Augustine and the Pear Tree

Transcription

1 Augustine and the Pear Tree Lord, grant me purity, but not yet. Augustine, Confessions, book VIII, chapter 7 Augustine was no stranger to sin. In his youth, Augustine tells us that, at age 16, the madness of lust had complete sway over me, and I resigned myself entirely to it. Then he ran wild in the shadowy jungle of erotic adventures. (Confessions, 2.1-2) At 18, Augustine began a monogamous relationship with a mistress, whom he stayed with for 12 years, and had a son with. But, he couldn t marry her due to differences in social rank. At 30, his mother encouraged him to marry, and so he became engaged (at age 30) to a 10 year old girl. But, the legal age for marriage was 12, so he had to wait 2 years. His mistress had been sent away as a result of the engagement, but he couldn t bear to go 2 years without sex for that long. So he took another mistress for a year before converting to Christianity, ending his relationship with his second mistress, and calling off the engagement (at age 31). Yet, he was really troubled by that time he stole some pears. The law written upon human hearts : Though not yet a Christian, Augustine says that he nevertheless still knew it was wrong to steal. This moral law is written upon our hearts. As evidence for this, he asks, After all, what thief will tolerate another thief? The idea is that, if someone were to steal from YOU, you would complain, Hey! You can t do that to me! That is, you think others ought not steal from you. Augustine takes this to be evidence that we have an innate understanding of morality. For, if others have an obligation not to steal from YOU, then surely you too have an obligation not to steal from them! This sentiment is perhaps best captured by The Golden Rule: Do to others as you would have them do to you. (Matthew 7:12 ; Luke 6:31) The theft: 16 year old Augustine was out late with his band of friends, and they stole a bunch of pears from someone s pear tree. Why did he do it if he knew it was wrong? Typically, we seek an explanation of sin in terms of abandoning the highest goods (i.e., God) in favor of the lowest goods (i.e., sensory, bodily pleasures). Augustine writes, Someone has committed a murder. Why did he do it? He loved his victim s wife or estate, or he wanted to steal enough to live on, or he was afraid of losing something to his victim, or he was burning to revenge himself on someone who had injured him. 1

2 But, Augustine had no such reason. They weren t hungry. (They had plenty of food.) The pears weren t even very delicious. (They had better pears elsewhere.) They threw the majority of the pears to some pigs. So, why? Augustine answers, what I wanted to enjoy was the theft itself, the sin. [M]y heart was seeking in such a way that I would be wicked for no reason, so that there would be no cause for my wickedness but wickedness itself. It was foul, this wickedness, and yet I loved it. In Anselmian language, we might say that he abandoned rectitude merely for the sake of abandoning it. This to do what is wrong merely because you want to do what is wrong is the epitome of wickedness; it is the polar opposite of justice (which, recall, is to do what is right merely because it is right). We could sympathize a bit if Augustine was hungry, or if the pears he stole were the most delicious in town, or if their owner had offended him in some way. But, to steal merely because it s wrong. How vile! Our hearts were tickled that we were deceiving people who did not expect us to do such things and fervently wanted us not to. To bring harm upon someone who neither expects it nor wants it, for no reason other than the joy of harming them is especially despicable. Questing for an explanation of his behavior, Augustine suggests that he perceived some power in it. Pride mimics loftiness, he says. He was perversely imitating God by exercising some shadowy likeness of omnipotence in other words, to thumb one s nose so blatantly at justice is, in a way, to declare one s self ABOVE justice (mistakenly, of course). Abelard s Ethics Here, Peter Abelard ( AD) asks, What is sin? 1. Four Features of Sin: According to Abelard (see, e.g., paragraph 67), ordinarily, when someone acts immorally, the following four things occur, in this order: (1) A mental vice that makes us disposed to sin (2) A desire or will for evil (3) Consent to evil (4) Action, or the doing of the evil Let s examine each in turn, and ask whether sin is located there. 2

