UNDERSTANDING GOD S JUSTICE TOWARDS THOSE WHO SUFFER: A CRITIQUE OF ELEONORE STUMP S DEFENSE. A thesis presented to.

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1 UNDERSTANDING GOD S JUSTICE TOWARDS THOSE WHO SUFFER: A CRITIQUE OF ELEONORE STUMP S DEFENSE A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Robyn Renee Gaier November 2004

2 This thesis entitled UNDERSTANDING GOD S JUSTICE TOWARDS THOSE WHO SUFFER: A CRITIQUE OF ELEONORE STUMP S DEFENSE BY ROBYN RENEE GAIER has been approved for the Department of Philosophy and the College of Arts and Sciences by James Petrik Associate Professor of Philosophy Leslie A. Flemming Dean, College of Arts and Sciences

3 GAIER, ROBYN RENEE. M.A. November Philosophy Understanding God s Justice Towards Those Who Suffer: A Critique of Eleonore Stump s Defense (88pp.) Director of Thesis: James Petrik Within philosophical discussions of the problem of evil, the issue of God s justice towards those who suffer is of primary importance. In this thesis, I consider one aspect of this issue by analyzing and critiquing Eleonore Stump s claim that justice requires God to compensate the human sufferer for instances of undeserved and involuntary suffering. I critique her view on the grounds that a) such moral constraints upon God exceed what distributive justice requires, b) there is a disparity between her view and its Thomistic foundation, and c) such a view fails to align with the notion of justice advocated in contemporary moral theories. Approved: James Petrik Associate Professor of Philosophy

4 Dedication In loving memory of my grandparents, Elmer and Rose Gaier and Harold and Reva Liette, whose faith in God no amount of suffering could deter

5 Acknowledgements I wish to extend my sincere gratitude to those whom have helped me reach the successful completion of not only a Master of Arts degree, but of a personal educational goal. Many thanks to my thesis advisor and mentor, James Petrik, whose patience and insistence upon the revisions of this thesis have greatly enhanced both its quality and presentation. I firmly believe that the shortcomings which persist herein are due to my own shortcomings in adequately addressing his comments. I wish to further thank John Bender, Donald Borchert, and Mark LeBar for agreeing to comprise my thesis committee. Finally, I thank those whom have given me encouragement and support throughout my years at Ohio University. My parents, Roger and Beverly Gaier, as well as Regina and Kevin Mann, Nikole Berling, Austin Dacey, Chris Stasa, Mike Tager, and James Taylor all of whom inquired about my progress, and requested copies of this thesis long before its completion I thank you!

6 6 Table of Contents Abstract...3 Dedication...4 Acknowledgements...5 Chapter One: Divine Justice and the Human Sufferer...7 I. Evil, Perfect Goodness, and the Greater Good...7 II. Justice and the Greater Good...10 III. The Scope and Boundaries of this Thesis...14 IV. The Structure of this Thesis...17 Chapter Two: The Nature of Divine Justice...18 I. The Divine Good...19 II. Restrictions upon Divine Distribution: Stump s Defense of GUS...21 III. Avoiding Possible Pitfalls...25 IV. GUS s Appeal...31 V. Conclusion...33 Chapter Three: Distributive Justice and Its Role in God s Moral Agency...35 I. Of Divine Distribution...36 II. A Divergence Between GUS and the Demands of Distributive Justice...42 III. An Involuntary Altruistic Justice...47 IV. Conclusion...49 Chapter Four: Aquinas s Divergence from GUS...51 I. Aquinas, GUS, and the Principle of Double Effect...51 II. Aquinas s Just War Theory...56 III. A Case from Textual Evidence...58 Chapter Five: GUS s Failure beyond Aquinas...63 I. On Communal Goods...63 II. Aggregation and GUS...66 III. On the Preservation of Respect for Persons...72 IV. Justifying God s Ways to GUS...78 Chapter Six: GUS and the Problem of Evil...80 I. God s Charity and GUS...81 II. Limitations and Prospects...83 Bibliography...87

7 7 Chapter One: Divine Justice and the Human Sufferer Within philosophical discussions on the problem of evil, there are pervading concerns regarding the nature of God as characterized in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Specifically, there are important conflicts among the ways in which God s perfect benevolence, omniscience, and omnipotence are understood, conflicts that hinder progress towards a viable resolution to this problem. Part of the task of responding to the problem of evil, consequently, is to pay careful attention to how these attributes ought to be understood. It is my aim to make a modest contribution to this endeavor by attempting to clarify one aspect of God s benevolence. Specifically, I will be asking whether considerations of justice prohibit God from allowing one individual to suffer undeserved harm from which she derives no benefit in order to promote some good for another (or others). I. Evil, Perfect Goodness, and the Greater Good The problem of evil arises for theists who maintain that God is perfectly benevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent, and who further recognize that evil is an undeniable part of the universe this God is alleged to have created. The problem is predicated upon the notion that a perfectly good being would eliminate the evil that she is aware of and has the power to eliminate. Thus, the persistence of evil in the world calls into question the existence of such a God. For this reason, the problem of evil is also referred to as the argument from evil against God s existence.

