UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY. Creativity, Culture, and Genius: Nietzsche's Ethics of the Creative Life. Philip John Puszczalowski A THESIS

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1 UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Creativity, Culture, and Genius: Nietzsche's Ethics of the Creative Life by Philip John Puszczalowski A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY CALGARY, ALBERTA DECEMBER, 2016 Philip John Puszczalowski 2016

2 Abstract In my dissertation Creativity, Culture, and Genius: Nietzsche's Ethics of the Creative Life I aim to articulate what creativity means to Nietzsche. I present an account of Nietzsche in which creativity exemplifies the "highest potential power and splendour" (GM P: 6) of human beings. Specifically, I hope to demonstrate that what is best about us is creativity, and that to live a creative life is to have creativity as a governing principle. Although Nietzsche does not explicitly state that people should have creativity as a governing principle for organizing lives, I will show that this thought lies within his work implicitly. To do this, I use Aristotle as a foil for Nietzsche and contrast their thinking on the question, "What characteristic exemplifies what is best about humans?" Aristotle believed that there were three potential answers to this question: pleasure, noble action and politics, and contemplation. I put Nietzsche to work philosophically, contrasting these three possible answers with Nietzsche's philosophy, and showing that none of them are viable options. The positive portion of my project focuses on demonstrating the interconnectedness of creativity, culture, and genius for Nietzsche. The importance of these three concepts cannot be underestimated in Nietzsche's philosophy, and I show how they are vital to his thought with creativity serving as the central focus and a governing principle for human beings. ii

3 Acknowledgements It is impossible to express the amount of gratitude I have for all those who have helped me along the way while working on this project. And even if such expression were possible, I would lack the eloquence to adequately communicate it. With that said, I would like to thank my supervisor Mark Migotti for his tireless and unwavering commitment to my project. His belief in my project's aim and his extensive comments and support on the numerous drafts of this thesis are profoundly appreciated. Without his help, this project may have never progressed beyond the stage of mere contemplation. I would also like to thank the Department of Philosophy for funding me throughout the years in the form of scholarships and employment which has prevented me from being forced to live in a tub downtown. I would also like to thank Ishtiyaque Haji and Christopher Framarin for their comments on earlier drafts of the first two chapters. When you are submerged in any subject for too long, you begin to think that everyone intuitively understands what you are talking about. Their comments forced me to clearly articulate my project and it is all the better because of them. I also want to thank Shelley Ann Hulbert for organizing our weekly Nietzsche Group during the last year of writing. Her comments and suggestions proved to be invaluable. I would also like to thank Hardeep for her support, patience, and understanding throughout this entire process. Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents. Their patronage and support throughout the years is something for which I will always be grateful. iii

4 Table of Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgments iii Table of Contents iv List of Abbreviations v Epigraph vii Introduction Chapter 1 Aristotle and After Aristotle After Aristotle Chapter 2 Suffering and Contentment Nietzsche's Comrades in Suffering Two Kinds of Sufferers Greatness and Suffering A Meaning for Suffering Suffering as Stimulus Suffering and Hedonism Chapter 3 Culture and Politics Nobles and Higher Men Style The Vita Activa and Vis Creativa Solitude Politics Chapter 4 Affirmation and Contemplation Contemplation's Origin The Contemplative Type Reactivity and Passivity Passivity and History The Problem of the Scholar The Active-Contemplative: A Music Making Socrates Chapter 5 Creativity and Ressentiment Genius The Problem of Mass Culture The Task of Humanity The Problem of Creative Ressentiment The Formula for the Creative Life Bibliography iv

5 List of Abbreviations Works by Nietzsche A BGE BT CW D EH GM HH GS The Antichrist Beyond Good and Evil The Birth of Tragedy The Case of Wagner Daybreak Ecce Homo On the Genealogy of Morality Human, All Too Human The Gay Science NCW Nietzsche Contra Wagner P PCP PHT The Philosopher The Philosopher as Cultural Physician Philosophy in Hard Times PTAG Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks TI TL UM WP WS Z Twilight of the Idols On the Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense Untimely Meditations The Will to Power The Wander and His Shadow Thus Spoke Zarathustra v

6 References to Nietzsche's aphoristic works will cite the abbreviated title followed by the aphorism number (GS: 370). To his other works, references will be to the part and section number (GM II: 6). In the case of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, an abbreviated section title will be given instead of a number (Z II: "The Rabble"). Passages involving prefaces to Nietzsche's works will use "P" as the part number (GM P: 6). Works by Other Aristotle M NE POL Metaphysics Nicomachean Ethics Politics References to Aristotle will cite the abbreviated title followed by the book number, section number, and line number (NE I a6-10). Works by Other Authors CJ Critique of Judgement (Kant) WWR The World as Will and Representation (Schopenhauer) Kant's Critique of Judgement is cited by the abbreviation followed by the section number (CJ: 47). Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation is cited by the abbreviation, followed by the volume number and page number (WWR I, 196). Works by Plato are cited by title and line number (Apology 69a). vi