3 (1) Vice: Broadly speaking, virtues and vices are good (virtues) or bad (vices) features of human beings. They can be features of either the body or the mind. They can either be moral or non-moral. For instance: Body (Non-Moral) Vigor (bodily strength) vs. Weakness of the body Able-bodied vs. Lameness Sight vs. Blindness Mind (Non-Moral) Good memory vs. Forgetful Knowledgeable vs. Ignorant Quick-witted vs. Obtuse (slow to understand) Mind (Moral) Justice vs. Injustice Perseverance vs. Laziness Moderation/Self-restraint vs. Gluttony and Wantonness/Lasciviousness In this essay, Abelard is concerned only with the third category the MORAL virtues and vices. These, he says, make us disposed to bad or good deeds (1). In short, a MORAL vice inclines the mind to doing something that isn t fit to be done at all. (4) The MORAL virtues and vices are the ones that are connected to praise and blameworthiness. Someone who is blind or forgetful is not for that reason deserving of blame, or punishment. However, someone who does something unjust IS. (2) Will, or Desire: Vices generate a bad will. By will, Abelard seems to mean desire (see especially 29; also, 28, 33-34). For example, someone with the vice of wantonness: sees a woman and falls into lust. His mind is stirred by the pleasure of the flesh, with the result that he is set on fire for the shamefulness of sex. (21) Or, someone with the vice of gluttony is going by another person s garden and on seeing the delicious fruits falls into craving them. Indeed he is driven by the very nature of his feeble state to desire what he may not take without its owner s knowledge and permission. (28) 3

4 (3) Consent: In response to this bad will, or desire, we have a choice: We can either do it or renounce it. (7) That is, we can CONSENT to whatever the evil will is pushing us toward, or refuse it. This is not quite to DO it. Rather, we consent to evil simply when we don t draw back from committing it and are wholly ready to carry it out should the opportunity arise. (29) By consenting to evil Abelard means to knowingly venture into evil; that is, intending to do evil. He uses these interchangeably (see, e.g., 85). [Consent not just to action, but even to the desire itself: Strictly speaking, Abelard s view seems to be that even mere consent to a wicked desire is a sin. Of a case of lustful desire, he writes, sin is rather to consent to this lust or to this action. (49)] (4) Action: Finally, we carry out the action. Note that we might CONSENT to carry it out without actually carrying it out. For instance, maybe you ve decided and are fully committed to murdering someone, but you drop dead on the way there, or are tackled by someone before you can complete the job, etc. 2. Sin is Consent to Evil: Abelard believes sin is located in (3). Consent to evil is a sin. This is scorn for God and an affront against him. (7) For, when we do this, we show a readiness not to do for his sake what we believe we ought to do for his sake, or not to renounce for his sake what we believe ought to be renounced. (8) When you know that you ought to do X (because that s what God commands), but you intentionally ignore it and prepare to do something else instead, you are showing scorn for God. And, ultimately, Abelard argues that you can do this without the addition of any sort of evil desires or actions. Let s see why. (1) Having a Vice is Not a Sin: Vices are simply dispositions or inclinations to either desire or do evil. These are present within you even when they re not actually manifesting in desire or action. For instance, if you re hot-tempered, you re STILL hottempered even when you re asleep. But, surely you re not sinning when you re asleep? [In physics we talk of dispositions too. For instance, salt is soluble that is, it is disposed to dissolve in liquid. A vase is fragile that is, it is disposed to shatter when struck. And these are present even when the salt isn t dissolving, and the vase is whole and intact.] 4