8 8 A full treatment of the problem of evil would, of course, need to discuss all three of the aforementioned attributes of God; however, progress towards a response can be served by isolating and scrutinizing these attributes individually. That is the aim with which the present inquiry will be conducted, for I will focus only upon God s benevolence. Furthermore, I will focus only upon a particular conception of God s benevolence, viz., that found within the Judeo-Christian tradition. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, God s benevolence is commonly understood as moral goodness. This conception of God s benevolence views God as a moral agent who has moral responsibilities and is morally accountable. Richard Swinburne deems this view of God s benevolence an essential part of the Judeo-Christian tradition. If God s goodness were supposed to be other than moral goodness, then it might be no objection to his existence that there is pain and suffering. But, it seems to me deeply central to the whole tradition of the Christian (and other Western) religion that God is loving towards his creation and that involves his behaving in morally good ways towards it. 1 Although it is possible to conceive God s benevolence as not entailing moral goodness, (on, for example, a Spinozistic conception of God), the Judeo-Christian understanding of God s benevolence incorporates moral goodness. Thus, attempts to respond to the 1 Swinburne, Richard. Providence and the Problem of Evil. New York: Oxford University Press,

9 9 argument from evil in the Judeo-Christian tradition have the challenge of doing so in ways which preserve the moral goodness of God. One very common response among Judeo-Christian apologists is simply known as the greater good defense. 2 This defense refers to the claim that evils are allowed by God because they are conditions for goods which are greater than the evils in question. It is noteworthy that some versions of this defense allow for a large range of greater goods, including instances of human suffering where the greater good befalls someone other than the actual sufferer, including, sometimes, humanity taken collectively. The best known such defense employing a communal good is that which appeals to the value of human freedom. This, the free will defense, 3 suggests that the possibility of moral evil is allowed by God because it is a condition for the greater good of significant human freedom. 4 Alvin Plantinga is the best known contemporary defender of this line of thought; however, the view goes back at least as far as Saint Augustine. 5 Yet, although 2 A defense is distinguished from a theodicy in the sense that a defense simply provides a possible reason why an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly benevolent God would allow evil. A theodicy, on the other hand, attempts to make the stronger assertion that God allowing evil in the world is morally justifiable. (Stump, Eleonore. Providence and the Problem of Evil As found in Christian Philosophy. Ed. Thomas P. Flint. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, , hereafter PPE). 3 For more on the free will defense, please refer to Alvin Plantinga s article The Free Will Defense, in Philosophy in America, ed. Max Black. London: Allen and Unwin , or his book God and Other Minds. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Moral evil is typically distinguished from what is called natural evil, where the former refers to evils caused by human actions and the latter refers to evils resulting from natural forces. The former would include such occurrences as theft, murder, and rape, while instances of the latter would include tornadoes, floods, and earthquakes. 5 Augustine, Saint. City of God. Bk. XIV. Trans. Marcus Dods. New York: Modern Library,

10 10 human freedom is not the only communal good employed in greater good defenses, it is deserving of attention due to its widespread influence and popularity. Prima facie it might seem as though the free will defense only suggests why God might allow moral evils to occur, but not further indicate what the greater good might be in cases of natural evil. 6 Nonetheless, the idea that there might be other greater goods in such evils cannot be so easily dismissed. For instance, Peter Van Inwagen has suggested that the orderliness of nature might be such a greater good in cases of natural evil. 7 The order of nature itself, which is the cause of events such as tornadoes and earthquakes, could be the good that God may wish to preserve even at the cost of some suffering to sentient beings. II. Justice and the Greater Good While the greater good defense has an intuitive plausibility, there are philosophers, both theistic and atheistic, who have argued that God s perfect goodness places moral constraints upon the legitimacy of His allowing one to suffer for the benefit of another or others. Among those philosophers who advocate such constraints are William Alston, Marilyn McCord Adams, Michael Tooley, and Eleonore Stump. Alston and Adams place a weaker constraint upon the extent to which God may allow one to 6 I acknowledge that there may be philosophers who advocate that an ordered nature is necessary to have meaningful freedom. In this way, natural evils, like moral evils, are equally a condition for significant human freedom. 7 Van Inwagen, Peter. The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence as found in The Evidential Argument from Evil. Ed. Daniel Howard-Synder. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,

