In this clear and closely reasoned book, Professor Reid considers the relation of formal, and especially moral, philosophy

Transcription

1 78 their sincere belief in the importance of coordination, and their responsible participation in the coordinating process. It is too early for me, at any rate, to predict either success or failure for the Council. I said in the book that if voluntary coordinating methods fail, formal coordinating mechanisms are inevitable. Of this I am certain. Dr. Glenny is now a member of the professional staff of the Board of Higher Education of Illinois, also a new coordinating agency. This Board, unlike the California Coordinating Council, has the power to approve or disapprove any new unit of instruction proposed by the public universities. At its meeting on September 11, 1962, the Board overruled its Executive Director in three important instances - in approving a new master's degree in forestry, a new program in Latin American studies, and new undergraduate majors in German, Russian, and Speech, in three of the public universities. This, too, does not seem to be an auspicious beginning. Coordinating bodies are not the only fallible agents. It is always possible for a legislature to thwart effective coordination. Now a legislature may wish an outside agency to mediate among many proposals and pressures, and then it may find it politically e, xpedient to make special provisions for one institution or a group of them. Coordination, whether voluntary or formal, is a process beset with difficulties. But it is also a process which is essential to the development of a differentiated system of higher education of high quality. GEORGE F. KNEELER University of California, Los PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION Angelcs, c~n 6y LOUIS ARNAUD REID lleincmann, London, In this clear and closely reasoned book, Professor Reid considers the relation of formal, and especially moral, philosophy

2 George F. K n eller to the theory and practice of education and proceeds to a philosophic discussion of several leading educational issues. The first part demonstrates that the theory and practice of education rest on a number of deeply rooted assumptions - about human nature, for instance, and above all about values - which are ultimately philosophic in character. Reid examines the implications of applying theory to practice and especially of applying philosophy to education. He defines the nature of the person and its consequences for education and analyzes the concept of freedom. The second part of the book opens with an engaging chapter on discipline, in which Reid applies a philosophical distinction among three kinds of punishment to the question of punishment in education. Teaching, he says, should be an "encounter" between teacher and pupil; thus arises the need for greater "depth" in education and for an awareness of the "mystery of being." The book concludes with a presentation of certain principles for the professional education of teachers. For what the term is worth, Professor Reid is a personal idealist who admires the work of such existential thinkers as Buber, Mounier, and Marcel. His conception of the "personal self" is Kantian in part. Unlike Kant, however, he does not restrict freedom to moral action. His view of life is religious, but "mystical" and "existential" rather than orthodoxly Christian. Reid is more interested in ethics than in logie. Above all, he believes both passionately and intellectually in the supreme importance of education and in the essentially personal quality of the teacher's vocation. This enthusiasm permeates the whole work. It gives movement and feeling to a style that is intimate and conversational. Professor Reid repudiates the currently fashionable idea that the task of philosophy is to.clarify concepts through an analysis of language. He defines philosophy as a mode of vision, a means of "seeing afresh," which, though it never finally proves or disproves anything, deepens our insight into the nature of things. (pp ) He also rejects the notion that educational theory can do without formal philosophy, pointing out that our views on particular, questions in education are the result in part of attitudes so broad in' scope that only philosophy can tackle them. Educational philosophy, then, is the use of philosophy and philosophical methods to think about educational problems. It deepens our understanding and improves our prac- 79