7 Epigraph "...even if his ideas had been as true and precious as those of Columbus or Newton, many would have counted this yearning, taking it as the sublime part for a man to say, "If not I, then another," and to hold cheap the meaning of his own life. But the fuller nature desires to be an agent, to create, and not merely to look on: strong love hungers to bless, and not merely to behold blessing. And while there is warmth enough in the sun to feed an energetic life, there will still be men to feel, "I am lord of this moment's change, and will charge it with my soul." George Eliot, Daniel Deronda, Chapter 38. vii

8 Introduction In Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Alexander Nehamas claims that Nietzsche "does not believe that there exists a single proper kind of life or person" (Nehamas 1985, 8). According to Nehamas, "any effort to attribute to Nietzsche a positive view of human conduct, consisting perhaps of a description of the right kind of life or of a set of principles for becoming the sort of person he admires, is bound to fail" (Ibid.). The problem with this claim is that it does not go deep enough and explores a somewhat superficial reading of Nietzsche. I propose that Nietzsche does provide a principle around which a life can be organized creativity. What is significant is that Nehamas' reason for why he believes that there is no such principle is entirely compatible with my claim that Nietzsche endorses creativity as a principle which best exemplifies what is best about human beings. To see how this is the case, it is necessary to discuss Nehamas' argument. Nehamas acknowledges that Nietzsche admires people who are artistic, such as Goethe, Beethoven, and Shakespeare. Artists of this order of rank are deeply individual. Nietzschean individuals are those who separate themselves radically from "the herd"; they create their own values rather than following the values held by the rest of society. The problem as Nehamas sees it is that if Nietzsche's positive project is the creation of "individuals," then any set of principles or rules which describe how to become an individual are bound to fail. As Nehamas puts it: A true individual is precisely one who is different from the rest of the world, and there is no formula, no set of rules, no code of conduct that can possibly capture in informative terms what it is to be like that. There are no principles that we can follow in order to become, as Nietzsche wants us to become, unique... The very notion of the individual makes it impossible to say in informative terms how one can ever become that (Nehamas 1985, 225). 1

9 Nehamas makes a good point here, and there is textual evidence in Nietzsche to support his conclusion. For example, Zarathustra states: ""This is my way; where is yours?" thus I answered those who asked me "the way." For the way that does not exist" (Z III: Spirit of Gravity). This passage certainly affirms Nehamas' claim regarding individuals. Zarathustra makes it clear that there is no general formula to follow, and that each person must seek out their own way. Providing a formula or a set of principles will not make us unique individuals as Nietzsche hopes we will become, but will instead produce generic copies with some slight variations. In this thesis, I argue there is a principle which can be followed and which can produce unique individuals; the principle of creativity. Creativity as a governing principle for a life can fulfill this role because creativity itself demands uniqueness and originality. Mere imitation is not creativity. True creativity must constantly transcend its origin. How exactly that is to be accomplished must be left to the creative individuals, as Nehamas correctly points out: "[I]t is as impossible to specify in advance the rules that must be broken for the process to succeed as it is, say, to specify in advance the conventions that must be violated for a new and innovative genre in music or literature to be established" (Nehamas 1985, 225). Beethoven did not follow or break a set of pre-established rules in order to transcend the music of Mozart. There was no set of rules, nor could there be such a set of rules. However, reflecting upon and analyzing Beethoven's music does reveal how it differs from Mozart. So while it may not be possible to prescribe a formula, reflection can reveal the formula that was employed by the artist. The problem is that the formula can only ever be followed once. If it is repeated by someone else, they would be imitating the artist that utilized it, and therefore, the person would not be engaged in true creativity. Truly creative activities break the mold and create a new one. 2