11 11 suffer in cases where the sufferer does not derive a benefit. Alston claims that it would be incompatible with God s goodness to wholly sacrifice the welfare of one of His intelligent creatures simply in order to achieve a good for others, or for Himself, but grants that God might allow some suffering for goods which benefit persons apart from the sufferer. 8 For her part, Adams asserts that God s goodness only requires that the goodness of one s life on the whole is not outweighed, or balanced-off, by the evils one experiences. Divine goodness to created persons involves the distribution of harms and benefits, not merely globally, but also within the context of the individual person s life. At a minimum, God s goodness to human individuals would require that God guarantee each a life that was a great good to him/her on the whole by balancing off serious evils. 9 Adams claims that God would not wholly use the life of one human being, or allow an individual to experience suffering greater than the good of her life on the whole. Though Michael Tooley and Eleonore Stump would accept the points made by Alston and Adams, they would both argue that neither Alston nor Adams go far enough in identifying the constraints that justice imposes upon God s action. Michael Tooley 8 Alston, William. The Inductive Argument from Evil and Human Cognitive Condition as found in The Evidential Argument from Evil Adams, Marilyn McCord. Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,

12 12 claims it is unjust to impose evils upon some in order to provide goods for others. 10 Clearly, Tooley dissents from Alston in claiming that the suffering one endures cannot be justly allowed by God if its purpose is to benefit another or others, even if the sufferer s life on the whole is still good. Eleonore Stump also dissents from the weaker constraints postulated by Alston and Adams. The doctrine of God s providence gives us the nature and purpose of God s rule, and the account of God s goodness shows us constraints on the way he can achieve his purpose. In particular, the notion of God s justice requires that undeserved suffering permitted by God be somehow compensated. Undeserved suffering which is uncompensated seems clearly unjust; but so does suffering compensated only by benefits to someone other than the sufferer. 11 Stump s position asserts that the sufferer must be compensated for each instance of undeserved suffering. It is insufficient, according to Stump, that the goodness in one s life on the whole balances out instances of undeserved suffering. What justice requires on her view is that every instance of undeserved suffering an individual experiences must be a source of some greater good for that individual. 10 Tooley, Michael. The Argument from Evil Philosophical Perspectives. 5. Philosophy of Religion, Stump, Eleonore. PPE

13 13 While I am sympathetic with the view of Alston and Adams, I believe that Tooley and Stump place an unwarranted constraint upon God s morality. 12 In this thesis, I intend to show that this is so, especially with respect to Stump s version of this constraint, which I will henceforth refer to as GUS, (for God s permission of undeserved suffering). The following will serve as my canonical formulation of GUS. GUS: it is unjust for God to allow one individual to suffer undeservedly unless God s doing so is the best available means to promote some good for the sufferer. I wish to focus upon and critique Stump s position for two main reasons. First, Stump s account is the most fully articulated position of those who share similar views. 13 This is largely due to the fact that Stump considers her project as an exegesis of Aquinas, who wrote extensively on morality and natural theology. Second, Stump s position has not been analyzed among contemporary philosophers. For instance, although Alston 12 My sympathy with the views of Alston and Adams, but divergence from those of Stump and Tooley is, perhaps, best illustrated by my further sympathy with the following passage as found in James Petrik s book Evil Beyond Belief. It is, it seems to me, not true that loving an individual or having goodwill with respect to an individual entails that one accord the individual s welfare absolute priority in one s scheme of values. And this seems right even if we stipulate that the love is perfect. A perfect love ought to be commensurate with the value of the beloved, and if the value of the beloved does not trump all other values, a perfect love would not treat it as if it did. (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc ). In this context, Petrik is criticizing Adams s view. However, I maintain some sympathy with both views in the following way. I believe that placing an individual s welfare as absolute priority over other values is not necessary in order for the goodness of one s life on the whole to outweigh the evil she experiences. For instance, there may be cases where an individual may undeservedly suffer, and who cannot be compensated for such suffering. If such suffering is allowed, then clearly the individual s welfare is not treated as an absolute priority, at least not in that instance. Still, the suffering may be allowed in promotion of another value (say, another s opportunity for salvation), because it does not compromise the overall good of the sufferer s life. 13 Tooley, by contrast, makes the point in the course of his argument against theism, but does not go to any great lengths to defend it. Nonetheless, it is my contention that if my case against Stump succeeds, it would apply, mutatis mutandis, against Tooley and any other advocate of GUS.