5 (2) An Evil Will is Not a Sin: For several reasons: Counter-Example #1: Evil will without sin: We cannot help having wicked desires. So, HAVING them is not a sin. Rather, GIVING IN to them is a sin. For instance, with respect to the wrongness of adultery, it isn t the lusting that had to be prohibited (which we cannot avoid and wherein we do not sin ), but rather the assent to it. (50) Indeed, it is impossible to live WITHOUT these sorts of desires arising. For, even if we resist an evil desire, he says we don t entirely extinguish it, so that we always have a will we might strive against. (22) Temptation is an opportunity to become a better person: Temptations and desires for evil things are not sins. Rather, they are material for a fight (5). We NEED material for a fight in order to become virtuous and praiseworthy. Where does the great reward come from if there is nothing serious we put up with? We struggle by fighting here in order that, triumphant in the struggle, we might receive a crown elsewhere. [But] where is the fight if the material for the fight is absent? (22) Where there is a battle, there is opportunity for victory. And victoriously resisting the desire for evil is praiseworthy. Really, the most praiseworthy people are those who struggle against terrible vices and desires, and WIN! [Consider: Who is more deserving of praise someone who is by nature cool-headed and doesn t get angry in a tense situation, or someone who is by nature very hot-tempered but RESISTS their internal inclination and remains calm in a tense situation? The latter right? Similarly, we re often proud of, e.g., alcoholics who are prone to drink, but resist and overcome their alcoholic vice and desire for drink (whereas we never congratulate someone who doesn t struggle with this issue for remaining sober).] If the only things you ever WANTED to do were good things, we wouldn t be very impressed to learn that you did good things. Abelard writes, For what great deed do we do for God s sake if we don t put up with anything opposed to our willing, but instead accomplish what we will? Indeed, who thanks us if, in what we say we are doing for his sake, we are [really] accomplishing our own will? (23) 5

6 [Question: Imagine that there is someone who only ever wants to do good things (e.g., a Mother Theresa-like figure). Is this person less praiseworthy than someone who does something good for others DESPITE having a constant desire to hurt others?] Abelard suggests that, over time, it becomes easier for those who have successfully curbed their bad desires to continue doing so. Resisting evil desires STRENGTHENS us over time, so that we become better people for it. Abelard points out that God turns this temptation itself into an opportunity for us, when he exercises us by it so that thereafter it can be less hard on us when it occurs, and so that even now we may fear less the assault of an enemy we have already conquered and know how to endure. (73) [So, perhaps Mother Theresa is still praiseworthy for soul-building at the soul gym?] Counter-Example #2: Sin without evil will: Imagine an innocent man who is being hunted by his cruel master. He hides for as long as he can, but eventually is found and faced with the choice: Die, or kill his master in self-defense. He does not want to kill his master, but does so out of a desire to preserve his own life. Abelard thinks that this man has sinned even though he did NOT desire/will to kill. Surely he does NOT will to kill the man. Rather, he suffers it i.e., he does something he really DOESN T WANT to do (just as a sick person doesn t WANT to be operated on, but they consent to suffer it in order to be cured; (18)). He writes, he was brought to this point by willing to escape death, not by willing to kill his master Surely a so called willing like this, one that consists of great mental sorrow, isn t to be called a willing but instead a suffering. To say he wants one thing because of another is like saying he tolerates what he doesn t want because of something else he does desire. (15, 18) Yet, Abelard believes that this man HAS sinned. For, he believes that it is wrong to intentionally kill. His sin was located in his CONSENT to kill: Yet he did wrong in consenting (even though he was under duress from the fear of death) to an unjust slaying he should have borne rather than inflicted. [B]ecause he consented to a killing he shouldn t have consented to, his unjust consent that preceded the killing was a sin. (15, 16) [What do you think? Abelard thinks that, when given a choice between kill or be killed, you ought to die! Is he right? Is killing in self-defense morally wrong?] 6