10 This interpretation of creativity has some virtues. First, it supports what Nietzsche puts into the mouth of Zarathustra. 1 The implication is that no two people can have the same way. Just as everyone is unique, so is everyone's way. This is the distinctive demand of creativity. The same cannot be said for other possible governing principles, such as pleasure. Second, creativity as a governing principle supports Nehamas' argument. Creativity can produce individuals in fact, the production of individuals is the inevitable outcome of creativity. So while Nehamas is largely correct in his reasoning and his interpretation of Nietzsche, he errs in drawing the wrong conclusion. In keeping with these remarks, my thesis can be viewed as an interpretation and vindication of Nietzsche's positive project. It is widely thought that Nietzsche's critical project or one of his critical projects concerning truth, or metaphysics, or morality is very effective, but the same commendation is often lacking when it comes to the positive project. What I hope to show is that Nietzsche's ethics of creativity to use Bernard Reginster's phrase is both philosophically interesting and viable. At the outset, it is important to realize that when Nietzsche speaks of creativity, he does not mean anything mysterious. By "creation," Nietzsche simply means making something. For example, carving a table out of wood would be a form of creation, as would composing a poem or painting a portrait. "Creativity" is the ability to make new things. 2 This is not to be understood as simply making a new table, or writing a new poem, but as making something new and original. For Nietzsche, the value he places on creativity is connected to the values of "originality" and of "culture." Imitation may be the sincerest form of flattery, but mere imitation 1 ""This is my way; where is yours?" thus I answered those who asked me "the way." For the way that does not exist" (Z III: Spirit of Gravity). 2 Bernard Reginster defines creativity as "a special skill or ability possessed by some individuals, something like the inventiveness they display in resolving problems or overcoming difficulties" (Reginster 2009, 43). 3

11 is a declaration of creative bankruptcy. What Nietzsche finds valuable in creativity is its constant push beyond current achievement. As we have seen, something truly creative must be original. So it is not enough that an individual simply creates, rather, the individual must also employ creativity with their creation. After all, a machine can produce products, but it is not capable of creativity; that is, so far as we know, a distinctly human ability. A deeper understanding of Nietzschean creativity requires us to connect it to "culture." Nietzsche defines culture as a "unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a people" (UM I: 1). Briefly, culture is the manifestation of a society's artistic drives. 3 These drives are all aimed in a single direction, with the intention of furthering human excellence. Culture is a kind of progression in that it organizes the previous forms of culture into new forms, rather than starting from chaos or barbarism each time. 4 Within this important connection between culture and creativity lies the thesis of this study: that Nietzsche's ethical thinking culminates in the idea that humanity's "highest potential power and splendour" (GM P: 6), is found in their most successful efforts of creative creation. For Nietzsche, the most successful creative individuals are exemplified by the genius or "great man." This emphasis on creative individuals is a recurring theme throughout Nietzsche's entire corpus of published and unpublished writings. For example, in an unpublished passage: The highest individuals are the creative persons be they morally the best, or else useful in some larger sense. Thus they are the purest models and are the improvers of mankind (PHT: 78). 5 3 I will examine Nietzsche's conception of "culture" further in chapter three. 4 "Nothing would be sillier than to claim an autochthonous development for the Greeks. On the contrary, they invariably absorbed other living cultures. The very reason they got so far is that they knew how to pick up the spear and throw it onward from the point where others had left it. Their skill in the art of fruitful learning was admirable. We ought to be learning from our neighbors precisely as the Greeks learned from theirs, not for the sake of learned pedantry but rather using everything we learn as a foothold which will take us up as high, and higher than our neighbor... What matters in all things is the higher levels..." (PTAG: 1). 5 This passage is from Notebook 30, autumn 1873 winter 1873/

12 Nietzsche clearly believes that creative individuals are the highest human exemplars and humanity should be organized in such a way that promotes and is conducive to their existence, since it is these creative individuals that are the "improvers of mankind" and whom will construct and direct culture. Therefore, Nietzsche thinks that "the production of great works is the aim of culture" (P: 46) and further, that "the task of culture is to see to it that what is great in a people does not appear among them as a hermit or exile" (P: 42). When Nietzsche says that culture aims at producing great works, he means in the first instance, great works of art. 6 In addition, creativity specifically great creativity should be promoted by culture so geniuses do not appear as "strokes of luck," (GM III: 14) but as deliberate, purposeful occurrences. So not only are creative individuals important for culture, but culture is important for creative individuals; each feeds off the other. Creative individuals exemplify human excellence and enhance and promote culture through their great works, which in turn makes culture more conducive to the emergence of creative individuals. This may seem to give rise to a chicken or egg type question "What came first, the genius or the culture?" however, Nietzsche is clear that genius is what gives rise to culture. Without a creative individual, a true culture will not arise: "A culture is the consequence of every great art world, but it often happens that due to hostile countercurrents this final resonance of a work of art remains unachieved" (P: 33). Creativity can be a governing principle of lives or cultures for Nietzsche. By "governing principle" I mean a unifying goal or focal point of a life. Hedonists use pleasure as a governing principle, while Aristotle argues that contemplation should serve this purpose. All this means is that the individual uses pleasure as a general principle when determining what actions to perform. Actions which produce pleasure will receive precedence over actions which do not 6 "Culture can emanate only from the centralizing significance of an art or work of art..." (PCP: 175). 5