14 14 dissents from Stump, he does not defend his disagreement. 14 William Hasker also criticizes Stump in his article The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil, but only in regard to how morality seems to be undermined in Stump s position. 15 I, however, will be critiquing Stump s position differently in my effort to show that an adequate account of God s moral goodness does not entail that God is bound by a general moral obligation to compensate individuals who experience undeserved suffering. III. The Scope and Boundaries of this Thesis My strategy in showing the inadequacy of Stump s position will be to sketch scenarios in which we would not deem a human agent unjust were she to allow an individual to suffer undeservedly in order to promote some benefit for another or others. These scenarios will, however, involve circumstances in which human beings are constrained concerning the degree to which they can promote the good; thus, it might be thought that the points they establish cannot be applied to God, since an omnipotent and omniscient being is not constrained to the same degree or in the same respects as finite human agents. While these worries are understandable and care in the use of analogies with the human case is certainly called for, there are two reasons that I believe such analogies are legitimate in the context of this thesis. The first reason is that God, as the Creator of the universe, may actually be constrained in certain respects which surpass our understanding. Even Stump assumes 14 Alston, William. The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition Hasker, William. The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil. Faith and Philosophy. Ja 92; 9(1):

15 15 that there are some constraints upon God that are beyond our understanding. She claims that, although it is God s aim for human beings to grow closer to God as a result of suffering, it is ultimately human freedom which dictates whether one s will is actually changed through suffering. Stump explains this important consequence of human freedom in the following. even if it could be shown that the suffering never eventuated in any spiritual improvement, it would not have been demonstrated that the suffering was pointless. As long as human beings have free will (where free will is understood in the incompatibilist sense), nothing God does or permits can guarantee that a person becomes spiritually better, because his betterment depends on his changing his will. All that is required for the suffering to count nonetheless as serving God s purpose is that it be the best available means for turning a person to God, and it is hard to see how we would ever be in a position to know that some suffering did not meet this condition. 16 Stump not only claims that it is the individual who ultimately determines whether her will is changed, but she further claims that the benefit deriving from suffering may even be a 16 Stump, Eleonore. PPE In this passage, the first emphasis is the author s, while the emphasis upon the last phrase is my own.

16 16 hidden part of the inner life of a person and not ever apparent in behavior. 17 That there might be a best available means that is beyond our ken, suggests that God s pursuit of soteriological aims may be constrained in ways that are, likewise, beyond our ken. The second reason why I have chosen to incorporate analogies concerning human moral agents is in regard to my aim. These analogies help to further my position that God s justice does not impose the specific obligation upon God that is expressed in GUS. In this regard, I only wish to clarify the nature of the constraints upon God s agency that are entailed only by God s justice. Determining whether God is bound by GUS is an issue that has significant implications for the contours of contemporary responses to the problem of evil. As noted above, whether it is morally permissible to allow an individual to suffer for the welfare of another or others plays a significant role in many contemporary theodicies and defenses, including what is arguably the most prominent of these, the free will defense. If this thesis succeeds, it will have removed at least one obstacle that God s perfect benevolence is sometimes alleged to pose for such lines of response to the problem of evil. Though it is my hope that these apologetic strategies do not founder due to considerations deriving from God s omnipotence or omniscience, it is not part of this thesis to show that this is so Stump, Eleonore. PPE, More generally, one might worry whether analogical reasoning about morality is legitimate in drawing conclusions about God s moral obligations. It is not my intent in this thesis to embark upon a detailed defense of such analogical reasoning; however, it bears noting that ensuing discussion is within the context of the problem of evil and the charge behind the problem of evil is partly driven by a willingness to use human moral intuitions to challenge God s perfect goodness. Thus, in drawing upon human moral intuitions in understanding God s goodness, I am following the lead of the atheist. Moreover, it is hard to see what one would use other than human moral intuitions in drawing conclusions about God s morality within a philosophical discussion.

17 17 IV. The Structure of this Thesis This thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter two provides a detailed account of Stump s position and her defense of GUS. The alleged Thomistic foundation of Stump s view is presented and a case is made for the prima facie attractiveness of GUS. In chapter three, I begin my critique of Stump s position by focusing upon her contention that GUS flows out of considerations of distributive justice. I argue that there is a disparity between what GUS imposes and what distributive justice mandates. Having articulated this disparity, I argue in chapter four that Stump s position further appears to diverge from its Thomistic foundation. In short, it is not evident that Aquinas would have accepted GUS. In chapter five, I attempt to broaden my case against GUS by showing that a diverse range of contemporary moral theories are committed to legitimate violations of it. There I will also return to the attractive features of GUS sketched in chapter two in order to show that the intuitive appeal of these features does not withstand critical scrutiny. My concluding chapter will assess the place of such a critique within the larger framework of the problem of evil. Principally, I will argue that even rephrasing the constraints of GUS in terms of God s charity as opposed to God s justice does not trump the central arguments of this thesis.

18 18 Chapter Two: The Nature of Divine Justice In Stump s account of God s goodness, she recognizes both similarities and differences between divine and human morality. This convergence and divergence is best conveyed in Stump s adoption of Aquinas s distinction between distributive and commutative justice. Aquinas explains this difference in the following: There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic v. 4) calls commutative justice, that directs exchange and the intercourse of business. This does not belong to God The other consists in distribution, and is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then the proper order displayed ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. 19 Commutative justice, according to Aquinas, does not belong to God since it pertains to relationships among equals. For instance, suppose you agree to paint someone s house for five hundred dollars. If you paint the house according to the owner s specifications but do not receive this amount, or received less, then you have a 19 Aquinas, Saint Thomas. ST I. q. 21, a.1. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Notre Dame: Ave Maria Press, 1981.

