically derives. This position is, clearly, closer to the classical ideal than the one I have described above, though it still makes no reference to the idea of subsistent being. However, once we re-introduce divine (or creaturely) libertarian freedom, then the distinction between God qua core reality and God qua mind with knowledge of the world will re-emerge. In this case, the nature of being in general will not be fully expressed by the core reality. So in such a case, on the view I have expounded, the core reality will not have a claim to divinity considered simply in itself. 4. The proposal in context In concluding, I would like to clarify the approach I have outlined by comparing it with three others - firstly, with Swinburne's (once more), then with the classical account, and then with Charles Hartshorne's. Turning to Swinburne first, the approach I have followed has taken for granted Swinburne's ontology, and tried to see on what basis we might commend religious attitudes towards certain of the entities picked out within that ontology. So my concern has not been with epistemological issues (why think there is a God of the kind Swinburne describes?), but rather with a conceptual issue - why think that the reality Swinburne describes is properly the focus of religious attitudes? My account, unlike Swinburne's, rests on a distinction between God qua basic power and God qua individual having knowledge of the world. In brief, I have argued that this distinction is necessary if we are to see what attitude a Swinburnean God would take towards his own existence, and if we are to see how this self-understanding would shape his way of relating to things in the world. More exactly, I have argued that qua individual mind, Swinburne's God has reason to consider himself not as 'lord of all' but rather as the channel, even the 'servant', of the basic endowment presupposed in his activities, and that Swinburne's rationale for worship therefore fails. However, such a God remains worthy of worship not so much qua basic power, but rather as the channel of that power, for in this role he sums up the basic tendencies of existence. There may appear to be a tension here in the thought that Swinburne's God should consider himself a servant, in the sense indicated, while still being a proper object of worship. But this suggestion presents a paradox

10 100 MARKWYNN only while we persist in connecting the ideas of worship and of power or dominion. On the account I have given, it is the ability of Swinburne's God to represent the character of existence in general which establishes his divinity, and therefore his worthiness of worship. His refusal to consider himself as 'lord' in the sense of master in no way compromises a claim to divinity which rests on these grounds. Of course, we are free to keep the notion of 'lordship' in relation to such a God, but in that case the notion will need to undergo a transformation of sense, and will need to be purged of any association with domination.24 To the extent that this account succeeds in making Swinburne's ontology appear religiously relevant, it amounts to a defence of that scheme over against the classical approach. But at the same time, it brings out at various points the significance of the classical proposal. It does this in particular by suggesting that understanding the religious significance of Swinburne's God depends upon making a distinction between this God qua an individual mind and qua the indeterminate and 'simple' power which is presupposed in the existence of everything else. Granted that Swinburne's God qua individual mind will acknowledge his dependence upon this basic power, there is a clear concession here to the thought that no individual thing, considered merely as such, can provide a proper anchor for religious devotion. Instead, Swinburne's personal God provides a proper focus for religious devotion by virtue of serving the basic power which is presupposed in his own existence, and thereby in the existence of all other things. At the same time, it is this personal God, and not the basic power, which is divine in the fullest sense, in so far as he sums up the nature of being in general. This understanding of the basis for ascriptions of divinity represents, of course, a further acknowledgment of the value of the classical tradition. The question which remains, one I have skirted around for present purposes, is whether the classical account of the status of the basic power carries conviction. In turn, that will depend on what we make of the classical approach to a variety of topics, including divine knowledge, the nature of personhood, and the relation between a cause and its effects. For instance, if we adopt the classical understanding of divine knowledge, then we should be able to dispense with the distinction between core reality and actualisation of that reality. If moreover we adopt the classical view of personhood, then the proper focus of religious devotion will be a reality which is at once simple and personal. Lastly, the account I have offered may suggest certain parallels with Hartshorne's well-known distinction between the abstract and concrete poles of the divine nature.25 In particular, these notions recall respectively the idea of God as basic power and as individual mind with knowledge of the world. However, Hartshorne treats the abstract pole of the divine nature