7 Digression: The Doctrine of Double-Effect A century after Abelard, Thomas Aquinas would argue that killing in self-defense is NOT wrong. He agrees that intending evil is wrong, but argues that one does NOT intend evil in such cases. For, intentional actions sometimes have TWO effects one that is intended, and another that is not. He writes, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life, is not unlawful (Summa, II-II.64.7) Today, we would say that what is intended is the preservation of your own life. The killing of the attacker is merely a foreseen side-effect of your primary intention. The doctrine here is that it is MUCH worse, morally to cause harm intentionally than it is to cause harm that is not intended (it is beside the intention ) but is, rather, merely foreseen as a (secondary) side-effect of fulfilling one s primary intent. We still appeal to something like this distinction today, and quite frequently. Consider, for instance, the following two scenarios: Strategic Bomber: A pilot bombs a factory that contains the enemy s store of weapons, and thus shortens the war, saving millions of lives. Unfortunately, 10,000 civilians live next to the factory who will die in the bombings. Terror Bomber: A pilot deliberately bombs 10,000 innocent civilians in order to demoralize the enemy, thus shortening the war and saving millions of lives. In Terror Bomber, the 10,000 deaths are intended as a means to ending the war and saving millions of lives. In Strategic Bomber, the deaths of 10,000 is merely a foreseen, but unintended side-effect of ending the war and saving millions. According to the DDE, strategic bombing is morally permissible, but terror bombing is not and, indeed, the majority of people s intuitions are aligned with this verdict. It is regrettable, but permissible to kill the civilians in Strategic Bomber since their deaths are merely collateral damage of war. 7

8 Proportionality: Though, note that harming as an unintended side-effect is not ALWAYS permissible. It must be PROPORTIONATE to the good you re intending to gain. So, for instance, imagine that I INTEND to get to work on time. To do so, I ll need to drive 100 miles an hour through a parade. I foresee that, as an unfortunate, unintended side-effect of pursuing my primary intention, hundreds of people will be die as a result of me running them over with my car. The good achieved by the primary effect (getting to work on time) is not even remotely proportionate to the harm caused as a secondary effect (hundreds of deaths). Therefore, this would be morally impermissible. He says, And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful. (Note also that Aquinas thinks it is SOMETIMES permissible to intentionally kill; for instance, he believes that some wars are just, and so soldiers can permissibly kill enemy combatants permissibly. It is permissible because they were granted public authority to do so. Though even then, they still sin if they be moved by private animosity. ) Abelard vs. Aquinas: According to Abelard, you WANT to save yourself, and DON T WANT to kill your attacker. However, you do INTENTIONALLY kill your attacker. According to Aquinas, you do NOT intentionally kill your attacker (nor do you want to). Rather, what you intend to do is preserve your own life. The death of your attacker is merely a secondary- / double - / side- effect of fulfilling your primary intention. Therefore, it is morally permissible. (Who is right? Do you intend the attacker s death?) [Thoughts? Does the DDE hold up? For instance, Aquinas uses DDE to show that suicide is wrong in every instance. But, is there a moral difference between the following cases? Euthanasia (Intended) A suffering, dying patient is given a lethal dose of painkillers in order to intentionally kill him as a means to relieving his suffering. Euthanasia (Foreseen) A suffering, dying patient is intentionally given a dose of painkillers as a means to relieving his suffering. Unfortunately, the only dose that is strong enough to dull the pain is a lethal one. It is foreseen that the patient will die as a side-effect of fulfilling the primary intention. Note that, even though active euthanasia is still illegal in most of the world, doctors often get around this law by performing the second procedure instead of the first.] 8

9 (4) A Bad Action is Not a Sin: If one has already sinned by consenting to do evil, he says, Adding on the performance of the deed doesn t add anything to increase the sin. (30) Again, Abelard argues for this by way of counter-examples. Counter-Example #1: Sin without bad action: Consider first an example of how someone can be PRAISE-worthy without a good action. Abelard writes, There are two people with the same plan of building homes for the poor. One of them accomplishes the performance of his devotion. But the other has the money he s prepared stolen from him violently and isn t allowed to finish what he proposed, being prevented by no fault of his own but hindered only by that violence. Could what is enacted externally lessen his merit before God? Or could another person s malice make him who did as much as he could for God s sake less acceptable to God? (97) If the deed somehow increased the praiseworthiness of the person, then two absurd conclusions would follow: (1) People could become better the richer they were (98) since the very rich could have the intention to be charitable AND actually donate a lot of money. (2) Even the hypocrites would be praiseworthy that is, people who do good deeds not out of an intention to do what God wills, but rather out of greed for human praise. (60) As an example of SIN without action, we ll have to supply our own cases: Successful Assassination: Peter points a gun at his victim and pulls the trigger. The gun fires and his victim dies. Unsuccessful Assassination: Paul points a gun at his victim and pulls the trigger. At that moment, a goose flies in front of the bullet, and his victim escapes. Abelard would claim that Peter and Paul sin equally. The fact that Peter SUCCEEDED adds nothing to his sin. For Paul fully INTENDED to do the same thing. He only failed due to an unforeseen mishap that was totally outside of his control! Abelard writes, someone who tries as hard as he can to go through with it is just as guilty as one who does go through with it insofar as he is able. (30) 9