19 19 justified claim upon the owner for the agreed upon compensation. This claim upon the owner arises not only because of the existing contract, but because you have completed your portion of the contract. This is distinguished from distributive justice, which does not involve a relationship among equals. Rather, distributive justice concerns a relationship where one party has authority over others. It is not a relationship of mutual standing. In his explanation, Aquinas notes that human beings are subject to these types of relationships as well, and the family model provides a good illustration of this. A parent has authority over a child and the means to distribute goods such as food and clothes to the child. Monarchs and other political leaders also share this power to distribute to those under their authority. Similarly, distributive justice applies to God, since God has authority over humanity and the means to distribute goods to humanity. I. The Divine Good The good that God is ultimately concerned to distribute, however, is neither some particular finite good nor any combination of finite goods. Rather, the good that God distributes is the good of salvation, as noted by Stump. 20 Stump not only claims that in his dealings with human beings, God s ultimate aim [is] to unite them to himself in heaven, but she also claims that this union with God is the ultimate good for mankind. 21 She expounds upon this latter claim by comparing one s salvation, (as achieved by turning one s will towards God s), to the finite good of human health. 20 Stump, Eleonore. PPE Ibid. 58, 73.

20 20 the spiritual disease includes an unending loss of union with God and the perpetual torment of being left to one s sinful self; and the benefits of curing the will s disease are not a few more years of this life, with its painsand miseries, but an enduring life of fulfillment and joy. If we are willing to accept pain and degradation as a means to the benefits of physical health, we are in no position to rule out suffering as a means to the good of redemption. 22 That is not to say that finite goods play no role in turning the sufferer s will towards God s. In fact, Stump recognizes the possibility that, in particular circumstances, finite goods can serve this purpose. What must be emphasized, however, is that the distribution of finite goods cannot be one s exclusive or fundamental focus in deciding whether God distributes goods justly. Like Aquinas, Stump adopts these two notions of justice to help elucidate the moral agency of God. Stump follows Aquinas in claiming that distributive justice applies to both God and humanity; whereas, commutative justice applies to only humanity. God cannot enter into the sort of exchanges with his creatures on which notions of commutative justice are founded, because he is the creator of everything and therefore cannot be considered as equal to any of his creatures. Distributive justice, however, can be attributed to God. There are 22 Ibid. 73.

21 21 certain things due every creature in virtue of its condition and nature... That a creature has a certain nature or is in a certain condition may itself be a result of God s mercy; but once the creature is in a particular state, considerations of justice will require that it be dealt with in certain ways. 23 Thus, God s moral obligations, according to Stump, are not involved in the initial creation of human beings, since creation was a matter of God s mercy. Rather, God s moral obligations are consequent upon the creation of human beings. II. Restrictions Upon Divine Distribution: Stump s Defense of GUS According to Stump, there are three restrictions which the demands of justice impose upon God s promotion of human welfare. The first of these restrictions is that it would be unjust for God to directly and intentionally produce some evil as a means to a greater good. God permits an evil to occur just when he knows that he can providently direct things in such a way that allowing the evil to occur will be a greater good for the sufferer than preventing that evil. In this way, although God does not do evil in order to bring about good, Aquinas says, he does permit evils from which he can draw good Ibid Ibid. 64.

22 22 This is one of the reasons, Stump notes, that Aquinas s theory of morality cannot be reduced to mere consequentialism. To further support this claim, Stump advances the Thomistic view that, for an action to be morally good, both its object and end must be good. On Aquinas s view every action has an object, an end, and certain circumstances in which it is done. The object of an agent s action is the state of affairs the agent intends to bring about as a direct effect of the action. The object of an action is to be distinguished from the action s end. We might think of an action s object as what the agent intends to accomplish as a direct result of his action, and the end of the action as why he intends to accomplish it. 25 Thus, Stump claims that it is unjust for God to produce or allow some evil unless the object of the action is the prevention of greater suffering. when suffering is inflicted (or allowed) just for the sake of preventing some greater harm to the unwilling sufferer, the object of the action is not causing (or concurring in) some evil but rather causing (or concurring in) the lesser of two evils for the sufferer, when the greater will occur if the 25 Ibid