11 SIMPLICITY, PERSONHOOD, AND DIVINITY 101 as merely a simplification of the fullness of the divine reality. On his view, this simplification may have a certain point philosophically, but is devoid of any religious significance.26 By contrast, on the account I have given, reference to the basic power is required for an appreciation of the self-understanding of a Swinburnean (or Hartshornean) God, and is therefore essential for understanding the basis of any religious response to this reality. The account I have given is consistent with various Hartshornean moves concerning the superiority of change over changelessness, and so on, but does not require them. It identifies divinity in the first instance not by reference to some such theory of the nature of perfection, but by reference to the idea that a thing is divine in so far as it discloses the nature of being. Such an approach is, clearly, closer in spirit to the Thomistic account in its understanding of the rationale for ascriptions of divinity. 5. Conclusions In this discussion, I have tried to identify some of the ways in which God conceived individualistically, in the way Swinburne indicates, may prove to be a proper focus of religious attitudes. The discussion suggests that Swinburne's own way of justifying the idea that such an agent is worthy of worship may not carry conviction. In place of this account, I have suggested that a personal God of the kind he describes is worthy of worship as the summation of the basic tendencies of existence, and not as the world's master. The idea of simplicity retains a place here in so far as this view rests upon the thought that a personal God should consider himself as the humble servant of the basic, 'simple' reality presupposed in his own activities. It has a place moreover in so far as the divinity of Swinburne's God rests on his ability to represent in a unitary way the nature of being in general. It would be possible, I think, to argue for an approach of this general kind on rather different grounds. For instance, there seem to be christological as well as broadly pastoral reasons for favouring such an account over the view that it is God's dominion over the world which establishes the appropriateness of religious attitudes. However, I hope the case I have made can stand independently of such supporting considerations. Notes 1. Of course, it will also be said that there is a distinction between creaturely and divine passibility in so far as God's being affected always depends upon the divine consent. See for instance Marcel Sarot, God, passibility and corporeality (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1992), pp

12 102 MARKWYNN 2. See, for instance, William Alston, 'Hartshorne and Aquinas: A via media' in Divine nature and human language: Essays in philosophical theology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp Contrast Summa Theologiae 1 13, art See, for instance, Grace Jantzen's God's world's, God's body (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984), pp Oxford: Clarendon Press, revised edition, 1993, and Oxford: Clarendon Press, revised edition, 1991, respectively. 5. These choices are free in the libertarian sense. Of course, some commentators have sought to break the link between libertarian freedom and divine passibility, for instance by reference to the idea of middle knowledge, but this is not Swinburne's approach. See The coherence of theism, pp For a summary of Swinburne's approach here, see The existence of God (1991),. p Swinburne talks of God's * simplicity' in this connection, but clearly the term is not intended to carry all of the associations which it bears for writers in the classical tradition. 8. However, granted God's existence at one time, t\, his existence at later times is logically necessary. See The coherence of theism (1993), p For the relative probability of God and other things, see The existence of God (1991), p A discussion of certain tensions in Swinburne's association of 'simplicity' and probability can be found in my paper 'Some reflections on Richard Swinburne's argument from design', Religious Studies 29 (1993): Indeed, it is improbable that anything at all should exist. See The existence of God (1991), p. 106, and pp See again Note 6 above. 11. The coherence of theism (1993), p See, for instance, the Gospel of Matthew, 18: Swinburne thinks that God will do anything which he has overriding reason to do, since he is 'perfectly free': The coherence of theism (1993), pp But on his account, God does not have overriding reason to create: The existence of God (1991), pp 'Concretely' here is used in Hartshorne's sense, to which I shall return in Section This is to say that the Ontological Argument works in principle, even if we cannot grasp its soundness in practice. This seems to be Aquinas 's view: Summa Theologiae, 12, art See again The coherence of theism (1993), p See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 14, art Even commentators sympathetic to Thomas have granted this sort or point. See, tor instance, Gerard Hughes, The nature of God (London: Routledge, 1995), pp See, for instance, Anthony Kenny's remark that 'the notion of pure being is as empty as the notion of pure life or pure history': Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p I 47, art. 1, in T. McDermott (ed.), Summa Theologiae: A concise translation (Westminster: Christian Classics), p We might add: such a God provides a more obvious focus of religious respect than the cosmos in general, in so far as it is not a conglomeration of individuals, but a genuine unity, and the source of whatever unity can be ascribed to the cosmos. For this sort of reason, I doubt whether Aquinas would in fact have followed a pantheistic approach in the circumstances I have just described. 22. This thought could be elaborated in the way William Alston indicates when he treats goodness as a particularistic rather than a platonic predicate. See 'Some suggestions for divine command theorists', in Op. cit. (1989), pp

13 SIMPLICITY, PERSONHOOD, AND DIVINITY Of course, the act of focussing the basic tendencies of existence could itself provide a paradigmatic expression of those tendencies. 24. Of course, this is what Christians have done in speaking of Jesus as servant and as lord. Perhaps Swinburne was thinking of lordship in this sense in the passage I cited earlier. If so, his reference to the connection between lordship and dependence obscured his meaning, at least for this reader. It is true that on the view I have expounded, it is the dependence of things upon Swinburne's God which allows him to represent the nature of being in general; but on Swinburne's account, the significance of dependence relates rather to the idea that creatures owe respect to God as their benefactor. Compare Aquinas on the nature of God's lordship, Summa Theologiae, 113, art See, for instance, Creative synthesis and philosophic method (London: SCM, 1970), p See 'The God of religion and the God of philosophy', in Talk of God (London: Royal Institute of Philosophy, 1969), pp Address for correspondence: Professor Mark Wynn, Network of Philosophy, Australian Catholic University, McAuley Campus, 53 Prospect Road, Brisbane, Qld 4053, Australia Phone: ; Fax: ; m.wynn@mcauley.acu.edu.au