13 produce pleasure. 7 Another person may decide to use "chess" as their governing principle. This person devotes and organizes their life around the game of chess, so actions which are chessrelated (playing it, reading about it, studying it, etc.) will be given precedence over actions which do not involve chess. 8 For Nietzsche, "creativity" is such a principle. However, Nietzsche goes a step further and believes that creativity exemplifies what is best about humans. Of all the possible governing principles, Nietzsche thinks that creativity is the one that demonstrates what is best about us or in other words, creativity is what exemplifies the "highest potential power and splendour" (GM P: 6) of human beings. To live a creative life is simply to have creativity as one's governing principle. This passage from the Genealogy can further support my claim that creativity is the core value for Nietzsche and his main philosophical concern. It is made in reference to Nietzsche's speculation that morality may be to blame if humanity does not reach their highest potential. So what Nietzsche is primarily concerned about is creativity, and his philosophical concern with the dangers of morality is because of the effect it can have on creativity. If morality were his main concern, Nietzsche would be investigating how creativity affects morality, but this is clearly not the case. Consequently, creativity is the ability to generate more and varied forms of power and splendour, and this is Nietzsche's primary philosophical concern. Anything which enhances or impedes this ability will be important, but only because of the relation it has to creativity. 7 This does not mean that the person will always, or must always choose their subject of their governing principle. Someone may decide to organize their life around pleasure as a governing principle, but that does not mean they will always perform the action which produces pleasure. 8 I use the example of chess simply to demonstrate what I mean by a governing principle. Chess could be considered a first-order activity, whereas pleasure would be a second-order activity. I am not arguing that secondorder activities are superior to first-order activities (or vice versa). Second-order activities that are used as a governing principle for lives may allow for a broader range of actions, and may be superior to first-order activities in this regard, but whether second-order activities are therefore of greater value than first-order activities is not what I am concerned with here. 6

14 To make this more specific, I am assigning creativity the role that Aristotle assigns to contemplation. With this in mind, I approach my topic by contrasting Nietzsche's thinking on the question, "What characteristic exemplifies what is best about humans?" with Aristotle's, who thought the discussible answers to this question reduced to three: pleasure, noble action and politics, and contemplation of which only the latter two are taken seriously, and the last, contemplation, taken to be what is best about humans. This theme from Aristotle gives rise to his three kinds of lives: a life of pleasure (bios hedonikos), a life of noble action and politics (bios politikos), and a contemplative life (bios theōrētikos). The bios politikos and the bios theōrētikos becomes enshrined in a traditional opposition between the vita activa and the vita contemplativa, and my chief aim is to show that in valuing what I will call the vita creativa (a life governed by creativity), Nietzsche both responds to and transcends these traditional Aristotelian possibilities. While Aristotle prized speculative theorizing, Nietzsche prizes creative creating, and in fact, I hope this very project is a demonstration of this, as Nietzsche himself urged. In trying to understand a major theme in his thought, I will also be going beyond him somewhat; I am to present a reading of Nietzsche that he would endorse, and that helps make sense of his work despite the fact that he may never explicitly state it within his writings. ***** Turning to questions of method and interpretive principle, I believe that fruitful engagement with Nietzsche's philosophy requires a balance of scholarship, interpretation, and mindful philosophical thinking, and of these; it is these last two that are important in this project. While the accent in this project is not on scholarship, this is not because I will not be scholarly, but because the accent is on putting Nietzsche to work philosophically. 7

15 Moreover, although I am certainly concerned with what Nietzsche means, I take this interpretation and attempt to draw out certain conclusions that his thought generates. Nietzsche is often accused of not making arguments and merely making claims. Although he does not present his arguments in a formal structure like Thomas Aquinas or Spinoza, they are there if one is willing to piece them together. So while not all of what I attribute to Nietzsche may be fully explicit in his work, it lies within his work implicitly. This is not to say that I am putting words into Nietzsche's mouth. I simply plan to argue that, "If this is what Nietzsche means when he states 'A,' then we can conclude he would favour 'B.'" This methodology is recognized by Lester H. Hunt in Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue: Before one has read very far into his [Nietzsche's] works, one realizes that, although arguments are seldom given in the text, many are latent within it and must be sought and found rather than passively received... To find the premises which lead to a given idea, we often find that we have to go to books other than the one in which the idea appears, and not seldom we find that we cannot find enough premises to make a complete argument. In that case, we must have enough imagination to think of what premises would complete the argument, consistent with the other things the author says.(hunt 1991, 4). 9 Projects of the sort I am to undertake are not new, and I take my work to belong to the broad tradition of writing on Nietzsche in the manner of John Richardson in Nietzsche's System, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, by Alexander Nehamas, and Lawrence J. Hatab's A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy. 10 Each approaches Nietzsche with a different reading of his philosophy 9 Daniel Breazeale makes a similar remark stating: "It seems to have been one of Nietzsche's stylistic aims to obscure the close connections between his various themes, to present his thoughts on various subjects as if they were independent of each other, for the purpose of forcing the reader to make the connections and thus to do the thinking for himself" (Breazeale 1979, xlvi). 10 Richardson's book argues that Nietzsche has a metaphysics, which seems to contradict Nietzsche's explicit denial and opposition to metaphysical systems. He demonstrates that despite Nietzsche's criticism, a Nietzschean metaphysical system can be constructed "that both fits and clarifies what he [Nietzsche] says (writes)" (Richardson 1996, 3). Hatab attempts to demonstrate that although Nietzsche is a harsh opponent of democracy - and many Nietzschean concepts disparage democratic ideals - the apparent incompatibility of democracy and Nietzsche is not so cut and dry; it is possible to reconcile democracy with Nietzsche's philosophy without distorting his writings. Nehamas claims that Nietzsche "looks at the world in general as if it were a sort of artwork; in particular... as if it were a literary text" (Nehamas 1985, 3), and "create[s] what we may call a literary product..." (Ibid., 4). Again, Nietzsche never makes such claims, but Nehamas draws them out of what Nietzsche's writing suggests. 8