23 23 lesser does not. In such circumstances the object of the action is good even if the action involves inflicting (or allowing) suffering. 26 The degrees that Stump refers to in the above passage reflect her deep concern to respond to the problem of evil within the Judeo-Christian tradition. According to Stump, the primary purpose of human suffering is to help the sufferer return to God and eventually achieve salvation. If such suffering were not allowed, then the sufferer would be at risk of the much more severe harm of permanent alienation from God. Thus, the temporal suffering that one may endure on Earth is of little comparison to eternal punishment. The suffering on Earth would then be the lesser of these two evils. In this way, the suffering that God allows is compatible with God s moral goodness insofar as what is intended as the object of the action is maximizing the individual s opportunity for salvation. Yet, in order for the action to be good, both the action s object and end must be good, where the end of the action is the long-range goal the agent is pursuing. In the case of God s allowing some individual to endure suffering, the intended end of the action is to work for the ultimate salvation of the individual. Thus, for Stump, the object of God s action is giving the individual the best opportunity possible to transform her will and the end of the action is the individual s eventual salvation. I will now turn to Stump s second restriction regarding God s promotion of distributive justice; viz., the good which is drawn out of evil must benefit the individual 26 Ibid. 67.

24 24 who has experienced the undeserved suffering. This is the case even when the individual does not change his or her will as a result of the suffering. The opportunity to do so is itself a benefit to the sufferer, according to Stump, and satisfies God s moral obligation to the sufferer. since on Christian doctrine the ultimate good for persons is union with God, the suffering of any person will be justified if it brings that person nearer to the ultimate good in a way he could not have been without the suffering. 27 This restriction specifies that the sufferer must receive the good that is to be drawn from the suffering, when the good is thought to be one s opportunity for salvation. The third restriction that Stump believes is binding upon God specifies the nature of the relationship between the suffering and the good that is to come to the sufferer. Stump claims that the harm itself must be a necessary means or the best possible means in the circumstances to keep the sufferer from incurring even greater harm. 28 So, even if harm to a particular individual would decrease her likelihood of experiencing an even greater harm, if experiencing a certain amount of goodness would also accomplish this, then the harm in question is neither a necessary means nor the best possible means to this end. 27 Stump, Eleonore. The Problem of Evil 411, emphasis mine. 28 Stump, Eleonore. PPE 66.

25 25 Stump believes that distributive justice, as applied to God, entails these three restrictions which are binding upon God in cases of undeserved suffering. 29 Together, these three restrictions comprise what I will refer to as GUS. A general formulation of GUS may be found in Stump s following assertion. [O]ther things being equal, it seems morally permissible to allow someone to suffer involuntarily only in case doing so is a necessary means or the best possible means in the circumstances to keep the sufferer from incurring even greater harm. 30 III. Avoiding Possible Pitfalls In order to appreciate what Stump s defense has in its favor, it is important to consider and respond to several objections that might occur naturally upon first encountering her view. The first of these worries has to do with whether one s will is actually changed as a result of suffering. Particularly, one might wonder whether suffering is really an effective means to redemption given that there is no obvious correlation between an individual s suffering and her subsequent spiritual state. For all we can tell, there is as much reason to think that suffering drives individuals further from God as there is to believe it leads others to return to God. There are two possible 29 There are at least two different ways that suffering may be undeserved. It may be undeserved in the sense of moral desert, or it may be undeserved in terms of the care by which one engages in an activity. 30 Stump, Eleonore. PPE 66. The ceteris paribus clause which precedes the formulation will be discussed at greater length in chapter five.

26 26 responses to this contention. First, Stump acknowledges that such a change may be outwardly concealed, since the beneficial effects of any suffering may be a hidden part of the inner life of a person and not ever apparent in behavior. 31 Indeed, the spiritual life of an individual is a very private and personal matter, such that one ought to abstain from passing judgment of this sort on another. Secondly, Stump makes the much stronger claim that a change of one s will need not be even a necessary consequence of one s suffering. 32 This reinforces the notion that it is the good of the opportunity for salvation which is being distributed. Whether one s will is actually changed is ultimately a matter of human freedom. Thus, God might be justified in allowing one to suffer even if God s end is frustrated. This would be the case if allowing the lesser harm were God s best chance for leading a human being back to Him. Another possible pitfall to Stump s position is that, given her view of human freedom, it appears that the amount of evil in the world is a direct product of human freedom and not God s will. That is, suppose someone s will was not changed for the better as a result of that person s suffering. Suppose, rather, that what the sufferer wills becomes even more distant from God s will or, more specifically, that the sufferer inflicts suffering on others as a result of his or her own suffering. It would seem as though the amount of suffering in the world would then be significantly determined by human free will. But this, in turn, seems to be at odds with other aspects of Stump s view. To adopt it would mean that there is suffering that God does not will, as it is determined by human 31 Stump, Eleonore. PPE Ibid. 59.