3 80 tice, above all by examining the assumptions we bring to our thought and conduct as educators-assumptions about the purposes of education, for instance, or the nature of knowing. Granted that philosophic reflection deepens our understanding of education, how does it improve our practice? Professor Reid maintains that philosophy is properly applicable to education only insofar as it responds to the reflective convictions of individual teachers. The application of theory to practice is not a matter of abstract deduction but of personal reflection leading to particular actions. In his own words, "We have, I believe, to work from the idea of 'applying' theories and concepts, as such, to practice, towards the idea... of a person, charged with ideas, deciding and acting in an enlightened way in the individual situation. (p. 87) Since each classroom situation is unique, no theory can prescribe how the teacher is to act in particular circumstances. A situation so delicate and unpredictable cannot be hammered into shape in advance but must be handled on the spot with infinite care and sensitivity. The result will be not so much philosophy in action as "... dlaracter, leavened by philosophy, in action." (p. 96) In short, one applies philosophy to the practice of education by applying it first to oneself. According to Reid, every individual has a "personality" and a "self." The former, consisting of innate and acquired characteristics, is causally determined and scientifically explicable. Logically it presupposes the latter, for without an "T" to undergo the different experiences which I call my own, no personal history would be possible and hence no genuine knowledge or experience. The "self" is free, since it is the subject and not the object of personal experience, and hence lies beyond the scope of scientific inquiry. We ourselves are free in that, being not only personalities but also selves, we can detach ourselves from the flow of events and the weight of our past in order to reflect and act upon our reflections. Freedom itself, however, is morally neutral and is made good or bad only by the uses to which it is put. There are three kinds of freedom: freedom from restraint, freedom of choice, and freedom to s~bmit oneself voluntarily to a higher law, such as the divine, the moral or the aesthetic. The third of these, namely the aesthetic, is }he highest and the one to which education should point the way. The function of education, therefore, is not one of cultivating intellectual discipline or social adjustment or submission

4 George F. K nelle r to absolute standards. It is one of fostering the growth of the individual person in spirit, intellect, and feeling- a growth which springs from an "encounter" between teacher and pupil through the medium of knowledge. In such an encounter the progress of the lesson is guided, not directed, by the teacher, who responds to the freedom and initiative of his pupils. The process of teaching and learning is a sympathetic dialogue between persons, a mutual quest for knowledge and inspiration in "the small free community of the happy classroom." (p. 154) What the teacher gives is his greater knowledge and experience; what he receives is the stimulus of youthful minds. Knowledge is not independent of the knower but is, in part, what the knower conceives it to be. Although expressed in statements, it does not consist essentially of statements. In Reid's words, "It is what is possessed by the living mind of the person who makes the statements; and the knowledge possessed by the living mind is always much more than can be explained in any number of statements." (p. 35) All that we know suffers a "sea change" within ourselves. Hence the teacher offers, not objective information, but knowledge as it has molded and been molded by his own personality. It is not enough for the pupil merely to memorize information and conform to the rules of the subject; his studies must absorb and enthrall himl so that they inform, quicken, and emancipate 'his entire person. Much of what he learns will be fogotten anyway. Indeed, in itself knowledge is less important than what it does to the pupil. It remains not in his memory but in his person, in the caste of his mind and the depth of his feelings, in the range of his imagination and the sincerity of his care for others. Thus, in his book Professor Reid observes his own injunction not to apply philosophy to education objectively but to think philosophically and personally about education. As such, this volume is non-systematic. It cannot be said to constitute a textbook in the philosophy of education. Also, in a book that discusses both philosophy and education and handles a great many philosophical theories the connection between the author's educational views and his philosophical principles might have been made more explicit. For example, the connection between a philosophy of freedom and the educational problem of discipline is not firmly enough established. And we are not given a convincing explanation of the relation between teaching as a personal matter and thg~eacher's obligation to an objective community. 81