16 and draws inferences consistent with it, yet they present conclusions that Nietzsche never explicitly states. It is also important to note that while I will be making extensive use of Nietzsche's published writings, I will also utilize many of his unpublished writings. One must always be wary when doing so since a philosopher's unpublished writings do not signify their final thoughts on a matter. There may be a very good reason for why the philosopher was reluctant to publish them. However, I believe that Nietzsche's unpublished writings are just as valuable and revealing as his published works. That does not mean I will be using his unpublished writings willy-nilly, rather, I will use them in conjunction with what he did publish. Nietzsche often sums up his thoughts on a particular subject in these unpublished notebooks, and while the same thoughts can usually be found in his published books, they are often scattered throughout and must be searched for, which can give rise to the claim that Nietzsche does not provide arguments. Therefore, I employ his notebooks for the ease with which the concept is presented but support the unpublished passage with corroborating material from his sanctioned publications. ***** I begin by providing the conceptual background for the project in chapter one with an account of Aristotle's three possible lives. I examine Aristotle's reasons for why a life governed by pleasure does not exemplify what is best about humans, why a life governed by noble action and politics would be a good principle but not what is best about human beings, and finally, why contemplation as a governing principle exemplifies what is best about us. I then turn to Hannah Arendt's account of how Aristotle's life of noble action and politics is transformed by medieval Christian philosophers into the active life. 9

17 The purpose of establishing this background is so I can use Aristotle and to a lesser extent Arendt, as a foil for Nietzsche. While this chapter is mainly focused on Aristotle, this is so I can devote the rest of the project to Nietzsche. This is not to say that Aristotle does not reappear throughout the following chapters, he certainly does, but his appearances are to underscore and further Nietzsche's position. Since I will be arguing that Nietzsche believes creativity is the governing principle that exemplifies what is best about human beings, I will need to explain why he would be dismissive of the three options Aristotle proposes. Therefore, engaging with Aristotle will be beneficial for bringing forth Nietzsche's position. The next three chapters belong together and constitute the negative portion of my project. Each of them begins with a Nietzschean value which is contrasted with the relevant competitor and it is crucial that creativity involves all three. When Michael Tanner says: "Nietzsche's fundamental concern throughout his life was to plot the relationship between suffering and culture, or cultures" (Tanner 1994, 27), there is mostly a difference of emphasis between us. While he is correct to single out suffering and culture, I argue that creativity will underlie these notions. The same can be said for Bernard Reginster who provides a more recent take on the importance of creativity in Nietzsche. 11 He argues that creativity is an important aspect of the will to power, and any interpretation of the will to power which neglects the importance of creativity is missing an essential element. He then constructs an ethics around this new interpretation of the will to power showing the relationship between it, creativity, and suffering. I agree with much of what Reginster has to say on this topic, but I believe his interpretation also neglects how central creativity is to Nietzsche's philosophy. 11 See Reginster (2009) "The Will to Power and the Ethics of Creativity." 10