10 Counter-Example #2: Bad action without sin: People often do bad things accidentally, or out of ignorance, or because they are coerced. But, in these cases, they do so without fault, or sin. Some examples: (Keep in mind that Abelard thinks fornication (sex outside of marriage) is sinful, and that capital punishment is a just form of punishment.) Accident A poor woman wraps her cold baby up next to her to keep it warm, but accidentally smothers it in her sleep. (79) A man accidentally kills someone else with a bow and arrow while hunting. (129) Ignorance A man has sex with a woman whom he mistakenly thinks is his wife. (49) A judge sentences an innocent man to death because he believes he is guilty. (49) A man and woman marry but, unbeknownst to them, they are siblings. (53) Coercion A woman, subjected to force (i.e., raped), has sex with a married man. (49) A clergyman is bound by chains and forced to lie among women. (42) [Question: Why doesn t the man who kills in self-defense get included here under sinless bad actions? After all, he says that he does so under duress and against his will (11). So, shouldn t we include his action under coercion? Short Answer: No. What seems to matter here is whether it is POSSIBLE to avoid the action in question. In the two cases of rape, the victims are UNABLE to avoid the bad action. But, in the case of killing in self-defense, one DOES have an option: Namely, they can DIE. Abelard is in agreement with Anselm when he says that God doesn t allow us to be tempted more than we are able to bear For God makes sure that temptation doesn t pressure us into sin more than we can endure by resisting it. (72) So, all sins are voluntary if we understand voluntary as merely excluding the necessary (since no sin is inevitable) (34) (Though, Abelard doesn t like the fact that we call sins voluntary, since voluntarily implies willingly ; but the man under discussion kills his master UN-willingly.) In short, under duress means something like DIFFICULT to avoid, whereas being coerced or subjected to force means IMPOSSIBLE to avoid. Only the latter is not blameworthy.] Conclusion: In short, bad actions are neither sinful nor blameworthy whenever there is no consent to do evil. For example, of the incestuous marriage: he didn t consent to [doing evil] insofar as he acted unknowingly. (54) Here, ignorance excuses bad actions. 10

11 Deeds are in themselves all indifferent : Abelard even goes so far to say that actions are in themselves (inherently) neither good nor bad! He writes, Indeed God pays attention only to the mind in rewarding good or evil, not to the results of the deeds. He doesn t think about what arises from our fault or from our good will, but judges the mind itself in its intention s purpose, not in the result of the outward deed. In fact deeds are in themselves all indifferent. They are not to be called good or bad, except according to the intention of the doer that is to say, not because it is good or bad for them to be done, but because they are well or badly done, that is, done with the intention whereby they are done properly, or not. Therefore one s intention is called good in itself, but his deed isn t called good from itself, but rather because it proceeds from a good intention. (90-91) In short, no action is intrinsically good or bad (i.e., good or bad in itself ). Rather, an action is good only insofar as it is done with good intentions. So, in theory, even the most seemingly horrendous deed (e.g., murder) could be good. Examples: Consider two judges. One punishes a criminal for the sake of justice, and the other punishes him out of hatred springing from an old feud. (58) It is exactly the same action, but only the second judge sins. Or, consider the act of handing Jesus over to be crucified. Both God AND Judas did this. But, Judas (one of Jesus s followers) did it as an act of betrayal. (57; see especially the Dialogue, 406, pg. 143) Judas sins while God does not. The difference is in their intent. [Ethicists typically distinguish between right/wrong and good/bad. Imagine that you were convinced by Abelard that WRONGNESS or SIN is located in the agent s intentions. Nevertheless, surely an action can still be BAD even if it isn t WRONG. For instance, a lion doesn t act wrongly (or sin ) when it kills a human being. Nevertheless, isn t the fact that it mauls someone a BAD thing? Likewise, shouldn t we say that the mother who accidentally smothers her child does something BAD even if we hesitate to say that what she did was WRONG? If so, then an action CAN be bad in the absence of sin. Abelard does not seem to make this distinction between what is good and what is right. For instance, he seems to use these terms interchangeably when he writes, Indeed we call an intention good (that is, right) in itself. (106)] 11