27 27 moral agency. When this idea is applied to Stump s view, it not only allows for instances of suffering that are contrary to God s will, but it also commits the fatal error of suggesting that there are instances of undeserved suffering that lack the purpose of benefiting the sufferer. Stump addresses this concern by again appealing to Aquinas s philosophy. This time she draws upon his distinction between God s antecedent and consequent will. 33 Stump claims that the antecedent will is what God wills without the constraints of human will and action. What God consequently wills, on the other hand, is what God wills given certain conditions arising from human choices. 34 God s antecedent will and consequent will, however, do not conflict with each other. Both wills are directed towards drawing individuals closer to God. what God has ordained for his creatures insofar as it lies just in God himself to determine is what God is said to will in his antecedent will. But when a created person, because of some defect he introduces into himself, hinders himself from coming to the end God ordained for him, then God s willing nonetheless to bring that person to as much goodness as he is capable of (given the state of his will) is God s consequent will For Aquinas s distinction, see ST I. q. 19, a Stump, Eleonore. PPE Ibid.

28 28 So, if one should freely choose to inflict undeserved suffering upon another, the individual s choice is a product of human will. However, the extent to which the individual is successful in inflicting the suffering, or the degree to which the victim suffers, comprises God s consequent will and plays a role in God s divine plan. If the undeserved suffering fails to draw the sufferer closer to God, it must be, at least, the best possible means of doing so. Another worry one might have with Stump s contention that all undeserved suffering is salutary is the following: what are we to say of the suffering experienced by those who are already making an effort to align their wills to God s. On Stump s view, God is justified in allowing one to experience undeserved suffering only if it is the lesser of two evils. But the suffering would be the lesser of two evils only if the individual s will was such that eternal damnation is a live possibility, and it is hard to see how some devout theists would be in such a position. 36 There are two responses that Stump offers to this concern. The first response is one mentioned earlier: one could never be in position to know the spiritual health of another. The second is to suggest that the suffering experienced by the devout theist is a different experience than the suffering experienced by someone whose will is contrary to 36 Michael Tooley presents a more serious challenge along these lines in regard to animal suffering. It seems clear that an animal s suffering, (such as William Rowe s famous case of a fawn perishing in a forest fire), cannot be because the animal s will is to be drawn closer to God s will as in the human case. So, although Tooley grants that suffering must be compensated in order for God to be just he, unlike Stump, claims that suffering is not compensated and, thus, the morally good God of Christianity does not exist. See Tooley, Michael. An Argument from Evil. Philosophical Perspectives. 5. Philosophy of Religion Stump, or a supporter of GUS, might respond to this criticism by appealing along the Thomistic lines that God s justice towards human beings is significantly different than His justice towards non-human creatures (Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG) Bk. III. Chpt Trans. James F. Anderson. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975).

29 29 God s will. 37 This is because of the possibility that even a deeply religious person s faith and trust in God will strengthen in the course of his or her suffering. In such cases, the suffering does not throw God s benevolence into question for the sufferer; rather, it provides an instance in which the sufferer is able to exemplify that her faith and trust in God will not be so easily shaken. In the extreme case of martyrs, Stump notes, what is glorious about martyrs is not something extrinsic to them, conferred on them by God like a medal for valor, but something intrinsic in their nature itself. 38 In this way, suffering is just another avenue by which the martyr may uphold his or her strong personal convictions. Another important criticism that Stump addresses is the question of whether morality is, in any way, undermined by the assertion that all suffering is of benefit to the sufferer. If all instances of suffering must be of benefit to the sufferer, then it seems that there would be no moral obligation to help another who is suffering, when one has the means to provide such help. 39 Stump claims that this view is mistaken. Assuming that one is inclined to help alleviate the suffering of another, then not doing so because she believes that there must be some greater good in that instance of suffering is discredited for two reasons. First, such a view fails to appreciate the fact that God may will that one help alleviate the suffering of another. In fact, it may be God s will that one is witnessing this suffering and has the inclination and the means to alleviate such suffering. Secondly, 37 Stump, Eleonore. PPE Ibid William Hasker mentions this objection to Stump s view in his article The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil as found in Faith and Philosophy. 9 (1). Jan

30 30 this kind of reasoning also fails to appreciate the distinction between what an individual intends and what actually occurs. As noted earlier, Stump claims that God s plan is not discounted when we try to alleviate suffering since God ultimately determines the degree to which we are successful. 40 Our lack of knowledge regarding specific instances of suffering and their possible benefits is insufficient to justify us in allowing such suffering to continue. although God might be justified in allowing an evil to occur or to continue when he could stop it, we generally would not be, not because God has rights with respect to his creatures which we as fellow creatures do not have, but rather because God in his omniscience has the information necessary for being justified in permitting evil, and we do not. it is clear that in trying to alleviate suffering we do not interfere with God s plan of redemption since whether we are successful in alleviating that suffering is up to God Stump, Eleonore. PPE Ibid.