18 In chapter two, I present an account of why Nietzsche would dismiss a life governed by pleasure as exemplifying what is best about human beings. Although he is in agreement with Aristotle on this point, Nietzsche's reasons are quite different from those of Aristotle. The main reason why Nietzsche would dismiss pleasure as a governing principle which exemplifies what is best about us is due to his belief that suffering is necessary for creativity. While a life governed by pleasure would undoubtedly contain some degree of suffering, its goal would be to attain as much pleasure as possible. Nietzsche believes that such a goal is anti-creative and fails to generate human excellence. He believes that all human excellence is the result of great suffering, and this excellence is exemplified in a life organized around creativity. Individuals should seek out suffering and hardship, rather than a life of pleasure and happiness because suffering is a stimulus for creative enhancement. Although Nietzsche advocates suffering and thinks attempts to abolish it are foolish, he does recognize that suffering is not beneficial for everyone. Only certain types of people will gain an advantage from suffering; for everyone else, suffering is detrimental. However, he is only concerned with those individuals that can endure and profit from suffering. These individuals have the greatest potential for great creativity, so any effort to extinguish suffering wholesale is viewed with contempt by Nietzsche. Therefore, a life in which pleasure is the governing principle will be in opposition to suffering and creativity and cannot be what exemplifies what is best about humans. Chapter three is an examination regarding why Nietzsche would dismiss noble action and politics as a governing principle. Aristotle believes that human beings are political animals, and it is part of our nature to organize ourselves into communities. In addition, he argues that noble action is a good governing principle despite it not being the best governing principle. 11

19 Hannah Arendt claims that Nietzsche prioritizes the vita activa, believing it to be superior to the vita contemplativa. Many of the active life's features are things that Nietzsche believes are to be valued. As a result, Arendt will argue that Nietzsche believes the vita activa to possess a higher value than the life of contemplation. To demonstrate why Nietzsche would disagree with both Aristotle and Arendt, I contrast their claims against his virtue of solitude and his value of culture, as they relate to the "higher men." Nietzsche refers to his highest human exemplars as "higher men." They are flesh and blood individuals that human beings should strive to emulate and surpass because they possess creative power and are highly creative people. The creative type includes Goethe, Beethoven, and Shakespeare, to name a few. Nietzsche speaks highly about the nobles and masters who exemplify the active life, however, Nietzsche will argue that while these individuals are good, they are not the best; they are not "higher men." The reason, according to Nietzsche is because they lack creative power. This lack sets them firmly within the active life and separates them from being "higher men." Since the "higher men" are Nietzsche's creative exemplars, it stands to reason they will exemplify what is best about us, namely, their creativity. For Nietzsche, creativity is intertwined with culture; each feeds off and enhances the other. Since the active types lack creative power, they will also lack the ability to enhance and promote culture. In addition, solitude is a crucial value for Nietzsche and is a value that is in conflict with politics. For example, if an individual is to engage properly in politics they must associate and interact with others on a daily basis. They must participate in matters that are essential to the running of the state, which is clearly at odds with Nietzschean solitude. Since it is not possible 12

20 to engage in politics while separating oneself from society, noble action and politics as a governing principle for one's life will not be an option for Nietzsche. In chapter four, I examine contemplation as a governing principle and discuss why it will not exemplify what is best about humans. This chapter is to be understood in conjunction with chapter three. In chapter three I demonstrate that the highest human exemplars for Nietzsche "higher men" are not of the active type, despite possessing many of the active type's characteristics. Instead, the "higher men" are closely associated with the contemplative types artists, philosophers, saints, and scientists, providing a reason for why they do not have noble action and politics as governing principles. Due to the "higher men" all being of the contemplative type, it would seem that contemplation would be their governing principle, implying that contemplation exemplifies what is best about humans. However, this is not the case. The "higher men" share certain characteristics with the active type, and they also share certain characteristics with the contemplative type. But just as the similarities between the "higher men" and the active type are not enough to justify noble action and politics as their governing principle, the similarities between the "higher men" and the contemplative type are not enough to justify contemplation as their governing principle. The main reason supporting this claim is that contemplation possesses reactivity and passivity as characteristics both of which Nietzsche views with contempt. I demonstrate why contemplation does not exemplify what is best about us, by explaining why reactivity and passivity are undesirable features for Nietzsche. In particular, I engage with the scholar and the historiographer to show that these types have contemplation as their governing principle, and Nietzsche regards them with nothing but scorn. If the "higher men" are truly Nietzsche's exemplars, then they must have some other governing principle. 13

21 Chapter five begins the positive portion of my project. While the first four chapters explain why Nietzsche would be dismissive of Aristotle's three governing principles, chapter five constructs a general outline of what Nietzsche thinks best exemplifies human beings namely, creativity. I begin by constructing Nietzsche's notion of genius and explaining its connection to creativity and culture. In doing so, it will be clear that Nietzsche will endorse creativity as a governing principle and that it exemplifies what is best about us. With that framework in place, I address two significant issues: 1) Why is genius so rare? and 2) The problem of creative ressentiment. The first problem arises due to Nietzsche's assertion that genius is the result of hard work rather than inborn talent. He claims that many people have the potential to become a genius, but if this is true, why are they so rare? Regarding the problem of creative ressentiment, if Nietzsche believes that a life of creation and creativity is the best kind of life for humans to live, then why does he regard individuals such as the ascetic priest as decadent and life-denying, and consequently, of little value? For example, the ascetic priest seems to live a very creative life, creating an entire metaphysics. If Nietzsche values creativity, shouldn't he regard the ascetic priest as a highly creative individual and a "higher man"? In short, the answer is: No. 14