12 3. Why Do we Punish Deeds and Not Intentions?: Consider the woman who smothers her child through no fault of her own. In both Abelard s time and ours, she would be punished even though she has not sinned. And yet, consider a second mother who ALSO swaddles her child at night in the SAME way, but the baby SURVIVES. This woman will not be punished at all. The mothers are morally on a par, but punished differently! [The Problem of Moral Luck: Or consider Successful vs. Unsuccessful Assassination. The assassins perform exactly the same actions in each case. (On Abelard s view, they have sinned equally.) Yet, we would punish the first assassin MUCH more severely than the first. But, carefully consider WHY the two cases differ. In the Unsuccessful case, a goose just HAPPENS to fly in front of the bullet (a less far-fetched scenario is one where the gun just HAPPENS to jam). But, this is something that is completely outside of the assassin s control. So, the fact that he gets punished much less severely and is not deemed a murderer is merely a matter of luck! (He s lucky that goose flew by when it did.) Abelard notes that we often view others differently based on mere chance (see 90). He is grappling with a problem that would not be fully recognized until nearly 1,000 years later: the problem of moral luck! Problem: We often punish (or morally assess, blame, praise) people more or less severely based on factors that are completely outside of their control. For instance, in the case of the two men building homes for the poor, we ll likely praise the one who actually DOES so, and not the one who had his money stolen. On Abelard s view, this seems misguided, since the latter didn t build the homes only due to factors that were entirely outside of his control (namely, the theft). They were EQUALLY praiseworthy. Keep in mind also our two mothers, only one of whom smothers her child. Some questions: (1) ARE the assassins equally guilty, and the mothers equally guiltless, morally speaking? (2) If so, should they receive equal punishments? (3) If not, WHY should we punish them differently?] Abelard says we ought to punish deed rather than intent for two practical reasons: 1. Judging intent is impractical (or impossible): The first part of his answer merely points out that WE AREN T IN A POSITION TO KNOW people s intentions. We can t see into people s minds. So, the best we can do is focus on actions. This is imperfect, but there will be perfect justice in the end when God tries the fault in a true court. human beings don t judge about what is hidden but about what is plain. They don t think so much of the guilt belonging to the fault as the performance of the 12

13 deed. Rather God alone, who pays attention not so much to the deeds that are done as to the mind with which they are done, is truly thinking about the guilt in our intention and tries the fault in a true court. God has been called the examiner of the intentions or consents But we, who aren t in a position to discriminate or decide this, turn our judgment mostly to the deeds. (82, 85) 2. The role of government is to protect it s people rather than judge sin: Still, people often ACT wrongly in ways that we CAN see, and we still don t punish them for instance, there is no legal penalty for lying, cheating, or adultery. So, why don t we punish those? Abelard s second answer is this: We don t punish the faults so much as the deeds, and are eager to punish not so much what it is in someone that injures his soul as what can injure others, so that we prevent public damages more than correcting individual ones [I]n preventing public injuries we have regard for general expediency. Hence we often punish the least sins with greater penalties, not paying so much attention with the fairness of justice to what fault preceded as thinking with the discretion of foresight how great a disadvantage can come from them if they are punished mildly. (85, 88) God s role is to judge sin. The role of government is to preserve and protect its people. So, governments are more concerned with preventing you from harming others ( public damages ) rather than from harming your own soul. In part, we prevent future public injuries by setting an example. There are many people who imitate and so it is possible to draw others into guilt by example. (86) So, punishing actions discourages people from committing crimes in the future. For example, regarding the woman and her child, a heavy penalty is exacted from her, not for a fault she committed but to make her or other women more careful about anticipating such dangers. (80) Likewise, praise and reward ENCOURAGE GOOD deeds: in this life something is awarded for these good or bad deeds, in order that we may be further encouraged to good deeds or kept from bad ones and in order that some people should take their examples from others in doing things that are proper or shunning those that are improper. (100) Abelard even mentions (81) a judge who knows the accused is innocent, but sentences him anyway because he has no way to refute the incriminating evidence and he says that this is a good thing. Why? Because it keeps the justice system functioning smoothly. 13