5 112 Even so, the book abounds in insights. The chapters on discipline, teaching, and teacher education are full of suggestions, theoretical and practical, for educators of all persuasions to consider, and they open new vistas especially for those- and they are a growing number- who believe that existentialist and personalist thought has much to offer to the cause of education. In addition it is free from jargon, and combines lucid yet not simple analysis with a constructive philosophy of its own. Professor Reid's Philosophy and Education should stimulate and enlighten both the professional educator and the student of education alike. LOUIS ARNAUD REID'S REPLY TO GEORGE F. KNELLER Would that all reviewers would take the care to understand an author's point of view that Professor Kneller takes in his review of my book! I could not pick a quarrel with him even if I wanted to. All I should like to do now is to modify several points in his exposition and to explain one or two things which might temper a little his honest criticisms. Kneller says that I repudiate "the currently fashionable idea that the task of philosophy is to clarify concepts through an analysis of language." What I repudiate is the exclusive emphasis on this task of philosophy; certainly the analysis of language is and always has been a part of philosophy: and philosophy has gained enormously by recent linguistic studies. It is said of my "third freedom" (freedom to submit oneself voluntarily to a higher law) that it finds its highest manifestation in submission to aesthetic "law"-as distinct from moral or religious law. I do not say, nor think, this, though I believe that the winning of artistic "freedom" through acceptance of artistic discipline is a particularly illuminating example of the "third freedom." I think that Kneller's sentence, "Knowledge is not independent of the knower but is in part what the knower conceives it to be," clear in its context, is in itself a bit obscure. It slightly

6 Louis Arnaud Re~d suggests that "knowledge" has no relation to what is independent of the knower, understressing this necessary aspect of knowledge at the expense of insisting on the mind's part. Similarily, a little later on, in the applieation of the same point to teaching, he says, "Hence the teacher offers, not objective information, but knowledge as it has molded and been molded by his own personality." True enough; yet there is a danger of an over-subjective emphasis here. The teacher, after all, is not just expressing himself, nor just offering his own experience (though he is, inevitably, offering it). He is concerned to enlist in his pupils a respect for the objeetive, and to develop in each one of them a eoneern to interpret it as fairly as they can, though each in his or her own way. Not "information," but dead information, is the enemy. Now for Professor Kneller's criticisms. It is true that I disclaim my book as a "textbook," since it does not attempt to "cover" all the ground. Nevertheless, although it is not in this sense "systematic,'" I think I want to claim that as far as it goes (and not at all completely) it is "systematic." There is, at least, a very serious attempt to conceive the book as a whole as a system of related philosophical and educational ideas; this I would call "systematic," at least within the limited framework. I believe, anyhow, that it is more "systematic" than some textbooks! "The connection between the author's educational views and his philosophical principles might have been made more explicit." Does this apply to the limitation of length and scope, which is deliberate, or to a failure of attention to the treatment of the relationships between philosophy and education? I think that the latter criticism is not usually valid, though it sometimes is. I agree, for example, that "the connection between a philosphy of freedom and the educational problem of discipline is not" fully and at length established. I do not agree that it is not "firmly enough established." The relationship is smnmed up. clearly I think though not at great length, on pp (I used to lecture at great length on this relationship. Perhaps I was getting bored, and it was coming to seem too obvious to me!) Kneller's last criticism is, I think, just. It could be fended off, perhaps, by referring to the plan of deliberate limitation. But it is a fair objection that "we are not given a convincin~ explanation of the relation between teaching as a persona] matter 83

7 84 and the teacher's obligation to an objective community." To analyze this relationship adequately would be quite a large task. But I agree that a view such as mine which so stresses the development of personal quality, does need to be related more fully to the demands of living in a contemporary and changing community. Writers who share my views, and who have an acute sense of the complexities of contemporary social problems are welcomed to the task of confronting this urgent educational problem. WARD MADDEN Brooklyn College, on EDUCATION AND A RADICAL ttumanism by MAX LERNER Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1962, The translation of the international crisis into an educational crisis has for the most part taken place against a choral background qf conservative voices. Professor Max Lerner in this short Kappa Delta Pi lecture does not ordinarily use the terms "liberal" and "conservative." It is a question whether the categories themselves are any longer useful in distinguishing, let alone evaluating, various views. Most readers, because of what he has said in the past, will anticipate his as an authentic liberal voice. In view of the link between the career of liberalism in American life generally and liberal ideas in education, both of which are generally thought to be in decline at the moment, it is a matter of interest to see whether liberalism is going to reassert itself. It is also of interest-whether Lerner, in turning his attention from America as a civilization in general, to American education in particular, is going to be an important voice in the reassertion as it pertains to the latter. Lerner hints in his Foreword that we may indeed expect to hear from him