22 Chapter 1 Aristotle and After I begin by briefly discussing Aristotle's reasoning that there is a governing principle for humans and that it will help promote the best kind of life for humans to live. I then examine each of the three lives, their corresponding governing principle, and Aristotle's reasons for accepting or dismissing them as the case may be. The first section concludes with a discussion of Aristotle's reasons for why he thinks the contemplative life is the best life. The second section focuses on the evolution of the political life into the active life as related by Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition. Arendt explains how Aristotle's life of politics (bios politikos) gains additional characteristics due to the poor translation of medieval philosophers. As a result, the political life is transformed into the active life (vita activa), and therefore, into something that incorporates and goes beyond Aristotle's political life. The active life not only includes political activity but any activity that is not considered to be part of contemplation. The scope of the life of activity increases as a result, and yet, priority is still assigned to the contemplative/philosophical life. In this transformed shape the contrast between the vita contemplativa and the vita activa has become standard lore by Nietzsche's time. It is worthwhile to note that my interpretation of Aristotle is not undertaken for its own sake. The point is to use Aristotle as a foil for Nietzsche. I do not consider every interpretation of the notion of the best sort of life to lead, rather, I am organizing my comparison between Nietzsche and Aristotle around the idea of which governing principle exemplifies what is best about human beings. I do not think that I am radically departing from Aristotle, rather, I am using an interpretation that will help to illuminate what I believe Nietzsche thinks is best about human beings. 15

23 1.1 Aristotle After his trial for the crimes of impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens, Socrates must suggest a penalty to impose on himself. It is during this speech that Socrates declares that "the unexamined life is not worth living for men [human beings]..." (Apology 38a) i.e. a life which lacks reflection and philosophy is not a truly human life. Although this claim is strong enough, it is distinct from the even stronger claim that the deeply examined life is better than any other. In fact, this stronger claim that a life of contemplation is superior soon took hold in ancient Greece and would influence the rest of Western philosophy. 12 Plato plays a crucial role in this bias by reserving a special place for the philosopher in The Republic, not only making his way of life superior but also making the philosopher a king. 13 The Republic attempts to answer the question, "What is just and why is it beneficial to be just?", by raising the question of why we have politics at all. By using an analogy between the city and the soul, he develops an account of the need for justice. Significantly, Plato sketches an ideal polis ruled by the Philosopher King, who is within the political sphere, yet is not of the political sphere. The actual purpose of the state according to Plato is to ensure justice through the rule of the philosopher since philosophers would govern more wisely than politicians due to the philosophers' knowledge of the Forms. For Plato, a life of philosophical inquiry is the highest and best kind of life for a human being to live, while a life of politics is secondary The significance and impact of this Socratic dictum was not lost on Nietzsche, who remarks in The Birth of Tragedy: "Once we see clearly how after Socrates, the mystagogue of science, one philosophical school succeeds another, wave upon wave; how the hunger for knowledge reached a never-suspected universality in the widest domain of the educated world, became the real task for every person of higher gifts, and led science onto the high seas from which it has never again been driven altogether; how this universality first spread a common net of thought over the whole globe, actually holding out the prospect of the lawfulness of an entire solar system; once we see all this clearly, along with the amazingly high pyramid of knowledge in our own time - we cannot fail to see in Socrates the one turning point and vortex of so-called world history" (BT: 15). 13 See The Republic Part VII 471d-521c. 14 This bias against politics is probably rooted with Socrates. In many of Plato's dialogues, Socrates mentions how he has avoided a life of politics, despite the encouragement of many. For Socrates, politics and contemplation are 16