14 4. The Problem of Children and Infidels: Abelard (and most Christians) believe that all non-christians go to Hell when they die (a place of eternal suffering). Infidels: Yet, Abelard recognizes a tension here, since on his account many of these infidels are nonbelievers through no fault of their own: But being ignorant of God, or not believing him, or doing things that aren t rightly done, can happen without fault to many people. For if someone doesn t believe the Gospel or Christ because their preaching didn t reach them what fault can be attributed to him because he doesn t believe? (126) Such people don t knowingly (let us assume) consent to evil, or scorn God. So, on Abelard s view, they have not sinned. Nevertheless, we say this disbelief of theirs in which they died is enough for damnation (128) How is that just? Children: Abelard also believes that children (and the cognitively disabled) are sinless: I don t see how not believing in Christ (which is what disbelief is) should be attributed to a fault in children or those it wasn t announced to, or how anything done out of invincible ignorance or that we were unable to foresee should be attributed to a fault in us. (129) children and those who are naturally fools are exempt from this. Since they lack reason so to speak nothing is charged against them as a sin (113) Nevertheless, he adds that they are saved only through the sacraments. (113) That is, children who die without the grace of baptism are damned with both a physical and an eternal death even though they are innocent. (122) So, unbaptized children who die are without fault, but punished for eternity! 1 Problem: But then, on Abelard s account of sin, God doles out an INFINITE amount of suffering to many sinless people. That seems horribly unjust. Summary So Far: Let s review all of our cases so far before moving on. 1 See also: Just as what they [Jesus s crucifiers] did out of ignorance, or even the ignorance itself, isn t properly called sin, that is, scorn for God, so neither is disbelief, although this necessarily closes off access to eternal life for adults who are already using reason. Indeed for damnation it is enough not to believe the Gospel, to be ignorant of Christ, or not to receive the Church s sacraments, even though this happens not through malice so much as through ignorance. (124) 14

15 Case Desire Consent Action Sin? Have lustful desires, but resist them X X NO Assassination attempt, but gun jams X YES Successful assassination attempt YES Unwillingly kills in self-defense X YES Accident: Smothered baby, hunting accident Coercion: Forcibly raped Ignorance: Unknowingly commit adultery/incest Not being Christian, either because: (a) incapable (e.g., babies) (b) never heard of Christianity (infidels) X X NO X X X (Note that all of the sins include consent to evil, and all non-sins lack consent to evil.) Abelard s Reply: Abelard replies in several ways, none of which are totally satisfying. In the end, Abelard is forced to distinguish between blameworthy and punishworthy. Original Sin: Like Augustine and Anselm before him, Abelard accepts the doctrine of Original Sin, by which all humans deserve punishment because they are descended from Adam and Eve, who sinned in the Garden of Eden, and we inherit their guilt. He writes, Surely one who doesn t yet perceive by reason what he ought to do doesn t have any fault because of scorn for God. Yet he isn t immune to the stain of his earlier parents sin, from which he already incurs punishment even if not fault; he preserves in his punishment what they committed in their fault. (45) Divine Grace: Abelard also accepts the doctrine of Divine Grace (i.e., we are not able to save ourselves by our own power). But then, if God can justly REWARD people through no fault of their own (i.e., nothing praiseworthy), then it stands to reason that he can also justly PUNISH them for no fault of their own (i.e., nothing blameworthy). He says, just as some people are saved without any merits and gain eternal life by grace alone, so it isn t absurd for some people to bear physical penalties they haven t merited (122) [Is this a plausible line of reasoning? Imagine that your friend gives you a gift: What is this for? I didn t do anything to deserve something so nice, you say. I know, your friend replies. But, it s okay for me to give you a gift anyway, right? Yes, sure! you reply. NO* *but deserving of eternal punishment 15