31 31 IV. GUS s Appeal While Stump does not argue for GUS at length, leaving her case for it on a largely intuitive basis, in this section I would like to push the argument further than she by speculating as to the foundation of the intuitive appeal of GUS. Specifically, I will suggest that GUS is prima facie appealing because the three restrictions it advances give content to the belief that God respects the dignity of each individual. Because the sufferer must derive a benefit from undeserved suffering, respect for the individual is secured by the suggestion that God is somehow wronging the individual should God use her suffering as a means to help another or for some other greater good that has no benefit to her. In the history of moral philosophy, this idea is most closely associated with Immanuel Kant who claimed, rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves, i.e., as something which is not to be used merely as means. 42 Kant s reason for this was that persons are objects of respect by virtue of their rational wills. While the notion of respect for personhood is commonly associated with Kantian morality, a similar view can be found in the thought of Aquinas. Aquinas explicitly notes that rational creatures have a unique standing in the following passage from his Summa Contra Gentiles. [T]he very way in which the intellectual creature was made, according as it is master of its acts, demands providential care whereby this creature may provide for itself, on its own behalf; while the way in which other things were 42 Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. James W. Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing II

32 32 created, things which have no dominion over their acts, shows this fact, that they are cared for, not for their own sake, but as subordinated to others. That which is moved only by another being has the formal character of an instrument, but that which acts of itself has the essential character of a principal agent. Now, an instrument is not valued for its own sake, but as useful to a principal agent. Hence it must be that all the careful work that is devoted to instruments is actually done for the sake of the agent, as for an end, but what is done for the principal agent, either by himself or by another, is for his own sake, because he is the principal agent. Therefore, intellectual creatures are so controlled by God, as objects of care for their own sakes; while other creatures are subordinated, as it were, to the rational creatures. 43 Because Stump s position is inspired by Aquinas s philosophy, it is thus no stretch that it is the intrinsic importance of rational creatures that is the motivation behind the three restrictions found in GUS. Indeed, the idea that Stump confines God s distributive justice to His relationship with humanity, rather than to sentient beings in general, 43 Aquinas, Saint Thomas. SCG Bk. III, Chap. 112.

33 33 assumes the priority that Aquinas advocated. 44 I will return to this intuitive force behind GUS in chapter five, indicating why I believe God s respect for the dignity of each human being does not (contrary to initial impressions) commit God to upholding GUS. V. Conclusion In this chapter, I have presented Stump s view that a satisfactory response to the problem of evil must recognize that God is bound by the demands of distributive justice in his treatment of human beings. We have also seen that Stump argues for certain constraints upon how God may promote the good of His creatures. Specifically, Stump contends that there are three restrictions upon God s moral responsibility in regard to undeserved human suffering. First, she claims that it would be unjust for God to intentionally inflict evil as a means to a greater good. Second, she argues that it would be unjust to allow undeserved evil to befall one individual when the entire justification for doing so is the promotion of another s welfare. Third, she claims that the suffering allowed must be the best possible means to keep the sufferer from experiencing even greater harm. In the next two chapters, I will present my critique of GUS. More specifically, in the following chapter, I argue that there is a disparity between the requirements of distributive justice, the kind of justice applicable to God as an authoritative agent, and the moral constraints imposed upon God by GUS. The significance of this disparity will be 44 This is made explicit in Stump s assertion that the good which is distributed by God is the opportunity for salvation. Acknowledging that this opportunity relies upon one s will, it becomes clear that Stump believes that only human beings may engage in this type of relationship with God.

34 34 illustrated through the use of analogies which suggest that God s distributive justice may be maintained in cases where there are clear violations of GUS. In chapter four, I extend my critique beyond analogies, and argue that even Aquinas s own natural law theory is open to violations of GUS.

35 35 Chapter Three: Distributive Justice and Its Role in God s Moral Agency It was noted in chapter two that Stump takes God s moral agency to entail distributive, but not commutative justice. This is because God, as a moral agent, has a degree of moral responsibility in virtue of His unique relationship to humanity. Since God is the Creator of humanity, His power over human beings is subject to principles of justice applicable to authoritative moral agents. This kind of justice, distributive, concerns the responsibility authoritative agents have towards those under their jurisdiction. In this chapter, I will further analyze distributive justice in order to show that there is a disparity between what is required by GUS and what is required by distributive justice. To help elucidate this disparity, I will focus upon two claims. First, I will argue that distributive justice does not require the authoritative agent to compensate individuals for all undeserved harms. Second, I contend that making the demands of distributive justice applicable to God provides positive grounds for concluding that it is morally permissible to allow a person to suffer for the sake of others. 45 The third and fourth sections of this chapter will address these two concerns, respectively. The case to be made in these sections depends, however, on having in place a more detailed account of the nature of divine distributive justice. Providing such an account is the task to which I now turn. 45 I do not wish to be advocating that God does, indeed, do this. In fact, I hope that God s omnipotence and omniscience enables Him to bring it about that human beings are always compensated for undeserved suffering. Rather, I am only claiming that God s doing so is not a requirement of justice.