24 Plato famously illustrates this conviction in the Allegory of the Cave. Although the philosopher would like to remain in the contemplative realm, justice motivates him to return to the state and politics. In fact, Plato argues that what makes the Philosopher King qualified to rule is the Philosopher King's disinclination to rule. If the Philosopher King were truly of the political sphere, he would relish ruling his subjects, but this is not the case. He would much rather contemplate the Forms and engage in philosophical discussion. It is only out of pity and a desire to educate the citizens of the state that the philosopher returns to them, leaving the splendour of the Forms and the contemplative realm. However, he does not completely abandon contemplation but puts it to use in the political sphere. 15 In keeping with his more commonsensical convictions, Aristotle does not think it is philosophically useful to ground the divisions for the kinds of lives in the classes of an ideal state. Instead, he presents an argument for what is the best kind of life for humans or more specifically, what is best about human beings that does not depend on the Platonic Forms. Despite this disagreement, Aristotle sides with Plato in the belief that a political life is only second best. 16 Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics begins by asserting that everything seeks out some good. This good is the thing's end (telos) and differs according to what that thing is. Different not compatible bed-fellows. For example: "It may seem strange that while I go around and give this advice privately and interfere in private affairs, I do not venture to go to the assembly and there advise the city. You have heard me give the reason for this in many places. I have a divine or spiritual sign which Meletus has ridiculed in his deposition... it turns me away from something I am about to do, but it never encourages me to do anything. This is what has prevented me from taking part in public affairs, and I think it was quite right to prevent me. Be sure, gentlemen of the jury, that if I had long ago attempted to take part in politics, I should have died long ago, and benefited neither you nor myself... A man who really fights for justice must lead a private, not a public, life if he is to survive for even a short time" (Apology 31c-32a). 15 It could be argued that Plato brings the contemplative realm into the political realm in much the same way that Socrates brought philosophy into the agora. In fact, Socrates might have regarded cities as the best places for contemplation and philosophizing: "I am, you see, a lover of learning. Now the people in the city have something to teach me, but the fields and trees won't teach me anything" (Phaedrus 230d) 16 One cannot help but recall Zarathustra's words to his students: "One repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but a pupil" (Z I, "Gift-Giving Virtue"). 17

25 activities and crafts will have different ends, for example, the end of medicine is health, while the end of house building is a house (NE I a6-10). Further, some ends are aimed at because they lead to other goods, while others are targeted for their own sake. An instance of the former would be money. Money is the end of money-making, and money is sought after not for its own sake, but for what it can purchase. An end that is aimed at for its own sake (one does not want it for the sake of some other good) is an "ultimate end." Aristotle observes further that crafts and sciences form hierarchies. Certain crafts and sciences have ends that belong in the higher-order sciences. In other words, certain crafts and sciences have ends outside of themselves, for example, the crafts of sail-making and shipbuilding. There is no point of making sails if there are no ships, and there is no sense in making ships without naval warfare and navigation. However, what Aristotle wants to know is: "Is there an ultimate end of all human craft and action?" Aristotle believes eudaimonia or human flourishing fulfills this role. 17 While it seems evident that all human activity aims at attaining human flourishing, it is less apparent what constitutes human flourishing. Different people have different ideas about how to flourish, and this will dictate what they take to be the superior governing principle for humans. To determine how human flourishing can be realized, Aristotle appeals to the so-called Function Argument, which states that all things have a function (ergon). 18 For example, the function of a knife is to cut, and the function of the eye is to see. However, there is an important difference between these two objects. A knife is a human artifact; it is made by us to provide a 17 The Greek word eudaimonia is notoriously difficult to translate, since there is no corresponding word in English. The most popular translation is "happiness," but it can also be translated as "human flourishing," "character building," "fulfillment," "worthwhile," "doing well," among others. None of these English words encompasses the entire meaning of the Greek, however, I will translate eudaimonia as human flourishing since this translation best encapsulates the conceptual link concerning governing principles of an individual's life between Aristotle and Nietzsche. 18 For Aristotle's Function Argument, see NE I b a20. 18

26 particular function. An eye is an organ of a living being and has the function of enabling the organism to help us see and navigate our world. Also, it has a larger role to play in the function of the organism which in the case of humans is helping us to flourish. So just as we design a knife to fulfill a particular function, nature has designed us in a way that helps us achieve our function. This implies that human beings have a set function or activity, but what exactly is the function of a human being? What activity distinguishes human beings from other kinds of life? The first possible function Aristotle considers is growth and nutrition. Humans grow and require sustenance, but plants and animals also possess this function. Since all living things share this potential function, Aristotle thinks that this cannot be the function of human beings because humans are much more complex than plants and because it is not a distinctly human activity. The next function Aristotle mentions is sense perception. Sense perception is not something that plants engage in; however, it is shared with all animals including humans. Therefore, Aristotle thinks this also fails as an activity distinct to humans and does not qualify as the function of human beings. Aristotle's last suggestion regarding the possible function of humans is reason (logos). Human beings are capable of acting rationally, thinking and reasoning. While it is true that animals can also think (to a degree), they mostly act based on instinct. The lion attacks the gazelle because it is hungry, not because it realizes it will be easy prey and provide sustenance to ensure its survival. Reason is what separates humans from other living beings, 19 with Aristotle concluding that "the function of man is an activity of soul in accordance with, or not without, 19 "... and the things men have done from reason are thought most properly their own acts and voluntary acts. That this is the man himself, then, or is so more than anything else, is plain, and also that the good man loves most this part of him" (NE IX b a3). 19