16 Later, your friend gives you 50 lashings. What is this for? I didn t do anything to deserve something so horrible! you scream. I know, your friend replies. But, since it was okay for me to reward you for no reason, I figured it must also be okay for me to punish you for no reason. Right? Isn t there an asymmetry between harm and benefit; reward and punishment?] Punishing the Innocent Produces a Greater Good: Furthermore, it is clear that God sometimes justly administers punishment to those who don t deserve it in order to bring an even greater good out of it. He says, For God often physically punishes people here when no fault of theirs requires it. Yet he doesn t do this without cause. For instance, when he casts afflictions even on the just as a kind of purification or test of them (118) He also mentions a prophet who was deceived into doing something bad, but was struck dead by God anyway. This was good because many people saw a just man punished without any fault, and this benefited many people as a warning (122). Clarifying What Good Intentions Are: Abelard also clarifies that having a good intention isn t merely BELIEVING that you are doing the right thing. You also have to be CORRECT about this. He writes, Thus an intention isn t to be called good because it appears good, but more than that, because it is such as it is considered to be that is, when if one believes that what he is aiming at is pleasing to God, he is in addition not deceived in his evaluation. (109) Why? He is forced to add this extra condition, Otherwise the infidels themselves would have good deeds (109) So, we seem to have the following picture: Sin/Fault/Blameworthiness: Someone sins (i.e., is at fault, or is blameworthy) if and only if they have a bad intention. Bad Intention: Someone has a bad intention if and only if: (a) they intend, or consent, to do what they believe is wrong. Good Intention: Someone has a good intention if and only if: (a) they intend, or consent, to do what they believe is right, and (b) they are correct about this (i.e., it IS right). 16

17 Children and Infidels have not sinned, since they do not meet the criterion of having a Bad Intention. But, nor do they meet the criteria of Good Intentions. (Abelard seems to think that the fact that the people in question are in this middle-ground softens the problem a little; i.e., because they have never done anything praiseworthy.) Introducing Sins of Ignorance?: Consider the following passages: If we call sin everything we do wrongly or everything we have that is contrary to our salvation, then by all means we will call both disbelief and ignorance of the things that have to be believed for salvation sins, although there appears to be no scorn for God there. Nevertheless I think what is properly called sin can nowhere occur without fault. Indeed, if someone attributes this to a faultless sin on the part of the disbelievers, that will perhaps be all right, since it seems absurd to him that such people are damned without sin. Therefore this is what sinning out of ignorance is: not to have any fault in it, but doing what isn t appropriate for us. (125, 128, 130) Abelard is so troubled by this result of his view (that God eternally punishes sinless people) that he almost seems to take back his initial claim that sin has nothing to do with deed. Infidels perhaps sin in some improper (i.e., faultless) sense. [Is Abelard admitting that sometimes there is sin WITHOUT consent to evil? Sort of?] The Shocking Finale: Finally, Abelard is forced to admit, if someone should ask whether the martyrs persecutors, or Christ s, sinned we certainly can t say that they were sinning. No one s ignorance is a sin (110) In other words, even those who crucified Jesus i.e., murdered God! did not sin because they did not have bad intentions. They believed that what they were doing was right. In fact, it would have been sinful had they NOT followed their conscience going AGAINST what they thought God wanted them to do and NOT murdered God! (Though, of course, neither did they have GOOD intentions, since they were mistaken about what they ought to have done. So, their actions were neither blameworthy NOR praiseworthy.) Thus those who persecuted Christ or his followers, and believed they should be persecuted, we say sinned through action. Nevertheless, they would have sinned more seriously through fault if they had spared them contrary to conscience. (131) 17